The Smoot-Hawley Trade War Flashcards

Overview of the Smoot-Hawley Trade War Study and Findings

  • The study, conducted by Kris James Mitchener, Kevin Hjortsh%j O’Rourke, and Kirsten Wandschneider, documents the outbreak of a trade war following the United States' adoption of the Smoot-Hawley tariff in June 1930.

  • Key findings include a significant decline in U.S. exports to retaliating partners, falling by approximately 28%28\% to 32%32\%.

  • The research utilizes a new quarterly dataset of bilateral trade for 9999 countries and a second product-level dataset for U.S. exports to 5959 countries between 1926 and 1932.

  • Retaliators targeted the most important U.S. exports, such as automobiles, which fell by an additional 33%33\% in those markets after the tariff was enacted.

  • Welfare gains from trade for retaliating nations fell by roughly 8%8\% to 16%16\%.

  • The study refutes the traditional view that protectionism had a negligible impact compared to the GDP collapse during the Great Depression by focusing on geographical trade distortions and specific retaliation.

Historical Context and Origins of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff

  • Post-WWI Agricultural Distress: The roots of the tariff began with the First World War. New World producers expanded production while European farming was depressed. When European production returned, crop prices fell, leading to a U.S. recession in 1920–1 and prolonged agricultural depression in the 1920s.

  • Political Pressures: The Fordney-McCumber tariff of 1922 increased industrial protection. Midwestern Republicans and Democrats sought a "level playing field" for farmers. Herbert Hoover endorsed higher agricultural tariffs during the 1928 Presidential election.

  • Legislative Process:   - Hearings began in January 1929 under Willis Hawley (House Ways and Means Committee).   - The resulting bill raised industrial tariffs more than agricultural ones.   - The Senate Finance Committee, chaired by Reed Smoot, shifted the bill toward agriculture.   - The final Hawley-Smoot bill was signed by Hoover on June 17, 1930, effective the next day.

  • Tariff Increase: The legislation raised the average U.S. tariff on dutiable imports by approximately 66 percentage points.

Defining and Categorizing International Responses

  • Trade War Definition: Following Conybeare (1987), a trade war is a category of intense international conflict where states interact, bargain, and retaliate primarily over economic objectives related to traded goods sectors using restrictions on the flow of goods.

  • Types of Foreign Responses:   - Direct Retaliation: Measures taken specifically against the United States (the focus of this study).   - Signal for Protectionism: Viewing the U.S. move as a breakdown of international discipline and raising barriers against all countries.   - No Response/Domestic Protectionism: Doing nothing or raising tariffs solely for domestic reasons unrelated to the U.S. action.

  • Responders Categories:   - Protesters: Countries that filed official petitions with the U.S. State Department (35 countries/colonies by Fall 1929).   - Retaliators: Countries documented by contemporary sources (Mann, 1930; Jones, 1934) as imposing tariffs specifically in response to Smoot-Hawley.   - Threateners: Countries that protested but did not formally retaliate.

Detailed Breakdown of Foreign Reprisals and Retaliation

  • Canada: Characterized as aggressively responding. It lowered duties on 270270 British Empire goods and imposed countervailing duties on 1616 American products (approx. one-third of U.S. exports to Canada). It later passed an "emergency tariff" on textiles, meat, and electrical equipment.

  • France: Raised tariffs on automobiles and parts in April 1930. The basis changed from value to weight, effectively increasing rates by almost 50%50\% for some models. The tariff for American lard was doubled.

  • Italy: Duties on automobiles were raised by between 100%100\% and 167%167\%. The Royal Italian Auto Club called for a boycott of American cars.

  • Spain: The "Wais tariff" (July 1930) targeted automobiles, tires, and motion picture equipment. Duties for a car weighing 800kg800\,kg were 1,4401,440 pesetas if European-made vs. 2,4002,400 pesetas if U.S.-made.

  • Switzerland: Responded with boycotts of typewriters and automobiles. The tariff on typewriters rose from $5.25\$5.25 to $21.89\$21.89 per 100pounds100\,pounds.

  • Other Retaliators: Argentina, Australia, Mexico, New Zealand, and Cuba are also classified as retaliators.

Analysis of Protester and Retaliator Characteristics

  • The study uses a probit model to predict which countries responded:   Responderi=α0+β1USExportSharei,1928+β2TradeBalancei,19268+β3TradeBalancevsUSi,19268+β4MFNAgreementi+β5PolityScorei+β6IndebtednessDummyi+β7ContinentDummy+ϵiResponder_i = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 US Export Share_{i,1928} + \beta_2 Trade Balance_{i,1926-8} + \beta_3 Trade Balance vs US_{i,1926-8} + \beta_4 MFN Agreement_i + \beta_5 Polity Score_i + \beta_6 Indebtedness Dummy_i + \beta_7 Continent Dummy + \epsilon_i

  • Polity and Democracy: More democratic countries (higher polity scores) were significantly more likely to protest; a one-unit increase in the polity score raised the probability by around 14%14\%.

  • Econometric Findings:   - A country’s bilateral trade balance with the U.S. was not a statistically significant predictor of response.   - Countries running larger overall trade surpluses were more likely to respond.   - Political factors like World War I debt and existing Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) agreements did not play a significant role.

Quantitative Effects on Bilateral Trade Flows

  • The Gravity Model: The researchers estimated the impact on imports (IMijtIM_{ijt}) using importer-time (djtd_{jt}), exporter-time (ditd_{it}), and pairwise (dijd_{ij}) fixed effects:   ln(IMijt)=α+γ1Responderijt+ηControlsijt+dit+djt+dij+ϵijt\ln(IM_{ijt}) = \alpha + \gamma_1 Responder_{ijt} + \eta Controls_{ijt} + d_{it} + d_{jt} + d_{ij} + \epsilon_{ijt}

  • Results for U.S. Exports:   - Responders: U.S. exports were on average 25%25\% lower (OLS) or 18%18\% lower (PPML).   - Retaliators: Exports fell by between 28%28\% and 32%32\%.   - Threateners: Imports from the U.S. fell by between 15%15\% and 23%23\%, suggesting "de facto" retaliation beyond official labels.

  • Robustness:   - For sovereign (non-colonial) nations, responders reduced U.S. imports by 41%41\% to 47%47\%.   - Imperial preference countries (Canada/Australia) showed the strongest retaliatory effects, followed by Latin American countries and Spain.

Strategic Product Targeting and Automobile Case Study

  • Strategic Methodology: Testing if countries targeted "Top 10" U.S. export goods to circumvent MFN obligations.   ln(EXkjt)=α+δ1Top10kj×Responderjt+dkt+djt+dkj+ϵkjt\ln(EX_{kjt}) = \alpha + \delta_1 Top10_{kj} \times Responder_{jt} + d_{kt} + d_{jt} + d_{kj} + \epsilon_{kjt}

  • Findings on Targeting:   - Chief U.S. exports to retaliators fell by an additional 33%33\%.   - Chief exports to threateners fell by an additional 19%19\%.

  • The Automobile Sector: Automobiles were a visible, differentiated consumer good. The study found a negative and statistically significant effect for the triple-interaction term (Top10 $\times$ Retaliator $\times$ Automobiles).

  • Automobile Impact: Retaliators reduced automobile imports from the U.S. by an additional 43%43\%.

Welfare Impacts of the Trade War

  • Welfare Formula: The study modifies the Arkolakis et al. (2012) and Felbermayr et al. (2015) formulas:   Gj=1μj(1+δη/ϵτ)λjj1/ϵτG_j = 1 - \mu_j - (1 + \delta \eta / \epsilon_\tau ) \lambda_{jj}^{1/ \epsilon_\tau }   - ϵτ\epsilon_\tau: Elasticity of imports (set to 8.08.0).   - λjj\lambda_{jj}: Domestic expenditure share.   - μj\mu_j: Tariff multiplier (share of aggregate tariff revenue in income).   - δη\delta \eta: Parameter for model type (Armington/Krugman vs. Melitz).

  • Calculations for 1929–1931:   - For Retaliators: Welfare declined by roughly 0.30.3 percentage points between 1929 and 1930, and 0.50.5 percentage points by 1931.   - This equates to a loss of approximately 8%8\% to 16%16\% of the total welfare gains from trade.   - For the United States: The welfare impact through 1931 was small and inconsistent in sign (approx. 14.3%-14.3\% change in welfare gains by 1931).

Appendix: Specific Retaliation Data

  • Argentina: Boycott and stiffened regulations on U.S. apples; average tariff rose from 16.7%16.7\% to 28.7%28.7\% by 1933.

  • Australia: Increased duties on gasoline (6cents/gallon6\,cents/gallon), tobacco (12cents/pound12\,cents/pound), and a 20%20\% increase on Oregon logs/timber.

  • Canada (May 1, 1930): Introduced "countervailing duties" where Canadian rates automatically rose to match any higher rate imposed by the country of origin. Potatoes moved from free to a duty of 75centsperhundredweight75\,cents\,per\,hundredweight.

  • Italy (June 30, 1930): Duty on cheapest Ford model increased from $350\$350 to $815.50\$815.50.

  • Switzerland (Dec 10, 1930): Typewriter tariff rose from $5.25\$5.25 to $21.89\$21.89 per 100pounds100\,pounds.

  • Spain (July 22, 1930): Increased duties on sewing machines, razor blades, and hams; specifically penalized "extra European" cars.