Untitled Notes

Objectives of the Great Terror, 1937-1938

Introduction to the Great Terror

The mass repression in the Soviet Union during 1937-8, commonly referred to as the Great Terror or the 'Ezhovshchina', has been the subject of extensive scholarly work, resulting in numerous monographs, articles, and memoirs from various perspectives. Despite this volume of research, many specific circumstances regarding the organization and execution of the repression remain ambiguous. A significant barrier to comprehending these events is the inaccessibility of most documents from the NKVD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs) of the period, as they are archived in the KGB's repository. Additionally, though there exists substantial material in the still-closed Presidential archives regarding the actions of the Politburo and Joseph Stalin, local and republican archives contain a wealth of information that could enlighten how central directives were operationalized locally.

Need for Further Research

Historians have embarked on a detailed study of these historical dimensions, yet due to the extensive lack of data and inadequate research thus far, many inquiries remain unanswered. Of particular interest are the dynamics between central authority and 'local initiative' during the events of 1937-8, and the systems implemented for selecting victims of repression. Clarifying the objectives behind the purges and assessing the actual number of victims are also pressing areas calling for further investigation.

Historical Context and Commencement of Repression

The consensus among historians places the commencement of this new phase of Stalinist repression in late summer or early autumn of 1936. Notably, in June of that year, Stalin directed the NKVD to prepare for a new political trial against Trotskyists and Zinovievists. On June 29, the Central Committee of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) sent a secret letter to local branches concerning the 'terrorist activities of the Trotskyist-Zinovievist counterrevolutionary bloc', prompting many former opposition members to face repression. The August trial in Moscow of the so-called 'anti-Soviet joint Trotskyist-Zinovievist center' led to the execution of all 16 defendants, including prominent figures like L. B. Kamenev and G. E. Zinoviev, sparking a new wave of arrests across the nation.

Political Changes in the NKVD

On September 26, 1936, under Stalin’s directives, G. G. Yagoda was ousted from his role as the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs (NKVD) and was replaced by N. I. Ezhov, who had previously acted under Stalin to oversee the NKVD’s operations. Following this shift, on September 29, Stalin signed a Politburo decree aimed at the comprehensive eradication of former oppositionists.

Mass Repression Begins

In the months following these events, large-scale arrests swept through economic, state, and party institutions. In January 1937, a second significant Moscow trial, targeting the so-called 'Parallel Anti-Soviet Trotskyist Center', took place, further escalating the repression. The results from this initial purge were reviewed during a Central Committee plenum in February-March 1937, where the Sector of Leading Party Organs of the Central Committee, led by G. M. Malenkov, generated lists of nomenklatura officials with allegations of association with oppositionists and various perceived deviations.

Structure and Mechanics of Repression

The list compiled by Malenkov noted the vast number of former party members in the Soviet Union, numbering over 1,500,000 and highlighting how many former party members outnumbered existing communist members in various enterprises. Discussions during the February-March plenum among participants emphasized the prevalence of perceived 'anti-Soviet elements,' resulting in further accusations against a mix of political opponents, particularly focusing on former kulaks and various exiles.

Continued Hunt for Opposition

Following the plenum, the pursuit of former oppositionists deepened, including the expulsion of many from metropolitan areas to less industrial regions. From March to June 1937, arrests proliferated among party and state officials, and mass detentions began to extend within the leadership of the Red Army. This represented a broader mechanism through which threats were perceived within party ranks, structuring a significant reorganization of power amid escalating fears of opposition.

Institutional Repression and the Troika System

The establishment of the troika (a three-person commission consisting of the NKVD head, party secretary, and local procurator) facilitated the rapid processing of arrests, where sentences could be enforced without comprehensive checks. With the Politburo's authorizations, including the operational order issued on July 30, 1937, commands for nationwide procedures against hostile elements were operationalized, indicating a systematic approach underpinning the terror's expansion. The quotas set forth specified that 259,450 individuals would be arrested, with 72,950 designated for execution.

Operation and Specialized Actions

Beyond the indiscriminate purging of perceived enemies, the NKVD identified specific groups for targeted actions, including ethnic Germans in defense sectors or individuals accused of espionage and counter-revolutionary activities. Furthermore, the deportation of the entire Korean population from the Far East exemplified the extreme measures enacted under the guise of national security and suspected sabotage.

Trials as a Tool for Propaganda

A dual mechanism of trials emerged, utilizing both open and secret judicial procedures to fulfill propaganda requirements while also cementing the authority of the Communist Party through zero-tolerance actions against notable figures formerly involved in opposition or perceived anti-regime activities. From August to December 1937 alone, approximately 40 major trials were sanctioned.

Signs of Reformation and End of the Terror

As early as January 1938, indications emerged suggesting a possible cessation of the terror. On January 9, directives were issued that rectified earlier unjust dismissals of party members' relatives. However, later developments, including resolutions endorsing an extension of operational quotas showed a continuation of violence against enemies within, despite superficial acknowledgments of error. The effectiveness of the NKVD's operations from February through August further revealed an ongoing need for direct repression against potential threats, leading to consistent demands for quota increases until the overarching policy of repression began to fade by late 1938.

Conclusion - Understanding the Objectives

The orchestrated repression from 1937-8 served distinct objectives primarily centered on eliminating perceived threats within the political landscape. By dismantling political strata classified as hostile or potentially rebellious, Stalin and the cohort of leaders behind the Great Terror sought to reinforce their power amid an increasingly tumultuous environment. The logical paradox of this purge rested on recognizing its necessity to preemptively mitigate dissent in anticipation of broader geopolitical instability.