African Ethics - Study Notes (SEP)
1. On the terms ‘Ethics’ and ‘Morality’
Ethics (in philosophical usage): study or science of morality; morality understood as a set of social rules, norms, and beliefs about right/wrong conduct and about good/bad character.
Morality: subject matter of ethics; often used interchangeably with ethics in practice.
Morality1 vs morality2 (as used in the article):
morality1: the moral beliefs and presuppositions that a group of people actually obey in daily life.
morality2: the reflective enterprise of moral thinkers who analyze, clarify, and interpret those beliefs.
The entry treats morality1 and morality2 as pertaining to the same moral phenomenon (human conduct) and argues ethics is often clarifying morality1 for broader applicability.
African ethics uses the moral language of a society as its starting point and emphasizes the social character of ethics, an ethics of duty (not of rights), and the common good.
The article notes the interplay between universal human concerns and particular African moral language and social structures, arguing for the autonomy of ethics from religion in traditional African contexts, while acknowledging religion can play a role in moral life.
Aristotle’s view (via cross-cultural comparison) is invoked to illustrate that moral statements within a culture often transcend local boundaries, aiming at universal human relevance (e.g., virtue as knowledge).
Key aim of the entry: contribute to understanding African ethical thinking by foregrounding the African moral language and its central concepts of character and moral personhood.
2. African Words for Ethics (or Morality)
A substantial number of Sub-Saharan African languages lack a direct equivalent for the word ‘ethics’ or ‘morality’; ethics is often expressed via terms for character or conduct.
Akan (Ghana, author’s native language):
To say someone lacks morals or is immoral: best rendered as, and often literally expressed as, having “no character” (Onni suban).
Ewe: expresses “He has no character” with the phrase nonomo mele si o.
Yoruba: iwa means both character and morality (and also means ‘being’ or ‘nature’).
Igbo: the word onwe ghi ezi agwa meaning character; expressions like “he has no morals” (onwe ghi ezi agwa).
Shona: tsika means ‘ethics’ or ‘morality’; hunhu means ‘character’ (used to express lack of morals as Haana hunhu: “He has no character”).
South Sotho (Lesotho and southern Zimbabwe): no direct equivalents for ethics/morality; moral life is expressed via words meaning behavior or character (e.g., maemo = character or behavior; maemo a mabe = “he has bad character”); good character is lokileng or boitswaro.
Islamic moral philosophy continues to use akhlaq for ethics, meaning character.
The Greek root ethike (from which ‘ethics’ derives) means ‘character’ (ethos); thus, ethics is conceived across cultures as centered on character.
Across Akan, African, and Arab traditions, character is the central reference point for moral life.
Overall point: in many African languages, discourses about morality reduce to discourses about character.
3. The Notion of Character as Central to African Ethics
While other moral concepts (good, bad, right, wrong) appear in African moral thought, character (suban in Akan; iwa in Yoruba) is foundational.
Akan: pa/papa = good; bone = bad/evil; a bad person = bad character (suban bone).
Yoruba: iwa is the core moral concept; a person is morally evaluated by his or her iwa (good or bad).
African ethics is described as character-based ethics: the quality of one’s character is fundamental to moral life.
Why character is central:
A society can impart moral knowledge but living according to moral principles requires good character.
Knowledge of rules does not guarantee moral action; character is what enables conduct to align with moral principles.
Moral judgments link to character: wrong-doing = bad character; virtue = good character.
Moral education in African cultures (proverbs, folktales) aims to form habits and virtues; character is acquired through repeated actions and habituation.
Akan view on habit formation:
Character comes from deeds: “character comes from your actions” (nneyee).
Virtue is acquired by performing good actions repeatedly; over time, a habit becomes a virtue.
The Akan phrase aka ne ho, meaning “it has remained with him” or “it has become his habit.”
Human nature: initial moral neutrality at birth; moral character develops through actions and responses to moral instruction.
4. Moral Personhood
Ifeanyi Menkiti’s definition: personhood is attained by participating in communal life and fulfilling the obligations of one’s social stations; ethical maturity arises from discharging duties and roles.
Akan concept of personhood (onipa) and related terms:
Onipa = person/human being (ambiguous: can refer to a person or people in plural).
An individual who behaves cruelly or selfishly may be said to be “not a person” (onnye onipa) despite being a human being.
Yoruba concept: eniyan denotes a person; normative sense emphasizes moral standing; Ki i se eniyan = not a person (normative judgment about moral status).
Two important implications of these norms:
There can be a distinction between human being and personhood; one can be a human without attaining moral personhood.
The normative judgments (oye onipa) signal higher moral standards expected of a person; “a truly good person” is oyie onipa paa.
The Akan belief about human nature and good: God created every human being to be good; interpretations vary:
Interpretation 1: humans are created to do good and always pursue virtue (which would undercut moral neutrality and the possibility of evil).
Interpretation 2: humans are endowed with the capacity for virtue and vice; moral choice remains possible; moral neutrality is preserved.
Tiboa (conscience) in Akan thought:
Tiboa creates a sense of guilt and internal moral sanction; central to moral choice and self-regulation.
Kamer a (Rwanda) denotes conscience as internal feeling; kamera likewise influences moral motivation and guilt.
Conscience is essential to moral agency and moral achievement, aligning with the belief in moral neutrality at birth and the development of moral personhood through virtue.
5. The Humanistic Foundations of African Morality
Debate about religion and morality in Africa:
Some scholars claim African morality derives from religion; morality is religiously grounded.
Others (e.g., Wiredu, Wilson, Maquet) argue that Akan morality is logically independent of religion; morality is not derived from revealed religious dictates.
Traditional African religion is not a revealed religion; it’s not a single source of universal moral commands.
The article argues for an autonomy of ethics from religion in traditional African contexts: moral values originate from human welfare and social living rather than divine revelation.
Spiritual experiences (divination, spirit mediums, encounters with deities) are part of African spirituality but do not provide a comprehensive basis for a durable ethical system.
Religion can still sanction moral behavior and express moral values, but it is not the ultimate source of African moral values.
The non-religious (humanistic) basis of African morality:
Goods are defined by their consequences for social welfare: generosity, honesty, faithfulness, truthfulness, compassion, hospitality, peace, justice, respect, happiness, etc.
The goods originate from existential conditions and social needs, not divine commandments.
African morality is described as humanistic, social, and welfare-oriented, with religion playing a supplementary or sanctioning role rather than being the primary source.
6. Humanity and Brotherhood
Humanity and brotherhood are central moral concepts:
Humanity is not merely an anthropological term; it is a moral notion concerning relations among members of the human family.
Brotherhood refers to an association of people with common aims, expressed as a universal moral kinship beyond biological ties.
The Akan maxim: “Humanity has no boundary” (Honam mu nni nhanoa) emphasizes universal kinship and moral obligations across ethnic and racial boundaries.
The idea of universal brotherhood rests on shared humanity and common moral values, not on racial or genetic divisions.
Hospitality and generosity are cited as exemplary virtues arising from this sense of universal brotherhood:
Campbell (Britain) notes hospitality as a sacred and ancient custom in Bantuland.
Nyerere notes universal hospitality as a social virtue of African societies.
Worth of the human being: a maxim like “The human being is more beautiful than gold” (onipa ye fe sen sika) expresses the preeminence of human worth over material wealth.
Practical expressions:
Conversations with strangers, openness to others, and curiosity about others reflect a lived sense of unity and common humanity (as described by Kaunda).
The value of the human being is tied to compassion, hospitality, and concern for others.
7. The Notion of the Common Good
The common good features prominently in African ethics.
Akan symbol: a siamese crocodile with two heads and a single stomach symbolizes the common good—the basic interests of all members of the community are identical.
Important distinctions:
The common good is not the simple sum of individual goods; it is the basic good that enables flourishing for all.
When the common good is achieved, individual goods are also achieved; there is no inherent tension between the common good and individual well-being.
The common good comprises fundamental goods (peace, happiness, justice, dignity, respect, equality, security) that all humans desire.
It underpins and motivates social, political, legal, and economic institutions aimed at social order and well-being.
The communitarian ethic is centered on pursuing the common good and the social harmony it entails.
8. Social, Not Individualistic, Ethics
African ethics emphasizes social life and mutual interdependence rather than individual autonomy:
Aristotle’s claim that humans are by nature social (politeis) is used to align African ethics with a social conception of human life.
Proverbial maxims emphasize mutual help, collective responsibility, cooperation, reciprocity, and interdependence.
Selected Akan maxims illustrating social ethics:
The well-being of man depends on his fellow man: onipa yieye firi onipa.
Humans are not self-sufficient: onipa nye abe na ne ho ahyia ne ho.
Reciprocity and mutual aid: the right arm washes the left arm and the left arm washes the right arm; life is mutual aid (Obra ye nnoboa).
Mutual aid in farming and broader life: nnoboa denotes helping each other to work; those who help others are not harmed when they need help.
The vulnerable deserve help: “A human being needs help” (onipa hia moa); “Your neighbor's situation is potentially your situation” (Wo yonko da ne wo da).
Empathy for others: “If it sticks into your neighbor's flesh, it sticks into your own” (etua wo yonko ho a, etua dua mu).
Social morality involves dual obligations: individuals have duties to themselves and to others, rooted in shared human needs and interdependence.
Altruism and mutual reciprocity are central to the African social ethic.
9. The Ethics of Duty, Not of Rights
African ethics is humanitarian and duty-centered, not rights-centered.
The natural relationality of persons entails duties and obligations within a community; these duties are foundational for social ethics and the common good.
While duties and rights are not entirely separate in African ethics, duties take priority because they arise from needs and social welfare rather than from abstract rights.
The ethics of duty emphasizes compassion, solidarity, reciprocity, cooperation, interdependence, and social well-being.
African ethics rejects a sharp separation between duty and what Western philosophy calls supererogation (acts beyond the call of duty):
In Western thought, supererogation is optional; in African humanitarian ethics, strong moral duties are seen as capacious and all-encompassing.
A native’s hospitality and helpful conduct are not treated as extraordinary; moral life integrates duty with moral ideals (love, virtue, benevolence).
The capacious moral universe: duties, ideals, and obligations merge into a single moral framework that aims to maximize human welfare for all, not merely what is legally or formally required.
10. Conclusion
African morality is rooted in humanism: human welfare, interests, and needs as fundamental.
This humanism gives rise to the communitarian ethos, recognizing natural sociality and interdependence as essential to ethical life.
The moral life centers on character (the quality of the individual’s life) and the capacity to become a morally responsible agent within a community.
A moral conception of personhood is tied to communal membership and the discharge of social duties.
The recognition of all humans as brothers by reason of our common humanity is a key ethical ideal, promoting universal human solidarity and global ethics.
Although Africa’s moral ideas are not reducible to or entirely dependent on religion, religion still functions as a source of sanction and as part of moral life in many contexts.
Final emphasis: humanism, sociality, common good, and moral duties are the core pillars of African ethics, with character as the ultimate determinant of moral life and personhood.
Bibliography (selected themes and sources)
Kwame Gyekye (author of the SEP entry) and collaborators: foundational discussions on Akan ethics, personhood, and the humanistic foundations of African morality.
Key thinkers cited: Menkiti (on person and community), Wiredu (moral foundations, religion and morality), Wilson (religion and morality in Africa), Maquet (ethics of Rwanda), Sarpong, Busia, Campbell, Nyerere, Kaunda, Krige, Molema, and others.
The entry situates African ethics within cross-cultural comparisons to Aristotle, Socrates, and Greek moral language, highlighting universality and particular African articulations.
Note: Quotations and specific maxims are presented in their translated form throughout the notes to illustrate how character, duty, and the common good are anchored in proverbs and social practice. The overarching aim is to provide a comprehensive, organized study aid that mirrors the structure and central arguments of the original SEP entry on African Ethics.