The Incredible Shrinking War: Notes on World War II and the Cold War

The Incredible Shrinking War: Notes on the Second World War and the Cold War

Introduction: WWII as a Global Event Worth Scrutinizing on Its Own Terms

The Second World War remains deeply popular in American culture (e.g., in late 1990s films such as Saving Private Ryan, The Thin Red Line, Life Is Beautiful, and extensive Second World War imagery on The History Channel). Yet this popularity does not consistently translate into historiographical attention. Historical writing has tended to treat World War II as either the prelude or the origin of the Cold War, subordinating or ignoring WWII as an event in its own right. In 1994, Mark A. Stoler argued that wartime diplomacy was often viewed as merely the seed time for postwar history, while diplomatic historians were increasingly separating pre- and post-Pearl Harbor history. This trend—treating WWII as the conclusion of the First World War or as a mere origin of the Cold War—has persisted and even grown in American historiography. The author notes the warning from Melvyn P. Leffler about the Cold War shaping the way historians write, and cautions against letting the Cold War eclipse the broader global scope and significance of WWII. The Cold War is rightly important, but WWII was a truly world-spanning conflict that reshaped the political, economic, and military order across continents.
The essay stresses that WWII lasted six years in its conventional framing, but begins in 1937 with the Sino-Japanese War, which would push the duration to $8\frac{1}{2}$ years if dated from that start. The Cold War, by contrast, lasted roughly $50$ years. The intensity and global reach of WWII, the author argues, make WWII arguably the only truly global war in history, and the events of WWII significantly affected the nature and structure of the Cold War that followed. WWII should be understood not merely as the connector between the interwar order and the Cold War but as a transformative event with its own distinct political and economic consequences.
The author cautions against the shrinking of WWII into a preface to Cold War history. He notes a tendency among some British historians to downplay the special Anglo-American relationship as a temporary byproduct of wartime alliance, and he argues that despite the shared experience of 1941–1945, WWII should be treated as a historically significant epoch that also shaped European integration (the EU’s emergence). The essay contends that the intense wartime experience created energy for European unity, which was—ironically—partly a response to the desire to avoid another continental-wide war.

The Historiographical Problem: WWII as a “Seed Time” vs. WWII as a World War

The author surveys the historiography that has treated WWII as a mere preface to postwar conflict. He cites the view that the war was the seed of the Cold War and the tendency to separate pre- and post-Pearl Harbor history. He argues that this approach marginalizes WWII itself and reduces its significance to a transitional phase rather than a major, world-transforming event. In Leffler’s critique, the Cold War is treated as a defining framework that distorts the interpretation of WWII history, especially in American historical writing.
The piece emphasizes that in the 1990s, there was a sharp trend in scholarly journals and dissertations toward Cold War topics, with much less attention to WWII. Diplomatic History, under editors Michael Hogan and George Herring, published roundtables and articles on the American Century, but widely neglected WWII’s role in shaping American diplomacy and global order. The author notes that among hundreds of SHAFR meetings and many dissertations, many works focus on Cold War themes, with little attention to WWII’s own dynamics and legacies.
The author highlights the irony that the most analytical discussions about the WWII era are brief and scattered, and that even major works by Roosevelt, Churchill, and other leading figures have been scrutinized for how they did or did not anticipate postwar political arrangements. The text points to the preoccupation with the Cold War as an intellectual habit of historians writing in the postwar era, a habit that may be hard to break because Cold War memory is embedded in the period’s politics and in researchers’ own experiences.
The author critiques a simplistic window on history—one that uses WWII to explain Cold War institutions and outcomes—while arguing that many new archives are not yet fully accessible (especially Soviet-era records). He emphasizes that as long as access to archival material remains limited, our understanding of WWII’s diplomacy, perceptions of Stalin, and the Western Allies’ policies will remain incomplete. He notes new research areas (American soldiers’ reactions to Europeans; gender and memory; Holocaust studies) as signs of life in the field that transcend the WWII/Cold War divide.
The Holocaust is discussed as a crucial historical phenomenon that has emerged from a Cold War-era frame to be treated within WWII history itself. Steiner’s meditation on whether the Holocaust is a unique singularity underscores the challenge of using a historical metaphor to discuss defense, humanism, and modern civilization. While Holocaust studies have expanded, they must be integrated with broader WWII history rather than treated as a separate Cold War-era topic. The author also notes postwar legal and archival debates (e.g., the Holocaust War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998) as examples of how memory and accountability shape historical inquiry.

WWII as a Global War: The World War We Often Forget

The author emphasizes that WWII was not solely a European or Pacific theater; it was a world war with global effects and consequences. He notes that WWII affected political economies, state-building, and security structures in the United States, Britain, and across Europe and Asia. In the United States, the war linked the economy to military spending, creating what Eisenhower later called the military-industrial-educational complex, which was a product of WWII and persisted into the Cold War. The author argues that this transformation in political economy—federal growth mixed with anti-New Deal sentiment—helped lay the groundwork for a liberal international order after the war.
The text discusses how the war's outcomes created a framework for liberal economic and political systems—Bretton Woods, monetary stabilization, and more open markets—that persisted into the 1970s. The author also notes that elements of the New Deal were internationalized in the wartime period: the idea that liberal capitalism would be exported as a model, the push for decolonization, and the belief in a global economic order supported by strong state institutions and multilateral cooperation. The Morgenthau Plan and Roosevelt’s notions of self-rule for colonies are discussed as potential early indicators of an international liberal order, though they are also controversial for their economic implications for defeated Germany.
The author argues that the war’s internal domestic effects—mass mobilization, growth of government power, and the acceptance of more centralized economic planning in wartime—left a lasting legacy in the United States. The war’s success contributed to a consensus about American liberal democracy and capitalism, and to the sense that the United States could assume a leading role in international affairs in the postwar era. Yet this “American Century” vision was contested within American politics and among its wartime allies, especially Britain, as decolonization and nationalist movements gained momentum after the war.
The discussion of nationalism and decolonization is central. Nationalism rose across Europe and Asia as colonial empires began to dissolve, while East–West tensions persisted. The text argues that nationalism and decolonization were both products of liberal ideals and independent of the Cold War framework, shaping Europe’s postwar order and contributing to the broader geopolitical shifts of the period. The Polish struggle for self-determination, the Polish–Soviet negotiations, and the “percentages agreements” between Churchill and Stalin are cited as examples of how postwar settlements reflected competing nationalisms and great-power politics.

The Great Power Struggle and the Anglo-American Special Relationship

A key theme is the Anglo-American special relationship in World War II. The author argues that the wartime partnership between the United States and Britain, though deeply intense and productive, was not purely sentimental. It involved real tensions and disagreements about strategy, empire, and postwar order. Roosevelt’s discussions with State Department officials about postwar arrangements show a concern that Britain could ally with the United States but also be a rival in shaping liberal international institutions and postwar economic order. Roosevelt worried about the British Empire’s potential to obstruct American liberal economic objectives and decolonization, yet he did not dismiss Britain as a minor power; instead, he treated Britain as a major co-equal partner in the postwar order with a special, albeit constrained, role.
The essay emphasizes that the wartime alliance was a complex triad among the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, with the “special relationship” serving as a critical factor in alliance management. Churchill’s realpolitik and realist pragmatism—his willingness to cooperate or balance with the Soviet Union as needed—are contrasted with Roosevelt’s more liberal, idealistic, or at least pragmatic postwar aims. Yet the author notes that Roosevelt did not intend to destroy the Soviet Union or impose containment in the way Cold War strategists later did; rather, his approach sought to balance Great Power interests and prevent a Europe dominated by any single power.
The Polish question, decolonization, and nationalism further complicated the alliance. The wartime alliance had to accommodate nationalist aspirations and decolonization, even as these movements clashed with Great Power interests. The author argues that nationalism’s resurgence, including in Eastern Europe, contributed to destabilizing postwar arrangements and to the emergence of Cold War tensions, but nationalism was not merely a Cold War byproduct; it was a fundamental force shaping the era’s politics.

Three Themes and One Overarching Truth

The author signals that there is one overarching truth and three interrelated themes to guide a proper understanding of WWII’s place in American and global history.

Overarching truth: The war should not be viewed solely as the origin of the Cold War. Nazi Germany and expansionist Japan were defeated, and WWII generated liberal-democratic order, a liberal international economic framework, and nationalist decolonization that had lasting effects beyond Cold War logic. The war’s reality and consequences demand independent treatment rather than reduction to Cold War origins. The author insists that the war’s significance goes beyond whether it was the prelude to a longer U.S.–Soviet confrontation; WWII’s outcomes—defeat of fascism, the liberal international economic order, and decolonization—constituted a transformative historical epoch.

Theme 1: Liberalism triumphs in the postwar order. The war accelerated the global spread of liberal, market-oriented practices and institutions (open markets, rules-based trade, and democratic governance) while supporting the architecture of a liberal international order. The author notes that American liberalism in this period encompassed free markets and an open door for economic exchange, reinforced by the Bretton Woods system and related international economic arrangements. The wartime generation’s belief in liberal economic structures—supported by New Deal–era ideas—helped shape postwar institutions and policy. This liberal triumph is juxtaposed with a cautious view of how it could be implemented, given anti-Communist sentiment and anti-colonial movements that complicated Western leadership.

Theme 2: The Anglo-American special relationship as a driver of postwar order. The wartime alliance between the United States and Britain, and its tensions and compromises, significantly influenced the postwar alignment of power. The relationship was not merely a wartime romance but an essential factor in shaping the empire’s role in a changing world. The text emphasizes that the war’s special relationship involved complexities such as Great Power decolonization, economic competition, and competing visions for a postwar liberal order. The alliance’s postwar implications—particularly Britain’s evolving role and the American willingness to reshape or challenge imperial arrangements—are key to understanding the origins and nature of the cold war order.

Theme 3: Nationalism, decolonization, and self-determination reshape the postwar world. Nationalist movements and decolonization movements grew in the wake of WWII, challenging imperial power structures and political orders. The essay links these processes to liberalism’s success, while also noting that nationalism often clashed with postwar aims (e.g., Poland and Eastern Europe’s self-determination, the broader decolonization of Asia and Africa). Nationalism is presented as a powerful force that influenced postwar alliances, boundary drawing, and the configuration of power in Europe and beyond. The author argues that nationalism and decolonization must be studied as crucial dimensions of WWII’s legacies, alongside the Cold War’s East–West contest.

Three Critical Observations about the WWII–Cold War Transition

The author stresses that the transformation after WWII cannot be reduced to a mere “origins” narrative for the Cold War. The war fundamentally altered international economic systems, security arrangements, and political cultures. The Bretton Woods framework, in particular, represents a monumental economic shift that anchored the postwar liberal order and persisted for decades.
The war’s outcomes did not deterministically produce Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, nor did unconditional surrender guarantee a particular postwar settlement. The text argues against a simplistic teleology that equates unconditional surrender with Soviet expansion, noting that the historical path to postwar order was contingent, complex, and influenced by many factors, including nationalist movements, strategic bargains, and the competing aims of the Allied powers.
The war’s memory is culturally persistent. The author notes the rise of popular nostalgia for the war and its battles, the influence of “good war” narratives on later policy choices, and the temptation to view WWII as a moral imperative to intervene without considering the complexities of strategy, diplomacy, and postwar settlement. He cautions that an overemphasis on the war’s moral clarity could blind historians to its broader political, economic, and social consequences.

Emerging Areas of Research and the Ethics of War Memory

New work on the WWII era includes military sociology (how soldiers experienced Europe and the Atlantic theater), gender and international history, and Holocaust studies that connect to broader war history rather than solely to Cold War memory. The Holocaust has begun to be treated as a historical anchor rather than a mere metaphor, with scholars asking how to integrate Holocaust memory with the broader history of WWII and postwar Europe. The author cites scholars who emphasize Holocaust representation in general histories of WWII, as well as the broader debates about how war crimes are researched, remembered, and prosecuted.
The text notes that WWII scholarship should not be reduced to “campaign history” or biased toward military strategy at the expense of political economy, diplomacy, and social change. It calls for an integrated approach that examines how political leaders, military strategy, economic policy, and social forces interacted to create the postwar world.
The “stateless” or purely military history critique is discussed. The author argues that battles and campaigns matter not only for tactical outcomes but for their influence on political decisions and strategic possibilities. He cites Bartov and Overy to illustrate the risk of reducing WWII to either a fascist or a military narrative, and he emphasizes the need to understand how military history interacts with diplomacy, economics, and ideology.
The author concludes by arguing that WWII has its own indispensable place in history and should not be treated as mere prelude to the Cold War. He uses the image of the “incredible shrinking war” to critique historiography that narrows WWII to its role in the origins of the Cold War. He also invokes a cultural flourish—quoting Jimmy Buffett about not talking about the war anymore—to underscore the danger of forgetting or trivializing WWII’s significance.

Key Historical Details and References Highlighted in the Essay

World War II’s global intensity and reach differentiated it from other conflicts. WWII is described as arguably the world’s most intense and globally experienced conflict, lasting six years in conventional terms, and potentially longer if dated from its regional origins (1937) to its global culmination (1945). The Cold War’s length is given as roughly $50$ years.
Pearl Harbor in December 1941 marks a pivot toward full-scale U.S. involvement; the war begins to “disappear under the icy onslaught of the Cold War.”
The essay critiques how the period around 1941–45 has been underrepresented in top scholarly discussions of the postwar era, citing specific issues such as the Duke of Luce’s “The American Century” roundtables (Part I and II) in Diplomatic History (Spring and Summer 1999), which rarely address WWII’s role in shaping the so-called American Century.
The Holocaust is treated as a critical historical event within WWII with moral, political, and humanitarian implications. Steiner’s reflections on whether the Holocaust is unique and its implications for the crisis of humanism are cited to emphasize the ethical dimensions of WWII that must be integrated into historical analysis. The text also notes debates about whether Holocaust studies should remain separate from WWII or be integrated into a broader historical narrative.
The “hidden or submerged” nature of wartime intelligence and covert operations is discussed. The OSS’s wartime work (e.g., Yugoslavia, Vietnam) and its postwar legacy raise questions about how much of this work should be declassified and studied. The author also notes British covert operations in the United States and the role of propaganda, intelligence sharing, and foreign influence campaigns in moving the U.S. toward active involvement in the war.
The economic and political transformation in the United States during and after WWII includes the growth of government power, the integration of military spending with the national economy, and the emergence of a large, centralized state. The author emphasizes the continued growth of government and the persistence of wartime policies into the Cold War period, including increased use of intelligence as a tool of foreign policy (the “intelligence” state).
The wartime architecture for a liberal international order—embodied in Bretton Woods (and related to the Morgenthau Plan for Germany, and proposals for decolonization and economic liberalization)—is highlighted as a critical driver of postwar global economics and politics. The essay references scholars who have analyzed these issues (Hogan, Eisenberg, Karl, Milward, and others) to illustrate how wartime economic thinking shaped postwar policy.
The role of nationalism and decolonization is emphasized as a parallel driver of postwar politics. The text argues that nationalism’s reawakening played a central role in destabilizing some Allied agreements and in shaping decolonization movements, which in turn influenced postwar governance and the East–West balance of power.

Three Concluding Observations and a Note on Periodization

The author cautions against viewing WWII’s significance exclusively through the lens of Cold War origins. He argues for recognizing WWII’s own historical significance: the defeat of Nazism and militarist Japan, the triumph of liberalism, and the emergence of decolonization movements as independent outcomes of the war.
The argument about periodization is nuanced. While some historians argue that the Cold War began early (even in 1917 in some arguments about World War I’s aftermath and later), the author emphasizes that these periodizations can obscure WWII’s own historical dynamics. He notes that Churchill’s and Roosevelt’s postwar thoughts involved complex considerations about Soviet power, British empire, and the balance of great powers; these considerations cannot be wholly absorbed into a simple Cold War narrative.
The essay ends with a provocative suggestion from Lord Gowrie that perhaps the Second World War did not truly end until the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. This provocative line serves to reinforce the argument that WWII’s legacy persisted far beyond 1945 and should be studied on its own terms, not solely as a preface to Cold War history.

Implications for Study and Examination

For exam preparation, focus on the following themes and points:
- The WWII era as a global event with lasting impact on political economy, diplomacy, and social change, not just as a prelude to the Cold War.
- The three central themes: liberalism’s global expansion, the Anglo-American special relationship and its tensions, and the forces of nationalism and decolonization.
- The tension between “origins of the Cold War” explanations and the need to appreciate WWII’s own outcomes (e.g., Bretton Woods, decolonization, and the liberal international order).
- The methodological critique of Cold War-centric histories and the call for greater archival access (including Soviet-era records) and broader methodological approaches (military history, social history, memory studies).
- The ethical and philosophical questions raised by WWII, including the Holocaust, memory, and the challenges of reconciling modern civilization with unprecedented brutality.
- The perils of “campaign history” and the importance of integrating political, economic, military, and diplomatic perspectives to understand WWII’s global transformations.

Key Dates and Figures (for quick recall)

Sino-Japanese War begins in 1937; WWII duration commonly cited as $6$ years, or $8\frac{1}{2}$ years if dating from 1937.
Pearl Harbor: December 1941.
WWII ends in 1945; Cold War commonly dated as lasting ~ $50$ years (roughly 1945–1991 in standard literature).
Bretton Woods system established in the mid- to late-1940s; Morgenthau Plan debated as postwar German policy.
The “American Century” debate triggered roundtables in Diplomatic History (Part I in Spring 1999 and Part II in Summer 1999).
Holocaust studies and related policy debates (e.g., the Holocaust War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998) illustrate how memory and policy intersect in postwar history.

Representative Arguments to Remember (for essay prompts)

WWII should be studied as a world-historical event with its own internal logic and consequences, not simply as the seedbed for the Cold War.
Liberalism, not Soviet or Allied coercion alone, shaped the postwar order; Bretton Woods and the spread of liberal economic policy were central to this transformation.
Nationalism and decolonization were not merely byproducts of the war but essential forces that redefined global power and the postwar order.
The Anglo-American alliance, while central to wartime strategy, required careful attention to its postwar implications and the evolving imperial context, including tensions over decolonization and the balance of power with the Soviet Union.

In sum, Warren F. Kimball urges a reevaluation of World War II’s place in history, arguing that the war’s significance extends beyond its role as origin of the Cold War. The war produced a liberal international order, catalyzed decolonization, and reconfigured the Western alliance in ways that deserve study on their own terms. The “incredible shrinking war” metaphor serves as a caution against a historiography that diminishes WWII to a mere preface, and as a reminder of the war’s enduring global consequences.