Notes on Gender Reforms, Electoral Quotas, and Women’s Political Representation

Introduction: Gender Reforms, Electoral Quotas, and Women’s Political Representation

• In the last two decades, over 118 countries and political parties have implemented gender quotas to ensure women's political representation.

• East and Southeast Asia have seen 15 countries beginning gender reforms and quota strategies to address the gender gap in politics.

• This study examines the origins and impacts of gender equality strategies on women's political engagement, focusing on Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore.

• These countries share similar communitarian values and socio-economic development, yet have diverse approaches to gender equality in electoral reforms.

• The research controls for cultural and economic factors to emphasize institutional impacts on women's representation at party and national levels.

• Taiwan and South Korea adopted mixed electoral systems and legislated quotas to enhance women's legislative representation at local and national levels.

• Taiwan has used reserved seats for women since the 1950s.

• Singapore has resisted legislating quotas, but the ruling party voluntarily introduced a quota in 2009.

• These strategies have yielded slow and uneven improvements.

• The effectiveness of electoral systems and quota strategies is contingent on:

  • Party system institutionalization.

  • Electoral competitiveness.

  • Legal enforcement.

  • Socio-cultural attitudes toward women.

Female Ministers and Elected Parliamentarians

• Table 1 presents data on female ministers and parliamentarians in Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore.

• Electoral systems:

  • Taiwan: Mixed.

  • South Korea: Mixed.

  • Singapore: Plurality PBV (Plurality Block Vote).

• Quotas:

  • Taiwan: Reserved seats + candidate quota (50%).

  • South Korea: Candidate quota (50% for PR list) + (30% for SMD).

  • Singapore: Voluntary party quota (30%).

• Year Adopted:

  • Taiwan: 1950s and 2005.

  • South Korea: 2004.

  • Singapore: 2009.

• Female Cabinet Ministers (%):

  • Taiwan: 7/41 (17.0).

  • South Korea: 3/24 (11.1).

  • Singapore: 1/18 (5.5).

• Elected Women, Lower House (%):

  • Taiwan: 37/113 (33.0).

  • South Korea: 47/300 (16.0).

  • Singapore: 20/89 (22.5).

• Last Legislative Election:

  • Taiwan: 2012.

  • South Korea: 2012.

  • Singapore: 2015.

• Gender equality strategies have led to slow and uneven results across Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore.

• Since 1990, women’s legislative representation has risen but varies among the three.

• Taiwan has an exceptional 34% of women in the Legislative Yuan, exceeding the 25% average in lower chambers with legislated candidate quotas in 2013.

• South Korea saw only a 10-point increase after legislating quotas since 2005.

• Singapore improved numbers without formal quotas, but the ruling party's voluntary quota of 30% in 2009 was largely symbolic.

Reasons for Gender Reforms and Quota Adoption

• The article details reasons for gender reforms and quota adoption for increased women's political representation in Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore.

• It highlights limitations of structural and culturalist approaches to explain women's underrepresentation.

• It considers the effects of electoral arrangements on women's legislative representation.

• The final section presents a summary of key findings.

• Gender quotas are affirmative action to accelerate women's entry into politics for "equality of results."

• Types of gender quotas:

  • Legislated candidate quotas: ensure a proportion of candidates are women.

  • Reserved seats: legislature seats set aside for women.

  • Party quotas: targets voluntarily set by parties to ensure female candidates.

• Quotas vary by legal enforcement and application level (party, local, or national).

• Legislated quotas are binding, while party quotas are voluntary.

• Aspirant party quotas are used at party primaries to ensure a minimum number of women candidates.

• Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore use variants of these quotas at different levels.

• Electoral reforms are examined for their motivations, affecting enforcement, compliance, and effectiveness.

• The spread of gender quotas is driven by:

  • Civil society/feminist movements.

  • International diffusion norm.

  • Democratization.

  • Strategic inter-party competition.

• In South Korea and Taiwan, feminist groups lobbied for legislated quotas after democratization, using international agreements like CEDAW.

• In Singapore, feminist pressures were less effective due to the government's control over civil society.

• Critics are concerned that quotas violate equal opportunity and reinforce negative perceptions of women legislators.

• Questions remain about whether women would represent "women’s interests."

• The PAP government in Singapore rejects legalizing gender quotas due to concerns of violating meritocracy and undermining credibility.

• Singapore's 22.5% legislative representation of women is lower than the global average of 28% in lower chambers using party quotas.

Gaps in Existing Literature

• Gender quota and electoral studies are largely Eurocentric.

• Few studies have examined progress in East Asia, unlike South Asia.

• Case studies will add geographical diversity and test explanations of women’s underrepresentation.

• Socio-economic underdevelopment literature does not explain women's political representation in these cases.

• Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea are affluent post-industrial societies with high economic development, literacy rates, and female tertiary education enrolment.

• Political participation of women has not increased at the same rate as economic development.

• Women's labour participation hasn't improved their political or corporate leadership positions.

• South Korea has the lowest percentage of women on corporate boards (2.4%), while Singapore and Taiwan have similar levels (7.9%).

• According to the Gender Gap Index, South Korea ranks poorly (111th) compared to Singapore (58th) and Taiwan (39th).

• The lack of women in politics and corporate boardrooms in Singapore and South Korea is puzzling, demonstrating a lack of systematic relationship between human development and gender equality.

• Patriarchal cultures, family networks, and inegalitarian attitudes affect women's political roles in Asia.

• Women's political leadership is sometimes attributed to male benevolence or family connections.

• An elite-focused approach can detract from the fact that women are poorly represented in the Cabinet and Parliament.

• Asia has the least progress in women’s political representation, with an average of 18.4% in Parliament, behind the global average of 21.8%.

General Statistics of Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore

• Table 2 presents general statistics for Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore.

• Total Population (millions):

  • Taiwan: 23.4

  • South Korea: 50.2

  • Singapore: 5.4

• GDP Per Capita (PPP):

  • Taiwan: 39,600

  • South Korea: 33,200

  • Singapore: 62,400

• Human Development Index (2013):

  • Taiwan: 23 (0.89)

  • South Korea: 15 (0.89)

  • Singapore: 9 (0.91)

• Literacy Rate of Women (%):

  • Taiwan: 96.3

  • South Korea: 96.6

  • Singapore: 94.6

• Gender Gap Index (2013):

  • Taiwan: 39 (0.71)

  • South Korea: 111 (0.63)

  • Singapore: 58 (0.70)

• Gross Enrollment Ratio of Women in Tertiary Education:

  • Taiwan: 87.9

  • South Korea: 85.3

  • Singapore: n.a.

• Female Labour Force (%):

  • Taiwan: 43.9

  • South Korea: 47.8

  • Singapore: 43.4

• Women are not well represented in the higher echelons of politics in South Korea and Singapore.

• Even though South Korea has a female president, women only constitute 16% of the National Assembly (Gukhoe).

• A Glass Ceiling Index shows South Korean working women face the least chance of equal treatment at work, and the largest gender wage gap among OECD countries.

• Taiwan has 17% women in the Cabinet and 33% in the Legislative Yuan, while Singapore only has one woman out of eighteen members in the Cabinet (5.5%).

Effects of Electoral Systems and Women’s Legislative Representation

• Electoral arrangement and gender quota strategies can affect the demand and supply of women in politics.

• Demand-side factors consider discrimination, while supply-side factors emphasize resources and motivations.

• The electoral system is the "most specific manipulative instrument of politics."

• Electoral systems have a strong mechanical and psychological effect on legislative outcomes and can bias the recruitment and nomination of women.

• Mechanical effects refer to the link between vote and seat shares.

• Psychological effects refer to voters' attitudes towards certain underrepresented parties, given the mechanical effects.

• Parties' decisions to stand female candidates are mediated by anticipation of mechanical and psychological effects.

• The party selectorate will have different concerns and incentives depending on the electoral system.

• The focus should return to the role of parties and consider their incentives and constraints in candidate selection.

• More institutionalized and party-centered parties in Taiwan are conducive to women’s political participation, compared to weakly institutionalized and candidate-centered parties in South Korea.

• Proportional electoral systems are generally more women-friendly than majoritarian ones.

• Globally, countries with proportional representative (PR) systems, women hold 25.2% of the seats, compared to 19.6% in plurality-majority systems and 22.7% in mixed systems.

• Factors promoting women’s electability in PR systems:

  • District (number of candidates elected per district) and party magnitude (number of seats a party wins in a district).

  • Electoral thresholds (minimum vote share to secure representation).

  • Open or closed list forms of PR (limits to voter’s choice of candidate).

• Higher district and party magnitudes in PR systems allow parties to present lists of multiple candidates and have more incentives to include women.

• More proportional components and higher district magnitudes tend to have higher numbers of female candidates.

• A woman’s decision to contest in an election depends on socio-cultural, institutional, and opportunity structures.

• Political recruitment of women is dependent on contextual factors such as:

  • A non-egalitarian political heritage.

  • Small pool of women with requisite qualifications.

  • Low education expenditures on women.

  • Population size.

  • Degree of democracy.

  • Salience of political office.

• Women’s interest in politics is dampened by perceived barriers to eligibility or chances of nomination and winning.

• When women perceive a more egalitarian political environment and a greater chance of being elected, more came forward.

• Gender quota strategies were effective in promoting egalitarian political culture and improving the supply of female candidates in Taiwan.

Summary and Key Findings of the Three Cases

• Taiwan has reserved seats for women at local-level elections since the 1950s.

• The strong feminist movement and contagion theory explain the adoption of 50% quotas for its party list after the nation’s constitutional reforms in 2005.

• Increasing the number of reserved seats or gender quotas increases women’s political participation and electoral competitiveness.

• Women elected through reserved seats or simulated gender-neutral quotas have equal or better qualifications than the men they unseated.

• In South Korea, political parties have engaged in gender reforms as part of the country’s democratic consolidation and mobilization by the feminist movement.

• Mechanical effects of electoral systems and candidate quotas are constrained by Korean party organizational features.

• Korean parties’ weakly institutionalized candidate selection processes, lack of commitment to gender balancing, and factionalism are disadvantageous to women.

• Weak quota compliance results in fewer women being nominated and elected into office in the SMDs.

• An institutionalized party system and strong leadership is critical in making quotas work.

• In Singapore, gender reforms were driven by party pragmatism rather than an ideological commitment to improve women’s political role.

• The PAP’s 30% voluntary party quota was more a symbolic gesture of benevolence towards women.

• Singapore women’s recent slow rise in politics is primarily a result of the PAP’s vote-seeking behavior.

• Singapore’s electoral system, with legislated ethnic quotas in the multi-member constituencies, also offers incentives to parties to stand women in the larger constituencies.

• Biased social norms and unequal family responsibilities are still dominant in Singapore and may be holding women back from considering politics as a career.

• Gender equality strategies alone are insufficient to guarantee women’s political representation.

• The effects of electoral systems and quota strategies are not automatic or mechanical, but also dependent on party system institutionalization, electoral competitiveness, legal enforcement, and social-cultural attitudes toward women.

Key Findings

• Parties’ motivation to engage in gender reforms is driven by strategic calculations and electoral incentives.

• Parties are more likely to support gender reforms to show symbolic benevolence towards women, if doing so increases their political leverage against their rival parties.

• Taiwan and South Korea developed competitive party systems since democratization in the late 1980s.

• Formerly male-dominated major parties only became more open to supporting gender quotas after their rival parties did so.

• Singapore’s hegemonic party system is less open to pressures from opposition parties or feminist groups.

• Limited gender reforms were due more to rapid demographic changes and a desire to capture the votes of the younger electorate.

• More proportional electoral systems with larger district magnitude are more conducive to women’s electability.

• "Zipper" quotas imposed in the PR tier were more effective in boosting the number of female candidates than in single-member districts (SMDs).

• Singapore’s case shows that the vote-seeking and risk-averse PAP began by fielding female candidates in the larger multi-member constituencies or the Group Representative Constituencies (GRCs).

• Constituencies with a larger district magnitude allow the parties to nominate and elect more women.

• Quota compliance is higher in an institutionalized party system than in a weakly institutionalized one.

• Weakly institutionalized party systems lack routinization, foster personalism, and hamper electoral accountability.

• In Taiwan’s institutionalized party system, there is a higher compliance with the legal candidate quotas and reserved seats for women at both the local and national levels.

• Quota compliance is lower in South Korea’s less institutionalized party system.

• Singapore’s case shows that party quotas are more likely to be complied with if parties have a strong bureaucratic culture and are committed to upholding gender parity.

Conclusion

• The study of the effects of gender quotas and electoral systems on women’s political representation is an exciting, emerging field.

• Formal and informal electoral rules affect the selection, nomination, and election of female candidates in East Asian cases.

• The impact of electoral arrangement and gender equality strategies will differ, depending on the implementation, enforcement, and interactions with the broader socio-political context.

• Research interests should be expanded and policy options should be raised to improve women’s political representation in Asia and beyond.