The Smoot-Hawley Trade War Flashcards
Overview of the Smoot-Hawley Trade War Study and Findings
The study, conducted by Kris James Mitchener, Kevin Hjortsh%j O’Rourke, and Kirsten Wandschneider, documents the outbreak of a trade war following the United States' adoption of the Smoot-Hawley tariff in June 1930.
Key findings include a significant decline in U.S. exports to retaliating partners, falling by approximately to .
The research utilizes a new quarterly dataset of bilateral trade for countries and a second product-level dataset for U.S. exports to countries between 1926 and 1932.
Retaliators targeted the most important U.S. exports, such as automobiles, which fell by an additional in those markets after the tariff was enacted.
Welfare gains from trade for retaliating nations fell by roughly to .
The study refutes the traditional view that protectionism had a negligible impact compared to the GDP collapse during the Great Depression by focusing on geographical trade distortions and specific retaliation.
Historical Context and Origins of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff
Post-WWI Agricultural Distress: The roots of the tariff began with the First World War. New World producers expanded production while European farming was depressed. When European production returned, crop prices fell, leading to a U.S. recession in 1920–1 and prolonged agricultural depression in the 1920s.
Political Pressures: The Fordney-McCumber tariff of 1922 increased industrial protection. Midwestern Republicans and Democrats sought a "level playing field" for farmers. Herbert Hoover endorsed higher agricultural tariffs during the 1928 Presidential election.
Legislative Process: - Hearings began in January 1929 under Willis Hawley (House Ways and Means Committee). - The resulting bill raised industrial tariffs more than agricultural ones. - The Senate Finance Committee, chaired by Reed Smoot, shifted the bill toward agriculture. - The final Hawley-Smoot bill was signed by Hoover on June 17, 1930, effective the next day.
Tariff Increase: The legislation raised the average U.S. tariff on dutiable imports by approximately percentage points.
Defining and Categorizing International Responses
Trade War Definition: Following Conybeare (1987), a trade war is a category of intense international conflict where states interact, bargain, and retaliate primarily over economic objectives related to traded goods sectors using restrictions on the flow of goods.
Types of Foreign Responses: - Direct Retaliation: Measures taken specifically against the United States (the focus of this study). - Signal for Protectionism: Viewing the U.S. move as a breakdown of international discipline and raising barriers against all countries. - No Response/Domestic Protectionism: Doing nothing or raising tariffs solely for domestic reasons unrelated to the U.S. action.
Responders Categories: - Protesters: Countries that filed official petitions with the U.S. State Department (35 countries/colonies by Fall 1929). - Retaliators: Countries documented by contemporary sources (Mann, 1930; Jones, 1934) as imposing tariffs specifically in response to Smoot-Hawley. - Threateners: Countries that protested but did not formally retaliate.
Detailed Breakdown of Foreign Reprisals and Retaliation
Canada: Characterized as aggressively responding. It lowered duties on British Empire goods and imposed countervailing duties on American products (approx. one-third of U.S. exports to Canada). It later passed an "emergency tariff" on textiles, meat, and electrical equipment.
France: Raised tariffs on automobiles and parts in April 1930. The basis changed from value to weight, effectively increasing rates by almost for some models. The tariff for American lard was doubled.
Italy: Duties on automobiles were raised by between and . The Royal Italian Auto Club called for a boycott of American cars.
Spain: The "Wais tariff" (July 1930) targeted automobiles, tires, and motion picture equipment. Duties for a car weighing were pesetas if European-made vs. pesetas if U.S.-made.
Switzerland: Responded with boycotts of typewriters and automobiles. The tariff on typewriters rose from to per .
Other Retaliators: Argentina, Australia, Mexico, New Zealand, and Cuba are also classified as retaliators.
Analysis of Protester and Retaliator Characteristics
The study uses a probit model to predict which countries responded:
Polity and Democracy: More democratic countries (higher polity scores) were significantly more likely to protest; a one-unit increase in the polity score raised the probability by around .
Econometric Findings: - A country’s bilateral trade balance with the U.S. was not a statistically significant predictor of response. - Countries running larger overall trade surpluses were more likely to respond. - Political factors like World War I debt and existing Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) agreements did not play a significant role.
Quantitative Effects on Bilateral Trade Flows
The Gravity Model: The researchers estimated the impact on imports () using importer-time (), exporter-time (), and pairwise () fixed effects:
Results for U.S. Exports: - Responders: U.S. exports were on average lower (OLS) or lower (PPML). - Retaliators: Exports fell by between and . - Threateners: Imports from the U.S. fell by between and , suggesting "de facto" retaliation beyond official labels.
Robustness: - For sovereign (non-colonial) nations, responders reduced U.S. imports by to . - Imperial preference countries (Canada/Australia) showed the strongest retaliatory effects, followed by Latin American countries and Spain.
Strategic Product Targeting and Automobile Case Study
Strategic Methodology: Testing if countries targeted "Top 10" U.S. export goods to circumvent MFN obligations.
Findings on Targeting: - Chief U.S. exports to retaliators fell by an additional . - Chief exports to threateners fell by an additional .
The Automobile Sector: Automobiles were a visible, differentiated consumer good. The study found a negative and statistically significant effect for the triple-interaction term (Top10 $\times$ Retaliator $\times$ Automobiles).
Automobile Impact: Retaliators reduced automobile imports from the U.S. by an additional .
Welfare Impacts of the Trade War
Welfare Formula: The study modifies the Arkolakis et al. (2012) and Felbermayr et al. (2015) formulas: - : Elasticity of imports (set to ). - : Domestic expenditure share. - : Tariff multiplier (share of aggregate tariff revenue in income). - : Parameter for model type (Armington/Krugman vs. Melitz).
Calculations for 1929–1931: - For Retaliators: Welfare declined by roughly percentage points between 1929 and 1930, and percentage points by 1931. - This equates to a loss of approximately to of the total welfare gains from trade. - For the United States: The welfare impact through 1931 was small and inconsistent in sign (approx. change in welfare gains by 1931).
Appendix: Specific Retaliation Data
Argentina: Boycott and stiffened regulations on U.S. apples; average tariff rose from to by 1933.
Australia: Increased duties on gasoline (), tobacco (), and a increase on Oregon logs/timber.
Canada (May 1, 1930): Introduced "countervailing duties" where Canadian rates automatically rose to match any higher rate imposed by the country of origin. Potatoes moved from free to a duty of .
Italy (June 30, 1930): Duty on cheapest Ford model increased from to .
Switzerland (Dec 10, 1930): Typewriter tariff rose from to per .
Spain (July 22, 1930): Increased duties on sewing machines, razor blades, and hams; specifically penalized "extra European" cars.