Course focus: Examination of key philosophers and their concepts.
Context of discussions surrounding mind, body, and the nature of reality.
Born: 1623; Died: 1673.
Wealthy upbringing; largely self-educated.
Served Queen Henrietta Maria from 1642 to 1660.
Married William Cavendish, living in France and the Netherlands during the English Civil War.
Published Works:
Poems and Fancies (1653)
Philosophical Fancies (1653)
Philosophical and Physical Opinions (1655)
Philosophical Letters (1664)
Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy (1666)
Grounds of Natural Philosophy (1668)
1667: First woman invited to observe experiments at the Royal Society.
Materialism:
All of nature is the same substance (matter).
Mind and human beings are material as well.
Vitalism:
Nature is alive and possesses degrees of sensation and thought.
Self-Motion:
Motion is inherent in all material things; self-caused, not externally imposed.
Cavendish vs. Descartes:
Materialism (Cavendish): All entities are made of matter.
Dualism (Descartes): Mind (immaterial) and body (material) are distinct.
Cavendish criticizes mechanistic metaphysics that views matter as passive.
Argues all material things are alive and interactive.
Descartes’s view of matter: passive, needing external cause to move.
Leads to infinite regress of external movers.
Challenges to conceptualize interaction without a substance transfer.
Cavendish posits a theory where all motion comes from within the material itself.
Object motion can be attributed to inherent properties of the objects rather than external forces.
Cavendish argues motion cannot be transferred from one body to another.
Every object possesses its own motion independent of external influences.
Principal Causes: The inherent motion and actions of materials (e.g., a bowl moving due to its own capacity).
Occasional Causes: External influences that may trigger motion without being the source of that motion (e.g., a hand throwing a ball).
Cavendish's view provides a unique challenge to Cartesian dualism by:
Asserting that both mind and body are material and capable of motion and sensation.
Suggesting that interaction occurs within a unified material substance.
Cavendish unifies nature under materialism tied to vitalism, proposing that all parts of nature are alive and in motion.
Rejects mechanistic views that consider matter as inert, offering a comprehensive theory of self-motion for explaining physical phenomena.
Challenges Cartesian reliance on immaterial substance with her robust materialist claims.
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