T1

Study Schedule

  • Week 1 (24 February): Conceptualising Terrorism and Violent Extremism

  • Week 2 (03 March): Framing terrorism and extremism: the role of media, experts and politics

  • Week 3 (10 March): Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Historical Perspective

  • Week 4 (17 March): Theorizing Violent Extremism: Policy-making implications

  • Week 5 (24 March): Independent Study Week

  • Week 6 (31 March): State and non-state terrorism: typologies, strategies and ideologies. Annotated proposal due.

  • Week 7 (07 April): Counter-terrorism in theory and practice

  • Week 8 (14 April): Globalisation and political violence: ISIS and Far-Right extremism

  • Week 9 (21 April): Independent Study Week

  • Week 10 (28 April): Radicalisation, alienation and violence

  • Week 11 (05 May): Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)

  • Week 12 (12 May): Responding to Risks of Extremism: The Case of Australia

  • Week 13 (19 May): CVE, Society and the State The Case of Indonesia. Research essay due 22 May.

  • Week 14 (26 May): 'Reciprocal radicalisation’? Rights, Democracy and the Security State

  • Exam Period (16-17): Exam

Unit Components - Theory

  • How have terrorism and violent extremism been conceptualized and defined academically, politically, and in policy?

  • What types of knowledge, theory, and interests have informed understandings of terrorism and violent extremism, and what are the implications of specific ways of thinking about terrorism, violent extremism, and radicalization for counterterrorism and CVE practices, policy, and politics?

  • What kinds of theory, knowledge, and assumptions underpin and drive counter-terrorism and counter-violent extremism policy and practice?

Unit Components - History

  • What have been the historical conditions under which terrorism as a particular form of political violence has emerged?

  • How have both state and non-state actors used terrorism, and to what ends?

  • How have societies and states historically responded to terrorism and violent extremism, politically and otherwise?

  • In what ways is terrorism and violent extremism changing over time?

Unit Components - Politics

  • What have been the social and political ramifications and impacts of acts of terrorism and counter-terrorism/violent extremism measures?

  • What kinds of political, social, and economic goals have been pursued via terrorism and violent extremism, and what have been identified as its drivers?

  • What kinds of impacts have terrorism and the resultant counter-terrorism policies and programs had at everyday, national and international levels?

  • What are some of the broader implications of this for our understanding of security, state legitimacy, democracy, power and sovereignty?

Unit Aims

  • Explain the problems and politics of defining and conceptualising terrorism and violent extremism.

  • Evaluate the importance of the specificity of particular case studies in debates about terrorism and violent extremism – how it is constructed as a global, national or sub-national threat and as a particular or unique form of political violence.

  • Understand the various theories regarding causative/driving factors behind terrorism and violent extremism, and identify the social, economic and political conditions in which it has emerged.

  • Hypothesize the implications and effectiveness of specific ways of thinking about terrorism and violent extremism for counterterrorism/violent extremism practices and policy using concrete examples.

  • Examine the political dynamics and historical and contemporary impacts of counter-terrorism and counter-violent-extremism.

Conceptualising Terrorism and Violent Extremism

  • Walter Lacquer (The Age of Terrorism, 1987): “a comprehensive definition of terrorism … does not exist nor will it be found in the foreseeable future. To argue that terrorism cannot be studied without such a definition (however) is manifestly absurd”

  • Can we identify an objective definition of terrorism, and is it an analytically useful term…or, is inherently and hopelessly partisan, political and politicised?

'Yes we can'

  • Actor and ‘legitimacy’ based definitions: terrorism is unlawful political violence carried out by non-state groups or individuals.

  • Ideological: terrorism is a violent manifestation of ‘extremist’ ideologies and worldviews in which violence is considered necessary/legitimate.

  • Legalistic: governments commonly defines it as “the unlawful use of, or threatened use of violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies as to the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological’. (US State Department definition)

  • Political: it is violence conducted by enemies, rivals or actors labelled as illegitimate, immoral etc.

'No we can’t'

  • Terrorism is not an ‘objective’ phenomenon, but contextually determined.

  • It is an emotive, subjective and partisan term, part of an often dangerous politics of labelling.

  • Defining terrorism as ‘unlawful’ violence is another way of saying that there are equivalent forms of violence that are lawful and ‘legitimate’, making it an issue of power, not the act itself. State terrorism is a case in point.

Problems of Definition

  • There is no universal agreement on the definition of terrorism among governments, international organisations or scholars.

  • Efforts at resolving the ‘definitional quagmire’ surrounding ‘terrorism’ are characterized by a number of common and important issues.

  • Major definitional assumptions include:

    • Claims to objectivity which ignore subjective and emotive baggage which shapes our understanding (i.e. ascribing all acts of a disliked/enemy groups as ‘terrorist’)

    • Over-generalizations, which ignore historical and geographical specificity

    • Actor-specific definitions (i.e. ‘terrorism is violence done by non state actors’)

    • Failing to separate the description and condemnation of terrorism (i.e. ‘terrorism is senseless violence’)

Is terrorism an analytically useful term?

‘No, it isn’t’

  • Labelling acts of political violence or other behaviors as ‘terrorism’ occurs in complex fields of meaning, culture, conflict and power, making it not analytically coherent as a concept.

  • It is intertwined with emotion and subjectivity tending towards simplification and political manipulation and abuse.

‘Yes it is!’

  • An agreed concept is possible and useful, with distinct characteristics identifiable across variable examples.

  • It is not going to disappear from political vocabulary so we should attempt to establish precise, coherent definitions as baselines.

  • Without ‘a set of theoretical frameworks to guide the field’, terrorism and violent extremism research ‘will always tend to drift into a form of journalistic speculation’

Towards working definition(s): characteristics of terrorist violence

  • Shanahan: “Terrorism’ is the strategically indiscriminate harming or threat of harming members of a target group in order to influence the beliefs and/or emotions of an audience group in ways judged to be conducive to the advancement of some political, ideological, social, economic, religious, or military agenda”. Critical Studies on Terrorism 3(2):173-190

    • Proposes that it involves harm and particular kinds of threats, but not necessarily violence.

  • Reflected in Australian government’s definition: ‘A terrorist act is an act, or a threat to act, that…. intends to coerce or influence the public or any government by intimidation to advance a political, religious or ideological cause.’

  • While the US Government definition reflects actor bases bias: "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents".

  • Are these an analytically defendable definition? Too broad? What basis for defining one act as terror and another not?

Cynthia Combs (1997)

Terrorism, as distinct from other kinds of violence, is an act composed of at least four crucial elements:

  1. It is an act of violence

  2. It has a political motive or goal

  3. It is perpetrated against civilian non-combatants, and

  4. It is staged to be played before an audience whose reaction of fear and terror is the desired result

Towards a working definition: characteristics of terrorist violence

  • ‘Terrorism is politically motivated violence’ (but not all politically motivated violence is terrorism)

    • This is in contrast for example to criminal violence such as extortion, bribery etc.

    • As such it has a political motive: to publicise a cause or grievance, forcing a change in a government or prevailing socio-political or legal order, forcing compliance or acquiescence, to instigate popular social and political upheaval or revolution, or to intimidate or subjugate a population to enforce compliance of some kind.

    • Debates within this over what constitutes ‘political motive’. Could domestic violence, for example, be considered as ‘terroristic’?

Towards a working definition: characteristics of terrorist violence

  • ‘Terrorism is a form of symbolic communication’

    • ‘Senseless’ is a term often used to describe terrorist violence, however violence always makes a statement of some kind.

    • This symbolic dimension is why terrorist acts often target places or people of symbolic rather than purely instrumental value or importance

Towards a working definition: characteristics of terrorist violence

  • ‘Terrorist violence instrumentalises its victims’

    • Terrorism is the intentional use or threat of violence against individuals or groups who are victimized for the purpose of intimidating or frightening a broader audience.

    • So integral to this is that the direct victims are then, not necessarily the main targets of the acts of violence but are instrumental to the primary goal of frightening or intimidating the watching audience who are intimidated/affected through the communicative power of this violence.

When is it terrorism? Lindt Café siege, Sydney, 15-16 December 2014

  • On 15 December 2014, nearly 20 years after he arrived in Australia from Iran, Man Haron Monis took 18 people hostage in the Lindt Café in Sydney and announced that Australia was ‘under attack by the Islamic State’.

  • After a 16-hour siege Monis shot dead one of his hostages, precipitating the police ‘emergency action’ which broke the siege resulting in the death of Monis and another hostage..

  • Although Monis had been a prolific user of the Internet and social media, subsequent Coroner’s inquest found that Monis made little sophisticated preparation for the siege, did not announce his intention nor did leave any clear politically-inspired message or martyrdom video.

  • Monis made no specific demands, other than demanding a debate with the Prime Minister on radio and to have the Islamic State flag delivered to the café.

  • At the time of the siege Monis was on bail, charged with multiple sex offences against women, alleged to have been committed whilst he held himself out as a ‘spiritual healer’.

When is it terrorism?

  • Monis also charged with being an accessory to the murder of his former partner and had recently failed to obtain custody of his two Australian born children.

  • Professed status as a Shi’a Muslim cleric was fraudulent. He is alleged to have converted to Sunni Islam days earlier.

  • Forensic examination of the internet and social media found no evidence that Monis ever had contact with Islamic State or any other terrorist organisation.

  • It was designated by government as terrorist incident who argued it necessitated strengthening Australia’s counter terrorism regime, including giving police shoot to kill powers.

  • Some media outlets described it as “The day international terrorism came to Australia”

  • Many experts argued against the utility and accuracy of defining it as a terrorist incident due to lack of key defining characteristics.

  • Critics suggested terrorism label unnecessarily instigated an Islamophobic moral panic, capitalized upon by far-right groups

When is a group ‘violent extremist’ or ‘terrorist’?

  • ‘Terrorist’ is not just used to describe an act of violence, but also to entire groups and organisations. Most governments have lists of proscribed terrorist groups, which are regularly updated.

  • Is it useful or accurate however, to characterise an organisation, solely by its use or alleged use or support for, violence? What are the analytical, policy and security implications?

According to Australia’s Attorney General’s Department, a terrorist organisation is one that:

  1. A court finds is directly or indirectly engaged in preparing, planning, assisting or fostering the doing of a terrorist act or

  2. the government has listed as a terrorist organisation by regulations.

The Australian government can list an organisation as a terrorist organisation if the Minister for Home Affairs is satisfied that it:

  • is engaged in preparing, planning, assisting or fostering the doing of a terrorist act or

  • advocates the doing of a terrorist act.

  • An organisation advocates the doing of a terrorist act if it directly or indirectly:

    • counsels, promotes, encourages or urges the doing of a terrorist act

    • gives instruction on the doing of a terrorist act

    • directly praises the doing of a terrorist act, where there is a substantial risk that this praise might lead someone to engage in a terrorist act.

And what about extremism?

  • USAID defines violent extremism as “advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic or political objectives”.

  • Berger has defined extremism as “the belief that an in-group's success or survival is inseparable from the need for hostile action against an out-group”.

  • Unlike terrorism, which is an act of violence, violent extremism can refer to idea, beliefs or advocacy, so advocating for acts of political violence, but not necessarily directly engaging in these. It is inherently relational

  • It presents a conceptually and often legally grey area, where the line between notions of extremist, heterodox, or even simply offensive, political views, and ‘violent extremism’ are often ambiguous or situationally determined.

Case of Hamas

  • Hamas, an Arabic acronym for the Islamic Resistance Movement, is a Palestinian organization formed in the 1980s emerging out of Gaza refugee camps.

  • Its stated objectives are to liberate historical Palestine from Israeli occupation, illegal annexation and the imposition of blockades. Hamas does not recognise Israel’s statehood but accepts a Palestinian state on 1967 borders.

  • It has fought numerous conflicts with Israel, including the use of bombings and suicide attacks, which it claims as legitimate resistance to Israeli aggression and illegal occupation/annexation. This includes the attack of 7 October 2023. The subsequent destruction of Gaza by Israel in response has been labelled as genocide and constituting of war crimes by the International Court of Justice.

  • Initially consisting of a military wing and social services programs, in 2005 it engaged in the political process winning legislative elections with a strong majority in Gaza. There have not been elections since.

  • In February 2022 Australian followed the US, UK and Israel in proscribing the entirety of Hamas as a terrorist organisation. Previously only its military wing, the al-Qassam Brigades, was listed as such.

    • Aus. Gov rationale: Hamas preaches ‘hateful’ ideology, is organizationally linked to military wing involved in violence, and has praised acts of violence.

    • Critics: unnecessarily alienates non-violent and parliamentary elements of a societal-wide organization with significant support that is intertwined with Palestinian nationalism, ensuring escalation and foreclosing dialogue or compromise. Legitimates discourse of ‘elimination’ that translates into catastrophic violence. Representation of Hamas in the proscription is simplistic, debatable. Serves to suppress legitimate pro-Palestinian activism and nationalism, becomes a means for legitimating force, violence and criminalization over negotiated settlement.

  • Poses questions regarding:

    • Political subjectivity and role of political alliances in determining ‘terrorism’ proscriptions. Is it a case of taking sides in a conflict, and delegitimizing all violence, defensive or otherwise, by one side? How does this compare to the labelling of historic independence guerillia groups resisting European colonization.

    • The strategic and security implications of doing so. Does it undermine possibilitiues of negotiated settlement and hence some political outcomes?

Case of Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (People’s Defence Units)

  • YPG are Kurdish defence units/militias in northeastern Syria. Formed in 2011 it expanded significantly during the Syrian civil war, later affiliating with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). It had significant wins against ISIS, receiving air and ground support from the United States

  • YPG and affiliated groups (in particular the PKK: Kurdish Workers Party) are designated terrorist by Turkey and Qatar the result of long-running conflict between Turkish state and Kurdish groups seeking political independence and a Kurdish homeland.

  • The US also lists the YPG-linked PKK as a terrorist organisation. This however did not prevent it working closely with YPG in the struggle against ISIS. The YPG later claimed the US deserted it once ISIS had been defeated, with Turkey resuming military and bombing attacks on YPG held territory.

  • The case of the Kurdish YPG poses questions regarding the political use of terrorist designaitons by states, posing questions such as:

    • What contexts can result in organisations being listed, or delisted, as ‘terrorist’ and what can this tell us regarding terrorist designations and strategic interest.

Mexican drug cartels

  • Trump administration recently labelled 8 cartels as foreign terrorist organisations

  • Traditionally cartels not labelled as terrorist groups because their primary motivation is financial gain, rather than political or ideological objectives.

  • Doing so may widen range of those who can be targeted, including for ‘material support’

  • Concerns will be used as pretext for US military strikes/intervention in Mexican territory

  • Implications for asylum seekers: could make easier to win US asylum claims on basis fleeing terrorist org. or could expose to prosecution if paying cartel smugglers.

  • Mexican government argues emphasis of US should be on crime mitigation ie managing flows of arms into Mexico and illicit drug demand which serve to arm and enrich the cartels.

  • Poses questions regarding:

    • Terrorism proscription as pretext for use of military force.

    • Terrorism proscription enabling, but also bypassing, particular kinds of anti-criminal and law enforcement

What difference does it make?

  • In many countries terrorism is listed as an extraordinary crime, and so subject to measures, penalties and processes outside of existing criminal law, including due process presumptions, certain rights of the accused and sentencing provisions.

  • Designation of an incident as ‘terrorist’ often entails mobilisation of extra-legal powers and resources i.e state of emergency powers and the jurisdiction of different security apparatus (i.e. specialist CT forces, federal agencies, secret services etc

  • Demarcated terrorist incidents often precipitate the introduction of specific counter-terrorism measures, powers and resource allocations

  • Labelling an act terrorist has widespread impacts on public perceptions, anxiety and fear. It can in some instance result in upsurges in hate speech or reciprocal and copycat acts.

And what difference does it make?

  • Designations can be politically subjective and reflective of political bias.

  • Proscribing organisations as terrorist/violent-extremist can result in a zero-sum approach, i.e. ‘elimination’, foreclosing possibilities of dialogue or negotiation which are integral to violence mitigation and de-escalation.

  • Designations are often intertwined with broader political contexts and discourses i.e. anti-migration and multi-culturalism discourse, xenophobic & populist sentiment, political alliances and interests etc, which may prioritise instrumental political utility over genuine security.

  • Extremism and its definition, and its links to violence are not linear, nor definitive. Risks emerge of criminalization of marginal or oppositional worldviews, furthering illiberalism.

  • Misplaced targeting can produce what it aims to prevent, as seen in reciprocal radicalization and receptiveness to violence as a reaction to unjust treatment.