chapter 7

One way sociologists think about how legislators and other policymakers organize policymaking revolves around the concept of policy domains (Burstein, 1991). A policy domain is that part of the political system that focuses on a particular social issue, such as family problems, criminal justice, or health policy. A given domain includes many people who are especially concerned with the issue addressed by that domain, including legislators, other officials, and people outside the government. For example, Congress has committees that deal with health issues; various federal agencies, such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the National Institutes of Health, address those issues; and outside the government, there are interest groups, think tanks, medical professionals, and other experts especially concerned with health policy. In general, health policy is likely to be formulated by those who belong to that policy domain; after all, these are the people most knowledgeable about—and most willing to devote time and energy to—health policy issues. Although Congress as a whole must vote on health-related legislation, the legislation itself is shaped within the health policy domain.

The concept of a policy domain is akin to but not the same as the concept of an arena (see Chapter 5). An arena is a setting where claims can be presented (a congressional committee’s hearings might be an example). A policy domain is a network of people who share an interest in a particular policy issue; those people may oversee several arenas in which claims about that issue can be presented (such as different committees’ hearings, specialized newsletters, and so on).

We can begin thinking about policy domains by considering the social circumstances of legislators. Although analysts usually focus on the federal Congress, we can assume that similar considerations affect state and local legislative bodies. Imagine a social problems claim that has been attracting attention: the media have been covering the story, public opinion polls may indicate that people are expressing concern about this troubling condition, and claimsmakers and constituents may contact legislators and ask them to take action. These circumstances might lead to a new law—to policymaking—but then again, they might not.

A new policy is by no means an automatic outcome. After all, there are lots of people who want legislators to do lots of different things, and legislators cannot possibly respond to all of these demands; there are simply too many calls for action. It would cost too much to implement them all, and many of them call for legislators to take contradictory actions. Moreover, legislators may have their own ideas about what ought to be done. Although some claims about valence issues enjoy nearly unanimous agreement (see Chapter 2), people disagree about many position issues, so there may be both people who favor and people who oppose passing a particular law. How can legislators sort out all of these demands?

Recall that Chapter 5 spoke of the media’s role in agenda setting. It helps to think of legislators as having an agenda—a prioritized list of things they want to address. The list of demands they face is impossibly long; legislators don’t have enough time or enough money to do everything that they are asked to do, so they need to establish priorities, to decide which things really need to be addressed now.

Once again, we see the competitive nature of claimsmaking. Just as claimsmakers must compete for media coverage and public attention, they also must compete for places on legislators’ agendas. During this process, claimsmakers may wait years until they finally get legislators to address their concerns. Because laws touch on virtually all aspects of social life, there is terrific competition for legislators’ attention among people calling for new laws or changes in existing laws. One result is the establishment of lobbyists, professionals responsible for knowing the ins and outs of the legislative process, who maintain networks of contacts with legislators and their staff members, and who understand how to effectively package claims so as to attract legislators’ interest and support. Most industries, professions, and other well-established interest groups maintain permanent lobbying operations to try to influence lawmaking.

Recall the discussion of ownership in Chapter 3—how some claimsmakers become the established authorities on an issue, and how other people turn to those claimsmakers when questions arise regarding their issues. One way to maintain ownership of an issue is to establish a lobbying operation so that someone is always ready to convey your views to those assembling legislation.

Attempting to influence policymaking can require patience. The political scientist John W. Kingdon (1984) offers one model for understanding how particular policies arrive at the top of Congress’s legislative agenda. He describes three streams: (1) the problem recognition stream, (2) the policy proposal stream, and (3) the political stream. Each stream is constantly flowing, but the three streams often have minimal contact with one another. On occasion, however, they seem to converge, and when they do, Congress is more likely to act. While Kingdon’s focus was Congress, his three-stream model has implications for other policymakers (see Box 7.1).