Hedonism: Key Concepts and Theories

4.1 Egoism and Hedonism

Definition of Egoism: rejection of altruism; makes each individual the center of their own life, with little or no moral concern for others’ rights or well-being.
Nietzsche’s stance: endorses egoism in its strongest form; admires individuals who pursue their own purposes with a force of will that overcomes religious, moral, and conventional constraints (including ideas of justice and equality).
Inconsistency problem for egoism: if strength of will is the touchstone of a good life, it cannot accommodate opposing strong affirmations of the will (e.g., Paul’s self‑subordination to Christ) without an external standard of value.
External standard of value: an ancient doctrine associated with egoism—“hedonism” (from the Greek for “pleasure”).
Relationship between egoism and hedonism: often conflated; Nietzsche argues egoism is natural to humans, while moral codes (e.g., Christianity) suppress the natural impulse; ascetic religious practices exemplify the suppression of the will to align with divine law. The monkish virtues are cited by Hume as an example of such asceticism.
Core claim of hedonism: when not deflected by religious or altruistic doctrines, people naturally seek pleasure and avoid pain; morality is seen as constraining and an obligation that ignores what one enjoys.
Hedonists’ answer to “Why should I forgo pleasure because morality says so?”: there can never be a reason to forgo pleasure; pleasure is the ultimate or sole natural good, and pain the natural evil.
Moralism vs Puritanism: moral-restraining life is conflated with religious suspicion of pleasure; even careful separation of morality from personal preference still leaves hedonism as a natural ally of egoism.
Summary: egoism seeks the will to power; hedonism provides a standard—pleasure—as the natural good and the criterion by which to adjudicate competing affirmations of the will.

4.2 The Cyrenaics

The Cyrenaics: ancient school first advocating a hedonistic view; founded by Aristippus of Cyrene.
Core tenet: pleasure, and pleasure only, is universally desirable; pain is a universal evil.
Consequence: the best life is one with as much pleasure and as little pain as possible; pleasure is a natural good and pain a natural evil.
Contrast with honor and disgrace: unlike pleasure and pain, honor and disgrace are not universally valued; they vary across cultures and contexts, making them less reliable as natural values.
Examples of cultural variation: pregnancy outside of marriage is disgraceful in some societies but not in others; a cuckolded husband may be ridiculed in some cultures and pitied in others; yet physical harms like burns or cancer are universally distressing.
Implication: unlike natural pleasures/pains, honor and disgrace depend on local customs and times; natural values (pleasure and pain) remain constant across cultures.
Cyrenaic ideal critique: although pleasure is universally valued, a life dominated by straightforward bodily pleasures (food, drink, sex) is often unrealizable or unstable due to the inevitable co-occurrence of pain with such pleasures (hunger enabling feasting; drunkenness leading to nausea; sexual risk and disease).
Conclusion: the Cyrenaic ideal is alluring in theory because it appeals to nature, but in practice it tends to be self-defeating and unrealizable.

4.3 The Epicureans

Epicurean alternative to Cyrenaic hedonism: pleasures should be refined and cultivated to maximize pleasure while minimizing pain; the focus is on mild, gentle pleasures that are not accompanied by pains.
Consistency with nature: Epicureans argue for pleasures that typically do not produce accompanying pains; hence “pleasures without pains.”
The need for constraint: such pleasures require self-restraint and deliberate cultivation; natural impulses (e.g., heavy drinking, loud entertainment) are not automatically aligned with Epicurean aims.
Common misperception: Epicureanism is often seen as indulging in sensual luxury, but the Epicurean program actually discourages indulgence in base pleasures and emphasizes cultivated, refined pleasures (good wine in moderation, light meals, tasteful company, literature, and arts).
Tension with natural appeal: Epicureanism asks us to relinquish many natural pleasures to avoid later pains; this lowers its broad appeal compared to a naïve, unrestrained hedonism.
Summary: serious reflective hedonism (as per Epicurus) is a meaningful philosophy of life, but its prescribed life may not satisfy everyone—those seeking political glory or intense passion may find it dull.
Conclusion: while there is a natural basis for pleasure and a natural aversion to pain, the Epicurean path shows that a life of unrestrained pleasure is not the only or best way to maximize well-being; the gains of restraint may offset the loss of some natural pleasures.

4.4 John Stuart Mill on Higher and Lower Pleasures

Mill’s core claim: pleasure is the natural good and pain the natural evil, but some pleasures are inherently higher quality than others.
Mill’s famous intuition: a “Socrates dissatisfied” life is better than a “pig satisfied” life; higher pleasures may outweigh lower pleasures in value.
Two moves to justify higher vs. lower pleasures:
1) Quantitative contrast: a higher pleasure would yield more total pleasure than a lower one; this is often judged by quantity, but this approach is unsatisfactory because it risks reducing all pleasures to a single common scale.
2) Qualitative contrast via experienced judges: those who have experienced both kinds of pleasures can judge which is better; a pleasure’s quality is determined by the preferences of competent judges.
Problems with Mill’s approach:
- Difficulty in achieving genuine unanimity among competent judges; tastes and standards may vary, making it unclear whether higher pleasures are genuinely better.
- Even when experts prefer certain pleasures (e.g., sophisticated arts or wine), it may reflect taste rather than an objective difference in quality.
- The appeal to competent judges becomes a stipulation rather than empirical evidence; it does not convincingly establish that some pleasures are intrinsically higher.
Key conclusion: the appeal to higher and lower pleasures does not salvage strict hedonism; even if some pleasures are better, the basis for ranking them cannot be fully grounded in pleasure alone.
Important implication: there is something about certain activities themselves—beyond the pleasures they produce—that makes them valuable; thus, there must be more to “the good life” than pleasure alone.

4.5 Sadistic Pleasures

Possible hedonist objection: if a torturer derives pleasure from torturing, and a healer derives pleasure from saving a life, the two lives might be argued as equally good from a purely pleasure-based view.
However, most people view torture as morally repugnant; the question is whether a consistent hedonist must concede this as a justifiable form of happiness.
The text suggests that a consistent hedonist need not endorse torture as a general ideal, but could still claim that the torturer’s life might be subjectively more pleasant if the torturer experiences more pleasure than pain; this would offset the victims’ pain from the perspective of the torturer’s balance.
This line of argument clashes with ordinary morality and common sense, illustrating how hedonism can be deeply counterintuitive and morally troubling.
The author notes that turning to such cases, while challenging for conventional ethics, does not by itself falsify hedonism; a stronger objection is needed, which leads to Aristotle.
Takeaway: hedonism can generate disturbing implications (e.g., the value of the torturer’s life) that conflict with common moral judgments; these tensions motivate deeper scrutiny of what constitutes the good life.

4.6 Aristotle on Pleasure

Aristotle’s broader view: pleasure is indeed a good, and he even describes the chief good as a kind of pleasure, but he argues that we cannot properly assess hedonism without clarifying what is meant by “pleasure.”
Critical distinctions about pleasure vs pain:
- Pain has a clearer sensory or experiential form (a locatable sensation or an unwanted experience).
- Pleasure cannot be simply equated with a single sensation; there are many pleasurable experiences beyond bodily sensations (conversations, games, intellectual activities).
Aristotle’s key claim: pleasure is not a single thing; there are multiple kinds of pleasures, and not all pleasures are tied to bodily sensations.
Not all pleasures are ends in themselves: some pleasures are ends (the activity is enjoyable in itself, e.g., playing golf); others involve sensations and may be ends in themselves or may be pursued as means to other goods.
The distinction between the activity and its pleasure: pleasure often resides in the activity (the activity is valuable in itself) rather than in a mere pleasurable sensation; e.g., restoring antiques is valued for the activity itself, not only for the pleasure it produces.
The error of crude hedonism: the idea that pleasure is simply a perceptible sensation leads to a simplistic view; Aristotle insists that some pleasures are intrinsic to the activity and do not reduce to sensation alone.
Pleasure and happiness: Aristotle connects pleasure to happiness but emphasizes that happiness requires more than pleasure alone; one must understand what makes a life genuinely good and happy, which goes beyond merely maximizing pleasures.
The upshot: while he agrees that pleasure is a good and that the happiest life involves pleasure, Aristotle argues that the good life must be evaluated through a broader account of human flourishing (happiness) rather than pleasure alone; thus, understanding what makes life good requires a richer conception of happiness beyond mere pleasurable experience.