The Political Cost of War Mobilization in Democracies and Dictatorships Summary

The Political Cost of War Mobilization in Democracies and Dictatorships

Abstract

• The article challenges the existing research that suggests fighting or losing an interstate war is not more costly for democratic leaders than dictators.
• The author argues that military mobilization, a key aspect of war, is costlier for democrats than dictators because:
  • Democracies rely on public support, which favors social spending over military spending.
  • Dictatorships rely on elite support, which favors military spending.
• The research finds support for this argument during the period from 1950 to 2001.
• The findings provide microfoundations for existing empirical results and suggest that differences in conflict behavior between democracies and dictatorships are most pronounced when significant mobilization is required.

Keywords

• Political survival, interstate conflict, domestic politics, war, regime type

Introduction

• Domestic politics significantly affect interstate conflict processes.
• Institutional explanations for differences in conflict behavior often assume that the political costs of war are higher for democracies, suggesting that democratic leaders are more sensitive to the consequences of war than non-democratic leaders.
• Recent empirical studies suggest that participation in war has limited influence on the survival of democratic or dictatorial leaders.
• The outcome of war affects the political survival of autocratic leaders, but not democratic incumbents.
• A critical, often overlooked, aspect of interstate war is more costly for democracies: economic mobilization, indicated by increased military spending and decreased nonmilitary spending.

Economic Mobilization

• Economic mobilization represents a government's economic adjustments for interstate war, often ignored in terms of its domestic political consequences.
• The winning coalitions of democratic leaders prefer lower military spending and higher social spending, while nondemocratic leaders' coalitions favor the opposite.
• The study finds that mobilization for war increases the probability of a democratic leader losing power more than it does for a nondemocratic leader.
• The assumption that the political cost of fighting a war is higher in democracies is conditional on the mobilization of economic resources.
• Differences in conflict behavior should be most significant when fighting involves significant mobilization efforts.

Article Structure

• The article is structured into six sections:
  1. Reviews research on the relationship between leader survival, interstate war, and regime type.
  2. Presents the argument for why mobilization for war should be costlier for democratic leaders than dictators.
  3. Describes the empirical tests used.
  4. Reports the results.
  5. Reports the results.
  6. Discusses the larger implications of the findings.

Leader Survival, Interstate War, and Regime Type

• Institutional explanations often assume the political cost of war is greater in democracies due to higher political accountability.
• Democratic leaders are more likely to be punished by the public for leading their country into a war or losing a war, whereas dictators only need the support of the political elite.
• Recent research indicates the relationship between leader survival, interstate war, and regime type differs from underlying assumptions.
• Chiozza and Goemans (2004) found the probability of an incumbent retaining office is statistically unrelated to their country’s involvement in an interstate war.
• Autocratic leaders who initiate conflicts decrease their likelihood of removal from power, unless they lose the war.
• The tenure of autocratic leaders is more sensitive to war outcomes than that of democratic leaders.
• Democratic incumbents are not significantly affected by their country’s performance in interstate war, while nondemocratic incumbents are rewarded for winning and punished for losing.
• Croco (2011) finds that culpable leaders are more likely to be removed from office after losing a war in both democracies and nondemocracies.
• Chiozza and Goemans (2011) find that losing an interstate war increases the likelihood that an autocrat suffers a regular or forcible removal from office.
• Forcible removals are empirically rare in democracies with only 5.5 percent of democratic leaders between 1919 and 2003 losing office in an irregular manner.
• Participating in or losing an interstate war is not systematically costlier for democrats than dictators.
• The assumption that democratic leaders are more likely to be removed from power than autocratic leaders is questionable.

The Political Cost of War Mobilization

• Governments increase economic resources dedicated to the military when prosecuting an interstate war.
• The increase in a government’s allocation of resources to the military represents a state’s economic mobilization for war.
• Between 1950 and 2001, countries fighting in an interstate war allocated an average of $6.8$ percent of their annual GDP to military spending, while countries at peace spent only $2.5$ percent.
• Fighting an interstate war has been associated with governments allocating fewer of their economic resources to nonmilitary purposes.
• From 1960 to 1999, governments allocated $16.2$ percent less of their annual GDP to health care spending during an interstate war than they did during peacetime ($1.6$ percent vs. $1.9$ percent).
• The political cost of mobilization refers to how the patterns of government spending affect the political survival of an incumbent leader.
• The political cost of war mobilization should be higher for democratic incumbents than for autocrats because:
  • All incumbents rely on a winning coalition.
  • Incumbents maintain support by allocating economic resources to their preferred policies.
  • Prospects of retaining office are linked to the winning coalition’s assessment of how the incumbent spends resources.

Winning Coalitions

• Democratic winning coalitions are larger than those of dictators.
• Dictators' winning coalitions are made up almost exclusively by members of the civilian elite and/or military.
• Democratic winning coalitions are composed of proportionately more members of the general public and fewer members of the elite.
• Democratic incumbents must be more responsive to the preferences of the general public.
• Dictators must be more responsive to the preferences of the elite.

Spending Preferences

• The public prefers government allocate more resources to social spending and fewer resources to military spending, compared to the elite.
• Military training socializes members of a state’s armed forces to value a stronger military and favor higher military spending than the civilian population.
• Military spending over and above the level necessary to provide national security crowds out consumption spending popular among the public but finances private benefits and club goods for members of the military.
• Bachman, Blair, and Segal (1977) found that members of the military prefer higher military spending than do members of the public.
• Holsti (1998) and Szayna et al. (2007) find that members of the public are more likely than members of the military to think that military spending should be decreased in order to increase education spending.
• The public derives more direct benefits from social spending (e.g., health care and education) than the wealthy civilian elite.
• Spending on social programs is financed through taxes on the civilian elite (Przeworski et al. 2000; Boix 2003).
• The general public would prefer a government allocate more of its resources to social spending than the civilian elite.
• There is a general, negative correlation between income and support for the welfare state in the United States and Europe (Cook and Barrett 1992; Jæger 2006).

Mobilization and Political Cost

• The spending preferences and representation in winning coalitions imply that the political cost of mobilization for interstate war should be higher for a democratic incumbent than a dictator.
• Economic mobilization increases military spending and decreases social spending.
• Leaders are less likely to be removed from power when they implement policies consistent with their winning coalition's preferences.
• Democratic leaders are more likely to lose office given relatively high levels of military spending and low levels of social spending than dictators.
• Democracies should generally allocate fewer resources to military spending and more to social spending.
• Nondemocracies increased military spending and decreased social spending to a greater degree during interstate wars than democracies between 1950 and 2001.

Potential Challenges to the Argument

• Selectorate theory argues mobilization should be relatively more costly for autocratic leaders than for democratic leaders.
• Winning an interstate war is a public good.
• Economic resources not allocated to a war effort are distributed to a leader’s winning coalition in the form of private benefits.
• Mobilization for interstate war increases the probability an autocratic leader will lose office because it decreases the resources available to be spent on private benefits.
• Goldsmith (2007) argues opposition parties incentivize democratic incumbents to mobilize for war, absent among nondemocratic leaders.
• Citizens can punish an incumbent who fails to allocate resources necessary to win a war by voting for a leader’s political opposition in a democracy.
• Democratic leaders might strategically avoid participating in wars that require significant mobilization to avoid removal from power.
• Democratic leaders might finance wars through borrowing, taxes, or printing money to avoid reducing social spending.
• The public might accept high levels of military spending during war due to a