Chapter 1 Notes: The Crime Control Enterprise

The Crime Control Enterprise

    This chapter introduces the idea that the criminal justice system operates as a complex, interlinked enterprise—akin to a criminal justice-industrial complex—driven not only by public safety goals but also by powerful political, economic, and social interests. The comparison to Eisenhower’s warning about the military-industrial complex helps frame how defense and security‑related industries can influence policy when insulated from public view and accountability. The text notes that prior to World War II the United States had no permanent armaments industry; after the war, a large, state‑backed, private‑sector apparatus emerged, raising concerns about the entrenchment of power that could threaten liberties and democratic processes. A parallel argument is made for the criminal justice system: since the 1970s a drastic buildup—especially prisons and corrections—has created a prison‑industrial complex. This is not portrayed as a single conspiracy, but as a confluence of political, bureaucratic, and economic interests that incentivize more imprisonment and the expansion of related markets. The result is a system that, while capable of delivering justice, also generates and sustains social problems—and profits for some—from policing to private prison companies, with conventions and markets that normalize the exchange of goods and services around punishment. The key question throughout is who benefits from public policy and who bears the costs, an approach captured in the refrain to “follow the money.”

The chapter highlights that the prison‑industrial complex became especially salient during the wars on crime and drugs, with private prison companies formed to profit from incarceration and a US market in corrections that is measured not only in public expenditures but in the size of the workforce. Table 1.1 (below) provides a snapshot of expenditures, payroll, and employment in the criminal justice system, underscoring the scale of the enterprise. Total criminal justice expenditures exceed $304.6$, $66.4$, and $89.2$ billion in the categories of Police, Judicial and Legal, and Corrections, respectively, while payrolls total $149.0$, $3.0$, and $3.6$ billion for those same categories. The system employs roughly $2{,}447{,}000$ police, $497{,}000$ judicial staff, and $758{,}000$ corrections personnel. The public‑policy implication is clear: a large, growing, and profitable industry shapes policy choices and the distribution of public resources. The text emphasizes that these expenditures and employment figures do not reflect related private security and other security occupations, which further widens the scope of the enterprise.

The phrase “bodies destined for profitable punishment” (Leighton and Selman 2018) captures a core tension: as the industry expands, it creates large lobbying power and economies of scale that push for more punishment, which deepens racial, class, and gendered inequalities. This dynamic makes reform politically difficult because a broad coalition—spanning liberal and conservative politicians, rural economies dependent on prisons, and private companies seeking profits—gains from the status quo. The chapter also describes how the war on drugs and crime catalyzed the militarization of policing, including the expansion of SWAT teams and other militarized units, and how defensive technologies and logistics have diffused from the Department of Defense to local law enforcement through programs like the 1033 program (officially enabling transfer of surplus military equipment to police). The militarized approach has been linked to broader social costs, including increased violence and the targeting of minority communities. The narrative also traces the post‑9/11 expansion of a security‑industrial complex (SIC) that integrates criminal justice, private security, military, and intelligence activities, driven by fear of crime, minorities, and immigration. The text also notes the growth of the troubled teen industry (wilderness camps, military‑style schools, conversion therapies, etc.), which largely operates unregulated and has a history of abuse. These components together form what the authors call the security‑industrial complex (SIC), the crime control enterprise, and the broader political economy of punishment.

The chapter argues that understanding criminal justice policy requires looking beyond evidence‑based debates about deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and retribution to consider who benefits financially and politically from criminal justice policies. Following the money reveals incentives that may sustain punitive practices even when social outcomes worsen or reforms are possible. The narrative also links these dynamics to other social and economic processes, including the media’s role in shaping public fear, and the way the criminal justice system intersects with broader market forces and political power.

Trends and Power Dynamics

This section previews several broad, interlocking trends that shape the criminal justice enterprise and the distribution of power within society. These trends reflect and reproduce social inequalities, while also creating new opportunities for control, surveillance, and profit. The trends discussed include climate change, globalization and neoliberalism, immigration, militarization, privatization and revenue generation, and cybercrime and the emergence of a pre‑crime society. Each trend is connected to the central question: who benefits from policies, and who bears the costs?

Climate Change/Climate Crisis

Climate change is framed as a critical justice issue because it will disproportionately affect marginalized groups, intensifying existing inequities and increasing social disorder. Greenhouse gas emissions from burning fossil fuels are linked to higher death rates, illness, and ecological damage, with disproportionate impacts on poorer neighborhoods—e.g., urban heat islands can be up to approximately $20^ ext{o}F$ hotter than surrounding areas (urban heat island effect). Climate harms are expected to cascade through food security, infrastructure, disease, and disaster response systems. Mental health consequences are significant for youth: a cross‑national survey of 10,000 youths found that nearly 60 ext{%} felt very or extremely worried about climate change, with substantial shares feeling helpless, afraid, or betrayed by government inaction, and with more than 45 ext{%} reporting negative effects on daily functioning (Hickman et al. 2021). The climate crisis also intersects with justice concerns through gender‑based violence in disaster contexts and the broader political economy of social supports cut by neoliberal policies. In the Juliana v. U.S. case, young plaintiffs argued that government actions promoting fossil fuels violated constitutional rights to life, liberty, and property, and equal protection, by contributing to climate harm and discriminating against children and future generations (Juliana v. U.S. 2015; 2020). While the appellate court rejected standing for the plaintiffs, it acknowledged the federal government’s long knowledge of fossil fuel risks and its affirmative promotion of fossil fuel use via tax provisions, permits, subsidies, and leases (Juliana v. U.S. 2020). The climate crisis thus illustrates how corporate and government actions—often justified in terms of economic interests or “the free market”—produce harms that the criminal justice enterprise must navigate, from disaster response to punitive policy responses.

Globalization and Neoliberalism

Globalization refers to increasing interdependence across borders in finance, trade, information, and people. While it brings benefits, it often produces a “race to the bottom” in regulatory standards, creating environmental, labor, and tax costs and concentrating corporate power. Transnational crime and illicit markets expand with globalization, including trafficking, drugs, counterfeit goods, and money laundering; consequently, crime control must also become transnational. The rise of corporate power relative to government power is a central feature of neoliberalism, characterized by deregulation, privatization of public services, tax cuts for the wealthy, and reductions in social spending. By shifting wealth and decision‑making power toward corporations, neoliberalism enlarges income and wealth inequality and reinforces social hierarchies along class, race, and gender lines. The chapter argues that inequality has intensified in the pandemic era, with billionaire wealth increasing dramatically even as many people fall into poverty. Neoliberal ideology often frames social problems as individual failings rather than systemic issues, a narrative that privatizes solutions and legitimizes prevailing power structures. The section also notes how technology platforms and financial institutions reflect a broader pattern: private platforms moderate content and financial services, often shaping public discourse and access to resources in ways that align with corporate interests. The net effect is a concentration of power that shapes criminal justice policy and its outcomes, while reframing social problems as individual deficits rather than systemic injustices.

Inequality is highlighted as a core consequence of globalization and neoliberalism, with examples ranging from stagnant wages for most workers to skyrocketing wealth for a small elite (e.g., the world’s ten richest men’s fortunes increasing dramatically during the pandemic). The authors emphasize that such structural forces underpin crime rates and the social conditions that drive crime, challenging simplistic explanations that focus on individual choices alone. They also critique the way contemporary media stories celebrate individual perseverance and success in the face of structural barriers, which obscures the systemic roots of problems like homelessness, healthcare access, and education funding.

Immigration

Immigration is framed as a central site where global dynamics and domestic policy intersect with criminal justice. The United States has a long history of tension among anti‑immigrant sentiment, labor needs, and democratic ideals. The text introduces the idea of racialized mobility regimes—policies shaped by race, ethnicity, and national origin that determine entry, residence, work, and citizenship rights. Since 1990 the immigrant population has surged, rising from about $20 ext{ million}$ to over $45 ext{ million}$, with the combined immigrant and U.S.‑born children totaling roughly $86 ext{ million}$ people (about 26% of the U.S. population). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has expanded, with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) becoming a large civilian police force and ICE’s information‑gathering capabilities growing through access to private data and state/local records. Such surveillance infrastructures enable detailed dossiers on many people, often linked to routine activities like getting a driver’s license or utilities.

Anti‑immigration measures are frequently justified by fear of crime, but research shows that immigration is not associated with higher crime rates; in many cases, it is associated with lower rates of crime. From the 1990s onward, Latinx immigration rose while street crime fell. Reviews from the Sentencing Project and other organizations, as well as a variety of researchers, indicate that undocumented immigrants are less likely to be arrested for violent crimes than U.S.‑born citizens, illustrating the so‑called immigrant paradox. Nevertheless, immigration enforcement has become increasingly aggressive, a trend called crimmigration, which expands grounds for removal, reduces due‑process protections, imposes long sentences for border crossers, and weakens relief opportunities. The term “Juan Crow” captures the disproportionate impact on Latinx populations. The chapter emphasizes that criminalizing immigration makes immigrant communities more vulnerable to victimization (e.g., underreporting due to fear of deportation) and can undermine public safety by eroding trust between police and communities. Some cities adopt sanctuary policies to limit cooperation with federal deportation efforts, which some research finds do not threaten public safety. The discussion also notes the broader political and media narratives that sometimes sensationalize Latino crime while ignoring evidence that immigrants, including undocumented individuals, are often less prone to serious crime than natives.

The text also discusses civil vs criminal offenses in immigration law, noting that illegal entry is a civil matter and that many undocumented individuals contribute to communities and economies. The interplay of immigration enforcement with criminal policy is described as a major area where the criminal justice enterprise intersects with border control, labor markets, and national security.

Militarization

Militarization of policing has deep roots in expanding police capabilities and adopting military culture and equipment. The chapter traces the U.S. shift from Peel’s policing ideals (crime prevention, public support, minimal force) to a modern emphasis on militarized policing, especially after the 1960s civil unrest. Militarism is defined as a belief system that valorizes force and military power as primary problem‑solving tools. The text cites Kraska’s view that war‑like policing blurs the line between war and law enforcement, creating a system in which civilian police and military practices become interchangeable. The growth of SWAT and Special Response Teams (SRTs) is highlighted: in 1983, only 13% of towns with populations 25k–50k had a SWAT team; by 30 years later, nearly 90% did. Originally reactive, these units became proactive and used to raid for drugs, gambling, public order offenses, and even minor infractions. Local police departments now receive training and support from veterans and former military personnel, contributing to an economy built around weaponry, armor, vehicles, and related services—often reinforced by asset‑forfeiture laws. This militarization has correlated with increased violence, including the use of no‑knock or rapid raids that can endanger residents and officers and raise the likelihood of confrontations.

The militarization logic extends to responses to protests, especially Black Lives Matter demonstrations. While most crowds are peaceful, persistent stereotypical portrayals of crowds as dangerous can escalate tensions and justify aggressive policing. The discussion also critiques the idea that protests themselves are inherently irrational or violent, arguing that many demonstrations express legitimate grievances against systemic inequality and police violence. The chapter notes that community policing—rooted in Peel’s principles—faces challenges when officers are trained in action‑oriented, militaristic settings, leading to an “us vs. them” subculture that undermines cooperative problem solving.

Privatization and Revenue Collection

Privatization in criminal justice involves outsourcing government tasks to for‑profit firms, with conflicts between high profits and quality public services. The privatization of punishment began with the outsourcing of food and health services, but expanded in the 1980s to include the construction and management of prisons (operational privatization). Private prison companies have gone public, raising capital through stock markets and incurring large debts, which increases the focus on profit and can distort policy toward harsher measures. The industry’s power includes lobbying and campaign contributions, while workers’ conditions in private prisons are often poorer than in public facilities, contributing to turnover and performance issues, which can in turn affect inmate safety and treatment. The text argues that privatization shifts incentives away from rehabilitation and public welfare toward shareholder value, with consequences for fairness and justice. The broader political economy of punishment is thus shaped by private interests that benefit from higher incarceration rates, rather than necessarily by evidence of crime reduction.

In addition to prisons, privatization expands into housing for undocumented people and families, juvenile offenders, and the mentally ill, as well as private provision of healthcare, food services, electronic monitoring, and reentry programs. The result is a multi‑national, debt‑ridden private prison sector that worsens incentives for ever‑increasing confinement and expanded surveillance. The text emphasizes that this privatization is tied to the globalization of services and the broader privatization agenda of neoliberalism, which often prioritizes profits over public safety and justice. In the broader economy of punishment, private actors’ duty to maximize profits can conflict with the public good, raising questions about accountability and the effectiveness of policy reforms.

The chapter also discusses the expansion of fines and fees as a revenue stream for governments. Courts have increasingly served as revenue centers, with aggressive policing targeting minor offenses and imposing fines plus court fees. When individuals cannot pay, arrest warrants and further fees can trap them in debtors’ prison. Ferguson, Missouri, is used as a case study where DOJ findings showed officials pressuring police to issue citations to boost court revenue, revealing how municipal budgeting can be wired into punitive policing. This creates a coercive, revenue‑driven justice system that harms poorer residents and communities of color, with electronic monitoring and probation often substituting for more humane or effective reforms. The text argues that such predatory finance and outsourcing practices create a vast network of private companies profiting from the criminalization of poverty, while ensuring that public accountability is eroded and crime control remains financially self‑perpetuating.

Cybercrime and the “Pre‑Crime” Society

The digital age complicates traditional borders of jurisdiction and responsibility. Cybercrime involves cross‑border attacks where attackers leverage multiple countries to commit and launder crime online, making investigation and prosecution difficult. The Stuxnet virus is cited as a watershed moment, illustrating how cyber operations can target critical infrastructure (e.g., Iran’s nuclear program) and demonstrate both the potential for state‑sponsored cyber tools and the broader vulnerability of essential systems. The chapter notes the development of national cyber security leadership (e.g., a Cyber Czar) and specialized units (e.g., Cyber Command) to protect financial and critical infrastructure. Meanwhile, organized cybercrime has become professionalized, with malware developers and their customers collaborating in ways reminiscent of Silicon Valley firms, including bug reporting, feature proposals, and customer support—indicating sophisticated, legitimate‑sounding business practices within criminal activity.

The dark web is described as a marketplace for criminal goods and services (e.g., hard drugs, child exploitation, forged documents, counterfeit currency, weapons) with a high degree of anonymity. While the dark web is often sensationalized, it has legitimate uses and a set of self‑imposed safety rules in some marketplaces. Digital currencies—especially cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, Monero, and Zcash—facilitate anonymous or near‑anonymous transactions. Bitcoin began as an anonymous digital cash concept, but Know Your Customer (KYC) regulations and blockchain traceability have reduced anonymity, leading to the rise of privacy coins (Monero, Zcash) that obscure sender/receiver identities and transaction amounts while maintaining anti‑fraud protections.

Technological advances also enable the criminal justice system to pursue crime prevention through data mining and surveillance. The book describes a shift toward a “pre‑crime society” where risk assessment, dataveillance, predictive policing, crime analytics, and digital tracking attempt to forecast and prevent crime before it occurs. This reflects a broader securitization logic that treats citizens as data points and potential threats, potentially enabling broad oversight and control over everyday life. The concept of “life mining” and the creation of “data‑doubles” raises ethical and political concerns about privacy, civil liberties, and the legitimacy of decisions made on the basis of predictive indicators rather than actual behavior. Foucault’s warning about a “military dream of society” and the coercive potential of such systems is invoked to emphasize the trade‑offs between order and personal freedoms in a data‑driven security regime.

Implications and Synthesis

The introduction to Part II and Part III frames the overarching challenge: climate change, neoliberal globalization, immigration, militarization, privatization, and cybercrime collectively shape the criminal justice enterprise in ways that can either promote public good or deepen injustice. The enterprise can contribute to broader societal aims if reforms address root causes and social inequities; but it can also reinforce existing power structures if reforms focus narrowly on punishment or are captured by powerful interests. The authors argue that reform should not be limited to the criminal justice system alone; it must address the structural conditions of society that generate crime and vulnerability. They also stress the importance of diversity within the criminal justice workforce and leadership, arguing that a more representative and intersectional approach can improve legitimacy, fairness, and innovation within the field. The authors present an optimistic counterpoint: a justice system that reflects and understands diverse experiences may be better equipped to design policies that achieve both safety and equity, rather than simply expanding punishment.

Diversity, Inclusion, and the Structure of Knowledge

The chapter stresses two reasons why greater diversity among criminal justice professionals matters: (1) fairness and confidence—the system appears more legitimate when it mirrors the demographic composition of society; (2) substantive insight—women and people of color bring experiences and perspectives that can improve research, policy design, and teaching within criminology. The authors cite research showing that diverse groups tend to be more innovative than homogeneous groups. They caution against token representation, urging meaningful inclusion that ensures diverse voices influence policy and practice. The text also notes that Part II (Chapters 3–6) will examine how class, race, and gender/sexuality intersect and influence experiences with lawmaking, policing, prosecution, courts, and punishment, reinforcing the importance of an intersectional perspective for understanding and addressing injustices.

Table 1.1: Criminal Justice Expenditures, Payroll, and Employees (Illustrative Snapshot)

• Total Expenditures (in Billions USD): Police $304.6$, Judicial and Legal $66.4$, Corrections $89.2$.

• Employee Payroll (in Billions USD): Police $149.0$, Judicial $3.0$, Corrections $3.6$.

• Total Employees: Police $2{,}447{,}000$, Judicial $497{,}000$, Corrections $758{,}000$.

Source: BJS 2021d: tables 1 and 4. Note: Detail may not add to total due to rounding. Payroll as of March 2017 (latest available at time of publication). Employment rounded to nearest thousand.

The chapter also notes the broader payroll and expenditure figures, remarks that the totals exclude the troubled teen industry, private security, private detective work, and other related occupations, and emphasizes the scale of the enterprise—an indicator of the political economy of punishment and the incentives that shape policy choices.

Review and Discussion Questions

1) What is meant by the criminal justice‑industrial complex? Why do the authors advocate “following the money” as a way to understand criminal justice policy?
2) What are some ways that this idea, and seeing criminal justice as an industry, shifts the analysis of criminal justice practice and policy?
3) Why does this chapter discuss climate change? What are the justice issues involved with carbon criminals and climate crimes?
4) What are the concerns about globalization? What is neoliberalism, and what impact does it have on the criminal justice enterprise?
5) To what extent do immigrants contribute to the crime problem, and what is the effect of anti-immigrant policies?
6) What is militarization of the police and why is it a concern? Why do the authors criticize the idea that crowds, like those at protests, are “mad” or irrational? Why are they skeptical of the idea that Black Lives Matter protests led to increases in the crime rate?
7) How does the escalation of criminal justice fines and fees affect policing, courts, and justice?
8) Why is cybercrime such a challenge for the criminal justice system? What is the “pre-crime society” and why is it a concern?