Aristotle (c. 330 BCE) → “in a democracy the poor will have more power than the rich, because there are more of them, the will of the majority is supreme.”
Abraham Lincoln (1863) → “government of the people, by the people, for the people.”
Mahatma Gandhi (1948) → “my notion of democracy is that under it the weakest shall have the same opportunities as the strongest.”
Victor Orbán (2014) → “i want Hungary to be an illiberal democracy.”
Xi Jinping (2017) → “China’s socialist democracy is the broadest, most genuine, and most effective democracy to safeguard the fundamental interests of the people.”
procedural democracy
Karl Popper (1945), The Open Society and its Enemies → “the ability to vote a bad government out of office is enough. That is democracy.”
Robert Dahl (1971) - a ‘polyarchy’ has:
freedom of association
freedom of expression and information
universal suffrage (everyone has the right to vote)
right to stand as candidates
free and fair elections
government policies depend on election results
these conditions ensure 1) the inclusion of different voices in deciding what happens, and 2) competition for power
substantive democracy
Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (2000)
a dichotomous (1,0) measure of democracy, if:
the chief executive is elected
the legislature is elected
there is more than one party competing in elections
an alternation in power under identical electoral rules has taken place
Larry Diamond (1999), developing democracy
free and fair elections
the active participation of the people, as citizens, in politics and civic life
protection of the human rights of all citizens
a rule of law, in which the laws and procedures apply equally to all citizens
measuring democracy: polity v project
“Polity Score” (-10 to +10)
the Polity scheme consists of 6 component measures that record key qualities of executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority and political competition
+6 to +10 → democracy
-5 to +5 → anocracy
-10 to -6 → autocracy
waves of democratisation
Samuel Huntington the third wave
first long wave → 1828-1922 → UK, France, US, and eventually much of Europe
first reverse wave → 1922-1942 → collapse of most new European democracies
second short wave → 1943-1962 → restoration of democracy in Europe and decolonisation
second reverse wave → 1958-1975 → democratic breakdown in Latin America, Africa, Asia, Greece
third wave → 1974-1991 → democratisation in Portugal, Spain, Greece, Latin America, Eastern Europe, parts of Africa
a long third wave? → third reverse wave?
stages of democratisation
liberalisation → initiation of the reform sequence
transition → arrangements are made for the new system of government
consolidation → widespread acceptance of the new system
deepening → democracy evolves from the superficial to the substantial
these stages might have distinct explanation → what facilities transition towards democracy might not be helpful to, or even to the detriment of, its long-term survival
economic theories
the argument
Seymour M. Lipset (1959) Political Man → “perhaps the most common generalisation linking political systems to other aspects of society has been that democracy is related to the state of economic development. The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy …A larger middle class tempers conflict by rewarding moderate and democratic parties and penalising extremist groups
Barrington Moore (1966) Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy → “no bourgeoisie, no democracy”
modernisation theory
“traditional society”
large agriculture sector
small industry sector
small service sector
low educational levels
small urban middle class
dictatorship
“modern society”
small agriculture sector
large industry sector
large service sector
universal education
large urban middle class
democracy
the hypotheses
hypothesis 1 (wealth correlates with democracy) → democracy is more common in rich countries than poor countries
hypothesis 2 (democratic survival) → transition to dictatorship become less likely as wealth increases
the evidence
“indeed we have found that once a country is sufficiently wealth, with per-capita income of more than $6,000 a year, democracy is certain to survive, come hell or higher water”
cultural theories
the argument
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963) Civic Culture → “constitution makers have designed formal structures of politics that attempt to enforce trustworthy behaviour, but without these attitudes of trust, such institutions may mean little. Social trust facilities cooperation among the citizens in these nations and without it democratic politics is impossible.”
Robert Putman (1993) Making Democracy Work → “[some countries] are blessed with vibrant networks and norms of civic engagement, while others are cursed with vertically structured politics …and a culture of distrust. These differences in civic life turn out to play a key role in explaining institutional success.”
Samuel Huntington (1996) Clash of Civilisations → “the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. …The clash of civilisation will dominate global politics.”
the hypotheses
hypothesis 1 (classical culture theory) → democracy is more common in some cultures (e.g. western) - which support democratic values, such as individual liberty, freedom of expression, equality - than in others (e.g. Islam, Confucianism)
hypothesis 2 (cultural modernisation theory) → economic development does not directly cause democracy, but economic development does lead to cultural change (e.g. civic culture), which in turn leads to democracy
critique
emphasis on specific aspects of culture that are deemed an “incompatible with democracy”
why have certain countries democratised despite their Confucianism culture (e.g. South Korea)
why have certain countries not democratised despite Christianity being the dominant religion?
hypothesis 1 (classical cultural theory)
cherry picking evidence: emphasis on particular aspects of culture that are deemed as “incompatible with democracy”
hypothesis 2 (culture modernisation theory)
measurement issues
what role do institutions play?
bargaining theories
the argument
highly related with economic explanation for democracy/democratisation
improved understanding of the casual mechanism
emphasises how change in economic development/inequality affects the balance of power between social groups/political actors
Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2006), Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy → “the elites would like to prevent [revolution], and they can do so by making a credible commitment to pro-majority policies. However, promises of such policies within the existing political system are often non-credible. To make them credible, they need to transfer political power to the majority, which is what democratisation achieves.”
2 groups of actors
elites → want to preserve their wealth
masses → want to redistribute
2 models of government
dictatorship → elites govern, but must pay costs of repression
democracy → majority governs, wealth gets redistributed (because the average voter is poorer than the elite)
factors influencing political transitions
likely wealth redistribution if democracy is introduced
probability of democratic revolution / coup vs. democracy
cost of repression
the hypothesis
hypothesis 1 (credible commitment) → elites is non-democracies cannot credibly commit to redistribute wealth without democratic institutions (e.g. elections, majoritarian parliaments)
hypothesis 2 (wealth inequality) → higher wealth inequality raises the risk of democracy for non-democratic elites, which leads to more efforts to suppress democracy
hypothesis 3 (economic shocks) → economic shocks lead to transitions to democracy, but not transitions away from democracy:
non-democracies: middle-class blames the elites for economic failure
democracies: middle-class blames the government of the day
the evidence
equal societies
democracy doesn’t redistribute much wealth; masses do not invest in revolution and the rich do not invest in repression
reforms will be gradual, non-violent and stable; repression and will be minimal
example: complacent autocracies (Singapore)
⇒ little/gradual pressure from below and accommodation between elites and masses is impossible
unequal societies
democracy redistributes much wealth; masses invest in revolution and the rich invest in repression
reform will depend on ability of the rich to repress
transitions tend to be violent and unstable
example: repressive autocracies (South Africa 1970s)
⇒ high incentive for mass pressure and high incentive for elite repression
the critique
Ansell & Samuels (2010) challenge Acemoglu & Robinson’s view that income inequality undermines democratisation
median voter theorem is inappropriate (Melzer Richard’s model (1981))
what about elite bargaining?
more people in more countries want “strong leaders”
democracy = competitive elections for political office
Ca 50% of countries in the world are now democracies (but this is less than half of the world’s population)
there has been a growth in democracy across the world since 1940s and again since 1980s
the main explanations of democracy focus on economic development, cultural values, and the strategic bargains between social groups
there is an on-going debate in political science about whether income inequality undermines democratisation or reinforces it
but democracy is under threat in many countries, or has “stalled” in others, and there are some worrying trends in attitudes towards democracy in many advanced democracies