LGLS cases
Fletcher v. Peck (1810) — Contract Clause / State Law Limits
Facts / Background
In 1795, the Georgia legislature passed a land grant giving ~35 million acres (present-day Alabama and Mississippi) to four companies for $500,000.
The grant was obtained through widespread bribery of legislators; company representatives promised legislators shares in the land if they voted for the bill.
Innocent third parties, like Robert Fletcher, later purchased portions of this land, including 15,000 acres from John Peck in 1803. Peck’s deed included covenants assuring legal title.
In 1796, a newly elected Georgia legislature rescinded the 1795 grant due to corruption and public outrage, declaring the sale void.
Legal Question
Can a state legislature cancel a land grant it previously made—even when innocent third parties have since purchased the land—without violating the U.S. Constitution?
Holding / Supreme Court Decision
No. The 1796 rescinding act was unconstitutional.
The Court ruled that once a land grant creates a valid contract and transfers ownership, the state cannot impair it—even if the original grant was corrupt.
Reasoning
Contract Clause (Article I, Section 10): No state may pass a law impairing the obligation of contracts.
Innocent purchasers (like Peck) are protected; they had no involvement in prior corruption and paid fair value.
While the legislature could cancel corrupt acts prospectively, it cannot retroactively void vested property rights.
Georgia, as a state in the Union, is bound by the Constitution; state law cannot override federal constitutional protections.
Chief Justice John Marshall emphasized legal protections over notions of “natural justice” or fairness, avoiding personal or political considerations.
Key Points / Takeaways
State corruption does not justify impairing vested contracts.
Protects innocent third parties in transactions.
Reinforces supremacy of the Constitution over state acts.
Establishes a strong precedent for the Contract Clause: contracts executed under state law cannot be arbitrarily voided.
Illustrates tension between natural justice/fairness vs. strict constitutional protections.
Context / Exam Notes
At the time, Georgia needed money post-Revolution but mismanaged land sales.
Land along the Yazoo River was valuable for cotton; few settlers lived west of the state.
James Gunn and others profited by buying and selling shares of the land, but innocent purchasers like Peck were not involved in the fraud.
This case reinforced that legal certainty and protection of contracts outweigh retrospective claims of corruption or public outrage.
✅ Exam Tip: Focus on:
Article I, Section 10 (Contract Clause)
Innocent third-party protection
Supreme Court as guardian of the Constitution against state violations
Chief Justice Marshall’s avoidance of deciding based on “natural justice”
Facts / Background
James Dale, a former Eagle Scout and assistant scoutmaster, had his adult membership revoked by the Boy Scouts of America (BSA) when the organization discovered that:
Dale was homosexual
Dale was a gay rights activist
In 1992, Dale filed suit against the Boy Scouts, claiming the BSA violated New Jersey's public accommodations law, which prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation in places of public accommodation.
The Boy Scouts argued:
Homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the values they seek to instill in young people
BSA is a private, not-for-profit organization, not a traditional public accommodation
Lower courts:
New Jersey Superior Court: Public accommodations law inapplicable; BSA protected by First Amendment expressive association
Appellate Division: Public accommodations law did apply, BSA violated it by revoking Dale’s membership; rejected BSA’s federal constitutional claims
New Jersey Supreme Court:
Application of the law did not violate First Amendment
Reinstating Dale did not compel BSA to express any message
Additional context:
Dale had been bullied in a military school in New Jersey
He came out while at Rutgers University and was terminated as assistant scoutmaster due to sexual orientation
BSA founded in England; had traditional values to uphold
Representation: Dale met with Evan Wolfson
Legal Question
Does applying New Jersey’s public accommodations law violate the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment right of expressive association to bar homosexuals from serving as troop leaders?
Supreme Court Holding
Yes.
In a 5–4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held:
“Applying New Jersey’s public accommodations law to require the Boy Scouts to admit Dale violates the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment right of expressive association.”
The ruling effectively gives the Boy Scouts a constitutional right to bar homosexuals from serving as troop leaders
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote:
BSA asserts that homosexual conduct is inconsistent with its values
A gay troop leader’s presence would force the organization to send a message, signaling acceptance of homosexual conduct as legitimate
Evidence / Key Points
Memo: BSA relied heavily on internal memoranda to support its position
Demonstrated how BSA interpreted its mission and values
Homosexuality considered not a public-facing issue, but relevant to internal leadership selection
BSA selects leaders based on:
Moral and character criteria (e.g., “morally straight and clean”)
Alignment with the organization’s mission and values
Local communities retain discretion over openly gay scoutmasters
Past memoranda were critical evidence; without them, BSA may have lost
Social / Political Context
Highly controversial case
Many nature and youth organizations withdrew funding from BSA after the decision
States and communities debated the moral implications of allowing gay leaders
After Kelo v. New London and other rights cases, similar tensions emerged regarding balancing individual rights vs. organizational/collective values
Both Dale and BSA felt something they cherished would be taken from them
Takeaways
First Amendment expressive association can protect private organizations from state anti-discrimination laws when inclusion would affect the organization’s expressive message
Membership standards may include internal moral or value-based criteria
Internal evidence, like memoranda, can be decisive in proving organizational purpose
The case highlights the tension between anti-discrimination laws and freedom of association
Insular Cases (1901–1922)
What the Insular Cases Actually Are
The Insular Cases are a cluster of Supreme Court cases decided between 1901 and 1922 that address how the U.S. Constitution applies to territories acquired after the 1898 Spanish-American War, including Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Hawaii. Before these cases, it wasn’t clear whether constitutional rights automatically applied in newly acquired territories, especially ones not on a path to statehood.
The Insular Cases establish three core principles:
The U.S. can distinguish between incorporated territories (on a path to statehood) and unincorporated territories (not on a path to statehood).
The Constitution does not fully apply to unincorporated territories; only some rights are automatic.
Only fundamental rights apply automatically; other rights can apply if Congress explicitly extends them.
Other important points:
Congress can treat unincorporated territories differently.
Jury trials and unanimous juries were treated as procedural, not fundamental.
Justice Harlan dissented in multiple cases, arguing the Constitution should apply fully wherever the U.S. governs.
The doctrine was heavily influenced by racial and imperial assumptions.
Some rulings from the Insular Cases are still cited today, though controversially.
Alaska was treated as incorporated (on a path to full constitutional rights), whereas Puerto Rico and the Philippines were treated as permanently unincorporated.
These cases allowed the U.S. to govern territories without granting full constitutional protections, a system later criticized as racist but still operative in some respects.
1. Downes v. Bidwell (1901) — The Foundation Case
Background / Facts:
After the Spanish-American War, the U.S. acquired Puerto Rico. Congress imposed a tariff on goods coming from Puerto Rico to the mainland U.S., even though the Constitution generally forbids tariffs within the United States.
Procedural History:
Merchants challenged the tariff, arguing that Puerto Rico should be treated like any other part of the U.S. and thus immune from internal tariffs.
Issue:
Does the Constitution fully apply to newly acquired territories like Puerto Rico? In other words, is Puerto Rico “the United States” for constitutional purposes?
Holding / Decision:
The Supreme Court held no. Puerto Rico is an unincorporated territory, meaning it is not part of the U.S. “for all constitutional purposes,” and Congress may treat it differently.
Reasoning:
The Court distinguished between incorporated territories, which are on a path to statehood and enjoy full constitutional rights, and unincorporated territories, which only receive certain rights.
Full constitutional protections do not automatically apply to territories acquired by conquest or treaty unless Congress provides them.
Why it matters:
Downes v. Bidwell creates the Insular Cases doctrine.
It sets the precedent that the U.S. can govern territories without granting full constitutional protections, providing legal justification for differential treatment.
2. Hawaii v. Mankichi (1903) — Defining Fundamental Rights
Background / Facts:
Hawaii, then a U.S. territory, prosecuted Mankichi for murder. He was convicted by a non-unanimous jury and without a grand jury indictment, both of which would violate the Constitution if applied fully.
Procedural History:
Mankichi appealed, claiming that his trial violated the constitutional guarantees of jury unanimity and grand jury indictment.
Issue:
Do constitutional jury protections (unanimity and grand jury) automatically apply in unincorporated territories?
Holding / Decision:
No. Jury unanimity and grand jury protections are procedural, not fundamental, and do not automatically apply in unincorporated territories.
Reasoning:
Only fundamental rights apply automatically in unincorporated territories.
Other procedural rights apply only if Congress extends them.
Why it matters:
Introduces the fundamental vs. non-fundamental rights distinction, which becomes central to the Insular Cases.
Confirms that Congress has discretion over which constitutional protections apply in territories.
3. Dorr v. United States (1904) — Jury Trials Are Not Fundamental
Background / Facts:
Fred Dorr, in the Philippines, published a newspaper criticizing the U.S. colonial government. He was charged with seditious libel and demanded a jury trial, arguing that it was his constitutional right.
Procedural History:
Dorr argued that denial of a jury trial violated his rights under the U.S. Constitution.
Issue:
Is the right to a jury trial a fundamental constitutional right that applies automatically in territories?
Holding / Decision:
No. The Philippines, as an unincorporated territory, does not automatically guarantee jury trials. Congress decides whether procedural rights like jury trials apply.
Reasoning:
Jury trials are procedural, not fundamental, and need not be provided unless Congress grants them.
Reflects Court’s belief that jury trials were not suited to colonial populations, a reasoning later criticized as racist.
Why it matters:
Confirms and strengthens the Mankichi ruling
Reinforces the fundamental vs. non-fundamental distinction
Shows how procedural rights can be selectively applied in territories
4. Weems v. United States (1910) — Limits on Punishment / Living Constitution
Background / Facts:
Weems was convicted in the Philippines for falsifying a document and sentenced to cadena temporal, which included:
Years of hard labor
Shackles
Loss of civil rights
Weems challenged his sentence as cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
Procedural History:
Appealed, arguing that the punishment violated fundamental constitutional protections.
Issue:
Does the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment apply in unincorporated territories?
Holding / Decision:
Yes. The punishment was unconstitutional. The Court recognized that “cruel and unusual” is not frozen in 1791 and must adapt to evolving standards.
Reasoning:
Some rights, like protection against cruel punishment, are fundamental and cannot be denied even in territories.
Constitution’s meaning can evolve over time, allowing protections to adapt to contemporary standards.
Why it matters:
Limits the harshness of the Insular Cases doctrine
Introduces a living Constitution concept within territories
Shows that fundamental rights still restrain government power
How These Four Fit Together (Exam Gold)
Narrative Context / Notes:
Territories = different treatment than states; not all rights automatically apply
Only fundamental rights automatically apply in unincorporated territories
Congress decides whether procedural/non-fundamental rights apply
Court reasoning shaped by racial & imperial assumptions
Cases like Weems show there are limits—some rights are so basic they cannot be denied, even in colonies
1. Marbury v. Madison (1803) — Judicial Review
Background / Facts:
William Marbury was appointed a justice of the peace, and his commission was signed but not delivered. He petitioned the Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus ordering Secretary of State James Madison to deliver it.
Key Questions the Court Considered:
Did Marbury have a right to the commission? → Yes
If he had a right and it was violated, did the laws provide a remedy? → Yes
Could the Supreme Court issue that remedy (mandamus)? → No
Holding / Decision:
The Supreme Court held that it could not issue the writ, because the statute granting that power conflicted with the Constitution.
Reasoning:
The Constitution is supreme over ordinary acts of Congress.
When a law conflicts with the Constitution, courts must enforce the Constitution.
This case established judicial review: the Supreme Court can declare laws unconstitutional.
Why it matters:
Courts can nullify acts of Congress that violate the Constitution.
The principle of judicial review is a cornerstone of limited government and the rule of law. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction according to the Constitution. If Congress could add its own terms, then why would the framers set out specific grounds? If Congress could add grounds about mandamus, then Congress would amend the Constitution whenever it liked. If Congress always does this, then the Constitution is no longer the fundamental law. What should the Court do? Even Congress is limited by the Constitution. It must abide by these laws. The Court gives effect to the Constitution, not Congress. Judicial review is now established. How can reason have power behind it? Reason equals power—it must appeal to individual reasoning.
2. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge (1837)
Background / Facts:
Charles River Bridge Company had a charter from the Massachusetts legislature to build a bridge. They claimed exclusive rights, arguing Warren Bridge (built later) violated their monopoly.
Warren Bridge charged a lower toll or eventually was free.
Issue:
Does a grant of rights to one private company prevent the state from chartering a competing bridge in the public interest?
Holding / Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Warren Bridge.
Reasoning:
The original charter did not explicitly grant a monopoly.
Public interest comes before private contracts when not explicitly limited.
The Court favored economic development and public benefit over corporate exclusivity.
Why it matters:
Established that charters should be construed narrowly.
Reinforced that government can act for the public good even when private interests exist.
3. Hawaii v. Midkiff (1984) — Eminent Domain and Public Purpose
Background / Facts:
Hawaii had a concentration of land ownership by a few private landowners, descendants of the king.
The state used eminent domain to redistribute land more evenly.
Issue:
Is redistributing private land via eminent domain constitutional if it serves a public purpose?
Holding / Decision:
The Supreme Court upheld the law, ruling it served a public purpose.
Reasoning:
Reducing oligopoly in land ownership benefits the public.
Government action to promote economic fairness can justify eminent domain.
Why it matters:
Confirms that eminent domain can be used for public purposes beyond traditional uses like roads or schools.
Focus is on principle, not individual outcomes (redistribution may have unintended effects like hoarding, but the Court focused on legality).
4. Hobbes and Locke — Philosophical Foundations of Government
Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679)
Context:
Lived through the English Civil War: chaos, violence, collapse of order.
State of Nature:
Humans are roughly equal, but scarcity + fear → competition.
Life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”
Social Contract:
People give up almost all freedoms to a sovereign.
Sovereign has absolute power to make/enforce laws.
People owe obedience except when life is directly threatened.
Analogy (Exam Gold):
Cashews vs. peaches example: without authority, theft and violence dominate.
Carl Schmitt → Hobbes: strong sovereign decides in emergencies; order over law.
John Locke (1632–1704)
State of Nature:
Humans are free and equal.
Natural rights: life, liberty, property.
Problem:
Rights exist, but enforcement is unreliable; people are biased in disputes.
Social Contract:
Government exists to protect pre-existing rights.
Power is limited; people can overthrow abusive government.
Analogy:
Locke → Marbury v. Madison: limited government, Constitution above rulers, law restrains power.
Key Contrast:
5. Meyer v. Nebraska (1923)
Background / Facts:
Nebraska banned teaching foreign languages to children in early grades.
Meyer, a teacher, was convicted for violating this law.
Issue:
Does a state exceed its police power by restricting cultural/educational freedom?
Holding / Decision:
Yes, the law violated liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Reasoning:
Liberty includes: education, family, culture, religion, marriage, work.
Police power exists to protect public welfare, but cannot exceed its bounds.
Why it matters:
Establishes substantive due process for personal freedoms.
Shows courts protecting individual liberty against overly broad state regulation.
6. Kelo v. City of New London (2005) — Eminent Domain for Economic Development
Background / Facts:
New London, Connecticut planned a redevelopment project in a distressed area (waterfront, shops, offices).
Suzette Kelo refused to sell her home (“Little Pink House”) to the city.
Kelo and neighbors filed a class-action lawsuit.
Issue:
Can the government use eminent domain to take private property for economic development?
Holding / Decision:
Yes, in a 5–4 ruling, taking property for economic development qualifies as a public use under the Fifth Amendment if it serves a public purpose.
Reasoning:
Public purpose includes revitalization, economic growth, increasing tax base.
Courts defer to government plans with holistic benefits to community.
Impact:
Controversial: sparked state-level reforms to limit eminent domain.
Principle: public use is broad, but Kelo motivated protective legislation for private property.
7. Cohen v. California (1971) — Offensive Speech / First Amendment
Background / Facts:
Cohen wore a jacket reading “F* the Draft**” in a Los Angeles courthouse.
Charged under Cal. Penal Code §415, which prohibits disturbing the peace with offensive conduct.
Issue:
Does prohibiting offensive speech like this violate First and Fourteenth Amendments?
Holding / Decision:
Yes. The word itself is not criminal, and no one was threatened.
Reasoning:
First Amendment does not give absolute protection, but limits on “fighting words” do not apply here.
Government cannot shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it.
Famous line: “One man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.”
Why it matters:
Protects offensive political speech.
Clarifies limits of state power to censor non-threatening expression.
Facts of the case
In 1795, the Georgia legislature passed an act granting approximately 35 million acres of land in present-day Alabama and Mississippi to four companies, including the Georgia Company, for $500,000. The grant was procured through widespread bribery of legislators, with company representatives promising legislators shares in the land if they voted for the bill. In 1796, a newly elected Georgia legislature, responding to public outrage over the corruption, passed an act rescinding the 1795 grant, declaring it null and void, and directing that all records of the original act be expunged. However, before the rescinding act, innocent third parties had already purchased portions of the land. Robert Fletcher purchased 15,000 acres from John Peck in 1803, with Peck's deed containing covenants that Georgia had authority to sell the land and that the title had not been constitutionally impaired by any subsequent act of the legislature.
Fletcher subsequently sued Peck in the U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts, alleging breach of these covenants based on the corruption in the original grant and Georgia's 1796 rescinding act. The circuit court ruled in favor of Peck on all counts, finding that the pleas were sufficient and that Georgia was seised in fee simple of the lands at the time of the original grant. Fletcher brought a writ of error to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Question
Can a state government cancel land grants it previously made, even when innocent third parties have since purchased the land?
Conclusion
A state legislature cannot rescind a land grant made by a previous legislature, even if the original grant was obtained through corruption, because such a rescission would violate the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Chief Justice John Marshall authored the unanimous 4-2 majority opinion of the Court.
The Contract Clause prohibits states from passing any law "impairing the Obligation of Contracts," and a land grant from a state to private purchasers constitutes a binding contract that vests absolute property rights in the grantees. Once Georgia conveyed the land through the 1795 act, it created a contract that transferred complete ownership to the purchasers, and the state's rights to the property were entirely extinguished. The fact that the original grant may have been procured through bribery or corruption does not change this constitutional protection, as innocent third-party purchasers who bought the land without knowledge of the corruption have legitimate vested rights that cannot be destroyed by subsequent legislative action.
Furthermore, the Constitution's Contract Clause applies to contracts made by states themselves, not just private contracts, and states cannot exempt themselves from this constitutional limitation by claiming sovereign authority. While legislatures generally have broad powers to repeal their own acts, they cannot undo a completed contract that has already conveyed property rights, as this would retroactively destroy vested interests in violation of fundamental principles of law and the constitutional protection of contracts. The 1796 rescinding act was therefore void as an unconstitutional impairment of contract obligations.
Justice William Johnson authored a concurring opinion, agreeing with the result but basing his reasoning on general principles of law rather than specifically on the Contract Clause.