Notes on Cuban Missile Crisis Transcript

Continuing the discussion and background of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Focusing on moments of high tension that could have led to war.
Debate exists on how close the crisis came to war.
Some argue Kennedy and Khrushchev remained in control, while others emphasize the potential for miscalculation.
Even if leaders don't intend to provoke war, misperceptions, accidents, errors, and unintended consequences can lead to undesired outcomes.

Discussion of DEFCON (Defense Condition) alerts, ranging from DEFCON 5 (normal) to DEFCON 1 (ready for war).

October 22: Kennedy announces the detection of missiles and declares increased readiness.
US Joint Chiefs of Staff implement DEFCON 3 alert, signaling increased readiness.
DEFCON 3 is intended to be accomplished without public notice, but Kennedy's TV address contradicts this.

Europeans, on the front lines, were particularly nervous about war.
Meeting between NATO head and American military head in Europe, General Norstad, and British Prime Minister Macmillan.
Macmillan expresses concern that DEFCON 3 declaration would be viewed as provocative by European NATO members.
Norstad agrees and seeks to delay DEFCON 3 in Europe.
Joint Chiefs of Staff grant Norstad discretion to delay the alert in Europe.
US military goes to DEFCON 3, but with an exception for Europe.

Despite the intention, some American military units in Europe were instructed by their service branch commanders to go to DEFCON 3.
A British senior air force commander and a senior American air force commander used their individual command authority to put their units on DEFCON 3 alert without informing Norstad.
Western military tradition grants autonomy to commanders for effective and flexible responses.
However, in this case, autonomy led to raising the alert level against senior commanders' wishes.
This unintended DEFCON 3 alert in Europe didn't provoke the Soviets, but had the potential to escalate the situation.

Forces in the United States were put on DEFCON 3, impacting foreign policy with Canada.
Prime Minister John Diefenbaker was hesitant to put Canadian forces on alert, fearing it would appear provocative.
NORAD, a joint Canadian-American operation, was put on DEFCON 3.
Americans requested Canada to put the rest of its forces on alert, however, Diefenbaker declines.
Canadian Minister of Defense and others favored going on alert.
The Canadian military quietly goes on alert despite the government's official stance.
Canada sent mixed signals, but eventually, Diefenbaker agreed to put Canadian forces on alert.
This situation did not escalate with the Soviets.

Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered SAC, in charge of long-range bombers, to go to DEFCON 2.
This was the only time the US military has ever been at DEFCON 2.
The US military commanders worried about a Soviet missile attack destroying American bombers on the ground.
To ensure readiness, they wanted some aircraft flying and safe from attack.

The order to go to DEFCON 2 was passed on to SAC bases via radio broadcasts in the clear (unencrypted).
This was standard practice to speed up the process, despite its security implications.
The Soviets would monitor these communications, effectively sending a message about the readiness of US bombers.
Deliberately telling the Soviets, the goal was to warn them against starting a war.
The scale of activities at DEFCON 2, such as keeping one-eighth of bombers in the air, would be evident to Soviet spies anyway.
It is unclear if President Kennedy approved this alert in advance; the military was delegated authority and acted on it.
Kennedy was dismayed, viewing it as provocative.
This unintended provocative action didn't lead to escalation, but it could have.
Existing bureaucratic systems and delegated authority led to these unintended consequences.

Vandenberg Air Force Base in California: site of missile launch and testing facility.
October 26: US military conducts a test of an intercontinental ballistic missile, fired from Vandenberg to Kwajalein Atoll.
Vandenberg was also an operational military base; ballistic missiles could be fitted with live warheads for an attack on the USSR.
Soviet spies might have known that Vandenberg could be used for operational purposes.
A launch from Vandenberg could be misinterpreted as a launch headed towards the Soviet Union.
In the heat of the moment, this could have led to a retaliatory response. Soviets lacking the time to determine the direction of telemetry could have engaged in a false counter-attack.
There's no indication that the Soviets had this knowledge or could detect missile launches from Vandenberg.
Routine test launches could have been misinterpreted.

US military set up a quarantine line around Cuba to prevent further Soviet deliveries.
Numerous interactions occurred between US military units and Soviet military units, especially submarines.
The US military wanted to track Soviet submarines and deter them, without sinking them.
Soviet commanders wanted to sneak through the quarantine. It was, effectively, a game of cat and mouse.

Hard to communicate with submerged submarines at the time.
Navies dropped practice depth charges (or signaling depth charges) on submarines.
The destroyer sails over the submarine and flings a charge over, which goes into the water and explodes.
These depth charges had limited explosive power—little more than a hand grenade, and could not significantly damage a submarine.
It was a way for the Americans to signal the Soviet submarines, "We know you're there. Leave the area."

Soviet submarine commanders may have misinterpreted the practice depth charges as real attacks.
A small practice depth charge might sound similar to a real depth charge exploding farther away.
There were problems being able to communicate effectively with Moscow for the submarine commanders.
It has been suggested some Soviet commanders considered taking defensive measures. It has been alleged they prepared nuclear torpedoes for possible life.
Each of the four Soviet subs had one special torpedo, which included an actual nuclear warhead.
No nuclear torpedoes were ever fired; reports of Soviet commanders being close to firing are likely exaggerated.
The American perspective: these encounters were fairly routine, as indicated by military logs. However, with the psychological pressures of a crisis, it could have escalated.
However, based on evidence, this escalation did not occur.

The Americans tracked the subs and signaled them by tossing signaling depth charges.
When Soviet subs came to the surface to recharge batteries, American commands played Jazz music for them to hear. The lecturer jokes, “Can you imagine a worse war prime than having to listen to Jazz?”