Electoral Reform in Canada – Detailed Study Notes

Context and Source Information

• Paper: “Time to Move On: The Need for Electoral Reform in Canada” by Justin Weir, McGill University – published in Federalism-E Vol. 24, No. 1 (2023)
• Federalism-E: bilingual undergraduate e-journal on federalism, multi-level governance, intergovernmental relations; joint initiative of Queen’s University & Royal Military College of Canada (RMC)
  • Editors-in-Chief (2023): Officer Cadets Jieun Lee & Odin Bartsch (RMC)
  • Associate editors span 8 Canadian universities; faculty advisor Dr. Christian Leuprecht
  • Mandate: forum for research/debate on federalism issues in Canada & abroad (English & French)

Overview & Central Argument

• Canada still uses First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) for federal elections – unchanged since 1867
• Liberal Party’s 2015 promise: “2015 will be the last federal election under FPTP” ⇒ promise abandoned, public discourse faded
• Only 5 democracies worldwide still use FPTP exclusively; called an “archaic” system
• Two systemic pathologies
  1. Vote distortion (unequal vote weight, wasted votes, strategic voting, majority reversals)
  2. Heightened regionalism (regional parties, polarization, policy tunnel vision)
• Thesis: switching to Mixed-Member Proportional Representation (MMPR) can mitigate both problems while retaining local representation

Mechanics of FPTP & Representation-by-Population (Rep-by-Pop)

• Canada divided into 338 single-member districts (“ridings”)
• Candidate with most votes in a riding wins the seat (plurality rule)
• Party with most seats forms government; leader becomes Prime Minister
• Constitutional principle $\text{rep-by-pop}$ ⇒ districts should have roughly equal population
• Demographic reality: accelerating rural-to-urban shift since 1960s ⇒ serious malapportionment
  • Top 24 ridings > $135\,000$ residents; some approach $160\,000$
  • Bottom 24 ridings < $75\,000$ residents; some as low as $27\,000$
  • P.E.I. & the Territories even more disproportionate (excluded from Fig. 1 in article because of scale)

Vote Distortion Under FPTP

• Wasted vote: any ballot cast for a non-winning candidate in a riding (zero-sum)
  • Close races amplify waste: e.g., 3 adjacent ridings each won by 1 % ⇒ thousands of ineffective ballots
• National consequence: popular vote ≠ seat count
  • 2021: NDP >2× votes of Bloc Québécois (BQ) yet fewer seats
• Majority reversal: party with plurality of votes fails to win most seats (occurred 14/18 elections since 1918)
  • 2015 Liberal majority: >60\% of voters chose other parties yet Liberals obtained absolute majority in Commons

Strategic Voting

• Voters abandon first-choice party to prevent “greater evil” (vote against rather than for)
  • Prominent in 2022 Ontario election: Liberals & NDP openly marketed themselves as strategic options to block PCs
• Empirical estimates
  • Up to $15\%$ of Canadian electorate feels pressure to vote strategically
  • Defection highest among supporters of locally weak parties (NDP, Greens)

Regionalism & Its Political Consequences

• Regionalism: identities rooted in province/area economics, culture, political history; exploited by parties for seats
• Causes within FPTP
  • Disproportionate rewards for concentrated support; penalties for diffuse national support
  • Strict party discipline: MPs risk caucus expulsion/cabinet loss if diverging from party line ⇒ local interests suppressed
• Emergence of region-based parties
  • Bloc Québécois (only runs in Québec; secessionist, Québec nationalism)
    • 1993: $13.5\%$ national vote ⇒ 54 seats (all in Québec)
  • Reform/Canadian Alliance (championed “the West”): up to $97\%$ of seats from AB-SK-MB-BC; ~$60\%$ Western vote share
• “Stuck parties” phenomenon
  • Liberals virtually abandon Alberta; Conservatives long ago wrote off Québec
  • Self-reinforcing: chasing new regions risks alienating base, so parties cede territory ⇒ Commons becomes regional battleground
• Effects on governance
  • Parliament debates dominated by regional issues; national, cross-cutting problems (e.g., class inequality, climate change) sidelined
  • Political polarization & caricatured identities (“Alberta = Conservative”) misrepresent heterogeneity (e.g., >$30\%$ Albertans voted non-Conservative in 2019 yet Cons. took all but 1 seat)

Democracy Deficit Indicators

• Voter alienation: sense votes “won’t change anything”
• Awareness survey: $79\%$ Canadians know seats ≠ votes; $64\%$ believe they should be proportional
• Turnout: Canada in bottom third of OECD since 1945; downward trend paralleling rise of regionalism (see Fig. 2)
• Representation gaps: FPTP linked to fewer women elected

Mixed-Member Proportional Representation (MMPR): Structure

• Hybrid: combines single-member districts with proportional “top-up” seats
  • Voter casts 2 ballots
  1. Candidate in local riding (plurality winner becomes MP)
  2. Preferred party list (determines share of top-up seats)
  • Legislature seat composition: typically $50\text{–}60\%$ district MPs, $40\text{–}50\%$ list MPs
• Balances criteria for a sound electoral system
  1. Proportional translation of votes to seats
  2. Maintenance of territorial representation

How MMPR Mitigates Vote Distortion

• Second ballot ensures every voter influences overall seat allocation ⇒ wasted vote effect drastically reduced
• Strategic voting disincentivized: voters free to support favourite party on list even if local race uncompetitive
• Majority reversals unlikely: top-up corrects disproportionality (Fig. 3 shows lower Gallagher Index scores under MMPR vs FPTP for 2000 data)
• Reduces urgency of frequent boundary readjustments; nevertheless adoption would trigger wholesale redistribution, leveling vote-weight inequalities

Riding Redistribution & Comparative Evidence

• Adoption usually cuts number of ridings (New Zealand: 99 → 65 after 1993 reform; Fig. 4)
• Canada could similarly redraw map; may remedy potentially unconstitutional malapportionment (Sancton)

Cross-Voting & Relaxed Party Discipline

• Empirical rates: $30\text{–}40\%$ voters cross-vote in NZ; ~$20\%$ in Germany
• Local candidates can attract personal votes independent of party label ⇒ MPs gain leverage, party whip weakens
• By loosening discipline, regionalist grievances less likely to spawn secessionist parties (e.g., BQ)

Broader Democratic Benefits of MMPR

• Voter turnout ↑ by up to $6\%$ in PR systems (LCC 2004)
• Women’s representation ↑ (NZ: 21 % → 31 % two elections post-reform; cross-nationally correlated, Lijphart)
• Encourages formation of new parties ⇒ greater ideological choice, higher voter satisfaction
• Safeguards against extremists via legal thresholds (e.g., Germany $5\%$ minimum vote share)
• International trend: past 120 yrs, 0 OECD states newly adopted FPTP; 26 adopted PR variants

MMPR & Regionalism

• With ~half as many ridings, micro-targeting a single region yields diminishing returns
• Parties incentivized to craft nation-wide platforms; us-vs-them rhetoric becomes costly
• Easier for “stuck parties” to expand outside heartlands; electoral competition becomes genuinely pan-Canadian
• Opens policy agenda to diffuse issues (poverty, environment) and supports innovative minor parties

Key Data, Figures & Statistics Mentioned

• Seats in House of Commons: $338$
• Population extremes of ridings: $\text{max}\approx160\,000$, $\text{min}\approx27\,000$
• Strategic voting pressure: $\sim15\%$ of electorate
• Majority reversal frequency: 14/18 elections since WWI
• Liberal 2015 majority with <40\% popular vote (implied when 60 % opposed)
• Green Party 2021: $6.5\%$ votes ⇒ 3 seats; BQ $7.7\%$ votes ⇒ 32 seats
• Women’s seat share NZ: $21\%\to31\%$ post-MMPR

Important Concepts & Definitions

• First-Past-the-Post (FPTP): plurality-wins, single-member districts
• Wasted Vote: ballot cast for non-winning candidate; has zero influence on seat outcome
• Strategic Voting: choosing non-preferred candidate/party to prevent undesirable outcome
• Majority Reversal: popular-vote winner fails to secure most seats
• Regionalism: political mobilization along territorial identities; often reinforced by electoral incentives
• Mixed-Member Proportional Representation (MMPR): dual-ballot hybrid combining district MPs with proportional list seats
• Cross-Voting/Split-Ticket: casting votes for different parties in district vs list portions
• Electoral Threshold: minimum % vote required for a party to gain list seats; tool to exclude micro-parties/extremists

Ethical, Philosophical & Practical Implications

• Equity: MMPR enhances equality of voice (one person ≈ one vote weight) — aligned with foundational rep-by-pop principle
• Democratic legitimacy: proportional outcomes foster perceptions of fairness, efficacy, responsiveness
• National cohesion: mitigating regionalism addresses unity concerns (e.g., “Wexit”, Québec sovereignty)
• Gender & minority inclusion: proportional systems correlated with more inclusive legislatures
• Policy innovation: diversity of parties/voices expands solution space, counters tunnel vision

Conclusion — Study Takeaways

• FPTP simultaneously distorts votes and entrenches regional cleavages ➔ fuels democracy deficit (low turnout, alienation, false majorities)
• MMPR offers structural remedies: proportional fairness + continued local MPs
• Empirical evidence from NZ, Germany, OECD trends supports claims of higher turnout, gender equity, broader representation, and moderated regionalism
• Reform would require redrawing ridings, setting a reasonable threshold (≈$5\%$) and educating electorate on dual-vote mechanics
• Consensus among reform advocates: MMPR is the most balanced, context-sensitive alternative for Canada

Suggested Further Reading / Core References

• Law Commission of Canada (2004) “Voting Counts: Electoral Reform for Canada”
• Lijphart, A. (2012) “Patterns of Democracy”
• Cairns, A. (1968) “The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada”
• Scott, C. M. (2016) Policy Options article on MMPR
• Bickerton, J. (2017) “Parties and Regions”
• Fair Vote Canada resources on FPTP and PR