Tough Love Multilateralism – Comprehensive Study Notes

Introduction / Context

• Author: Bruce W. Jentleson (Director, Terry Sanford Institute, Duke University; former State Department Policy Planning Staff; adviser to Al Gore)
• Article: “Tough Love Multilateralism,” The Washington Quarterly, Winter $2003$–$04$ (Vol. $27:1$, pp. $7$–$24$)
• Core problem: U.S. foreign-policy debate polarized between
  • Unilateralists / Neoconservatives – celebrate U.S. unipolar dominance, dismiss multilateralism as naïve/weak.
  • Multilateralists – have exposed flaws of unilateralism but failed to articulate a credible, realistic, force-inclusive alternative.
• Central weakness hampering multilateralists: credibility on the use of military force (will + capability).

Dual Dynamics of Paradigms

• Broad paradigms shape specific policies and specific issue outcomes reshape paradigms.
• Key agenda items feeding the unilateralism–multilateralism frame:
  • United Nations’ overall role
  • Global environmental regimes (Kyoto Protocol)
  • International Criminal Court (ICC)
  • Arms control & non-proliferation
  • Use of force (most decisive litmus test)

Post-$9/11$ Setting & Iraq Case Study

• May $1, 2003$: President George W. Bush’s “Top Gun” landing on USS Abraham Lincoln — declared end of “major combat operations.”
  • Generated “shock & awe” domestic approval; boosted unilateralist confidence.
• Subsequent realities:
  • Unilateral post-war strategy in Iraq: more difficult, dangerous, expensive than advertised.
  • Afghanistan stabilization faltering (Taliban/Al Qaeda resurgence).
  • Liberia & other humanitarian crises evoke Rwanda/Bosnia/Kosovo debates on intervention.
• Result: U.S. foreign-policy debate more open than any time in recent memory.
  • Polls by Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) & others: public more attentive globally; no drift to isolationism; voters “ready to listen to alternatives.”

Strengths Multilateralists Should Emphasize

1. Realism & Match of Means to Problems

• Global threats (terrorism, WMD proliferation, pandemics) exceed any single nation’s capacity ➔ multilateral cooperation a necessity, not idealism.
• Comparative advantage logic (from trade economics): different states, IGOs, NGOs contribute unique capacities.
• Benefits of multilateralism:
  • Burden sharing (political legitimacy, financial cost, sustained commitment).
  • Enhanced legitimacy: international norms create “permissive conditions for action” (Finnemore quote).
  • Example: Counter-terrorism successes (intelligence sharing, border security, finance tracking) are multilateral but low-profile.

2. Power vs. Influence

• Distinction: Power = resources/capabilities; Influence = ability to get others to do what you want.
• Kissinger $2001$ warning: overt predominance unites others against U.S.
• Declining global image (Pew polls) erodes U.S. soft power (Nye) and thus tangible influence.
• Iraq diplomacy illustrates gap: German, South-Korean, Turkish, Indian domestic politics blocked cooperation; U.S. power ≠ guaranteed compliance.

Core Challenge: Multilateralist Credibility on Force

• Historical baggage: Somalia, Bosnia early $1990$s; perception UN & Clinton’s “pin-prick” minimalism failed.
• Rice $2000$ critique: Democrats rely on humanitarian or “international community” interests over national interest.
• Four inter-related axes multilateralists must nail down: When, Why, Who Decides, How.

A. WHEN to Use Force

• Force should never be first resort but cannot always be absolute last resort.
• ICISS “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) report ($2001$):
  • Permits anticipatory action when “evidence of likely large-scale killing.”
  • Aligns with Bush Doctrine statement (West Point $2002$): waiting for threats to fully materialize means “waiting too long.”
• Moral/strategic cost of last-resort rigidity: Rwanda $1994$, Bosnia $1992$–$95$, proliferation, entrenched terror networks.

B. WHY Force Is Legitimate

• Sovereignty conveys responsibilities as well as rights.
  • Annan $1998$: UN Charter issued “in the name of the peoples, not the governments.”
• ICISS: If a state “cannot or will not” protect populations, external intervention warranted.
• Feinstein & Slaughter: extend duty to prevent WMD acquisition by states lacking internal constraints; parallel logic for state-sponsored terrorism.

C. WHO DECIDES on Force

• Security Council holds “unique legitimacy,” yet credibility erodes if paralysis persists.
• Annan $1999$ & $2003$: Council betrays ideals if it stands by during “crimes against humanity.”
• ICISS tough love: when Council fails, expect states to bypass it.
• Persistent dilemma: mired Council vs. dangerous precedents of unilateral action.

Security-Council Reform Issues

• Expansion of permanent membership necessary for legitimacy (global South inclusion) but risks decision-making gridlock.
• Thomas Weiss caution: UN often obsesses over process > consequences.
• U.S. position: open to expansion, opposes stripping/extending veto.
• Ultimate key: member attitudes—acting as trustees of global interest, not parochial balancers (e.g., France on Iraq, Russia/China on Kosovo).

D. HOW to Employ Force Effectively

• UN operational limitations:
  • No standing force (Article $43$ aspirations unmet).
  • Adept at classic peace-keeping (post-settlement stabilization), weak at peace-enforcement (coercing active belligerents).
• Optimal model: Security Council authorization + U.S. (or capable coalition) command (Korea $1950$, Gulf War $1991$).
• Regional bodies fill gaps:
  • NATO success: Bosnia $1995$, Kosovo $1999$; assuming ISAF command in Afghanistan $2003$.
  • Australian-led coalition in East Timor $1999$ considered effective.
  • Mixed African cases (ECOWAS, emerging African Union standby force).
• Multilateralists must accept U.S. leadership as force multiplier, while unilateralists must accept institutional legitimacy as influence multiplier ➔ win-win.

Domestic Politics & U.S. Public Opinion

• Democratic Party deficit on foreign-policy confidence stems from vagueness (“Bush-lite”), not inherent multilateralism.
• Key polling data (all pre- and post-Iraq-war):
  • CCFR $2002$: Americans resist hegemonic role; favor strengthening UN; believe $9/11$ lesson = cooperate more, not act alone.
  • January $2003$: $(56\%)$ opposed invasion without new UN vote; only $(39\%)$ supported unilateral action.
  • March $17, 2003$ (pre-war): $(75\%)$ disapproved UN handling; rally effect boosted support for bypassing UN ($(65\%)$).
  • March $27, 2003$: During combat, $(61\%)$ preferred UN lead in reconstruction vs. $(31\%)$ U.S.
  • September $2003$: $(64\%)$ still back Saddam’s removal; $(51\%)$ say no clear Bush plan; $(63\%)$ want UN to guide Iraqi governance; $(72\%)$ favor transferring authority to UN.
• Pattern: Initial multilateral preference ➔ temporary wartime swing ➔ rapid reversion to multilateral bias once costs/risks apparent.
• Public pragmatism: will support force if embedded in credible multilateral strategy.

Ethical, Philosophical & Practical Implications

• Morality vs. Realpolitik: R2P reframes intervention as ethical obligation and security necessity.
• Legitimacy enhances not only ethical standing but operational success (locals’ acceptance, burden sharing, sustainability).
• Soft power decline (negative sentiment, rising anti-Americanism) imposes tangible strategic costs.
• Tough love toward multilateral institutions & partners:
  • Critique French/German obstruction pre-Iraq.
  • Call out U.S. partners not meeting Afghan/Iraqi reconstruction duties.
  • Domestic voices must pressure both U.S. unilateralists and multilateral free-riders.

Synthesis: Four-Point Tough-Love Agenda

1. Early-Resort Doctrine: authorize force sooner when preventive logic compels; weigh risks of inaction.
2. Responsibility-Based Sovereignty: rights contingent on protection duties; perpetrators can’t hide behind Westphalian shield.
3. Reformed & Responsive Security Council: broaden representation, curb veto abuse, act decisively—or expect bypass.
4. Division of Labor in Operations: UN legitimizes, U.S./capable coalitions execute major combat; UN/regionals excel at peace-keeping; all complement via comparative advantage.

Concluding Insights

• End of Cold War ≠ end of war; force debates will endure.
• Multilateralism possesses under-leveraged strengths (realism, legitimacy, influence) but must rectify force-related doubts.
• Success metric: Ability to present a doable, not just desirable, multilateral strategy — convincing analytically & politically.
• Without this evolution, multilateralism risks marginalization to “support-staff” status while unilateralism, despite flaws, fills the vacuum.