Access and Phenomenal Consciousness
General Introduction to Access and Phenomenal Consciousness
The lecture (Section ) focuses on the critical distinction between qualia—also known as phenomenal consciousness or "what it is like"—and other cognitive functions of the mind.
While the distinction may seem clear once understood, it is frequently a point of confusion for students who conflate the qualitative sense of consciousness with its functional applications.
The primary framework for this lecture is derived from Ned Block’s influential article, which distinguishes between Access Consciousness and Phenomenal Consciousness.
Access Consciousness (A-Consciousness)
Definition: Access consciousness refers to a conscious state that is available for the direct control of thought and action.
Functional Characteristics:
It is the state of being conscious in a way that allows the information to be used in reasoning.
It enables the formation of memories and the making of decisions or judgments.
It serves as the explanation for why an agent takes a specific action (e.g., "I moved because I saw the car coming").
Usage: In everyday language, when people use the word "consciousness," they are often referring to access consciousness.
Phenomenal Consciousness (P-Consciousness)
Definition: Phenomenal consciousness is the qualitative experience of a state; there is "something it is like" to be in that state.
Core Concept: This is synonymous with qualia. It is the raw feel of an experience—the redness of red, the smell of a rose, or the specific sensation of pain.
Importance to Philosophy: P-consciousness is the specific type of consciousness that creates the "mind-body problem," as it is difficult to explain how physical brain states produce qualitative feels.
Case Study: Access Consciousness Without Phenomenal Consciousness (Blind Sight)
The Phenomenon of Blind Sight: This is a rare condition resulting from an injury to the part of the brain that processes visual information (the visual cortex), even though the eyes and optic nerves remains perfectly healthy.
Clinical Presentation:
Typically, an injury to the left side of the brain affects vision on the right side of the visual field.
If the patient's working eye is covered, they report total blindness in the affected field. They state that "everything has gone black" and they have no visual experience whatsoever.
The Paradox of Accurate Guessing:
Despite reporting no visual experience, if asked to guess how many fingers a researcher is holding up in their "blind" field, the patient will guess correctly with a frequency significantly higher than chance.
Patients may also respond to stimuli by flinching or moving away from an object coming at them from the blind side, even though they cannot explain why they are responding.
Conclusion: Blind sight is cited as a potential real-world case where information is "access conscious" (available to drive behavioral responses and guesses) but not "phenomenally conscious" (the patient has no qualitative visual experience).
Phenomenal Consciousness Without Access Consciousness
The "Autopilot" Driving Example (Jaiwon Kim)
Scenario: A driver intends to go to a party, but the route starts on the same freeway they take to work every day.
The Experience: While driving, the person is deeply immersed in thought—for instance, thinking about Jaiwon Kim’s book on the philosophy of mind and the distinction between A-consciousness and P-consciousness.
The Outcome: The driver performs all necessary actions safely (staying in the lane, stopping at lights, turning) but does so on "autopilot." They eventually realize they have pulled into their parking space at work instead of going to the party.
Implication: The driver had phenomenal experiences of the road (they had to see the road to drive), but those experiences were not "access conscious" enough to interrupt their train of thought or alert them that they were taking the wrong exit.
Waking from Anesthesia or Deep Sleep
Scenario: A person waking up from surgery or a very deep sleep may experience a period before they are fully "awake" in the functional sense.
The Experience: The person feels drowsiness, discomfort, or mild disorientation. They do not yet have thoughts like "I am awake" or "I am a self," and they lack motor control to take action.
The Memory: Later, when fully conscious, the person can remember what it was "like" to be in that state.
Implication: This represents P-consciousness (the raw sensation of discomfort and drowsiness) without A-consciousness (the ability to make judgments or control actions at the time).
Unconscious Desires and Subliminal Messaging
Freudian Desires: Taking the idea of unconscious desires seriously, one might have a desire (an experience) that drives behavior but is not available for reflection, judgment, or articulation. In this sense, the desire is P-conscious but not A-conscious.
Subliminal Messaging: An image flashed for a split second is recorded phenomenally (one must have an experience of it for it to register). However, the duration is so short that the person cannot form a judgment about it or even notice it happened. While it may influence later irrational behavior, it never becomes access conscious.
Hypothetical Anesthetics Comparison
To further clarify the distinction, the lecture proposes two hypothetical (not real-market) anesthetics:
Anesthetic 1 (Access with partial Phenomenal): This drug prevents the sensation of pain but does not knock the patient out. The patient can observe the surgery and remember exactly what happened (A-conscious), but they lack the specific P-conscious experience of pain.
Anesthetic 2 (Phenomenal without Access): This drug allows the patient to feel every sensation—the knife cutting, the saw grinding—creating a torturous experience. However, the patient has no capacity to reflect on the pain, cannot form the thought "I am in pain," and forms no memories. Upon waking, the patient thinks the surgery was quick and remembers nothing.
Access Consciousness and Representation
Kim’s View on Moods: Jaiwon Kim argues that moods (e.g., feeling "down in the dumps" or generally "upbeat") cannot be access conscious because they lack representational content.
Representational Content defined: To represent something, a state must have "satisfaction conditions"—something in the world that makes the state accurate or inaccurate, correct or incorrect.
The Debate:
Kim questions what would make a raw mood accurate or mistaken.
The lecturer disputes this, suggesting that moods can factor into rational decisions. For example, being afraid can be rational or irrational depending on the object of fear.
A mood like being "upbeat" could represent the world or one's life as being generally "good." This implies that "goodness" or "badness" are properties that can be represented, though this is a controversial philosophical claim.
Theoretical Implications and Worries
Sharpness of the Distinction: The lecturer expresses concern about how sharp the distinction between A and P consciousness truly is. Most examples involve being "fully one" but only "partially the other."
Degrees of Awareness: Consciousness often comes in degrees of focus and awareness. Even in a waking state, many P-conscious sensations (like the feeling of one's foot on the ground) are not currently A-conscious because they are not being attended to.
Problem for Functionalism: The core utility of the distinction is to highlight that Functionalism effectively explains access consciousness (how the mind processes and uses information) but fails to account for the nature of phenomenal consciousness (the qualitative experience itself).
Transition: This leads into the final lecture of the section, , regarding theories of consciousness.