Max Weber - Methodology of the Social Sciences

FOREWORD

The essays in this book were written in close connection with actual research and intensive meditation on the substantive problems of the theory and strategy of the social sciences.
Written between 1903 and 1917, during Max Weber's most productive years.
Weber had achieved eminence in Germany in various fields such as economic and legal history.
Weber's methodology is relevant today due to the relationship between concrete research and general theory.
The essay on "Objectivity" originated from the need to clarify the implications of a concrete problem.
The essay "Critical Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences" reflects the methodological challenge of causally explaining the emergence of an "historical individual," such as modern capitalism.
The essay "The Meaning of 'Ethical Neutrality' in Sociology and Economics" stemmed from concrete interests, including economic theory, academic freedom, political convictions, and intellectual integrity.
The three essays published here do not comprise all of Weber's methodological writings.
Social science today is significantly different from what it was when these essays were written.
The success of social sciences in devising procedures of convincing reliability have led to their marriage with policy.
The relationship between concrete research and general theory has become a more pressing problem than ever.
Weber's essays demonstrate the indispensability of theory in explaining concrete phenomena.
Weber's methodological writings raise questions regarding the structure of a theoretical system and the possibilities of a variety of theoretical systems constructed around their central problems and ultimately "related to values".
Weber regarded the particular and the concrete as the really "value-relevant" phenomenon.
"Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy" brings the problem of general theory before us in a most intriguing way.
The improvement of social science has been accompanied by a vast sprawl of interest over a multitude of subject matters which cannot readily be coordinated intellectually into a unified body of knowledge.
Weber's discussion of "value-relevance" can help bring order into the social sciences and heighten our self-consciousness regarding the grounds on which we choose problems for investigation.
The Meaning of ''Ethical Neutrality'' in Sociology and Economics was directed towards the social scientists in universities who made assertions about the right ends of policy in the name of their scientific or scholarly disciplines.
Weber's treatment of the relationship between social science and the ends of action should aid social scientists to see both their possibilities and their limitations.
Problems for research will therefore themselves tend to be formulated with closer regard for their theoretical assumptions and lead to growth of knowledge.

The Meaning of "Ethical Neutrality" in Sociology and Economics

"Value-judgments" are practical evaluations of the unsatisfactory or satisfactory character of phenomena subject to our influence.
The problem of the "freedom" of a given science from value-judgments is not identical with the question of whether in teaching one should declare one's acceptance of practical value-judgments.
Distinguishing between partisan and non-partisan value-judgments only obscures the practical implications of the preferences suggested.
The university teacher should be devoid of "passion" and should avoid all subjects which threaten to arouse over-heated controversies.
Empirical facts and the exhortation to take an evaluative position should be done with cool dispassionateness.
One must acknowledge the logical disjunction between descriptive and evaluative statements.
Whether one should assert practical value-judgments in teaching is a matter of practical university policy.
"Intellectual integrity" is the only specific virtue the university should seek to inculcate.
Ultimate and highest personal decisions should not be confounded with specialized training.
The student should not be influenced by the teacher's suggestions that they are prevented from solving his problems on the basis of his own conscience.
Schmoller's views reflect a great epoch, but the objective situation has changed for the younger generation.
Today, there is no single "correct" point of view on practical-political preferences.
"Personally" tinted professorial prophecy is repugnant since many officially accredited prophets preach in lecture halls free from control or contradiction.
What takes place in the lecture hall should be held separate from the arena of public discussion.
The calm rigor, matter-of-factness, and sobriety of a lecture declines with pedagogical losses when the substance and manner of public discussion are introduced.
The student should obtain the capacity to fulfill a task in a workmanlike fashion, recognize facts, distinguish them from their own evaluations, and subordinate themselves to their task.
It is poor taste to mix personal questions with specialized factual analyses.
The cult of the personality is petty and has prejudicial consequences, but many ostensible opponents of political value-judgments don't understand the postulate of "ethical neutrality".
A mass of particular, concrete interests underlie this essay—his recurrent effort to penerate to the postulates of economic theory.
The expression of evaluations in teaching should not be justified and then contradicted when the conclusions are drawn therefrom.
The right to state evaluations should be granted to spokesmen for all party preferences.
Anarchists can be good legal scholars because their convictions equip them to perceive problems others may overlook.
If the university becomes a forum for values, it must permit unrestrained discussion from all value positions.
It is in accord with the dignity of science to be silent about such value-problems as one is allowed to treat.
Whether one may, must, or should champion certain practical values in teaching should not be confused with the logical discussion of the relationship of value-judgments to empirical disciplines.
Pseudo-ethical neutrality can become suggestive with especial force by simply "letting the facts speak for themselves."
Scientific "objectivity" should not be achieved by weighing evaluations against one another and making a "statesman-like" compromise among them.
Sciences, both normative and empirical, can tell persons engaged in political activity that these are conceivable "ultimate" positions with reference to this problem.
Discussions of value-judgments should have clarity and an explicit separation of different types of problems.
The investigator and teacher should keep separate the establishment of empirical facts and their own practical evaluations.
Common postulated practical goals should be known as "a priori ends."
It must be acknowledged that ethical imperatives are not identical with "cultural values," even the highest of them.
Formal propositions (e.g. Kantian ethics) contain no material directives.
Concrete problems which ethic can't offer unambiguous directives toward include certain social-political problems.
There are no conflicts between politics and ethics; these conflicts exist in the relationsbetween private and political morality.
Three things that every discipline can demstrate from concrete directives: 1) Indispensable means, 2) inevitable repercussions, 3) conditionally competition of numerous possible evaluations in their practical consequences