David Hume fall 2012
Page 1: General Principles of Morals
Engaging in disputes with people who are obstinate in their beliefs is challenging.
Especially difficult are those who are disingenuous and may not genuinely believe their arguments.
Such individuals often engage in arguments for the sake of argument, often disregarding logic and reasoning.
The reality of moral distinctions is questioned by some individuals (disingenuous disputants), but moral sensibility is inherent to human nature.
Even the most indifferent individuals have moments where the concepts of right and wrong affect them.
To persuade such individuals, a strategy of non-engagement may be effective, promoting eventual introspection.
A recent debate arises: Are morals derived from reason or sentiment?
Ancient philosophers asserted morality arises from reason, while more contemporary thinkers see it rooted in taste and sentiment.
Confusion exists among different moral systems, leading to significant debates within philosophy regarding morality.
Page 2: Reason vs. Sentiment in Morality
The debate concerning the source of moral distinctions often leads to heated discussions.
Proponents of reason argue that moral truths can be discerned by rational argumentation, citing historical disputes as evidence.
In contrast, moral sentiments are described as automatic feelings like beauty, where reasoning plays a lesser role.
Justice and moral judgments in trials involve reasoning to ascertain facts and fairness.
If facts are established, the second step involves reasoning about moral implications, suggesting that reason has roles in these discussions.
Sentimentalists argue that moral qualities—such as virtue's pleasing nature and vice's abhorrent nature—cannot be solely rendered through reasoning, emphasizing emotional responses.
Morality's essence might require a sentimental foundation, beyond mere rational assessment of virtues.
Page 3: Concurrence of Reason and Sentiment
Hume proposes that moral distinctions arise from a combination of reason and sentiment, but a final judgment arises from sentiment.
The existence of commonly recognized moral values suggests a universal inner sense of morality.
The necessary reasoning precedes sentiment to help shape morality, but ultimately feeling plays a crucial role in moral actions.
The role of reasoning is not to enforce sentiment but rather to clarify and distinguish it.
Instances of refined moral character may require intellectual engagement to appreciate their full context; thus, both reason and sentiment contribute to moral constructs.
Page 4: The Importance of Sentiment
Utility leads to moral judgments, requiring sentiment to form a positive or negative association with actions.
Pure reason alone cannot result in moral actions without an underlying sentiment for human happiness and aversion to suffering.
Justice often requires nuanced assessments reflecting utility, contrasting with actions of pure benevolence.
A challenge arises when justice conflicts with personal feelings, particularly in cases of extreme necessity.
These complexities represent the intricate nature of moral decision-making which propounds the influence of both reason and sentiment in determining justice.
Page 5: The Nature of Ingratitude
In examining acts of ingratitude, Hume argues that moral blame arises as an emotional response shaped significantly by context and circumstances rather than pure reason.
Morality is seen as inherently linked to emotional reactions influenced by relationships, thus further demonstrating the limits of reason in moral discernments.
Each moral judgment is entwined with a background of personal sentiment and social dynamics leading to the characterizations of moral good and evil.
Page 6: The Role of Moral Beauty
Moral beauty functions similarly to natural beauty, existing through complex interactions within a society and the perception of individuals.
The construction of morality manifests when aspects of virtue compel a feeling of beauty recognized by those with appropriate sensibilities, reinforcing Hume's stance on creating moral judgments from sentiment.
Page 7: Relations vs. Moral Action
The absolute lack of emotional or moral ties can lead to perceptions of injustice; the enjoyment of moral judgments depends heavily on emotional engagements and sentiments rather than objective relations.
Life experiences and contextual understanding largely facilitate moral decisions, illustrating that morality arises from our emotional cores.
Page 8: Utility in Morality
The concept of utility plays a decisive role in the moral evaluation of actions; benevolence considered purely as a function of utility can vary across contexts.
Recognizing the influence of utility creates frameworks for evaluating moral actions and their outcomes.
Page 9: Praising Benevolence
The estimation of qualities favors beneficence and humanity, correlating with public approval across cultures.
Throughout history, displays of compassion and friendship consistently inspire collective regard, forming a cornerstone for moral behavior.
Utility is often a significant factor in the merits of benevolence, recognizing that social virtues drive public contentment and happiness.
Page 10: Justice and Its Merits
Justice is foundational to societal coherence, yet its necessity varies with circumstances and human condition.
Property rights may be temporarily overlooked if dire situations arise, questioning the immutability of legal principles based on shifting notions of necessity and social good.
Page 11: Why Utility is Praiseworthy
Utility directs moral sentiment toward actions comprehensively perceived as resulting in positive outcomes for society.
While self-interest has notable depth in moral reasoning, the communal experience persists in shaping wider sentiments of virtue and vice.