Licenses and Leases

Licenses and Leases

Introduction to Property Law

• Laws 3160, 2024/25

• Dr. Alexander Damianos, a.damianos@kent.ac.uk

Lease vs. License

• A license is a personal interest.

• A lease is a property interest.

Outline

• The lease / license distinction.

• Street v Mountford (1985).

• Definition of a lease.

• Antoniades v Villiers (1990).

• AG Securities v Vaughan (1990).

• Sharing residence.

• Westminster City Council v Clarke (1992).

• Bruton v London Quadrant Housing (1999).

• Exceptional cases: Templemania.

Ownership, Possession, Property, Land

• A set of relationships, ideas, and material things.

Gray & Gray

• Kevin Gray & Susan Gray.

• Essay: ‘The Idea of Property in Land’.

• In Susan Bright & John Dewar (eds), 1998, Land Law: Themes and Perspectives. Oxford: University of Oxford Press. Pp. 15-51.

Key Ideas from Gray & Gray

• Fragility of the concept of property.

• Relationality of property.

• Power and property.

• ‘The proper order of things’.

• Relative both in practice and as an idea.

• Degrees of Property – a slippery concept.

• Property as fact.

• Property as right.

• Property as responsibility.

Property as Fact

• Anti-intellectual streak to property law.

• The propriety of property.

• Emotional security & sovereignty.

• The potency of the behavioral connotations of property.

• The externally verifiable modalities of possessory control.

Property as Right

• A complex calculus of carefully calibrated estates and interests in land.

• Not necessarily ‘visible’ or ‘material’.

• One step removed from estate/land.

• Ownership of a right in/over physical property.

• An abstract right.

Property as Responsibility

• Elements of utility characterizing a relationship to land.

• Held in balance.

• Not so much a bundle of rights as a bundle of individuated elements of land-based utility.

• A state-directed responsibility to contribute to the collective exploitation of land resources for communal benefit (Locke?).

• Less a right, more a restraint (or obligation).

• Not the arrogance of right, but the obligation of civic responsibility and community.

Relation to Leases & Licenses

• What understanding of property is apparent in these cases?

• How do we know when an interest is realized as lease or license?

• When does occupation of land become possession?

• Gradations (or degrees) of property.

What is a License?

• A license is a permission.

• A temporary permission.

• A conditional permission.

• From the Latin precario.

License: Precarious

• It may be contractual.

• It can be withdrawn.

• It does not bind third parties.

• It poses no threat whatsoever to those who might acquire an interest in the land.

Licenses: Use/Occupy Property

• To park over the holidays on my neighbor’s land.

• To stay with my parents over the pandemic.

• To shop.

• To grow vegetables on an allotment.

• To walk on open parkland.

Metamorphosis of Licenses

• Reasons to control the metamorphosis of licenses include:

  • Binding of third parties.

  • Proliferation of ‘invisible threats to strangers’ (Birks).

• Reasons to encourage licenses include:

  • Encourages efficient use of land.

  • Social reasons.

• Occupation might become possession.

• How do we recognize this?

• Relationship between licenses and non-possessory property rights.

  • Easements?

  • Village greens?

Licenses and Power: Porter v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [1999] All ER (D) 1129 (CA)

• Ms. Porter had a dispute with the London Electricity Board (LEB) over the electricity supply to her new flat.

• The police were called after Ms. Porter refused to leave the LEB showroom until her demands were met.

• She was arrested for breach of the peace and charged with assault on a police officer, but the case was not pursued.

• Porter sued the police for damages, including assault, battery, wrongful arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution.

Decision in Porter Case

• Ms. Porter’s claim was dismissed by the Central London County Court and the Court of Appeal.

• The court held that Ms. Porter became a trespasser when she refused to leave at the LEB employees’ request, and the police were entitled to use reasonable force to remove her.

• The court considered itself bound by CIN Properties Ltd v Rawlins [1995] EGLR 130 (CA), which affirmed the right of private landowners to exclude at will.

Feminist Judgment

• An imagined appeal to the House of Lords by ‘Baroness Grear’.

• Accepts the law of trespass for protecting ‘zones of intimacy’ but argues it doesn't necessarily apply to all forms of property.

• Suggests a ‘doctrine of reasonable access’ to ‘quasi-public’ spaces to prevent exclusion unless there are ‘objectively reasonable’ grounds.

• Argues Ms. Porter acted as a reasonable citizen-consumer during her non-disruptive sit-in protest, making the police conduct unlawful.

What is a Lease?

• Refer to Street v Mountford (1985 AC 809).

Context in 1983

• The Rent Act 1977 provided tenants with rent regulation, security of tenure, and strong succession rights; licensees were excluded from these protections.

• Council housing was a dominant form of tenure but beginning to decline.

• The Right to Buy Housing Act 1980 provided secure tenancies.

Back in 1983

• The distinction between lease and license was the legal threshold for occupier rights.

• Courts were effectively policing the grant of rights to occupiers.

• Lower courts resisted granting rights to occupiers; Aldrington Garages Ltd v Fielder 1978 7 WLUK held that parties should not be prevented from creating a license if that was their intention.

Street v Mountford (1985)

• House of Lords decision.

• An agreement granting exclusive occupation of residential accommodation for a term at a rent creates a tenancy, notwithstanding the use of the word ‘licence’.

• Radical decision that overrules contractual autonomy and lowers the threshold for statutory protections.

Facts of Street v Mountford

• Mrs. Mountford and her husband lived on the top floor of a house divided into ‘flatlets’ owned by Mr. Street.

• An agreement was signed in 1983.

• Payment of £37 per week by Mrs. Mountford.

• A ban on anyone other than Mrs. Mountford occupying the rooms without prior permission.

• A right on the owner’s part to enter the rooms to inspect them, read meters, carry out maintenance, etc.

• A requirement to keep rooms clean and tidy.

• Agreement terminable on 14 days notice.

• The agreement stated, ‘I understand and accept that a licence in the above form does not and is not intended to give me a tenancy protected under the Rent Acts.’

Legal Journey of Street v Mountford

• Mrs. Mountford registered a fair rent under the Rent Acts.

• Mr. Street applied to the County Court for a declaration that her occupancy was a license.

• He conceded exclusive possession but maintained that the intentions of the parties were definitive.

• The County Court said it is a tenancy.

• The Court of Appeal said it is a license.

• The Court of Appeal stated it is possible for an owner to grant a right of exclusive occupation without creating a tenancy if he ensures that the clear intention of both parties is manifested to the effect that the rights to be granted are merely those of a personal right of use, and not those of a tenant.

Definition of a Lease (Lord Templeman)

• Lord Templeman (at 816) defined a lease as:

  • A grant of land.

  • For a term.

  • At a rent – although this may no longer be required.

  • With exclusive possession of the land.

• The primary difference between the definition of a lease and the definition of a license is that a license does not confer exclusive possession of the land.

• Where there is exclusive possession then the agreement is a lease unless it falls within an exception.

Key quotes from Street v Mountford 1998 Exclusive Possession

• A tenancy is an estate in land.

• The tenant possessing exclusive possession is able to exercise the rights of an owner of land, which is in the real sense his land albeit temporarily and subject to certain restrictions.

• A tenant armed with exclusive possession can keep out strangers and keep out the landlord unless the landlord is exercising limited rights reserved to him by the tenancy agreement to enter and view and repair.

• A licensee lacking exclusive possession can in no sense call the land his own and cannot be said to own any estate in the land.

• The license does not create an estate in the land to which it relates but only makes an act lawful which would otherwise be unlawful.’ Lord Templeman (at 816)

Key quotes from Street v Mountford 1998 Residential Accommodation

• In the case of residential accommodation there is no difficulty in deciding whether the grant confers exclusive possession.

• An occupier of residential accommodation at a rent for a term is either a lodger or a tenant.

• The occupier is a lodger if the landlord provides attendance or services which require the landlord or his servants to exercise unrestricted access to and use of the premises.

• A lodger is entitled to live in the premises but cannot call the place his own.

Law and Language

• ‘…the consequences in law of the agreement, once concluded, can only be determined by consideration of the effect of the agreement. If the agreement satisfied all the requirements of a tenancy, then the agreement produced a tenancy and the parties cannot alter the effect of the agreement by insisting that they only created a licence. The manufacture of a five-pronged implement for manual digging results in a fork even if the manufacturer, unfamiliar with the English language, insists that he intended to make and has made a spade.’ Lord Templeman (at 819)

Exceptions: Not all exclusive possessors are tenants

• There can be no tenancy unless the occupier enjoys exclusive possession; but an occupier who enjoys exclusive possession is not necessarily a tenant. He may be owner in fee simple, a trespasser, a mortgagee in possession, an object of charity or a service occupier.

• To constitute a tenancy the occupier must be granted exclusive possession for a fixed or periodic term certain in consideration of a premium or periodical payments.

• The grant may be express, or may be inferred where the owner accepts weekly or other periodical payments from the occupier (at 818).

Landmark Case: Street v Mountford

• The context of the Rent Act is very important.

• Guaranteed rights for tenants.

• What Street v Mountford decides is that a tenancy involves exclusive possession, for a term, at a rent.

Sharing Cases

• What happens to the license/lease distinction in the absence of exclusive possession?

• Antoniades v Villiers [1990] 1 AC 417.

• AG Securities v Vaughan [1990] 1 AC 417.

Antoniades v Villiers

• Mr. Villiers and Miss Bridger occupied an attic flat in Mr. Antoniades’ house.

• On their request, Mr. Antoniades supplied a double bed.

• Separate, largely identical agreements were signed with Mr. Villiers and Miss Bridger, in which they each agreed:

  • To pay £87 per month.

  • To share the rooms with the licensor and others whom the licensor might from time to time permit to use the rooms.

  • Not to obstruct such use.

  • Not to use the rooms in any illegal or immoral way.

  • Not to allow others of their choosing to use the rooms.

  • To vacate the flat if they should marry.

  • To use the rooms together with the licensor and permit others to do so.

Treating the Agreement

• ‘In considering one or more documents for the purpose of deciding whether a tenancy has been created, the court must consider the surrounding circumstances including any relationship between the prospective occupiers, the course of negotiations and the nature and extent of the accommodation and the intended and actual mode of occupation of the accommodation.’ Lord Templeman (at 460)

Surrounding Circumstances: Antoniades v Villiers

• It was clear from the course of negotiations and from what actually happened in practice that Mr. Antoniades did not intend to share accommodation with Mr. Villiers and Miss Bridger, nor to allow others to do so:

  • The right to do so, apparently reserved under the agreement, had never been exercised.

  • It was clear that neither of the defendants knew what ‘exclusive possession’ referred to; had Mr. Antoniades intended to share, this would have emerged during negotiations.

Clause in Antoniades v Villiers

• ‘[The clause] conferred power on Mr. Antoniades to convert the sitting-room occupied by Mr. Villiers and Miss Bridger into a bedroom which could be jointly occupied by Mr. Villiers, Miss Bridger, Mr. Antoniades and any person or persons nominated by Mr. Antoniades. The facilities in the flat were not suitable for sharing between strangers. The flat, situated in an attic with a sloping roof, was too small for sharing between strangers. If [the clause] had been genuine there would have been some discussion between Mr. Antoniades, Mr. Villiers and Miss Bridger as to how it might be operated in practice and in whose favour it was likely to be operated. The addendum imposed on Mr. Villiers and Miss Bridger sought to add plausibility to the pretence of sharing by forfeiting the right of Mr. Villiers and Miss Bridger to continue to occupy the flat if their double-bedded romance blossomed into wedding bells.

Continued Analysis: Antoniades v Villiers

• Finally and significantly, Mr. Antoniades never made any attempt to obtain increased income from the flat by exercising the powers which [the clause] purported to reserve to him.

• [It] was only designed to disguise the grant of a tenancy and to contract out of the Rent Acts.’ Lord Templeman (at 462)

Determining Exclusive Possession

• Separate agreements can be interdependent (in particular where they contain identical terms).

• Examine the surrounding circumstances (e.g., did the occupants apply for the accommodation jointly, and did they seek joint and exclusive possession of the premises?).

• Specific terms in an accommodation agreement can be a pretence (or sham) and therefore take no effect.

• To establish whether the terms are a pretence, one must examine the surrounding circumstances (e.g., the course of negotiations, the intended and actual use of the premises, etc.).

AG Securities v Vaughan (1990)

• Four young men shared a flat in London, subject to an agreement with AG Securities.

• Each signed a separate agreement.

• When a resident left, they would be replaced.

• AGS would ask the current residents whether they had any suggestions, would then interview those suggested, assess their income, and determine whether they should move in.

• Where no one was suggested, AGS would find a new potential resident themselves, and ask the current residents for their views, without being bound by them.

Agreements in AG Securities v Vaughan

• The agreements between AGS and the residents required the occupiers:

  • To share the flat with up to three others.

  • Not to impede the use of the flat by the others.

  • To meet with other prospective occupants to agree terms of sharing costs.

  • Not to assign the agreement to anyone else.

• The agreements made no provision for allocation of individual rooms to individual residents by AGS.

Possibilities: Lord Templeman

• Lord Templeman saw the following possibilities:

  • AG Securities might have granted exclusive possession of the whole flat jointly to several residents, so that they had a lease in the flat together.

  • AG Securities might have granted exclusive possession of one bedroom each to four different residents, with joint use of the sitting room, kitchen, and bathroom, so that each would have a tenancy in their bedroom. This was not argued.

  • AG Securities might have granted each resident a license.

Reasoning in AG Securities v Vaughan

• Lord Templeman argued that:

  • AGS were under no compulsion to give each occupant an agreement containing the same terms or to require any payment.

  • The agreements signed did not compel any occupant to become a joint tenant of the whole flat with someone who moved into the flat later on.

  • No one had agreed to become a joint tenant.

  • The company had the right under the agreement to move a new occupant into the flat when a room became available.

Analysis by Lord Templeman

• ‘…if the four respondents had been jointly entitled to exclusive occupation of the flat then, on the death of one of the respondents, the remaining three would be entitled to joint and exclusive occupation. But, in fact, on the death of one respondent the remaining three would not be entitled to joint and exclusive occupation of the flat. They could not exclude a fourth person nominated by the company.’ Lord Templeman (at 460)

• The four residents could therefore not be tenants; they had to be licensees.

Additional Factors in AG Securities v Vaughan

• Each new resident chose their own room; not AGS.

• When there were fewer than four residents, those living in the flat were not required to make up the shortfall in payments.

• Rent would vary between the occupants, depending on how long they had been present: a new occupant might pay more than those who had been there longer.

• Many people came and went in the time the defendants lived in the flat.

• AGS later decided to let out the flats on long leases and required the residents to leave.

Joint Tenancy

• Four ‘unity’ requirements:

  • Unity of possession: each joint tenant must be entitled to possession of every part of the co-owned land.

  • Unity of interest: each joint tenant’s interest in the estate must be the same in extent, nature, and duration.

  • Unity of title: each joint tenant must derive their title to the estate from the same act (e.g., adverse possession) or the same document.

  • Unity of time: the interest of each joint tenant must normally vest at the same time.

Four Unities - Antoniades v Villiers vs. AG Securities v Vaughan

Determining Joint Tenancy

• To determine whether joint occupants of accommodation with separate accommodation agreements have a joint tenancy (giving them exclusive possession together), we can ask:

  • Do the agreements require the signatories to become joint tenants with others?

  • What would happen if one of the tenants died? If the answer is that the landlord would move someone else in, and the other tenants would have no power to prevent this, then they cannot have a joint tenancy (because joint tenants enjoy exclusive possession).

  • Are the four unities present?

Recap: Sharing Cases

• Two cases, AG Securities v Vaughan & Antoniades v Villiers, heard together, demonstrate the variety of ways in which accommodation can be shared.

• The cases were fraught because of the powerful rights given by the Rent Act 1977.

• Will you all be tenants?

• If so what will that mean?

• What do you have to think about when deciding this?

Exceptional Cases: Housing for Homeless

Outline: Exceptional Cases

• Two contradictory cases.

• Both concern accommodation provided under statutory duties to house homeless people.

• Both feature landlords who wanted to control the provision of accommodation because of the vulnerability of their occupiers.

• Westminster City Council v Clarke [1992] 2 AC 288.

  • The purpose of the accommodation is relevant even when there is exclusive possession.

• Bruton v Quadrant Housing [2000] 1 AC 406.

  • A non-proprietary lease?

Westminster CC v Clarke

• Mr. Clarke had been homeless.

• Westminster City Council, under statutory duty, accommodated him.

• Accommodation consisted of 31 single rooms, each with a bed and limited cooking facilities.

• The accommodation had a warden supported by a resettlement team of social workers.

• It was intended to provide somewhere to stay while occupants underwent rehabilitation and treatment.

• It was described as a license.

Clarke Case Continued

• Complaints that Mr. Clarke caused nuisance, annoyance, and noise.

• WCC sought to terminate the agreement.

• Mr. Clarke smashed up the room he was occupying, threw out the furniture, and claimed to be a secure tenant.

• A secure tenant could not be evicted without:

  • WCC serving notice.

  • the court finding Mr. Clarke had breached a ground conduct constituting an annoyance/nuisance to neighbors, and

  • the court deciding eviction reasonable.

Agreement Provisions: Westminster CC v Clarke

• Sharing a room.

• Being moved to a different room.

• Occupancy by Mr. Clarke alone and not anyone he invited.

• Termination by the Council with at least seven days’ notice.

• Payment by Mr. Clarke of £16.79 per week.

Additional Agreement Stipulations

• Mr. Clarke must not invite anyone to share accommodation/stay overnight.

• Keep his room clean and take care of furniture provided.

• Be in his room by 11pm and that visitors have left by then.

• Cause no nuisance, annoyance, or discomfort to other residents.

• Comply with the directions of the warden/other staff.

Purpose of the Accommodation

• Lord Templeman reasoned that the Council’s purpose in specifying the terms of the agreement had to be taken into account in determining whether it conferred a lease or a license.

• He concluded that the agreement was a license:

  • 'In reaching this conclusion I take into account the object of the council, namely the provision of accommodation for vulnerable homeless persons, the necessity for the council to retain possession of all the rooms in order to make and administer arrangements for the suitable accommodation of all the occupiers and the need for the council to retain possession of every room not only in the interests of the council as the owners of the terrace but also for the purpose of providing for the occupiers supervision and assistance.'

Further Reasoning

• 'For many obvious reasons it was highly undesirable for the council to grant to any occupier of a room exclusive possession which obstructed the use by the council of all the rooms of the hostel in the interests of every occupier. By the terms of the license Mr. Clarke was not entitled to occupy any particular room, he could be required to share with any other person as required by the council and he was only entitled to 'occupy accommodation in common with the council whose representative may enter the accommodation at any time.'

Conclusion in Westminster CC v Clarke

• 'It is accepted that these provisions of the license to occupy were inserted to enable the council to discharge its responsibilities to the vulnerable persons accommodated at the Cambridge Street terrace and were not inserted for the purpose of enabling the council to avoid the creation of a secure tenancy. The conditions of occupancy support the view that Mr. Clarke was not in exclusive occupation of room E… Although Mr. Clarke physically occupied room E he did not enjoy possession exclusively of the council.’ Lord Templeman (at 301)

Implications of Westminster CC v Clarke

• When determining whether a term is a pretence or not, the court can look to the purpose of the inclusion of the term.

• Does the term serve to fulfill the purpose of providing the accommodation?

• This stopped exclusive possession arising – Mr. Clarke could not exclude the landlord.

Bruton v London Quadrant Housing Trust [2000] 1 AC 406

• Similar agreement to Clarke’s.

• L & Q held the property on a license from the London Borough of Lambeth.

• L & Q were to provide accommodation for homeless people in fulfillment of Lambeth’s statutory duties.

• Lambeth and L& Q wanted to avoid any possibility of granting tenancies.

• Their position was that if L&Q only had a license then it could not grant anything more than a license.

• Nemo dat quod non habet.

Bruton Case Continued

• Mr. Bruton challenged this understanding.

• He claimed repair rights under s.11 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985.

• These rights are only available to tenants with tenancies of less than 7 years term.

• So what conclusion did the House of Lords reach?

Outcome of Bruton v London Quadrant Housing Trust

• He did have a lease for the purpose of s.11!

• House of Lords considered themselves bound by Street v Mountford.

• All the elements required to demonstrate a tenancy were present.

• The special circumstances of the agreement were insufficient to counter the fact of exclusive possession.

• Lord Hoffman said – the agreement is irrelevant because you cannot contract out of the statute.

Nemo Dat in Bruton Case

• How could L &Q grant a lease when it only had a license?

• Possibly a tenancy by estoppel.

• You cannot deny there is a lease when you behave as if you have granted one.

• But the Law Lords specifically rejected this approach.

• The House of Lords said this was a non-proprietory lease.

Reflections on Bruton Case

• The clarity of Street v Mountford is depleted in the real world.

• And there are contradictory conclusions.

• Do councils and charities have to be supported in fulfilling housing obligations to vulnerable people?

• Should the rules be different for social providers?

• But should vulnerable people have fewer rights than others?

• And aren’t all young people vulnerable in the housing market now?

Contemporary Relevance: Property Guardians

• Property Guardians provide our final example of the elusive nature of the lease license distinction.

The Housing Act 1988

• No new Rent Act tenancies from 15th January 1989.

• New tenancies are either assured or assured shorthold tenanices.

• Market as opposed to fair rents.

• Limited succession rights.

• Stronger rights for possession particularly when there are rent arrears.

• Assured shorthold tenancies (which are now the default form of tenancy) enable possession to be granted with 2 months notice.

• Serious reduction in incentives to grant licenses.

• Greater insecurity for tenants.

Increasing Re-Regulation

• For tenants:

  • Extension of obligations under s.11 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985: Homes must be fit for human habitation.

  • Tenant deposits are protected.

• For residential occupiers:

  • Housing Health and Safety Rating System – Housing Act 2004.

  • Licensing of certain properties including HMOs.

  • Financial penalties and Rent Repayment Orders.

• Increase in incentives to avoid granting of leases?

• No increase in regulation of rents.

Post-Crash Housing Crisis

• Increased unaffordability of home ownership.

• High deposits.

• Lower wages.

• Shortage of new builds.

• High demand for rental properties.

• Soaring rents, particularly in urban centers.

• Generation Rent – a lifetime as a tenant.

• Inventive solutions: Shared properties & Property Guardianship.

Property Guardians

• A property guardian company finds residents (“property guardians”) for unused premises that they normally don’t own, for the purpose of securing and safeguarding the property.

• Often commercial or industrial buildings not intended or adapted for residential accommodation.

• Can pose health and safety risks.

• Generally, living in these properties costs less.

• Insecure.

• Government ambiguity about status.

• Non-standard living conditions.

Camelot Guardian Management Ltd v Khoo [2018] EWHC 2296

• The premises were former local authority offices in central London.

• Property guardians were used to protect the premises from trespassers.

• 14 of them, including Khoo, occupied around 11 rooms.

• Khoo had signed an agreement described as a license.

• It stated:

  • No exclusive possession.

  • Space shared with other guardians.

  • He was to vacate as soon as the agreement was terminated.

  • Rules stating how the property was to be occupied and used.

• The local authority wanted the property back for redevelopment.

• Camelot served a notice to end the license.

• Khoo contended he occupied the property as a tenant and refused to vacate.

Lease or License: Camelot v Khoo

• The judge at first instance granted a possession order.

• The appellant was given a right to exclusive possession of a bedroom and two storerooms and a right to the shared use of the remainder of the property excluding the bedrooms or particular spaces of the other occupants.

• Nonetheless, he concluded that the arrangement was a license and not a tenancy.

• The appeal to the High Court was dismissed.

• The agreement was a license and not a lease.

Determining the Issue

• Does the agreement confer a right to exclusive possession?

• Consider the words used by reference to the subject matter and any other relevant circumstances known to the parties at the time of the agreement.

• Are the terms of the agreement a sham, device, or pretense to disguise the grant of a tenancy?

• Apply the terms of the agreement to the facts.

• Here, the appellant did not have a right to exclusive possession of any part of the property.

• There was a right of possession of the property as a whole, not a particular part.

• The right was not exclusive as other guardians also occupied the property.

• The specific rules supported the conclusion it was a license.

• There was no sham or pretense.

LB Southwark v Ludgate House [2020] EWCA Civ 1637

• The issue was whether occupation of parts of Ludgate House by property guardians meant that the property was not a ‘single hereditament’ for rating purposes, because parts of it were in separate domestic rateable occupation.

• A major selling point for property guardian firms is that occupation by guardians takes otherwise empty commercial property out of commercial rates.

• In part, this turns on the nature of property guardians’ occupation – so on the one hand the firms require occupation to be residential and on the other hand, they need it not to be residential.

• CA decided (overruling UT) that the occupation was commercial.

• Reinforces the Khoo decision - context and contract details are taken seriously, resulting in a license, not a tenancy.

Property Guardians and HMO Licensing

• Camden insisted that Camelot obtained an HMO license for a property occupied by guardians.

• This means Rent Repayment Orders are available to Property Guardians.

• In 2019, Colchester Borough Council prosecuted Camelot for failing to license an HMO and multiple breaches of HMO management regulations.

• The property was a former care home which had up to 30 guardians in it.

• Faulty fire alarm system, blocked fire escapes, and sealed doors.

• Only one kitchen and shared bathrooms lacked hot water.

• Camelot pleaded guilty to 15 charges.