Divine Command Theory and the Nature of Wrongness

Context: Jeffrey Stout has commented on an earlier paper by Adams (1973), urging development and modification of metaethical views.
Adams' Stance: He acknowledges a change in his views, indicating a different direction from Stout’s analysis.
Objective: To respond to Stout's insightful connection between metaethical issues and fundamental questions in meaning theory.

Definition: Proposed as a partial analysis of "(ethically) wrong" for specific religious believers (Jewish and Christian).
Implausibility Acknowledgement: The theory cannot serve as an analysis for all speakers, particularly non-believers.
Requirements under the Old Theory: 1. An action X is ethically wrong if and only if it contradicts God's commands. 2. The statement "X is wrong" typically signifies opposition or a negative attitude toward X.
Overdetermined Meaning: The definition of "wrong" appears complex, leading to potential conflicts in religious ethic beliefs.
Example of Conflict: If God commands cruelty, conflicting attitudes may arise: - Adams cannot genuinely oppose such a command because of the nature of the command.
Background Beliefs Required: - Key belief: God is loving (3), ensuring God does not command cruelty for its own sake, though logically possible. - If belief in God’s loving nature were to falter, Adams posits the concept of ethical wrongness would falter too.

Adjustment: Rather than just analyzing meaning, the wrongness is now identified with disobedience to God’s commands—universal across believers.

Theses Presented: 1. If X is wrong, then X contradicts God's commands (4). 2. If X is obligatory, it is required by God's commands (5). 3. If X is ethically permitted, it is permitted by God's commands (6). 4. If God is not loving, then nothing is ethically wrong, obligatory, or permitted (7).

Competence in Using 'Wrong': Not all users must know the nature of wrongness, but all should understand wrong as a property of actions.
General Usage: People can recognize ethical properties without fully comprehending their nature: - Plato’s Insight: The good is pursued despite a lack of clear definition (Republic 505D–E).
Agreement Among Users: - Users often overlap in their opinions and classifications of wrong actions, such as universally viewing child torture as wrong.

Analytical Considerations for Wrongness: 1. Wrongness should be seen as objective and not influenced merely by personal thoughts. 2. Theory should approximate pre-theoretical opinions on actions considered wrong. 3. Wrongness should causally influence perceptions of actions deemed wrong. 4. Understanding wrongness should yield more opposition to actions viewed as wrong. 5. The best theory should satisfy intuitions about wrongness and align with a higher law.

New Definition of Wrongness: Wrongness is defined as the property of acting against the commands of a loving God. - This theory claims metaphysical necessity but is not analytic or a priori.
Distinct Characters in Theory: - The commands of God are not just to be taken literally; they involve distinction between absolute and revealed will.

Command Recognition: Distinction in God’s commands leads to implications regarding moral actions: - Requires a theory of revelation to adequately discuss divine commands.
Metaphysical Necessity: If the property of wrongness aligns with God's commands, it must hold universally across possible worlds.

Contingency Argument: It may be argued that God's commands shape the nature of wrongness contingent on their attributes in various worlds.
Paradox of Non-Loving God: Without a loving God, ethical wrongness may appear non-existent but can still resonate as a concept in alternative worlds.

Philosophical Reflection: The nature of wrongness is deeply intertwined with perceptions of divine command, encapsulating both objective ethics and subjective human experience.

Adams, Robert Merrihew (1973). "A modified divine command theory of ethical wrongness." In Religion and Morality, eds. Gene Outka and John P. Reeder, Jr., 318–347. Garden City: Anchor.
Adams, Robert Merrihew (1979). "Moral arguments for theistic belief." In Rationality and Religious Belief, ed. C. F. Delaney. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Stout, Jeffrey L. (1978). "Metaethics and the death of meaning: Adams’ tantalizing closing." The Journal of Religious Ethics, Spring 6: 1-18.