Illiberalism in Peacebuilding
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Topic: Illiberal Peace? Illiberalism in Peacebuilding, Mediation, and Conflict Resolution
Core idea: Since the early 1990s, international responses to civil wars and conflicts were dominated by liberal discourses and practices labeled as liberal peacebuilding. Over the last decade, liberal peacebuilding has faced growing challenges. In several recent conflicts, states rejected liberal ideas of peaceful negotiation, giving rise to illiberal peacebuilding (also called illiberal peace, authoritarian peace, or authoritarian conflict management).
Definition of illiberal peace/peacebuilding: A form of conflict management that aims to end violent conflict through illiberal mechanisms, using top‑down, state‑centric methods, including violence, while employing co‑optation, corruption, and patronage to secure compliance.
Emergence and significance: The chapter analyzes how illiberal peace practices emerged and why they pose a challenge to conventional liberal peace frameworks.
Key claim about the turning point: The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 is framed as marking the final demise of the post–Cold War liberal framework for conflict resolution and peacebuilding; however, illiberal practices had been evident in state responses to armed conflicts well before 2022.
Mechanisms associated with illiberal peace: Hierarchical, state-centric methods to end armed violence; deployment of violence when needed; patronage and corruption to secure compliance; suppression of human rights and proportionality concerns; co-optation of populations.
Contextual framing: The chapter places illiberal peace in dialogue with liberal peace, showing continuities and ruptures, and explores how illiberal forms of conflict management blur into counterinsurgency and outright war.
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Origins of liberal peacebuilding: Emerged from liberal consensus in the late 1980s/early 1990s, emphasizing democratization and liberal economic reforms as prerequisites for the modern state. The paradigm builds on a theory of conflict rooted in liberal ideas and universal norms.
Agenda for Peace (1992) and the root-causes narrative: The liberal peace framework posited that conflicts arise from unmet political, economic, and social grievances and advocated political settlements followed by peacebuilding to address such root causes (e.g., economic despair, social injustice, political oppression).
Peaceland (Autesserre, 2014): The liberal peace project produced a complex mix of discourses, institutions, and practices often described as a global peacebuilding complex or "Peaceland."
Three pillars of liberal peacebuilding:
State reform and liberalization (police/security reform, SSR; judicial reform; anti-corruption efforts).
Civil society and international organizations as primary actors and implementers (NGOs funded by donors; international agencies).
Economic liberalization and privatization as pathways to integration into the global economy.
Role of external actors in liberal peace: Civil society organizations, neutral mediators (e.g., Norway), and international organizations (UN agencies, MDBs) were central to implementing liberal peace.
Expected transformations: Political democratization (free and fair elections, civil rights, rule of law) and neoliberal economic reforms intended to liberalize the state and economy.
Critique of liberal peace’s state role: The state was paradoxically seen as both a potential source of conflict (repression) and as an entity needing reform to resolve conflict; however, reform programs often weakened existing security practices and destabilized fragile political junctures, provoking elite resistance (Egnell & Haldén cited).
Visualizing the liberal peace: A framework in which the international community gradually shrinks the coercive state’s capacity while promoting liberal governance norms and market reforms.
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Sovereignty vs intervention norms: Liberal peace was internationalized, but sovereignty norms constrained timely international responses to mass atrocities. This tension contributed to the development of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).
Responsibility to Protect (R2P): A doctrine adopted at the 2005 UN World Summit, obligating states to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, and permitting international intervention as a last resort when states fail to protect their populations.
2005 as a high-water mark: 2005 is identified as the peak of liberal peacebuilding; however, subsequent events showed its fragility, including Sri Lanka’s slide back toward brutal counterinsurgency (2005–2007) and the NATO intervention in Libya (2011) under R2P rationales, which produced regime change and civil war fragmentation.
Sri Lanka and the broader trend: The Sri Lankan case demonstrated how a liberal peace process could give way to an illiberal peace through brutal counterinsurgency and hegemonic state strategies.
Global power shift and rising non‑Western challenge: In the 2000s, many peacebuilding initiatives struggled to realize social and political transformation; governance reforms often failed or backslid toward authoritarianism. Power dynamics shifted as non‑Western powers (Russia, China, India) increasingly resisted liberal norms and asserted their own approaches to conflict management.
Quantitative note: The number of internationalized armed conflicts rose from nine in 2012 to twenty-five in 2020, reflecting greater involvement by non‑Western powers in regional conflicts.
Illustrative cases of illiberal models or strategies: Russia’s Chechnya model and its Syria intervention (2015 onward); China’s Xinjiang counterterrorism campaign (2014) and broader approach to domestic conflicts; the Astana Process in Syria (Russia, Iran, Turkey) excluding Western actors; ongoing debates about the UN process’s effectiveness in liberal peace contexts.
The Xinjiang example: May 2014 Strike Hard Campaign against Violent Terrorism in Xinjiang ( surveillance, forced re-education, restriction of religious practice).
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Emergence of illiberal peace in scholarship: Early critics (the left) argued liberal peace was insufficiently emancipatory, overlooked ordinary people, overly interventionist, and ignored everyday peace. This critique catalyzed a new literature on illiberal responses to conflict.
Sri Lanka as archetype: In the Sri Lankan case (2005–2007), the shift from liberal peacebuilding to a brutal counterinsurgency exemplified an illiberal peace and suggested it could be a model for future illiberal conflict management in intrastate wars (Goodhand 2010; Lewis 2010).
Russia and authoritarian peace: Studies of Chechnya (Baglione 2008) and Russia’s broader pattern (Russell 2014) identified processes of authoritarian peacebuilding.
ACM model: Lewis, Heathershaw, and Megoran (2018) defined Authoritarian Conflict Management (ACM) as: the prevention, de-escalation, or termination of organized armed rebellion through methods that eschew genuine negotiations, reject international mediation and constraints on use of force, disregard underlying structural causes, and rely on state coercion and hierarchical power. This model has been tested in contexts such as the Middle East, Thailand, Tajikistan, Central Asia, China, and Uzbekistan.
Special issue on illiberal peacebuilding (Smith et al. 2020): Editor-led workshops concluded illiberal peacebuilding prioritizes regime security and stability over accountability, human rights, and social inclusion; though debates about its meaning and utility persisted.
Case study expansion: Syria (Abboud 2021; Costantini & Santini 2021), Kyrgyzstan (Lewis & Sagnayeva 2020), Myanmar (Stokke et al. 2022; Olivius & Jenny Hedström 2021), Thailand (Chalermsripinyorat 2020), Tajikistan/Central Asia (Heathershaw & Owen 2019).
Core features of illiberal peace (first wave of literature):
Illiberal approaches challenge the liberal peace claim that conflict stems from unmet grievances. In contrast to Collier’s (2009) focus on the feasibility of rebellion, which argues that grievances are less central than rebels’ access to guns and money, illiberal peace prioritizes coercive state control to prevent rebellion.
Sri Lanka’s leadership claimed there was no ethnic conflict, reframing the grievance narrative to justify a military victory and suppress dissent.
Other cases (China, India) similarly dismissed grievances as nonexistent or treated them as criminal or terrorist concerns.
The broader literature on illiberal peace emphasized how coercive state practices, spatial control, and governance strategies were used to suppress opposition rather than address underlying grievances.
Spatial politics: The illiberal peace literature explored how postwar reconstruction and urban planning were used to consolidate power, reshape demographics, and marginalize opposition. Examples include Basateen al‑Razi in Damascus (Marota City) and the Turkish state’s urban strategies in Kurdish areas (Ercan), as well as monuments in Sri Lanka (memory politics) and the Aung San statue in Myanmar (a site for postwar state-building and a potential protest focal point).
Return of the state as central actor: Unlike liberal peace where civil society and international institutions often led reforms, illiberal peace emphasizes the state as the primary legitimate actor to end conflict and maintain stability, sometimes through suppressive measures against civil society and international organizations.
Contested role of civil society and international organizations: Illiberal regimes increasingly viewed NGOs as destabilizing or as Western instruments; international organizations were seen as intrusive and threatening sovereignty, contributing to backlash against civil society and reform efforts.
Core distinction: Illiberal peace centers domestic political agency and state sovereignty over internationalization and reformist liberal norms.
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Deeper analysis of the state-centered logic: The sovereign state is portrayed as the only legitimate actor capable of ending armed conflict and ensuring stability; liberal peace’s emphasis on civil society and external reforms is questioned or rejected.
Domestic vs external legitimacy: External actors (civil society, Western mediators) are seen as potentially destabilizing; illiberal leaders emphasize domestic legitimacy and the “will of the people” as a justification for illiberal methods.
Examples of illiberal interventions by regional powers: Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and others have engaged in interventions to prevent or contain internal rebellion when it aligned with friendly regimes. This includes military and political support for incumbents and the use of coercive tools to suppress opposition.
Tension with universal human rights: Illiberal interventions often prioritize regime security and stability over accountability and human rights protections, challenging universal norms of liberal peace.
The role of space and memory: State-led spatial strategies and monumental memorials (e.g., memorials in Sri Lanka) are used to consolidate postwar power, discourage dissent, and legitimate illiberal governance.
Summary takeaway: Illiberal peace posits that political order can and should be achieved through state-centric means, even at the cost of liberal democratic principles, by emphasizing sovereignty, stability, and the suppression of opposition.
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Mediation and conflict diplomacy: Liberal peace assumed neutral third-party mediation (e.g., Finland’s CMI, small states like Norway) would facilitate negotiations. Illiberal peace shifts toward major-power mediation and regional formats.
Regional powers as mediators: Afghanistan, Syria, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Libya saw mediation led by regional powers, sometimes excluding Western powers. Examples include:
Russia-led Moscow Format for Afghanistan, with Pakistan and China involved.
The Astana process in Syria (Russia, Turkey, Iran) excluding the West and sidelining the UN.
The UN process persisted but failed to make headway in Syria under liberal frameworks.
The argument for major-power mediation: Illiberal peace contends that successful mediation requires involvement by the principal regional players who have a stake in the conflict outcome, rather than neutral actors with limited stake.
State-centric security logic: Emphasizes the primacy of a strong, centralized leader who can act decisively in emergencies, sometimes bypassing democratic or judicial processes (echoing Schmittian ideas).
Notable leaders associated with illiberal conflict management: Vladimir Putin (Chechnya and Syria), Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Kurdish conflict in Turkey), Xi Jinping (Xinjiang), Paul Kagame (post‑conflict Rwanda), Narendra Modi (Kashmir), and Mahinda Rajapaksa (Sri Lanka).
International electoral dynamics: Liberal electoral processes are often portrayed as vulnerable to manipulation; illiberal approaches argue that elections can be violent and destabilizing, and therefore a strong leader and coordinated state action are necessary for stability.
Scholarly takeaway: Illiberal peace emphasizes state leadership and regional power dynamics as central to peace processes, challenging the liberal peace assumption of neutral mediation and broad-based democratization as prerequisites for peace.
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Economic dimension of illiberal peace: Elites capture economies to further regime security; the postwar political economy is governed by rent-seeking elites, which can stabilize a peace in the short term but at the cost of democracy and inclusive development.
Early examples of economic capture and illiberal peace:
Angola: Soares de Oliveira (2011) described postwar reconstruction managed by local elites in defiance of liberal peace precepts, constructing hegemonic orders and entrenching elite control over the political economy.
Indonesia: Claire Smith (2014) argued illiberal peace-building embedded corruption and impunity, protecting elites loyal to the central government.
The paradox of corruption: Some analyses suggest corrupted patronage networks and clientelist structures can, in the short term, stabilize conflict-affected societies and permit a form of political order—even though these arrangements undermine liberal principles and long-term development goals.
Ideology and illiberalism: While the illiberal peace literature often focused on practical and empirical aspects, the ideological underpinnings were less developed. Kraus et al. (illiberal counter-revolution) and Krastev & Holmes (2019) note an overarching trend of illiberalism in global politics, challenging liberal hegemony.
Laruelle’s conceptualization of illiberalism (2022): Illiberalism is not merely a negation of liberalism but a rejection of it in favor of majoritarian, nation-centric, sovereigntist solutions that uphold traditional hierarchies and promote cultural homogeneity. Illiberal peace is thus an ideational framework supporting hierarchy, statist authority, and fixed identities.
Schmittian heritage in illiberal peace: Carl Schmitt’s ideas influence illiberal peace—sovereign leadership above the law, a clear boundary between friend and enemy, and a rigid conception of space and land as fixed and controllable.
Hybrid forms and mimicry: Some cases show that illiberal peace can hybridize with liberal practices (mimicry or parody of liberal norms) or present counter-norms that redefine peace, conflict, and peacebuilding in opposition to Western models.
Counter-norms and normative contestation: Russia and others articulate their own readings of conflict management concepts, challenging Western norms and promoting alternative models for international conflict mediation. Kostelyanets (2019) highlights Russia’s promotion of alternative conflict mediation models as part of a broader geopolitical competition.
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The role of counter-norms in a contestation of concepts: Illiberal powers promote their own definitions of conflict, peace, and peacebuilding, challenging liberal norms and pushing for acceptance of different governance models.
Russia’s perspective: Sergei Kostelyanets (2019) notes Russia’s peace initiatives in the MENA region as alternative to Western proposals, framed as sustainable and affordable mechanisms to protect and advance Russian interests.
The importance of ideological contestation: The chapter argues that illiberal peacebuilding cannot be reduced to a set of policy preferences; it involves ideological contestation and the promotion of models that legitimize state-centric control and rejection of liberal norms.
Overall takeaway: The illiberal peace literature recognizes the emergence of competing norms and models of conflict management, driven by non-Western powers and regional actors, and questions the universality and effectiveness of liberal peace as a one-size-fits-all approach.
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References section (selected):
Arab News (2018) on Marota City project in Syria.
Autesserre (2014) Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and Everyday Politics of International Intervention.
Baglione (2008) on post‑settlement Chechnya as authoritarian peace-building (conference paper).
Berti & Sosnowski (2022) on siege and population control in Syria.
Birch, Daxecker, Höglund (2020) on electoral violence.
Brännström (2016) on Carl Schmitt and sovereignty.
Burai (2016) on parody as norm contestation (Russia–Georgia/Ukraine).
Carothers & Brechenmacher (2014) Closing Space: Democracy and Human Rights Support under Fire.
Cengiz (2020) on the Astana Peace Process for Syria.
Chalermsripinyorat (2020) on illiberal peace-building in Southern Thailand.
Collier, Hoeffer, Rohner (2009) Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War.
Cooper (2007) On the Crisis of the Liberal Peace.
Costantini & Santini (2021) Power Mediators and the Illiberal Peace Momentum.
Diehl (2016) Exploring Peace: Looking Beyond War and Negative Peace.
Diehl (2016)
Egnell & Haldén (2009) on Security Sector Reform and state formation.
Ercan (2019) on urban warfare and peace process in Turkish Kurdistan.
Flores & Nooruddin (2012) The Effect of Elections on Postconflict Peace and Reconstruction.
Goodhand (2008, 2010) on Afghanistan and Sri Lanka’s peace dynamics.
Heathershaw & Owen (2019) on Authoritarian Conflict Management in Post‑Colonial Eurasia.
Hellmüller (2022) on UN mediation in Syria.
Jones (2018) on China’s approach to Uyghurs in Xinjiang.
Jütersonke et al. (2021) Norm Contestation and Transformation in Global Peacebuilding.
Kania (2021) Forging Peace in Damascus.
Karaganov (2017) God pobed (Russia piece).
Keen (2012) Greed and grievance in civil war.
Keen (2021) Assessing Authoritarian Conflict Management in the Middle East and Central Asia.
Kenkel (2021) Rising Powers and Peacebuilding.
Kluczewska (2020) Tajikistan’s Atomised Peace.
Kostelyanets (2019) Russia’s Peace Initiatives in MENA.
Krastev & Holmes (2019) The Light that Failed.
Laruelle (2022) Illiberalism: A Conceptual Introduction.
Lewis (2020) Sri Lanka’s Schmittian Peace.
Lewis (2022) Contesting Liberal Peace: Russia’s Emerging Model of Conflict Management.
Lewis, Heathershaw, & Megoran (2018) Illiberal Peace? Authoritarian Modes of Conflict Management.
Lewis & Sagnayeva (2020) Corruption, Patronage and Illiberal Peace in Kyrgyzstan.
Matveeva (2021) Syria’s Uneasy Peace.
McCargo & Senaratne (2020) Victor’s Memory in Sri Lanka.
Megoran & Rakhmatullaev (2022) Authoritarianism and Non-Securitisation in Kyrgyz minority in Uzbekistan.
Olivius & Hedström (2021) Spatial Struggles and the Politics of Peace in Myanmar.
Piccolino (2015) Winning Wars, Building (Illiberal) Peace?
Pugh (2021) Peacebuilding’s Origins and History.
Rajapaksa (2007) Speech to Los Angeles World Affairs Council.
Richmond (2006) The Problem of Peace: Understanding the Liberal Peace.
Russell (2014) Ramzan Kadyrov’s Illiberal Peace in Chechnya.
Smith (2014) Illiberal Peace-Building in Hybrid Political Orders (Indonesia).
Smith, Waldorf, Venugopal, McCarthy (2020) Illiberal Peace-Building in Asia.
Smith (2022) Leviathan’s Architect (Turkey, Iraq, etc.).
Soares de Oliveira (2011) Illiberal Peacebuilding in Angola.
Stokke et al. (2022) Illiberal Peacebuilding in Myanmar.
Stoyan/others (illustrative) – additional citations as listed in the chapter.
Note: The bibliography confirms a broad, multi-year, cross-regional literature exploring illiberal peace, its origins, mechanisms, and implications for international peacebuilding.
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Additional references and scholarly works cited across the chapter include contributions on:
Mediation and peace processes (Costantini & Santini; Hellmüller; Stepannova).
Comparative studies of illiberalism in political science and political thought (Krastev & Holmes; Laruelle).
The relationship between economics, corruption, and peace termination (Soares de Oliveira; Smith).
The geopolitics of conflict management and counter-norms (Kostelyanets; Karaganov).
The references collectively underline a shift away from a purely liberal peace framework toward a more nuanced, state-centric, and geopolitically contested set of practices in peacebuilding.
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More references touching on key themes:
Liberal peace critiques (Richmond 2006).
Case studies of illiberal peace in hybrid orders (Smith 2014; Smith et al. 2020).
Case-specific analyses of illiberal peace in Syria, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Thailand, Tajikistan/Central Asia.
The role of regional powers in conflict management (Russia, Turkey, Iran, China, India).
The literature connects illiberal peace to broader trends in illiberalism and the “illiberal counter-revolution.”
Note on scholarly conversation: There is no single agreed-upon definition of illiberal peace; rather, a spectrum of approaches exists, with scholars debating terminology, scope, and applicability of illiberal frameworks in different contexts.
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Final references and notes (continuation and closing of the bibliography):
References to Rajapaksa’s 2007 address; Richmond (2006); Russell (2014); Abboud (2021); Schmitt (2003); Smith et al. (2020); Soares De Oliveira (2011); Stepanova (2021); Stokke et al. (2022); von Billerbeck & Tansey (2019); Zabyelina (2013).
The notes emphasize the ongoing scholarly discussion about illiberal peace, including its roots, operationalization, and implications for future peacebuilding.
Page 746 confirms the end of the chapter content in this excerpt and provides the concluding framing that illiberal peace is a counter-model to liberal peace and that its practical outcomes often involve coercive counterinsurgency, suppression of civil liberties, and a reassertion of state sovereignty.
Summary of Key Concepts and Connections
Liberal Peacebuilding ( origins, instruments, and assumptions )
Illiberal Peace/Peacebuilding ( definitions, mechanisms, and critique )
R2P ( Responsibility to Protect ) and sovereignty debates
SSR and Security Sector Reform ( state-building vs state weakening concerns )
Role of Civil Society and NGOs in liberal vs illiberal frameworks
Return of the State as central actor in illiberal peace
Spatial politics and urban planning as tools of illiberal peace (Basateen al-Razi, Marota City, monuments)
Role of major powers in peace processes (Russia, Turkey, Iran, China) versus Western mediation models
Schmittian influences on illiberal peace (sovereign leader, friend/enemy dichotomy, territorial boundaries)
Economic structures under illiberal peace (patronage, rent-seeking, elite bargains) and their short-term stabilizing effects
Counter-norms and norm contestation (norms of peace, conflict, and mediation under illiberal regimes)
Critical perspectives: illiberal peace as a reaction to liberal hegemony, with both emancipatory claims and brutal implementations
Real-world implications: case studies include Sri Lanka, Chechnya, Syria, Xinjiang, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, and others; broader regional dynamics (Astana, Moscow Format)
Ethical and practical implications: balancing stability with human rights, and questions about the ethics of peace achieved through coercion and suppression of dissent
Notable Definitions and Concepts (in context)
Liberal peacebuilding: A paradigm that seeks to resolve conflicts through democratization, market liberalization, rule of law, and civil rights, often mediated by international institutions and NGOs, with a global norm of liberal democracy as the endpoint.
Illiberal peace/illiberal peacebuilding: A counter-model that emphasizes state sovereignty, hierarchical order, and control over space and society; uses coercion, patronage, and selective modernization to end conflicts, often at the expense of rights and accountability.
Authoritarian Conflict Management (ACM): A framework describing conflict termination through non-negotiated, non‑mediated, state-centered coercive means, eschewing negotiation and international constraints on force, and prioritizing regime security over addressing root causes.
R2P (Responsibility to Protect): A normative framework legitimizing international intervention when a state fails to protect its population from atrocity crimes, though its application has been contentious and invoked selectively.
Counter-norms: Competing norms proposed by illiberal states that challenge liberal norms about peacebuilding, mediation, and governance, promoting alternative models of conflict management.
Important Cross-References (selected)
Ko A nnan, Agenda for Peace (1992): Liberal peace framework and the root-causes narrative.
Autesserre (2014): Peaceland – the everyday politics of international intervention.
Collier (2009) and Keen (2012): Debates on the feasibility of addressing root causes and the policy implications for illiberal state practices.
Smith et al. (2020); Lewis, Heathershaw, & Megoran (2018): illiberal peacebuilding in Asia and the ACM framework.
Laruelle (2022): Conceptual introduction to illiberalism and its implications for peacebuilding.
Schmitt (2003): The Nomos of the Earth – theoretical underpinnings for sovereign leadership and homogeneity concepts.
Kostelyanets (2019): Russia’s promotion of alternative conflict mediation models.
Case studies across Syria, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Angola, Chechnya, Xinjiang, and others illustrate the breadth and variation of illiberal peace practices.
If you would like, I can add more quotes or pull out specific quotations to emphasize in your study notes, or tailor the depth of coverage for particular topics (e.g., the ACM model, case studies, or normative debates).
International responses to civil wars, predominantly liberal peacebuilding since the 1990s, have focused on democratization, liberal economic reforms, and addressing root causes via political settlements. This framework, outlined in initiatives like the Agenda for Peace (1992), involves state reform, civil society engagement, and economic liberalization, with external actors like NGOs and international organizations playing a central role. Key expected transformations included political democratization and neoliberal economic reforms.
However, liberal peacebuilding has faced increasing challenges, evident in its inherent tension between sovereignty and intervention (e.g., Responsibility to Protect - R2P doctrine, adopted in 2005). Events like the NATO intervention in Libya (2011) and Sri Lanka's brutal counterinsurgency (2005–2007) highlighted its fragilities and the rise of illiberal peace practices. A global power shift, with non-Western powers like Russia and China asserting alternative approaches, further eroded liberal hegemony.
Illiberal peace (also called authoritarian peace or authoritarian conflict management) is a counter-model that aims to end violent conflict through top-down, state-centric, and often coercive mechanisms. It prioritizes regime security and stability over accountability, human rights, and social inclusion. Its methods include the deployment of violence when needed, patronage, corruption to secure compliance, and the suppression of human rights concerns. Illiberal approaches often dismiss underlying grievances as criminal or terrorist concerns and emphasize the state as the primary legitimate actor, actively suppressing civil society and questioning international organizations. Spatial politics, such as postwar urban planning and memory politics (e.g., monuments in Sri Lanka), are also used to consolidate power.
Mediation under illiberal peace shifts from neutral third-party mediators to those led by major regional powers (e.g., the Astana Process in Syria), who have a direct stake in the outcome. Economically, illiberal peace often involves elite capture and rent-seeking, which can paradoxically stabilize conflict-affected societies in the short term, albeit at the cost of long-term democracy and inclusive development.
Ideologically, illiberalism, influenced by Carl Schmitt's ideas, rejects liberalism in favor of majoritarian, nation-centric, sovereigntist solutions, promoting hierarchy, statist authority, and fixed identities. This leads to the promotion of counter-norms by illiberal powers, challenging established liberal definitions of peace, conflict, and peacebuilding.
In essence, illiberal peace represents a significant departure from the post–Cold War liberal framework, prioritizing state sovereignty and order through coercive means, even if it means foregoing liberal democratic principles and human rights.