The Interaction of Narcotics and Conflict - Cornell

The relationship between civil war and narcotics cultivation is increasingly visible globally, notably in Latin America, Southwest Asia, and Southeast Asia.
Focus commodities include:
- Coca: Source of cocaine
- Opium: Source of heroin
Majority of global coca and opium cultivation occurs in conflict zones.
Historical context:
- In the 1960s, countries like Turkey, Iran, and Bolivia produced significant opium and coca without armed conflict.
- Comparison with contemporary nations (Afghanistan, Burma, Colombia, Peru) where these crops thrive amid prolonged conflict.
Research findings indicate a link between narcotics and the sustainability of conflict, suggesting that narcotics can extend conflict duration (Ross, 2003; Fearon, 2004).
Open question regarding the dynamics of narcotics and conflict interaction; understanding of why narcotics relate to conflict duration remains incomplete.

Current academic research aligns with studies of the role of natural resources in civil wars, treating narcotics similarly to other ‘lootable’ resources such as diamonds.
Mixed results lead to a conclusion that narcotics do not influence conflict initiation but are evidently tied to conflict duration.
Highlights the need to understand specific dynamics and causal mechanisms of narcotics-conflict link (e.g., derived from literature on terrorism and organized crime).

Research explores economic incentives behind armed conflict, questioning the traditional view that civil war arises from irrational decisions resulting in a breakdown of order.
Notable works that challenge these views:
- Keen (1998), Collier & Hoeffler (2004), Berdal & Malone (2000), Ballentine & Sherman (2003).

Theories suggest economic motivations (greed) are more prevalent than sociopolitical motivations (grievance) in civil conflicts (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004).
Collier posits that civil war is an opportunity for profit and power rather than an irrational consequence of grievance.
The model focusing on rebellion opportunities provides stronger explanatory power than grievance indicators.
Critique of greed theory:
- Empirical studies indicate that self-enrichment incentives alone are insufficient to explain numerous conflicts (Ballentine & Nitzschke, 2003).
- Lack of agreement on correlation between resources and civil war (Ross, 2004a).

Classifying resources as ‘lootable’ and ‘non-lootable’ yields more insightful results (Le Billon, 2001).
Connection of commodity characteristics to conflict outcomes:
- Lootability, obstructability, and legality distinguish narcotics from natural resources like oil and timber.
Drugs’ high value-to-size ratio allows easier appropriation and market transport, enhancing their attractiveness to insurgents.
Research indicates that narcotics typically correlate with the duration of conflict, not initiation (Ross, 2004a).
Fearon (2004) notes that conflicts reliant on contraband like drugs have a mean duration of 48.2 years, versus 8.8 years for others, further confirming narcotics' link to prolonged conflict.

Emergence of literature on crime-terror nexus provides framework for understanding linkages between narcotics and civil conflict.
Post-Cold War dynamics:
- Shift in funding for insurgent movements from state sources to organized crime due to reduced state financing globally.
Increased involvement in narcotics relates to strategic necessity for financial independence from traditional state support (Makarenko, 2003).

As conflict progresses, original ideological motivations may shift toward criminal operational needs, complicating their goals (Makarenko, 2002).
Economic incentives linked to narcotics production empower insurgents, providing funds for fighters, weapons, and legitimacy via local economic integration.
The distinction between criminal motives and ideological ones blurs (Makarenko, 2004).

Data (1990–2003) indicates that 15 of 109 recorded intrastate conflicts occurred in countries cultivating opium or coca (4.7% of 9 drug-producing states).
- Excluded countries like Bolivia and Thailand, which lacked conflict despite drug production.
Notable examples of insurgent involvement in narcotics:
- Afghanistan: Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e-Islami's long-term drug trade reliance.
- Colombia: FARC's early involvement in coca cultivation leading to control over production and territories.
Historical context:
- Involvement in drug trade increased insurgent strengths and altered power dynamics between the state and non-state actors.

Afghanistan:
- Hekmatyar's reliance on opium trade, exacerbated by geopolitical factors and subsequent conflicts.
- Other factions (Northern Alliance, Taliban) also engaged in taxing or overseeing opium.
Burma:
- Heroin production became a key financial source for tribal insurgencies.
- Warlord control led to fragmented drug trade influenced by insurgency needs.
Colombia:
- FARC’s and ELN’s adaptations to drug revenues helped sustain their operations; AUC's funding linked primarily to drug trade.
Peru:
- Sendero Luminoso's connections to drug trade established a stronghold against state authority during its peak.

Shifts in group motivations, especially in Afghanistan and Burma, indicate the increasing pragmatism of non-state actors.
Many insurgent factions, while maintaining original goals, have adopted profit-seeking behaviors due to narcotic involvement.
The FARC’s involvement flips between ideological adherence and profit, reflecting intricate relationship dynamics.

Overall: Armed conflict seems to enhance narcotics production, leading to altered dynamics in both areas.
Motivational shifts influenced by narcotics complicate conflict resolution efforts, as economic incentives often override ideological goals.
Conflict resolution strategies must consider the economic dimensions of insurgency to avoid missing critical negotiations.