Appraisal of the Period

International Environment and Dynamics

Globalization and Its Effects

Globalization is a result of the spread of Western infrastructure (international capitalism) and superstructure (rationalism, democracy, human/minority rights). The capitalistic model of production, based on private property and profit maximization, spread in two waves between the late 15th and mid-19th centuries. Interrupted for half a century due to WWI and ideological splits, globalization resumed in the 1980s, marking the third wave (Oran 2001, pp. 1–26).

The rise of multinational companies in the early 1970s economically underpinned this resumption. Organized to maximize profits globally, these companies spurred production and sales on a multinational scale. This necessitated the relaxation of trade barriers under the premise of "free trade," leading to increased mobility of goods and capital. Consequently, the nation-state's control weakened, diminishing its effectiveness and legal authority.

Technological advancements like the microchip, optic cable, and computer in the 1980s fueled the communications revolution. The first industrial revolution in Britain (18th century) was based on steam power, and the second in the U.S. (19th century) on "Taylorism" (assembly line, mass production). These revolutions strengthened both capital (supply) and labor (demand).

The third industrial revolution led to the "information society," significantly impacting social and political realms. Capital mobility and productivity increased, expanding production and distribution globally. Capital (supply) gained strength relative to consumer (demand). The demand for labor, especially unskilled manual labor, declined, weakening labor's bargaining power while mobility was restricted (e.g., visas). Robot usage increased, and labor's class consciousness declined as production decentralized.

Economic focus shifted to supply, neglecting demand. Keynesian policies (social welfare, full employment) were abandoned for monetarist policies (lower wage increases, later retirement) advocated by Milton Friedman (Chicago School). These policies squeezed the consumer.

Major capitalist states gained power, and the disintegration of the USSR in the early 1990s politically cemented the West's unrivaled position, deeply impacting the world order.

The Rise of the West and of the U.S.

The U.S., as a major oil producer, was less affected by the oil shock than Europe. Europe recovered through conservation, new technologies (solar energy, natural gas), and price adjustments. Some argue the oil shock had a positive effect on the West.

Oil producers, lacking investment strategies, deposited petrodollars in Western banks or bought shares in Western companies, strengthening these entities. Banks recycled petrodollar deposits by loaning to oil-importing countries.

Human Rights, the "Green Belt," and the Carter Doctrine

President Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) used the Helsinki Final Act's third basket to promote human rights, targeting the USSR's vulnerabilities. This occurred even as the U.S. overlooked human rights issues in some allied developing nations.

A "Green Belt" of moderate Islamic countries was formed around the USSR, inspired by Zbigniew Brzezinski. Carter, with strong religious beliefs, aimed to create an Islamic shield against the USSR and potentially curb radical movements. This strategy was implemented as the 12 September military regime was established in Turkey.

In January 1980, the Carter Doctrine, a revision of the Truman Doctrine for the Persian Gulf, stated that an attack on the Gulf's oil fields would be considered an attack on the vital interests of the U.S.

A U.S. intervention would follow the Wohlstetter Doctrine, planning new air bases in eastern Anatolia to prevent Soviet access to the Gulf and to strike the Caucasus if needed.

The Reagan Doctrine and the "Second Cold War"

Ronald Reagan, upon becoming president in 1981, went beyond the Carter Doctrine, pledging full support to anti-Communist movements globally, reversing the Nixon Doctrine.

The Reagan Doctrine was implemented in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, and Cambodia, among others. Pro-American regimes received aid, while anti-American opposition groups were armed. The U.S. sold weapons to Iran (via Israel) to fund the Contras in Nicaragua.

Amidst situations in Iran, Afghanistan, Soviet missiles in Syria, and anti-American sentiment in Greece, Reagan launched the "Second Cold War" against the USSR. He initiated the multi-billion-dollar "Star Wars" project, disregarding the 1972 ABM treaty. This project contributed to the USSR's bankruptcy and reasserted the U.S. as a global power.

The Collapse of the USSR

The USSR, a major oil producer, initially benefited from rising oil prices, leading to complacency. Increased income was allocated to armaments and space research, but the Soviet system's weaknesses prevented these advancements from improving citizens' daily lives, unlike in the West.

After three elderly leaders (Leonid Brezhnev, Konstantin Chernenko, Yury Andropov), Mikhail Gorbachev became leader in 1985. He aimed to reduce tensions with the West to focus on domestic issues, surprising the West with a proposal to end nuclear testing. When the West did not respond, Gorbachev declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing.

Gorbachev introduced a four-point program:

1. The concept of the "Common European home" to integrate with Europe ideologically.

2. An agreement with the U.S. in November 1987 to limit medium-range missiles, followed by short-range missile agreements. Soviet forces would evacuate Afghanistan, and forces in Eastern Europe would be reduced by 50,000 soldiers. These decisions shook Eastern European regimes, suggesting the USSR was withdrawing support. The Iron Curtain had begun to rust with the demobilization of 500,000 military personnel.

3. Approval for national forms of socialism and reforms in Eastern Europe, ending the Brezhnev Doctrine.

4. A policy of liberalization within the USSR. A Party Conference was held after 47 years. Dissident Andrey Sakharov was released, and private ownership rights (excluding land) were recognized.

Gorbachev also battled three crises: political (lack of democracy), structural (inability to transition to intensive growth), and cyclical (shortages due to consumption-focused savings). The political crisis stemmed from the Communist Party's lack of popular participation, causing internal decay. The structural crisis was the failure to shift from extensive development focusing on surplus labor to intensive growth based on efficient resource allocation and technical progress. The cyclical crises came from the socialist state's emphasis on meeting basic needs (education, health, housing), resulting in savings being directed to consumption. Stalin had previously used monetary operations to reduce savings and address supply-demand imbalances.

Gorbachev pursued perestroika (restructuring) to overcome these crises, but it required eliminating privileges, and he lacked institutional or group support. To gain public support, he pursued glasnost (transparency). With difficult choices between monetary measures and IMF help (which would hurt the people and negate glasnost), production declined.

The crisis of nationalities unexpectedly broke out in 1987. Reforms and Western cultural influence led to incidents in Kazakhstan, Lithuania, and Nagorno Karabakh. Incidents followed in Crimea, Estonia, Moldavia, and Georgia. Georgia's refusal to provide athletes for the Soviet national team was significant.

In August 1989, the Kremlin was silent when a non-Communist government came to power in Poland, signaling the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine. East Germans fled to the West via Hungary. The Berlin Wall fell in November 1989. The USSR agreed to Germany's reunification in February 1990 and sought the IMF's help in July. Gorbachev was powerless to prevent these events.

When the USSR's existence was threatened, forceful actions led to bloodshed (e.g., Azerbaijan in January 1990, Lithuania in March). Lithuania’s oil supplies were cut off and strikes/demonstrations were banned. A referendum to maintain the Soviet Union passed, but the USSR disintegrated 74 years after its inception. Before disintegration, the USSR surrendered to the Third Basket of the second OSCE summit meeting in 1990 in Paris.

The U.S. emerged as the unchallenged global hegemon and the West as the unrivaled system. The world was shaped by international capitalism and Western values (human rights).

Developments in the Balkans and the Middle East

Developments in the Balkans and the Middle East were of interest to Turkey.

In the Balkans, repression against ethnic Turks in Bulgaria in 1984 caused tension and migration to Turkey, also affecting the Kurdish question in Turkey.

A necessity for Turkey is to maintain at least one Balkan route to Europe (via Bulgaria or Greece). Tensions with Greece under Papandreou and strained relations with Bulgaria threatened access to Europe and potentially soured relations with the USSR.

Between 1980 and 1988, the Iran-Iraq War created a power vacuum in northern Iraq, allowing the PKK to become entrenched. The Palestinian Intifada aggravated the Kurdish question in Turkey.

The Domestic Environment and Dynamics

The Economy

GNP increased by a factor of 2.1, imports by 2.5, exports by 2.75, and foreign debts by 3 during this period. These figures represented very high rates of growth.

The average ratio of foreign trade to GNP was 25.4\%. This ratio had been 11.8\% from 1961 to 1980 and 15.8\% in 1980. The average ratio of foreign debt to GNP was 35.6\%, while the corresponding figure had been 10.7\% from 1961 to 1980 and 23.0\% for 1980. This meant that the external dependency of the economy was rapidly increasing during this period.

Turkey's trade deficit doubled from $5 billion in 1980 to over $9 billion in 1990, progressively rising in subsequent periods.

In 1981, $1 USD was worth TL 110. By 1990, it reached TL 2,606. Inflation increased from 36.8\% to 54.8\%, averaging 44\%.

The economic restructuring package of 24 January 1980 devalued the currency from TL 35 to TL 70 per U.S. dollar, inducing price increases. Despite restructuring, the economic program failed to achieve its objectives.

Direct foreign capital inflow increased significantly after 1984 due to several factors:

• Turkey restructured foreign debts, also rescheduling commercial debts not guaranteed by the state; creditors marketed stocks below real value to recover unguaranteed loans.

• New foreign investment legislation allowed foreign investors to meet 50% of their capital through unguaranteed commercial loans if they obtained the other half in foreign exchange in cash. It was possible to buy unguaranteed commercial stock worth one U.S. dollar for twenty-five cents.

• Improvements in foreign investment legislation and privatization of state-owned companies.

• Easier rules for inward capital movements. Foreign banks establishing branches contributed to the inflow of foreign direct investment.

Implementation of the 24 January Package (1980-1987)

The regime following the 12 September 1980 coup allowed Turgut Özal, to take charge of the economy. Özal pursued two strategies:

1. Cutting Demand: Raising prices, devaluing the currency to make imports expensive, allowing real wages to fall (roughly half of 1977 levels by 1983), shutting down the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Unions (DISK), crippling labor's political power, removing interest rate caps to encourage savings, and allowing dubious bankers to attract savings with high-interest rates.

2. Encouraging Exports: Continuous devaluations to keep exports competitive, monetary incentives, and tax rebates for exporters. The ratio of exports to GNP rose from 2.77\% in 1979 to 10.7\% in 1989. The value of exports climbed from $4.7 billion in 1981 to over $12.9 billion in 1990.

These improvements were accompanied by negative developments: Imports rose faster than exports, with the trade gap growing wider (exports at $4.7 billion and $12.9 billion in 1981 and 1990, imports at $8.9 billion and $22.3 billion). Turkey's foreign debts rose from $16.6 billion in 1981 to $49 billion in 1990. The IMF allowed Turkey to restructure its foreign debts. The Turkish economy became overly exposed to foreign financial institutions.

Economic programs implemented conformed to "wild capitalism," managed through monetary policies weakening labor and strengthening capital. The taxation system was regressive, competition was unfair, and the chief objective was to achieve high capital accumulation. No effort was made to make the tax system progressive. Tax rebates to stimulate exports led to abuses via “imaginary exports.” The slogan shifted from "industrialization at any price" to "earn foreign exchange at any price" (Kepenek, p. 235).

Turgut Özal favored motorways over railroads. Privatization aimed to free the budget from public enterprises' deficits, resulting in the abandonment of government industrial programs. Industry's share in government investments fell from 20.7\% in 1978 to 4.5\% in 1990 (Sönmez, p. 16). In June 1986, the government's monopoly over tobacco was abolished, handing it to major international producers.

Initially, restructuring and globalization were positive: massive devaluation and price hikes cut inflation and demand. Import restrictions were curbed, increasing the availability of goods. Entrepreneurs raised exports. Exports jumped by 61\% in 1981. Contractors undertook projects abroad. Inflation, initially at 107\%, fell to 26\%, and the economy grew by 4\%. The IMF concluded a three-year agreement, allowing Turkey to incur debts, becoming a model country for the IMF.

However, this trend was unsustainable. To cope with the cost of living, people placed savings in pyramid schemes promising high returns. When bankers failed to honor promises, savings were wiped out (Bankers' Scandal). As agricultural subsidies were cut, farm production declined. By 1983, alarm bells rang: the budget deficit soared, inflation jumped to 30\%, and export growth ended. Wealth accumulated in the hands of a small group, creating a leisure class. Industrial capacity growth fell, and investments in new industries declined. The Turkish currency fell from TL 70 to the dollar in 1980 to TL 14,000 to the dollar in 1993. By 2001, the dollar was worth TL 1,630,000, and Turkey depended on international financial institutions.

The Economy after 1987

Significant events after 1987 included the economy worsening and politicians returning to politics.

By 1987, the 24 January 1980 package lost effectiveness. With IMF support, external resources were used, and high export levels were achieved. In preparation for the 1987 elections, agricultural subsidies and public service salaries were raised, and infrastructure projects were undertaken, causing the budget deficit to soar. These measures did not prevent the Motherland Party's vote share from falling from 41% to 36%. To deal with the deficit, the government borrowed from the public through treasury bills and state bonds.

As poverty spread, support for Islamists increased. The failure of the 24 January package became evident in the 1990s.

Politics

The 12 September coup brought economic liberalization but imposed garrison-like rules in politics.

Efforts to Stem Anarchy

The five-member National Security Council (NSC) assumed full executive and legislative powers, declaring martial law. Arrests followed. According to a publication by the office of the chief of the General Staff in May 1982, 17,374 individuals were brought to trial. The Association for Human Rights (established later) counted 650,000 people detained, 210,000 cases brought to courts, 230,000 individuals tried, and 1,683,000 registered by security services and police (Cumhuriyetin 75. Ytlt, p. 812)

The death of publisher İlhan Erdost drew attention to "unnatural deaths under custody.” Courts determined that torture directly caused 17 deaths. Authorities claimed 43 deaths were suicides, 16 occurred while attempting to flee, 74 as a result of shootouts, 14 as a result of hunger strikes, 2 from indeterminate causes, and 144 were of a suspicious nature. Only 73 deaths were due to natural causes.

Between 1980 and 1984, prosecutors sought the death penalty against 5,000 defendants; 517 received a death sentence, 124 of which were confirmed. Of these, 18 leftists, 8 rightists, 1 ASALA member, and 23 common criminals were executed. In one case, Erdal Eren, a minor, was declared older and fit for execution based on bone X-rays.

While suppressing unrest, the regime changed the legal system. The NSC, believing the 1961 Constitution's basic freedoms and labor rights caused anarchy, targeted associations, labor unions, and universities. Political parties, parliament, and associations were shut down, labor leaders were arrested, and DISK's activities were suppressed. All universities were brought under the control of YÖK. Democratic election systems were put aside, and administrators were appointed by YÖK. Martial law commanders were empowered to remove individuals from public office and private business.

The provisional Constitution approved on 27 October 1980 established the legal framework. All powers were vested in the NSC, and General Evren held the powers of the head of state. The constitutionality of NSC legislation could not be contested, and the military administration was not accountable.

The new Constitution, approved by a majority of 91.3\% in a referendum on 7 November 1982, protected the state and administration from society and the individual. The concept of "inviolability of the essence of fundamental rights and freedoms" was eliminated, and the executive and police powers were reinforced at the expense of the judiciary. Restrictions were placed on collective rights, and the powers of administrative tribunals and the constitutional court were trimmed.

Law No. 1402

Martial Law No. 1402 allowed the dismissal of public or private-sector employees without showing cause and forbade those removed from ever holding a public job. Dicle University faculty members were dismissed based on this law. The International Labor Organization (ILO) deemed this practice discriminatory. After legal proceedings, the Council of State annulled the University of Ankara's ruling on 7 February 1989, allowing victims of Law No. 1402 to return to their former positions.

The 12 September Coup and Islam

Although Atatürk was constantly invoked, the Turkish Language Council and the Turkish Historical Council were merged as the Atatürk High Council of Culture, Language, and History (AKDTYK). This ended the autonomy of the institutions and violated Atatürk's testament. Atatürk's ownership in the bank fell from 27.57\% to 0.03\% (Oran 1999, p. 146).

AKDTYK was tasked with instilling the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, fitting the prevailing conditions. Economic policies were impoverishing the masses, who were turning to religion for solace. The regime used religion to strengthen legitimacy and as social cement against communism and Kurdish separatism, conforming with U.S. president Jimmy Carter's anti-USSR "Green Belt” strategy. Turkey moved closer to the U.S. as friction increased with Europe over human rights abuses.

The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was reflected in the Constitution (article 134) and daily life. Its impact would be fully realized in the early 1990s.

Religious instruction was made compulsory in schools, and grace was said before meals in state boarding schools. Article 24 of the 1982 Constitution was amended to make Islamic religious instruction compulsory in high schools. Religious instruction was introduced into prisons. Kenan Evren peppered his speeches with quotations from the Quran and sayings of the Prophet. The Religious Affairs Directorate's budget grew, reaching a level 1.5 times higher than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 7 times that of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Annually, 1,500 mosques were built. The Religious Affairs Directorate published religious edicts and established Türkiye Diyanet Vakfi, which developed into a group of enterprises.

From 1980 to 1982, twenty-three faculties of theology were established. A Saudi Arabian institution known as Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami paid the salaries of Turkish religious instructors sent abroad. This was acknowledged after initial denials. This official approach to Islam affected society: Darwin's theory of evolution was not taught, and non-Muslim students attended courses on religion. Graduates of high schools that trained religious preachers and clerics entered Ankara University's Faculty of Political Science, becoming district administrators and provincial governors.

Turkish-Islamic Synthesis

The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, appearing in the 1970s, brought together the two main streams of the Turkish Right to counter leftist tendencies. The Aydınlar Ocağı defended this concept as the appropriate cultural framework for Turkey.

The Aydınlar Ocağı supported the 12 September regime, and the regime put its ideas into practice, planting members in key positions. The National Culture Committee of the State Planning Organization prepared a report in 1983 outlining a "national culture” framework for Turkish society.

The basis of this approach was the notion that national culture drew sustenance from Turkish and Islamic culture. Turkey was under assault by foreign culture, and the best safeguard was the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. Turks would lose their identity without Islam, and Islam was suited to Turks. This disregarded the notion that culture developed within a historical time frame. This was the duty of the state, which disseminated “national culture.”

Islam was given more weight, and an effort was made to reconcile this with Atatürk's teachings, diluting secularism.

In the 1990s and 2000s, the policies stressing Islam during the 1980s had grim consequences, including the proliferation of religious preachers and schools. The army's “postmodern” intervention of 28 February 1997 rid the state of this vestige of the 12 September regime.

The 12 September Coup and the Kurdish Question

After 1984, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis was used against Kurdish nationalism. Military aircraft dropped tracts with verses of the Quran calling for respect and obedience to elders over Kurdish-populated areas.

Kurdish nationalism had been dormant after the Tunceli operation of 1937-38. Signs of reawakening came in the 1960s with publications and the establishment of the Revolutionary Eastern Culture Hearths (DDKO) in 1969. In the 1970s, there was intensive publishing as the Kurdish nationalist movement organized. After 12 September, nationalists fled to Arab countries.

In the 1980s, the Turkish state considered the Kurds to be a "Turkish clan,” and the Kurdish question was reduced to "PKK terror.” The terrorists moved to bases outside the country after the Iran-Iraq War. The state was reluctant to admit there was more than a security and socioeconomic problem. All it did was seek to repress terror and forbid the use of the Kurdish language.

Law No. 2932

Law No. 2932 declared it forbidden to express, disseminate, or publish thoughts in any language other than the official language. This referred to Kurdish. Law No. 2932, a direct violation of Article 39/4 of the Peace Treaty of Lausanne, was repealed by the Turgut Özal administration on 12 April 1991 but provisions in constitution remained until 2001.

While the state attempted to deal with the Kurdish question by resorting to the system of Village Guards, the PKK established its political base in foreign countries with the ERNK. Even uttering the word "Kurd" was risky. In 1988, Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against the Iraqi Kurds, who fled to Turkey. The chief of the Turkish General Staff used the term "Kurd" for the first time. The methods used stained Turkey's human rights record and became Turkey's chief internal and external concern in the early 1990s. The attempt to deal with the Kurdish question by using Islam backfired and created the problem of Hezbollah in the late 1990s.

After the new Constitution, an election was held in 1983. The regime backed the Nationalist Democratic Party, but the Motherland Party of Turgut Özal won. Despite this, the regime secured continuity through the presidency of Kenan Evren until 1989.

After Evren, Özal was elected president in October 1989 and ran the government when Yıldırım Akbulut was prime minister. The Motherland Party lost power in the 1991 election, and Özal died in April 1993, while serving as president. Özal changed many aspects of public life that had ceased to serve any useful purpose, but was known as the man who opened up Turkey to rapacious international capital. The concept of public good was replaced with blatant private greed. Instead of encouraging participatory democracy, the masses were depoliticized. Culture and aesthetics gave way to kitsch.

The Foreign Policy of the Period

Shares of countries in Turkey’s foreign trade

• EEC countries' share in Turkey's trade was 53.3\% for exports and 44.1\% for imports

• External debts increased by almost a factor of 3 and short-term external debts increased almost 4.4 times.

• The level of internal debt increased by a factor of 21

• The ratio of interest payments from the budget to service domestic and foreign debt to tax revenues reached 35\%.

Factors Affecting Foreign Policy

International developments, the nature of the 12 September coup regime, and the Özal factor affected Turkish foreign policy.

International Environment

Globalization forced countries to conform to international capitalism and connect with it, increasing U.S. power. Turkey was affected by the U.S.'s Green Belt policy, and the 12 September regime was predisposed to follow such a course. Reagan's “Second Cold War” policies did not affect Turkey much; Ankara was not called upon to take an active role. Turkey's trade with the USSR grew. After Gorbachev came to power in 1984, Soviet foreign policy became more restrained. The USSR proved unexpectedly cooperative in the negotiation of the Conventional Forces Agreement in Europe.

The events of 1979 in Iran and Afghanistan increased Turkey's geostrategic importance. As the USSR withdrew, this advantage disappeared. The Papandreou administration in Greece caused problems for Turkey, and Bulgaria created a new problem by ordering the changing of Turkish names. This situation threatened to block Turkey's access routes to Europe. Despite this, Turkey exposed Bulgaria's actions internationally. The matter was resolved through the collapse of the Eastern Bloc.

Another international development affecting Turkey was the terrorist activity of ASALA. Armenian bills introduced in Western legislatures in the 1990s would affect Turkish foreign policy. Similarly, the terrorist activities of the PKK had less effect on Turkish foreign policy in the 1980s. Turkey's application to join the European Communities had not created concerns among members.

There was a feeling in the West that the circumstances in Turkey in the early 1980s were unusual and merited understanding as it wrestled with problems. This wait-and-see policy disappeared, particularly when it became apparent that Turkey would not make reforms to deal with the Kurdish question. This led to Western reactions against Turkey, which were exploited by Kurdish and Armenian nationalists.

The Nature of the 12 September Regime

Initially, the international reaction to the repression was muted because the military coup was seen as a result of the anarchy. However, when it became obvious that the Constitution was perverted to cast all associations, labor unions, and universities in a single mold, international pressure began to build.

This reaction came from Europe. However, American public opinion was not concerned, so Washington continued its diplomacy based on Realpolitik. For European public opinion, human rights were a major issue. Influenced by Turkish political dissidents, ASALA, and the PKK, Europe gradually distanced itself from Turkey. This left Turkey relatively isolated, with only the U.S. to turn to.

With the 12 September regime stamping out criticism, public opinion became irrelevant. In an environment where the only influence was that of the U.S., Turkish diplomats could no longer draw strength from Turkish public opinion. During the period from 1960 to 1980, Turkey's autonomy in its foreign policy had increased in step with increasing freedoms. The process was reversed from 1980 to 1990, and repression at home constricted Turkey's diplomacy.

The Özal Factor

Özal had a negative effect on Turkish foreign policy in three ways:

1. He opened up the Turkish economy without taking the necessary precautionary measures, making the country dependent and weakening its ability to conduct an active foreign policy.

2. He believed that increased trade would help overcome problems in bilateral relations, but this did not work in the case of Greece and some countries of the Middle East.

3. He bypassed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ignoring the traditional guiding principles of Turkish foreign policy and committing serious errors. Some examples of this include:

• Allowing nonresponsible members of the Akbulut government to make official statements and conduct negotiations.

• Conducting negotiations on ethnic Turks without informing the MFA.

• Negotiating the delivery of medicines to Iraq without the MFA's knowledge.

• Describing Armenian bills in the U.S. Congress as a one-off thing.

• Using undiplomatic language towards Bulgaria, precipitating a mass migration of ethnic Turks for which Turkey was unprepared.

• Announcing that the free movement of persons between Northern and Southern Cyprus would facilitate a solution to the Cyprus question.

Özal proposed a free trade agreement to the U.S. government without informing the MFA. The ministry was forced to deny having any knowledge of the proposal. With reference to Azerbaijan, Özal declared: "The Azerbaijanis are Shiites and therefore more attracted to Iran than to Turkey.