The Rwandan Patriotic Front: Exile, Reform, and Rise to Power

RPF's Rise to Power in Rwanda

RPF's Ascent: In July 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and its military wing, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), entered Kigali, effectively ending the Rwandan genocide.
The genocide resulted in over 500,000 deaths, and the aftermath led to mass displacement, with nearly half the population killed, internally displaced, or exiled.
The RPF formed the cornerstone of the Government of National Unity in Rwanda. The RPF's history predates its 1990 armed invasion from Uganda, emerging from the 40-year exile of its supporters across Eastern and Central Africa, Europe, and North America.
The RPF has historically sought to broaden its base beyond Tutsi ethnicity or specific ideologies.

Exile and Reform

The RPF's history illustrates the intersection of exile politics and domestic reform. Politicization and mobilization in exile respond to international, host country, and home country changes.
Governments may agree to domestic reforms to manage opposition but are wary of external opponents.
Governments may exclude externally-based organizations from political reform.
Activists may resort to force and construct alliances with domestic movements to enter the political arena.

The Dark Side of Reform and Lessons for the RPF

The Rwandan tragedy highlights the potential negative aspects of reform when regimes resist changes that threaten their control.
Ruling elites may oppose reforms using available resources, even in weak states, or create extra-state structures to maintain power.
The RPF needs to attract refugees back home and allow their participation in public affairs, while ensuring accountability for atrocities to avoid repeating history, especially given Rwanda's high percentage of exiled population.
The implications are also sobering for Africa, where refugees could influence political system reforms and state control of resources.

Early Refugee Politics in Rwanda

The first Rwandan refugee community emerged due to decolonization in the late 1950s.
Supporters of the Tutsi aristocracy, under the Union nationale rwandaise (UNR), lost power and wealth to members of the Hutu nationalist movement, Parti du mouvement de l'émancipation Hutu (Parmehutu).
Tens of thousands of Tutsi were killed and displaced, leading to a significant exodus.
By 1962, when the UN recognized Rwanda's independence, 40-70% of the Tutsi population was estimated to have fled the country.
Early political movements in exile were divided, reflecting divisions within refugee camps, with various ideological viewpoints based on individual leaders.
Some groups pursued armed struggle, while others, the Inyenzi (cockroaches), launched raids into Rwanda between 1961 and 1966.
Raids led to attacks on Tutsi within Rwanda and increased refugee flows.
In the late 1960s, new groups emerged to create broad-based alliances for political reform.
The Association generate des étudiantes rwandaise, headquartered in Bonn, aimed to bridge sectarian divisions among students in Europe.
The association sought cooperation to address social divisions entrenched during decolonization under President Gregoire Kayibanda's regime.
The 1973 coup by Juvenal Habyarimana, who initially promoted reform and rejected ethnic politics, preempted this movement.
Habyarimana's policies later limited Tutsi social mobility, leading to another wave of migration.

Social Restrictions Under Habyarimana

Despite initial independence, Tutsi maintained prominent positions in education, civil service, and the economy.
Habyarimana imposed a system allocating access to education and state employment by region and ethnicity to reverse this.
As much as 60% of posts were allocated to the President's home in the north, with the remainder to Kayibanda's home in the south.
Allocations were made based on Rwanda's official ethnic composition: Hutu (90%), Tutsi (9%), and Twa (1%).
Tutsi in the south could receive no more than 4% of places in schools or posts in the civil service, and in the north, 6%.
Restrictions limited social mobility for Tutsi, leading them to pursue business ventures or leave the country.
New migrants were better educated and distrusted by the existing exile community due to suspicions about their reasons for staying and leaving later.

The Imburamajo and Shifting Dynamics in Uganda

Events in 1972-73 preempted the emergence of the Imburamajo, composed of peasants, teachers, and traders, who sought to separate the right of return from the restoration of the monarchy.
In 1972, General Idi Amin overthrew President Milton Obote in Uganda and allied with the former Rwandan King, Umwami Kigeri.
Kigeri convinced Amin that the Imburamajo threatened the monarchy and his regime, leading to the movement's suppression.

Rwandan Alliance for National Unity (Ranu)

By the mid-1970s, leading political organizations within the refugee community were inert, and no pan-Rwandese movement had emerged.
Habyarimana's policy that Rwanda was 'full up' further excluded refugees from international forums.
Prospects of return seemed distant, and host countries restricted political organization.
Refugees sought to integrate into host societies for survival.
In Uganda, the chaos under Amin and the return of Obote diverted attention.
In Tanzania, refugees initially resisted resettlement but later embraced naturalization ceremonies in 1980.
In Burundi, refugees acquired documents for education and employment through informal channels.

Collapse of Integration and Rise of Ranu

By the mid-1980s, the strategy of blending into host societies began to fail due to implementation challenges and policy changes.
Despite Tanzania's official policy, obtaining citizenship proved difficult due to implementational ineptitude.
Laws prohibited illegal residents and refugees from working in state and parastatal sectors.
In Zaire, Rwandans, including the Bafumbira, were defined as foreigners, depriving them of political rights.
Use of local Tutsi mwami as administrators heightened ethnic tensions.
In Uganda, Rwandans were blamed for supporting Amin, leading to confiscation of land and dismissal from public employment.

Ideology and Strategy

The Rwandan Alliance for National Unity (Ranu) was formed amidst increasing uncertainty with a clear leftist ideology.
Aimed to abolish the monarchy and replace capitalism with a socialist state in Rwanda.
Leaders based in Nairobi took the movement underground due to controversial policies.
Worked through cultural organizations to foster nationalism and recruit activists who would study Rwanda's political history.
Ranu established international contacts by distributing papers at conferences and developing ties with organizations like the Eritrean People's Liberation Front.
Contacts were made with Libya and Eastern bloc countries despite monitoring by Kenyan secret police.
Ranu's branches in Central and Eastern Africa, Europe, and North America existed more on paper than in reality due to limited intellectual following.

Guerrilla Warfare in Uganda

A guerrilla war was started in Uganda against the Obote II regime by the National Resistance Movement (NRM), which included Rwandans Fred Rwigyema and Paul Kagame, both active in Ranu.
As attacks against the Rwandan community in Uganda escalated, more members joined the NRM and its military wing, the National Resistance Army (NRA).
Rwandan exiles gained first-hand experience in guerrilla warfare.

Defeating an Internationally Recognized Regime

The victory of the NRM inspired Rwandans to consider uniting to defeat their own government.

Ranu's Congress of 1985

In order to integrate experienced cadres, the 1985 Ranu Congress empowered its political bureau to form a task force, led by Tito Rutaremara, to develop a strategy for the movement's expansion.
Upon his return to Kenya in 1987, Rutaremara traveled to Uganda with Secretary-General Morove Protazi to meet with NRA cadres.
Ranu abandoned its strategy of working through high-status Rwandans to avoid risking their socio-economic status.
Rwandan university students were sent to refugee camps to initiate contacts and gather information.

Eight Point Plan

Three documents were drafted: a revised political program known as the Eight Point Plan, new Operational Guidelines, and a Personal Code of Conduct.
All were adopted in December 1987 by Ranu's Congress, which then decided to change the movement's name to the Rwandan Patriotic Front.
The Eight Point Plan presented a clear, simple message to unite Rwandans, focusing on democracy, national unity, and the right of return of refugees.
Nepotism and corruption would be replaced with the rule of law and due process.
The Eight Point Plan also called for a progressive foreign policy, an end to the system causing refugees, and a self-sustaining economy.
Specifics were side-stepped to maintain unity.

New Structures

New structures were established to give branches autonomy within the context of the Eight Point Plan.
Leaders were to be selected through democratic elections from the cell to the region.
Ranu's Congress would include regional chairmen, representatives of professions and interest groups, and would appoint the executive committee and commissions.
Key decisions would be taken by the political bureau, including the executive committee, regional chairmen, and members of the high command.
Finally, the Personal Code established clear guidelines for the behavior of RPF members and leaders.

Domestic Opposition

Inside Rwanda, the ranks of the opposition had grown rapidly in response to human rights abuses.
Non-governmental organizations were agitating for more accountability and openness in the conduct of the affairs of state.
These demands struck a resonant chord with international donors. Especially as the price of coffee, Rwanda's most valuable export collapsed.
In September, Habyarimana established the Commission nationale de synthèse to propose recommendations for a new democratic national charter.

Refugee Policy

Rwanda had begun to re-think its policy towards refugees, because after having established in 1988 a joint commission with Uganda, many felt that given a free choice, most Rwandans in that country would choose to stay there rather than to return, and thus that the refugee problem could be resolved 'with minimal actual repatriation'.
By legalising political activities domestically and softening its stand on the right of return for refugees, the regime in Kigali was taking a major initiative on the two central demands of the RPF, without their participation.
In Uganda, because of the difficulty in identifying exactly who were Rwandans and who were Ugandans of Rwandan descent, the military role which each played was unclear.
Although the NRA had established a plan to identify and demobilise non-Ugandans from its ranks as early as 1986, a further 1,000-2,000 Rwandans were recruited after supporters of Obote had invaded northern Uganda.

Military Pressure in Uganda

Critics began to characterise the NRA as an army of foreigners under the command of foreigners, and some went so far as to say that Yoweri Museveni himself was a Rwandan.
In order to safeguard the sovereignty and national security of Uganda, this group argued that the Rwandan members of the NRA needed to be removed.
By 1990, the war in the north had subsided and plans for a general demobilisation were underway again. At the same time, Rwigyema was removed from his command post, and RPF leaders began to fear that security agents from the regime in Rwanda were infiltrating the NRA.

RPF Invasion of Rwanda

Facing the prospects of political marginalisation in Rwanda, as well as increased restraints on their activities in Uganda, the RPF felt it had to act quickly.
The opportunity came in October 1990 when the Presidents of both Uganda and Rwanda were in the United States attending a UN summit. This meant, or so it has been claimed, that Museveni would be able to distance himself from any RPA activities until it was too late to stop them.
In Habyarimana's absence, the regime in Rwanda would also find it more difficult to respond effectively.
On the night of 30 September, the eve of Uganda's national day, approximately 4,000 Rwandan members of the NRA withdrew from their barracks in absolute secrecy, and began to march south towards the border.
By the time they reached Rwanda, their ranks were estimated to have grown to as many as 10,000.
They took very little ammunition for their light arms both because they lacked the ability to transport this, and so as not to undermine the principal explanation for their movements — namely, preparations for celebrations surrounding Uganda's national day.
Led by Rwigyema, the former deputy commander of the NRA, the large convoys of troops moving south aroused few, if any, suspicions.

Parallel Command Structure

The success of the withdrawal stemmed from the fact that within the NRA a parallel command structure, headed by Rwigyema, existed in the form of the Rwandan Patriotic Army - code-named 'Inkotanyi', a Kinyarwanda word meaning tough fighters.
As a clandestine structure within a military organisation which was known for its disciplined chain of command, the RPA utilised the cell structure of the RPF in which few knew more than a handful of other members.
Members of the NRA recall awakening on the morning of 1 October, only to find that large numbers of their ranks, most of whom were thought to have been Ugandans, had seemingly vanished overnight.
Kagame stated that the RPF had 'underestimated [its] ability to spread the word without it leaking'.
Museveni was blamed for complicity in the withdrawal and/or for not having control over his army.
The RPA decided to enter Rwanda at the first possible opportunity, which was at Kagitumba, fearing that Ugandan soldiers would be ordered to pursue their 'deserters' southwards.

Military Clashes

The result was a large-scale invasion into a territory characterised by savannah.
During its initial three-week offensive, the RPA moved more than 100 km into Rwanda and captured Gabiro, one of the regime's largest military depots, as well as a second city, Nyagatare.
The armies rwandaises (FAR) were only able to repel the invasion after receiving extensive reinforcements from Belgium, France, and Zaire.
The RPA's three top commanders, including Rwigyema, were killed…
A Hutu, Alexis Kanyarengwe, was named President, but Kagame was recalled to replace Rwigyema.
The RPA shifted strategy to 'mobile warfare' and pursued a ' diffused withdrawal' out of the territories that it had occupied and into the northeast and northwest.

Capturing International Attention

By capturing the depot at Gabiro, the RPA was able to acquire the stock of weapons and supplies which they had been unable to bring from Uganda and cache inside Rwanda in the traditional guerrilla fashion.
By invading the country and occupying key targets quickly, the RPF was able to attract international attention and to establish itself as a viable force in Rwandan politics.
Domestic pressures in Belgium, supported by RPF branches there, forced that country not only to withdraw its military support from Kigali, but also to seek to broker a negotiated settlement.
Such a move marked one of the RPF's first steps towards inclusion in the Rwandan political arena.
Habyarimana refused to have high-level contacts with the RPF following its initial invasion and perceived defeat, and sought to maintain its isolation by continuing to act unilaterally.
His regime continued with reform, but in such a way that the process could be controlled by the Mouvement révolutionnaire national pour le développement (MRND), and that the outcome would not challenge the power of the ruling party and its allies.

Re-emergence of the RPF

In order to rebuild morale and to re-establish itself in the public eye, the RPF needed to regroup and demonstrate that it had not been defeated and 'chased back into Uganda'.
The RPF re-assembled in the Vumba mountains, along the northwestern border with Uganda.
Its next move was to attack Ruhengeri in the north, near the heart of Habyarimana's political base, in January 1991.
The RPF's control of this town was brief, but it demonstrated its strength, and the vulnerability of the regime in Kigali.
By operating from areas deep inside the Vumba mountains, the RPA may sometimes have moved out of Rwanda.
Uganda denied claims that the movement was using its territory as a rear base.
Following its re-emergence, funds began to flow into the coffers of the RPA, which enabled it to purchase a considerable quantity of weapons, undoubtedly transferred to the front via Uganda.

Expanding Territory

The RPF built upon its momentum by continuing its attacks in the Ruhengeri prefecture as the new constitution was being presented to the MRND in April 1992.
In June, the RPA briefly occupied Byumba, and by September reportedly controlled approximately 1,800 km2 of land, and had 'an undeniable military advantage over the government'.
Morale soared and recruits of all ages poured into the RPA.
The FAR grew from 5,000 in 1990 to 40,000 in 1992, most had little or no training.
When they feared that their future was threatened by the prospect of a negotiated settlement, some members of the FAR sought to collect advance wages through other means - namely, by mutinying in Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, and looting the shops.

Economic Disaster

The RPF's unconventional guerrilla strategy was accompanied by the large-scale flight of the peasantry, rather than their politicisation.
This put additional strains on the Rwandan regime which was largely unable to care for the needs of those internally displaced.
The financial implications of this were tremendous, not least by robbing the fields of a labour force which was generally responsible for producing the bulk of Rwanda's cash crops at the very time that military expenditures, and the costs of caring for displaced people, were increasing dramatically.
Moreover, with the war located in the north, Rwanda's least expensive routes to the sea were blocked.

The Arusha Accords

By early 1992, Habyarimana was unable to maintain his diplomatic strategy of refusing direct contact with the RPF.
Less than one month after forming a coalition government with the MRND in April, Boniface Ngulinzira, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and a member of the Mouvement démocratique républicain (MDR), reversed Habyarimana's policy by meeting high- level representatives from the RPF in Uganda.
Additional talks were scheduled for June in Paris, and later continued in Arusha. At the same time, the Rwandan regime mounted a major military offensive in the northwest.
French troops sent to the north to protect 'French and other foreign nationals'.
The RPF's spokesman in Belgium said they reflected divisions between Habyarimana and his allies.
On 12 July 1992, in the presence of observers from various countries and organizations, the RPF and the Government of Rwanda signed a peace agreement scheduled to take effect one week later.

Key Decisions

Both sides agreed that all details should be finalised by October, so that the key decisions taken could be implemented by January 1993.
The first round of negotiations ended with agreement on a protocol which called for the establishment of the rule of law and recognised its fundamental role in maintaining not only democracy and human rights, but also national unity.
By agreeing to this protocol, the RPF and the opposition adopted measures through which corrupt members of the President's inner circle could be ' brought to book'.
Acceptance of the rule of law was clearly not in the interests of the Akazu and their clients.
In order to strengthen their own position vis-a-vis the MRND during the transition, the internal opposition, which lead the negotiating team in Arusha, agreed to RPF proposals regarding that period.
The Protocol also outlined the broad policies which the Transitional Government was to pursue, as well as the creation of specialised commissions and the rights of the judiciary.

Military Strength Balance

Most importantly, 50 per cent of the command posts, and 40 per cent of the regular forces would be drawn from the RPA.
In addition, the Presidential Guard was to be abolished, thereby greatly reducing Habyarimana's ability to control security.
These and others were attributed by an international commission to a 'circle of around 20 people' in Habyarimana's entourage who 'organise massacres, clashes with the opposition, and assassinations', and their identification implicated the President himself.

Creating Divisions

In order to block the implementation of a political order which he and his allies could not accept, Habyarimana refused to sign the agreements and set about politically dividing the opposition.
In addition, he helped to create groups which opposed negotiations altogether - namely, the Coalition pour la défense de la république (CDR) — and their affiliated armed youth wings or militias, which became known as the Interhamwe, those who fight together.
Because the 1991 protocol between the MRND and the opposition had called for the Prime Minister to be provided by the MDR, Habyarimana appointed Mrs Agathe Uwilingiyimana. This move helped to foster an ongoing crisis within the MDR, because some rejected the President's right to dismiss the former Prime Minister, who had become one of his leading critics.
Habyarimana gained the ability to split each of the parties in the coalition - except the PSR - between those who supported the Arusha process and those who were willing to accept offers of immediate access to power and resources.

RPF Strategy

The RPF sought to broaden its domestic base by building upon the contacts which had been developed with the pro-Arusha internal opposition parties.
The parties refused to send some of their cadres to the RPF zones for saftey.
They believed violence would be linked to ethnicity, as in the past — thus impacting the RPF — rather than following the political lines which had only recently become more clearly demarcated.

Core base Strength

By the time the Arusha Accords were signed in August 1993, the RPF was strengthening the core of its still fragile domestic base.
The movement's presence in Kigali expanded rapidly in December, when a contingent of 600 soldiers from the RPA entered the city to protect the five RPF officials designated to serve in the Transitional Government.
Habyarimana continued to oversee the build-up of militias affiliated with those parties which opposed the agreements that had been signed in Arusha, and to block the formation of transitional institutions.

The Rwandan Genocide

Those parties which opposed the Accords mobilised extra-state organisations through which they implemented a brutal genocide to eliminate supporters of the Arusha process.
Within hours of Habyarimana's death, roadblocks had been put in place and these reform-minded Hutu- virtually all the members of the internal opposition with whom the RPF had worked closely - were killed.
Radio Mille Collines, called upon all Hutu to defend themselves by attacking their Tutsi neighbours, who were characterised as potential, if not actual supporters of the advancing RPF, which was said to be seeking retribution for the 1959 revolution.
The UN peacekeepers did nothing to stop the regime. Because the killings represented the collapse of the Arusha Accords, the UN declared there was no peace to keep, and decreased its military presence in Rwanda to less than 300.
By the end of May, an estimated half million Rwandans had been killed.

Establishment of Coalition

Within one week after entering the capital by force, the RPF had established the broad-based coalition government called for at Arusha.
While a coalition, every act was undertaken with RPF personnel using RPF funds.
The situation started to improve during 1995 as the rehabilitation of the economy proceeded.
Creating separate identities for the state, the movement, and the government is critical if Rwanda is to live up to the principles that had been agreed at Arusha, albeit very difficult given the historical development of the RPF.

Weaknesses for Progress

The RPF maintained virtually no civilian administrative structures, nearly all the skilled manpower now available in Rwanda has come from the exiled community which gave birth to the movement.
Such a situation poses new difficulties for a broad-based government in which most members of the armed forces have some kind of affiliation, past and/or present, with the predominant party.
Lack of what many thought was an appropriate official response to the activities of the RPA led to tensions between the RPF and its coalition partners which reached a head in August 1995.
The largest group unrepresented in the current coalition is that which supported the former regime, participated in the formal economic sector of the state, and fled when the RPF entered Kigali.
The RPF will undoubtedly remain hesitant to permit national elections until it has gained popular support by pursuing effective public policies.

Exile, Reform, and Collapse in African Politics

Governments which systematically drive out large segments of their populations and/or prevent their return, set in motion a process of politicisation over which they have little control.
The internationalisation of conflict resolution brings with it a host of opportunities and obstacles. For example, external donors are likely to encounter opposition by pressing governments to pursue policies to which they are not fully committed.
Those groups whose social status is secured primarily through political patronage and controlled markets may well view the process as a 'zero sum game' in which they are the most likely losers.
When further delays became impossible, the only option which those in power had for preserving their own position and their lives was to eliminate any and all who favoured reform - namely, by pursuing a policy of genocide through the CDR and the Interhamwe.
While the risks of reform should not be avoided, those who promote such policies need to be cognisant of the ramifications of their actions and of the potential of their opponents.