The Crisis of July 1914

Secret war plans determined that failed diplomacy would lead to general war in 1914.
Previous crises settled due to matters of national interest, not honor.
Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand touched Austria-Hungary's honor, leading to the crisis.
Austria-Hungary feared ethnic subversion from Serbia.
Serbian nationalists sought to unite all Serbs, including those under Austrian rule.
Summer maneuvers in Bosnia and the Archduke's visit on Vidov Dan (anniversary of Serbia's defeat by the Turks) increased tensions.
A murder team, including Gavrilo Princip, assassinated the Archduke and his wife in Sarajevo.
Investigation revealed Serbian involvement in arming the terrorists.
The Black Hand aimed for the "unification of Serbdom" and was controlled by Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijevic (Apis).
By July 2nd, confessions confirmed Serbian military involvement, leading Austria to desire punishment for Serbia.

The Serb problem was a major issue for the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
Serbia's Orthodox Christianity and history of resistance made them untrustworthy in Austrian eyes.
Serbia's desire for a Greater Serbia threatened Austria-Hungary's territorial integrity and the imperial system.
Evidence of Serb complicity in the assassination led many in the Austrian government to support war.
Count Berchtold sought German support for aggressive measures against Serbia, aiming to isolate and eliminate Serbia as a power factor.

Austria hesitated to act unilaterally, which transformed the crisis into a general European one.
Decades of war planning influenced European governments' precautionary mood.
The net of interlocking treaties (France-Russia, Germany-Austria-Hungary-Italy) contributed to the conflict.
Austria sought Germany's support due to potential military consequences, particularly Russian intervention.
Emperor Franz Josef and Count Tisza initially opposed war due to fears of change and disruption to the empire's stability.
On July 2nd, the Emperor insisted on consulting Tisza, leading to delays.
Austria sought assurance from Germany to avoid isolation in a crisis.
On July 5th, Kaiser Wilhelm II offered Austria "full support," including potential alliance with Bulgaria.
The Kaiser emphasized that Austria needed to decide on its course of action, reflecting German impatience with Austrian prevarication.

The Imperial Council of Ministers met on July 7th, ten days after the assassination.
Tisza insisted on a note of demands before military action, delaying the decision.
By July 12th, Tisza agreed to a note followed by an ultimatum if necessary.
By July 14th, Tisza conceded to a short time limit for the note.
The Austrian note was delayed until after French President Poincaré's visit to Russia, to avoid diplomatic and strategic alignment between Russia and France.

The Austrian note demanded condemnation of propaganda, guarantees of future conduct, and Austro-Hungarian participation in investigations on Serbian soil.
The time limit for response was 48 hours after delivery on July 23rd.

By July 25th, Serbia had been warned that the note was coming.
Serbian ministers initially leaned towards acquiescence but, spurred on by Russian support, ultimately rejected the condition of Austrian officials on Serbian territory.
Grey proposed extending the time limit and mediating; however, Austria rejected interference.
On July 25th, Serbia was reconciled to capitulation but then received word of strong pro-Serbian sentiment from the Tsar, leading to a complete change in mood.

There was a brief hope that the crisis might be resolved like previous ones.
Politicians and diplomats underestimated the impact of abstract war plans.
Buchanan and Cambon understood the trigger effect of mobilization but their warnings lacked urgency.
Grey proposed a four-power conference, but other proposals and deliberate confusion undermined it.
Berchtold declared war on Serbia on July 28th to cut off attempts at mediation.
Conrad's war plans complicated a speedy resolution, requiring guarantees against Russian mobilization.

Russia implemented the "Period Preparatory to War," bringing its army to operational readiness.
Russian generals saw their responsibility as preparing for the worst, fearing German mobilization.
Russia decided to announce only partial mobilization while secretly preparing for general mobilization.
On July 29th, the Tsar initially cancelled general mobilization but later reinstated it due to pressure and reports of Austrian actions.
The decision to order general mobilization shattered prospects of averting war.

Bethmann Hollweg warned that Russian mobilization compelled German mobilization.
The Kaiser urged the Tsar to de-escalate.
Germany issued ultimata to Russia and France, demanding a suspension of war measures and a declaration of neutrality, respectively.

The dissemination of news of Russian general mobilization and German ultimata made the issue one of peace or war.
On August 1st, Germany mobilized against Russia.
France mobilized, hoping to delay until after German mobilization.
Germany declared war on Russia on August 1st.

On August 2nd, Germany delivered an ultimatum to Belgium, demanding passage through its territory.
Britain had guaranteed Belgian neutrality, and this violation proved the irrevocable event.
On August 4th, Britain declared war on Germany after the ultimatum to terminate military operations against Belgium expired.

Despite statesmen's foreboding, the declaration of war was greeted with popular enthusiasm in combatant countries.
Crowds thronged the streets, cheering and singing patriotic songs.