Brennan Polluting the Polls
POLLUTING THE POLLS: WHEN CITIZENS SHOULD NOT VOTE
Author: Jason Brennan
Article Reference:
Brennan, Jason (2009) Polluting The Polls: When Citizens Should Not Vote, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 87:4, 535-549.
This article was published in a recognized philosophy journal, indicating its engagement with academic discourse on ethics and political philosophy.
DOI: 10.1080/00048400802587309
Published online: 11 Aug 2009
The online publication date suggests its accessibility and contribution to contemporary ethical debates around democratic participation.
I. Introduction
Political Rights: Citizens in Western democracies possess a fundamental political right to vote, which is enshrined in law and legally protected. This typically includes universal adult suffrage and the right to cast a secret ballot without coercion.
Distinction Between Right and Morality:
The mere existence of a legal right to vote does not automatically confer moral correctness upon the act of voting. Possessing the right to do something does not mean it is always morally justifiable to exercise that right.
Example: While individuals have a political right to participate in rallies, such as neo-Nazi gatherings, doing so is widely considered morally reprehensible due to the hateful and harmful ideologies promoted.
The author, Jason Brennan, asserts that citizens have a strong moral obligation not to vote badly, even though they possess the legal and political right to vote in any manner they choose. This implies a moral responsibility that extends beyond legal permissibility.
Thesis Statement: Brennan argues that citizens should refrain from engaging in activities that are collectively harmful, particularly when the personal cost of abstaining from such activities is negligible. This core argument is applied directly to the act of voting.
Outline of Argument:
Ethical Obligation: There is a moral obligation for individuals to refrain from actions that, when aggregated, result in collective harm, especially when the personal sacrifice required to abstain from such actions is minimal.
Harm of Bad Voting: Voting badly is identified as a collectively harmful activity. Conversely, the personal cost associated with abstaining from voting (i.e., not casting a vote) is generally very low for an individual citizen.
Conclusion: Therefore, citizens have a moral duty not to vote badly. This forms the prescriptive core of Brennan's argument.
Comparative Examples: Brennan draws parallels between the moral responsibilities of voting and other roles within society. Similar to the expectations of competence and due diligence in demanding roles like parenting, surgery, or driving, voting carries an implicit expectation of making rational and informed choices to avoid causing harm.
Just as one wouldn't allow an incompetent surgeon to operate or an intoxicated driver to get behind the wheel, there's a moral case for caution in voting.
II. What is Bad Voting?
Initial Definition: Bad voting is initially characterized as the act of supporting policies or candidates that are harmful or unjust. This could include policies leading to economic instability, social injustice, or significant societal decline.
Refined Definition: Brennan refines this to state that bad voting occurs when citizens cast their vote without sufficient moral or epistemic (knowledge-based) justification for policies or candidates that are, in fact, harmful or unjust.
Sufficient justification implies that the voter has engaged in adequate research, critical thinking, and moral reasoning, and has not simply voted based on ignorance, bias, or unexamined preference.
Justifiable Votes: A voter may, under certain circumstances, have robust and well-reasoned justification for choosing a policy or candidate that, on the surface, appears harmful. This might be based on a perceived greater good, long-term benefits outweighing short-term costs, or choosing the lesser of two or more evils based on careful consideration of available evidence and moral principles.
Characterization Allowances:
Voting for the lesser evil may be a morally justified act. For instance, if all available candidates have significant flaws, choosing the one deemed least damaging might be the most responsible decision.
Individuals may vote to block known dangers, even if the alternative candidates are relatively unknown. This implies a defensive voting strategy aimed at preventing clear and present harm.
Conditions for Mistakes: Like surgeons, voters can make mistakes. However, doctors operate within well-defined standards of care and established medical knowledge, which do not directly translate to the subjective and often complex decision-making process of voting. The analogy highlights the potential for harm but also the difficulty in applying professional standards to a civic duty.
III. The Duty to Refrain from Collective Harms
Collective Harmings:
An action that is harmless or has negligible impact at an individual level can become significantly harmful when aggregated across a large number of people. This is a core concept in collective action problems.
Example: Electing Candidate P over Q might result in an estimated cost to the economy of billion. While an individual vote for P causes negligible personal disutility or direct harm, the collective impact of millions of such votes can be catastrophic. The individual voter feels no direct responsibility for the billion loss, making it easy to overlook the collective harm.
Arguments Against Voting Badly:
Some might argue that a failure to engage (abstaining) could lead to exploitation, similar to the Prisoner's Dilemma, where individual rational choices lead to suboptimal collective outcomes. However, Brennan focuses on the harm caused by active, bad voting.
Brennan emphasizes that voting is rarely about direct individual harm from a single vote. Instead, its moral weight derives from its contribution to collective outcomes, which can have significant societal consequences.
Moral Norms:
Many modern moral theories, such as rule consequentialism, support moral norms against engaging in actions that are collectively harmful, especially when the personal cost of refraining from such actions is low. Rule consequentialism, for example, would evaluate the morality of an action based on the consequences of everyone following that rule.
This perspective emphasizes fairness in collective responsibilities, suggesting that if all citizens have an interest in good governance, they also share a responsibility to avoid undermining it through poorly justified votes.
IV. Doing One’s Part in Modern Democracy
Citizens' Duties:
Brennan clarifies that citizens are not necessarily obligated to vote. The moral obligation arises if they choose to vote, in which case they must vote responsibly and with justification.
Good governance is considered a public good, benefiting everyone. The discussion examines the tension between actively contributing to good governance (e.g., through informed voting) and strategically withdrawing (abstaining) to prevent bad governance.
Counter Argument:
A universal requirement for all citizens to vote well is impractical. It contradicts the realities of diverse and often unjustified beliefs, as well as varying capacities and opportunities for social contributions.
Utilizing Time and Resources:
Becoming a truly informed voter can involve high opportunity costs, requiring significant time and effort that many citizens may not have or choose to allocate without a compelling justification.
Brennan suggests that ordinary forms of contribution to society extend far beyond just voting. People contribute through their work, community engagement, economic participation, and various other means, which may be more impactful or justifiable given their personal circumstances than trying to become perfectly informed voters.
V. Does Abstention Imply Epistocracy?
Elitist Perspective:
Some critics might argue that advocating for abstention by uninformed voters would lead to an elitist system (epistocracy), where political power is wielded by those deemed most knowledgeable or competent. This would imply restricting voting rights based on intelligence or education.
However, Brennan explicitly argues against restricting voting rights based on voter competency. His argument is one of moral obligation for individuals, not a legal or institutional change. He emphasizes maintaining equal voting rights for all citizens while individually advocating for voluntary abstention in specific cases where one cannot vote with sufficient justification.
VI. Voting for Character, Not Policies
Character vs Policy:
Many voters primarily make their decisions based on a candidate's perceived character, personality, or trustworthiness, rather than a thorough understanding or agreement with their specific policy platforms. Brennan suggests that this approach may often lead to bad voting if character judgments are not reliable indicators of good governance.
Reliability of Character Judgments:
A candidate's good character (e.g., honesty, integrity) does not automatically guarantee effective governance, sound policy choices, or just policy outcomes. Governing successfully requires specific skills, knowledge, and judgment that extend beyond personal virtues.
Misjudgment of Skills:
Voting based solely on perceived political skills (e.g., charisma, public speaking ability) may not align with good governance. The skills necessary to win an election are often different from those required to effectively lead, administer, and implement just policies.
VII. Self-Effacingness
Recognition Issues:
A significant challenge in advocating for responsible voting is that potential bad voters might not recognize their own deficiencies. People often overestimate their political knowledge or the justification for their voting decisions, complicating the advocacy for optimal voting behavior.
Practical Implications:
Awareness of one’s own possible cognitive biases or deficiencies in political reasoning could motivate individuals towards abstention. Alternatively, it might spur them to invest in significant effort to improve their voting behavior, similar to how individuals acknowledge and address personal failures in other realms (e.g., overeating, poor financial planning).
VIII. Conclusion
Emphasis on Democratic Protection:
Brennan's conclusion advocates for behaviors that preserve the integrity and functionality of democratic processes. This means minimizing the instance of bad voting, where citizens cast their votes without sufficient moral or epistemic justification for harmful or unjust policies or candidates. By choosing to abstain when unprepared to vote responsibly, individuals contribute to stronger collective outcomes and uphold the moral foundation of democratic participation.