Strategy and Grand Strategy: National Object and Military Aim Notes
Distinction Between Political Object and Military Aim
Fundamental Relationship Between War and Policy:
Nations do not wage war for the sake of fighting, but in pursuit of political policy.
The military objective is merely the means to achieve a political end; therefore, it must always be governed by the political objective.
Policy must never demand what is militarily or practically impossible.
Strategic study must begin and end with the question of political policy.
Terminology and Definitions:
The Object: Refers strictly to the purpose of policy. The universal object in war is a better state of peace, evaluated from one's own perspective. This applies equally to aggressor nations seeking territorial expansion and peaceful nations fighting for self-preservation.
The Military Aim: Refers to the specific direction and application of armed forces in service of the political object.
Physical or geographical terms like "objective" confuse thought by obscuring the functional distinction between policy goals and military means.
Historical Failure of Military Thought:
Gaining a military victory is not equivalent to gaining the political object of policy.
Because war theory has historically been dominated by military professionals, leaders have repeatedly identified the national object with the military aim.
Consequently, once hostilities commence, political policy is frequently subordinated to the military aim, treating military operations as an end in themselves rather than a instrument of state policy.
Historical Evolution of Military Doctrine and Clausewitz's Influence
The Canon of Main Force Destruction:
For over a century, the primary canon of military doctrine held that "the destruction of the enemy's main forces on the battlefield" constituted the sole true aim in war.
This canon was universally accepted, codified in military manuals, and taught in all staff colleges.
Statesmen who questioned whether this dogma suited the national object under specific circumstances were treated as committing heresy against established military doctrine.
Great commanders prior to the nineteenth century recognized the practical necessity and wisdom of adapting military aims to limitations of strength and political policy.
Prussian System and Rigid Dogmatism:
The rigidity of this doctrine stemmed largely from the posthumous influence of Karl von Clausewitz on Prussian soldiers, notably Helmuth von Moltke.
Prussian military victories in 1866 and 1870 led armies worldwide to copy the Prussian system and adopt Clausewitzian theory.
Misinterpretation of Clausewitzian Philosophy:
Clausewitz's disciples carried his teachings to extremes he never intended.
Having studied Immanuel Kant second-hand, Clausewitz adopted a philosophical mode of expression without developing a fully coherent philosophical mind.
His abstract and involved theories were difficult for concrete military minds to follow, leading readers to grasp vivid surface phrases while missing his deeper intent.
Detailed Analysis of Clausewitzian Theories and Limitations
Contributions to War Theory:
Highlighted psychological factors, arguing against the prevailing geometrical school of strategy by demonstrating that the human spirit was far more important than operational lines and angles.
Deeply analyzed the operational effects of danger, fatigue, boldness, and determination.
Errors and Strategic Blind Spots:
Maintained an overly continental outlook, failing to comprehend the strategic mechanism and impact of sea-power.
Declared on the eve of the mechanical era his conviction that superiority in numbers becomes every day more decisive.
Reinforced the instinctive conservatism of military authorities against technological innovation.
Gave a powerful impetus to universal conscription, creating mass armies that disregarded psychological suitability and were highly susceptible to panic and collapse.
Functioned as a codifying thinker rather than a creative or dynamic theorist; he introduced no progressive strategic or tactical concepts comparable to the eighteenth-century divisional system or twentieth-century armored mobility.
Theory of the Military Aim (Ideal vs. Reality):
Defined the theoretical aim of war as complete disarmament: "The aim of all action in war is to disarm the enemy… the complete disarming or overthrow of the enemy must always be the aim of warfare."
Exhibited Kantian dualism by distinguishing between abstract theoretical perfection and real-world execution: "This object of war in the abstract, the disarming of the enemy, is rarely attained in practice and is not a condition necessary to peace."
Expressed battle as the sole physical means ("There is only one single means, it is the fight"), yet admitted that the object of combat is not always destruction and can often be attained without combat occurring.
Warned of self-destructive recoil: "The waste of our own military forces must, ceteris paribus, always be greater the more our aim is directed upon the destruction of the enemy's power. The danger lies in this—that the greater efficacy which we seek recoils on ourselves, and therefore has worse consequences in case we fail of success."
Distortion by Disciples:
Disciples ignored his practical qualifications and seized entirely on his extreme abstract rhetoric, such as:
"We have only one means in war—the battle."
"The bloody solution of the crisis, the effort for the destruction of the enemy's forces, is the first-born son of war."
"Only great and general battles can produce great results."
"Let us not hear of generals who conquer without bloodshed."
Deprived strategy of maneuver, reducing the art of war to mechanical mass-slaughter.
Decried the idea of overcoming an enemy without great bloodshed as an error to be extirpated, contradicting classical commanders and Napoleon.
Flaws and Failure of Unlimited Application of Force ("Absolute War")
The Doctrine of Absolute War:
Proclaimed that success required the unlimited application of force: "To introduce into the philosophy of war a principle of moderation would be an absurdity. War is an act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds."
This concept formed the theoretical foundation for modern total warfare, fitting a hate-maddened mob rather than intelligent statecraft.
Subversion of Policy:
Subordinated national policy to strategy, and specifically to flawed strategy.
Disregarded the principle that war must be conducted for post-war benefit; expending national strength to exhaustion bankrupts policy.
Contradicted Clausewitz's own qualification that the political object must determine both the military aim and the scale of effort.
Posthumous Publication and Influence:
Clausewitz died of cholera in 1830 after twelve years spent writing On War.
Manuscripts were published posthumously by his widow from sealed packets bearing his warning that the unformed material was open to endless misconceptions.
Uncorrected doctrines directly influenced the causation and suicidal character of World War I, leading logically to World War II.
Post-World War I Theoretical Flux and Technological Developments
Lessons of World War I:
Protracted battlefield attrition drained national strength without delivering decisive military results.
The final German collapse in 1918 was caused more by economic pressure and food shortages from sea-power, alongside moral breakdown following failed offensives, than by physical destruction in battle.
Victors were left morally and physically exhausted, incapable of consolidating a stable post-war peace.
Emergence of New Strategic Vectors:
Sea-Power: Demonstrated that economic pressure could secure decisions without a single decisive naval battle.
Air Power: Introduced the ability to strike directly at civil, economic, and moral centers by bypassing opposing armies ("knight's move" combined with "queen's flexibility").
Mechanized Land Forces: Combined internal combustion engines and caterpillar tracks to enable deep armored penetration ("queen's move"). Bypassed main forces to sever supply lines, disrupt control systems, and induce structural collapse through operational shock.
Paralysis versus Destruction:
Nullifying an opponent's capability by paralyzing their vital control organs is far more economical than physical destruction through sustained tactical combat.
Shifted primary strategic emphasis from tactical combat to high-mobility maneuver.
Practical Execution in World War II
Mechanized Operations:
Poland (1939): 6 mechanized divisions were instrumental in collapsing the state within weeks.
Western Campaign (1940): 10 mechanized divisions decided the Battle of France in barely a month with minimal casualties, long before main German infantry masses engaged.
Balkans (April 1941): Rapid conquest achieved primarily through maneuver and paralysis rather than classical battle.
Eastern Front Operational Dilemma (1941):
Conflict arose between Adolf Hitler (who favored economic objectives) and General Staff leadership under Franz Halder (who insisted on classical battle destruction).
Heinz Guderian advocated rapid deep drives toward moral and economic centers (Moscow and Leningrad).
Hitler sided with orthodox staff officers to pursue battlefield destruction; despite capturing and destroying massive Soviet forces, the strategy failed to achieve a decisive end to the war.
Air Power Operations:
Tactical and strategic coordination between air and armored ground forces proved vital in achieving rapid structural paralysis during Blitzkrieg operations.
Allied air forces critically crippled German transportation and communication networks, enabling the successful 1944 invasion of Continental Europe.
Strategic vs. Grand Strategic Bombing
Definitions and Scope:
Independent air operations directed against industrial and civil targets are improperly called "strategic bombing"; they belong to the realm of grand strategy and should be designated "grand strategic bombing" or "industrial bombing".
Intended to achieve direct economic and moral collapse more quickly than surface action against armed forces.
Evaluation of Effectiveness:
Data regarding industrial bombing is heavily obscured by partisan assessments and unquantifiable variables.
Results fell consistently short of air staff claims and proved far less decisive than air operations directed against strategic military objectives like communications.
Produced severe, long-term social, moral, and physical destruction that compromised post-war recovery, a danger multiplied exponentially by the atomic bomb.
Author's Intellectual Evolution and Revision of Strategy
Early Formulation (1925):
In Paris, or Future of War (1925), criticized World War I attrition and advocated for:
Armored strikes against command and communication centers.
Air strikes directly against static civilian industrial targets.
Adopted by the British General Staff for the Experimental Mechanized Force (1927) and heavily utilized by the Air Staff.
T. E. Lawrence's Commentary (1928):
In a 1928 letter, T. E. Lawrence noted that Clausewitz's complete logical system misled disciples who preferred physical fighting over maneuver, predicting that corrective efforts would overshoot and require future rebalancing.
Subsequent Revision and Correction:
Later research demonstrated that air strikes on industrial centers produce prolonged economic attrition rather than rapid victory.
Industrial bombing inflicts severe damage on post-war stability; states must remember that "the enemy of to-day is the customer of the morrow and the ally of the future."
Reaffirmed that while civil targets are improper military aims, armies must not return to Clausewitzian battlefield bloodletting.
Core Principles of the Revised Strategic Aim
Rejection of Battle as an End:
"Battle" in its classical sense is an obsolete term and must not be treated as the ultimate aim of strategy.
Strategy must dominate tactics, using mobility and fluid movement to disarm tactical resistance.
Definitive Rule of Strategic Aim:
The true aim of strategy is not to seek battle, but to establish a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce a decision, its continuation by battle guarantees victory.