Notes on Presidential Power: The Power to Persuade
The Power to Persuade
Core assertion: presidential power is best understood as the power to persuade; command is just one method among many and often insufficient in a system of separated institutions sharing powers.
Self-executing orders can be useful but are transitory and do not replace bargaining across institutions.
Historical episodes illustrate limits of command: Truman’s steel seizure (1952), MacArthur’s dismissal, and Eisenhower’s handling of Little Rock all show that blunt use of force or unilateral action can be costly and politically risky.
When faced with a credible challenge to the presidency, a soft response can amount to abdication; decisive action can be costly but necessary to preserve policy aims when public challenges question who is in charge.
The steel seizure episode: action taken without hindsight; in hindsight a shutdown might have been cheaper than a seizure, but cost today argues for decisive action when information is uncertain.
Across these cases, the president seeks to keep policy objectives in reach, even if through expensive or controversial means.
The distinguishing point: persuasion, not coercion, is the essence of presidential influence; the president leverages status, authority, and bargaining opportunities to secure cooperation from others.
The executives’ persuasive power is most evident when other institutions share power; command cannot substitute for the collective bargaining process that characterizes a government of separated institutions.
The broader structural truth: the Constitution delegates powers across institutions; the executive relies on bargaining leverage across Congress, the judiciary, federal agencies, private actors, and international allies.
The concept of bargaining as a central logic of power is reinforced in foreign policy, domestic politics, and intergovernmental relations.
The Power to Persuade: Core Definitions
Persuasive power vs. command: persuasion relies on convincing others that acting is in their own best interest and consistent with their responsibilities; command prescribes, but persuasion aligns incentives.
The status and authority of the presidency amplify persuasive power: the office carries certain claims on loyalty and attention that others must weigh in their own calculations.
Persuasive leverage is not simply a matter of personal charm or logical argument; it depends on actors’ need or fear of presidential action.
The presidency offers multiple vantage points: veto, appointments, publicity, budgeting, and the ability to mobilize public opinion.
Bargaining is two-sided: other actors have their own status, authority, and incentives; the president’s leverage depends on the relative weight of these factors for all sides.
The Structure of Government and the Limits on Persuasion
The Constitution as “separated institutions sharing powers”: not truly separated in the absolute sense, but designed to interlock powers to prevent unilateral action.
Congress controls authority and funding; federalism and the Bill of Rights add layers of separation; private institutions (e.g., the press) can influence public policy as a “fourth branch.”
Political parties are themselves coalitions of separated organizations; nomination power is distributed among states; the White House’s influence over party nominations is limited by the broader party structure.
The president’s persuasive task depends on convincing other powerful actors that cooperation serves their own purposes; this is the essence of bargaining within a system of shared power.
The president’s formal powers (e.g., veto, appointments, budgetary control) provide advantages, but their effect depends on the counterparties’ willingness to engage.
The executive branch is a collection of independent actors (cabinet members, agency heads, military leaders) each with their own masters and loyalties; no one operates in a vacuum.
Five masters principle (summary): agency heads answer to Congress, to clients and staff, to themselves, to the president, and to the broader institutional environment; they have multiple loyalties that can constrain presidential pressure.
Dawes’ insight (paraphrased): cabinet members are a president’s natural enemies in the sense that they must balance conflicting masters; loyalty is never absolute.
White House aides can become semi-independent power centers if they gain the president’s consistent confidence and a routine role in presidential business.
The Power to Bargain in Practice
A president’s leverage grows from the perspectives of others: their need for presidential action today and their fear of consequences if they resist.
The bargaining dynamic is everywhere: from the veto and appointments to public advocacy and budget decisions.
The Little Rock episode and the Suez crisis illustrate how allied governments and domestic actors constrain and enable presidential influence through bargaining dynamics.
Even in foreign policy, allies can pressure the president; bargaining with states and international partners often determines outcomes more than sheer logic.
The executive branch’s distinctiveness arises from its structure: there is no single “executive” unit; instead, multiple institutions interact under shared powers.
The Marshall Plan: A Case of Highly Effective Bargaining
The Marshall Plan (1948) is a paradigmatic example of policy consensus achieved through bargaining rather than unilateral command.
Conditions in 1947-48: Truman’s caretaker presidency, Republican Senate leadership, and a coalition in Congress open to bipartisanship on foreign aid.
Key players and resources:
George C. Marshall: revered statesman with a powerful domestic and international reputation; senior staff in State and Defense; extraordinary staff talent (Dean Acheson, Robert Lovett, Will Clayton).
Arthur H. Vandenberg: Michigan senator, Republican leader in foreign policy, bipartisanship advocate; strong liaison with Congress.
Ernest Bevin: British foreign secretary who helped translate Harvard’s general idea into a concrete program and mobilized European response.
Patterson, Stimson, and the Committee for the Marshall Plan: mobilized private sector and public opinion in support of European aid.
The sequence of gains:
Bevin translates Marshall’s Harvard speech into a concrete European aid program.
Moscow’s actions (Molotov’s walkout, Prague’s 1948 coup) paradoxically reinforced support for the plan by underscoring Soviet threat and European weakness.
Truman’s public advocacy and a coordinated executive-legislative effort secured congressional authorization and funding.
Bipartisan Senate leadership, notably Vandenberg, and privately influential allies helped overcome isolationist opposition.
The transactional logic:
The plan required a “trade” of prestige and access: Marshall, Vandenberg, Harriman, and other leaders lent legitimacy and access in exchange for White House support and policy direction.
The White House provided coordination, speechmaking, budgetary leverage, and high-level appointments to secure support.
Bevin, Vandenberg, and Marshall supplied the credibility, resources, and political stamina to carry the plan through Congress.
Why the bargain worked:
The White House offered public and private commitments consistent with allies’ interests and the broader goal of containing Soviet influence.
The administration did not attempt to force outcomes but built a coalition by aligning incentives across political parties, the Congress, and allied governments.
Stalin’s geopolitical moves contributed to a public mood favorable to aid, amplifying the plan’s domestic legitimacy.
The broader lesson: when policy agreement exists but the means to implement it intersects with diverse interests, effective leadership uses bargaining advantages across parties, institutions, and nations to translate consensus into action.
Truman’s role in the bargain:
Provided personal authority and public persuasion to keep the plan moving.
Ensured support from staff and key agencies (Harriman, Nourse, Krug, Lovett) who could produce the necessary analyses and reporting.
Maintained a stance of no politics in the Congress while coordinating with Vandenberg to secure bipartisanship.
Important caveats:
Bargaining advantages do not guarantee success; outcomes depend on the willingness of others to trade prestige for commitments.
The plan’s success rested on mutual interests and the availability of compatible partners; the president cannot force such outcomes alone.
The Marshall Plan illustrates the president’s ability to leverage persuasion and bargaining to achieve a major foreign-policy objective through a coalition, not by direct command alone.
Choice, Decision, and the Guarding of Influence
The central concept: power is sustained through deliberate choices, not just the abstract possession of authority.
Choice vs. decision: in this analysis, “choice” is the preferred term for a president’s act of doing or not doing; it better captures the nuanced, often non-binary nature of options in real-world situations.
Past choices shape present bargaining leverage, but do not guarantee future influence; circumstances change and may render past advantages obsolete or dysfunctional.
The Marshall Plan case demonstrates how past selections (Marshall, Vandenberg, Bevin) created durable assets that the president could leverage in the present.
The steel crisis and the MacArthur case remind us that past leadership behavior also creates liabilities: concessions or deference can undermine future leverage.
Choice as a strategic asset: presidents cultivate relationships with key policymakers and private actors to create reliable channels of influence; this is the stock they trade in bargaining.
When past choices and the current environment align, presidents can maximize bargaining power; when misaligned, they risk reduced leverage.
Professional Reputation: How Washington Judges the President
Washingtonians’ persuasiveness hinges on professional reputation as well as formal authority.
The Washington community includes Congress, administration, governors, military leaders, party officials, private sector actors, and foreign diplomats; all watch the president for clues about will and skill.
The law of anticipated reactions (Carl J. Friedrich): actors anticipate how the president will respond and adjust their behavior accordingly.
Examples: MacArthur, Faubus, Arnall, Sawyer, Marshall, and Vandenberg.
The 1957-1958 Eisenhower episodes illustrate how reputation can be damaged by perceived equivocation and inconsistent messaging:
1957: Humphrey’s public criticism of the budget created laughter in Congress and among Washington observers; it signaled a lack of will and clarity.
The budget season and Humphrey’s outburst contributed to a pattern of perceived drift and indecision.
The May–July 1957 sequence showed a tense bargaining ground: defense vs. economy, foreign aid vs. domestic programs, party factions, and the press.
The July 1957 episodes around school aid and civil rights legislation highlighted the risks of internal misalignment and the dangers of ambiguous commitment.
The 1959 transformation: Eisenhower’s reputation recovered through a consistent, veto-backed defense and budget stance, a steady public stance, and clear opposition to certain expansions of domestic programs.
Key takeaway: a president’s professional reputation is fragile and dynamic; it is shaped by day-to-day acts, not just grand policies.
The limits of reputation: even a strong start (like FDR’s early-term demonstrables) may not be replicable in midcentury conditions; a president may need to compensate with steady performance rather than dramatic initial achievements.
Strategy for guarding reputation:
Demonstrate tenacity and skill across multiple domains over time.
Use veto, public speeches, and press conferences strategically to shape expectations.
Build a pattern of consistent, credible action against the backdrop of a changing political environment.
Public Prestige: Influence Beyond Washington
Washington observers also judge presidents by their popularity and perceived legitimacy with the general public.
Public prestige matters because it feeds the anticipatory calculations of Washingtonians who depend on public support for the president’s program.
The outside public is diverse and split; presidents are judged by a broad, often incoherent set of publics, not a single monolithic electorate.
The president can influence public opinion through speeches, media appearances, and policy demonstrations, but public prestige remains a probabilistic force: it enhances or diminishes the likelihood that others will cooperate with the president’s agenda.
The dynamic: reputation in Washington interacts with public judgment; sustained popularity can broaden the president’s bargaining power, while a dip can constrain it.
The overall lesson: public prestige is a separate but interdependent source of influence that complements the president’s formal powers and his professional reputation in Washington.
Synthesis: How a President Manages Influence
The executive is a system of bargaining across separated institutions; no single action guarantees success.
The president’s influence relies on a blend of personal authority, institutional leverage, and the capacity to shape expectations—both within Washington and in the public.
Choice-making under uncertainty is central: presidents must assess preconditions, align preexisting relationships, and strategically time their moves to maximize their bargaining position.
The Marshall Plan shows how powerful coalitions can translate shared values into effective policy through disciplined, bipartisan coordination and credible leadership.
The Eisenhower episodes illustrate how surgeons of reputation—acting with resolve and consistency—can turn around a perceived pattern of equivocation to emerge as a credible, effective leader.
The central takeaway: power, in this sense, is not the ability to command, but the ability to persuade through a disciplined, reciprocal process of bargaining among autonomous institutions and audiences.
Practical Implications for Exams
Distinguish between power to command and power to persuade; identify when each is likely to fail or succeed given institutional constraints.
Be able to explain the concept of "separated institutions sharing powers" and how it shapes presidential bargaining opportunities.
Describe how bargaining advantages accrue from status, formal authority, and ongoing relationships, and how countervailing pressures from others temper outcomes.
Use the Marshall Plan as a canonical example of successful presidential bargaining across Congress and allies; identify the key actors and the nature of their contributions.
Discuss the role of professional reputation and public prestige in shaping a president’s ability to persuade; explain the law of anticipated reactions and its practical consequences.
Recognize that outcomes in politics are case-by-case and time-sensitive; past choices can help or hinder current leverage, depending on circumstance.
Key Dates and Figures (illustrative, with years in LaTeX)
Constitutional Convention: 1787
Korea War context and MacArthur dismissal:
MacArthur dismissal occurred: 1951-1952 (context preceding steel seizure)
Steel seizure episode: 1952
Marshall Plan: Harvard address: 1947; Plan enacted: 1948; Vandenberg’s leadership in Congress: 1948
Bevin’s Bevin-Bevidence collaboration: late 1940s; Stalin’s role and Prague coup: 1947-1948
Eisenhower presidency: first term begins 1953; budget conflicts intensify in 1957; “new look” in 1959
Sputniks and post-Sputnik era: 1957-1958
Little Rock crisis: 1957
Budget seasons and fiscal years cited in the 1950s: 1957-1958-1959