Class Poll and Discussion Context
Poll results described: most students placed emotivism at the bottom; cultural relativism and deontology tied for first; deontology slightly ahead of cultural relativism for second place (unusual pattern).
Observed broader variation in opinions across a large class, suggesting potential for a productive discussion and a shifting generation mindset.
Virtue ethics tends to appear in the middle, consistent with its emphasis on balance.
The teacher notes this set of responses as a mirror of students’ moral intuitions and as a starting point for discussion in student-led conversations.
Emotivism vs. Subjectivism: Core Ideas (Overview)
Emotivism (Ayer-inspired moral theory): moral claims are non-cognitive; they do not express truth-apt propositions. They express emotions, attitudes, or commands intended to influence others, not to state facts.
Subjectivism (orthodox/textbook version, sometimes called Protagorean or traditional): moral judgments do express attitudes or feelings, but those statements can be true or false depending on the speaker’s own psychology or attitude.
Key contrast: Emotivism denies that moral statements have truth values; Subjectivism allows truth values by treating statements as propositions about the speaker’s feelings.
The course moves from Emotivism toward a deeper look at Subjectivism to clarify how each view handles moral discourse.
Moral Language: Truth-Value and Meaning (Foundational distinctions)
Non-cognitive vs cognitive: Emotivism is non-cognitive (no truth conditions); Subjectivism is cognitive in the sense that statements are about the speaker’s mental state.
Relation to Hume’s Fork (two kinds of meaningful statements):
ext{Relation of ideas}: true by definition, logically necessary (a priori).
ext{Matters of fact}: empirical, contingent, verifiable through observation.
Morality is often argued to fall outside Hume’s fork as a distinct kind of meaningful claim, depending on the theory (Emotivism denies cognitive content; Subjectivism treats it as attitude-based cognition).
Hume’s Fork and Moral Claims
Hume distinguishes three kinds of statements:
Conceptual claims or truths by definition (relation of ideas).
Descriptive factual claims about the world (matters of fact).
Moral claims are argued to be neither purely descriptive nor purely definitional, depending on the theory (topics discussed: whether moral claims fit into relations of ideas or matters of fact).
The lecture example: three statements to classify as relation of ideas, matter of fact, or neither; (murder example) to illustrate how some claims fall into empirical truth-claims, and others do not.
Descriptive vs Prescriptive (Is/Ought) and the Is/Ought Problem
The transition from descriptive claims to prescriptive claims is central to ethical debates:
Descriptive claim: describes how things are (facts).
Prescriptive claim: prescribes how things ought to be (values).
The lecture emphasizes the problem of moving from statements about what is to statements about what ought to be (the classic Is/Ought problem).
Illustrative example: “Homosexuality is unnatural.” Describes a state of affairs; infers a moral claim (“therefore it is bad”) via naturalistic reasoning (the naturalistic fallacy).
The role of premises that try to justify prescriptive conclusions: if the premise is about what is natural or normal, inferring what is good from what is natural is fallacious in this framework.
The Is/Ought Problem, Naturalistic Fallacy, and GE Moore
GE Moore's influence: ethics centers on what “good” is, not merely on deriving value from natural properties.
The naturalistic fallacy: the mistake of deriving an evaluative conclusion (what is good or bad) directly from descriptive premises about natural properties.
The example discussed:
Descriptive: “Homosexuality is unnatural.”
Prescriptive: “Therefore it is bad.”
The fallacy identified: moving from a statement about what is the case to a claim about what ought to be the case without an adequate normative bridge.
Emotivism: Core Claims and Mechanisms
Moral statements are not facts; they express attitudes and are often designed to influence others’ behavior.
Three main forms (as taught in the lecture) for analyzing what looks like a moral statement:
Descriptive claim plus emotional expression (fact + feeling).
Command or exhortation (tone-driven directive).
Exclamatory or evaluative expression (tone indicating approval/disapproval).
The “moral pseudo-concept” idea: phrases like “you ought to tell the truth” or “it is good to tell the truth” are analyzed in terms of how they express attitudes or motivate action rather than making factual claims.
The role of tone and “thickness” of exclamations: thicker exclamations convey stronger emotional force and greater motivational push.
Emotivism emphasizes that moral language is often a tool to incite action and shape behavior, not to state propositions that can be true or false.
The translation exercise: various formulations translate a moral sentence into non-moral content (e.g., into a factual claim plus emotional expression, or into a command) to show how the same surface sentence can carry non-cognitive content.
Emotivism vs. Subjectivism: How Moral Statements Are Turned Into Non-Moral Content
Subjectivism (orthodox textbook version):
Moral judgments express personal feelings or attitudes.
The sentence “You are wrong to lie” becomes a factual claim about the speaker’s attitude (e.g., “I disapprove of lying” or “I feel lying is wrong”).
General judgments like “Lying is wrong” are treated as expressions of attitude rather than universal propositions.
Emotivism vs. Subjectivism difference:
Emotivism denies that moral sentences express any evaluative proposition; they only express attitudes and aim to influence.
Subjectivism maintains that moral sentences do express attitudes, but they can still be truth-apt if understood as propositions about the speaker’s feelings.
The “orthodox subjectivism” vs “textbook subjectivism” distinction: orthodox means straight-forward, by-the-book position; subjectivism can vary in other interpretations (e.g., existentialist or non-orthodox variants).
Translating Moral Statements: Examples and Implications
Example: “You are wrong to lie.”
Under textbook subjectivism: translation is a factual claim about the speaker’s feelings or attitudes (e.g., “I disapprove of lying”).
Under emotivism: the surface sentence is not a truth-apt proposition; it’s an expression of disapproval and a command-like push, not a factual assertion.
Example: “Lying is wrong.”
Under subjectivism: a general attitude statement (e.g., “Lying is wrong (for me).”)
Under emotivism: a mood-expression; could translate to an emotional expression or a command (less about truth value).
The distinction between a universal normative claim and a mere expression of feeling:
Mundane factual content remains expressible; moral judgments shift content from truth-conditional to attitude-driven.
Demonstration of conversion techniques:
Non-sentential forms like exclamations (e.g., “Stealing money!” with tonal emphasis).
Commands (e.g., “Tell the truth.”) that function as directives rather than truth-conditional statements.
Emphatic forms with capitalization or tone to indicate moral content without asserting a proposition.
The point: You can’t directly contradict an emotivist in the usual sense because there isn’t a single proposition to oppose; you would need to translate into a standard propositional form to argue about it.
The Three Translational Routes for Moral Pseudo-Statements (Ayer’s Framework)
Route 1: Factual claim + emotional expression
Example: “Lying is wrong” could be represented as a factual claim about lying plus an attitude (“I disapprove of lying”).
Route 2: Command or exhortation
Example: “Tell the truth” functions as a directive rather than a truth-conditional claim.
Route 3: Exclamatory or evaluative phrase with no truth value
Example: “Truth!” or “Stealing money!” expressed with an emotional tone, not a proposition.
The speaker illustrates how thickness of the exclamation point and the use of emphasis (e.g., ALL CAPS) convey moral disapproval and social pressure rather than truth-conditional content.
How Moral Language Shapes Action (Practical and Ethical Implications)
Emotivism asserts moral language is intended to stimulate action and influence behavior, not to justify claims with evidence.
Commands, exhortations, and strong affirmative expressions can function as social mechanisms to enforce norms.
The ethical discourse as a form of social persuasion: moral language often aims to guide conduct rather than to declare objective facts.
Implying that moral disagreements may be best resolved through discussion of underlying attitudes and shared goals rather than mere factual dispute.
Contradiction, Disagreement, and Meaning in Moral Debate
Emotivism’s stance on contradiction:
Since moral sentences are expressions of attitude, they aren’t easily contradicted in traditional propositional terms.
To generate contradiction, one would have to recast the claim into a propositional form about a fact or value, which the emotivist denies as the core content.
Subjectivism allows for contradiction in terms of conflicting attitudes by different speakers: one may hold that lying is wrong while another may hold the opposite attitude; the truth of the claim then depends on the speaker’s attitude.
The lecture demonstrates how to engage with subjectivists: you can contradict a stated attitude by appealing to the opposite attitude or by showing inconsistency in the target’s expressed feelings.
Real-world parallel: even when people debate ethics, they often end up arguing about what they want, what they feel, or what they think others should want, rather than about objective facts.
The “Other Versions” and Broader Context
The lecture contrasts Emotivism with Subjectivism to illuminate how moral language can be interpreted differently:
Emotivism is a non-cognitive theory of moral language.
Subjectivism is a cognitive theory (claims express attitudes) but still non-objective in the sense of being about the speaker’s psychology.
Referenced historical anchors:
Protagoras and ancient Greece as the origins of Subjectivism.
Hume’s epistemology on what counts as meaningful statements (relation of ideas vs matters of fact).
GE Moore’s exploration of what “good” is, central to debates about moral realism and the is/ought distinction.
Practical Takeaways for Exam Preparation
Be able to distinguish:
Emotivism: moral sentences do not express propositions that can be true/false; they express attitudes and are designed to influence behavior.
Subjectivism: moral sentences express attitudes of the speaker; they can be true/false relative to the speaker’s feelings; general moral claims are attitudes, not universal propositions.
Recognize the three forms of translating a moral sentence under these theories: factual + emotional content, commands, and exclamations.
Understand Hume’s Fork and how it relates to evaluating meaning in moral discourse.
Be able to explain the naturalistic fallacy and the is/ought problem with clear examples (e.g., why “natural = good” is not a sound inference).
Be prepared to discuss how moral debates might proceed if moral terms are non-cognitive versus cognitive, including potential implications for ethics education and dialogue.
Quick Glossary (Key Terms)
Emotivism: A non-cognitivist view that moral language expresses emotions, attitudes, or commands, not true/false propositions.
Subjectivism: A view that moral judgments express attitudes or feelings of the speaker and can be true or false relative to those attitudes.
Orthodox Subjectivism: A “by-the-book” version of subjectivism where moral sentences express genuine propositions about one’s feelings.
Non-cognitivism: The position that moral sentences do not have truth-conditions; they are not truth-apt.
Cognitive: Sentences that express propositions that can be true or false.
Relation of ideas: A priori, necessary truths or definitions; true by virtue of meaning (Hume’s Fork).
Matters of fact: Empirical, contingent truths about the world (Hume’s Fork).
Is/Ought problem: The challenge of deriving normative conclusions (what ought to be) from descriptive premises (what is).
Naturalistic fallacy: Inferring moral value directly from natural properties (e.g., “natural implies good”).
GE Moore: Philosopher who argued about the nature of “good” and helped articulate is/ought concerns in ethical theory.
Moral pseudo-concept: A surface moral phrase that functions as a mood-expression or directive rather than a factual claim.
Thickness of exclamations: The strength of moral language conveyed by punctuation and typography (used as a metaphor for intensity of moral feeling).