(Mod 11) The Responsibility to Protect: Meeting the Challenges Gareth Evans

Responsibility to Protect (R2P) pg. 1-3

1. The Core Problem

Evans opens with a stark quote: “It is Myanmar’s sovereign right to kill their own people, too.”
This captures the clash between:

  • Traditional sovereignty (non‑interference, even in atrocities)

  • Humanitarian intervention (the idea that outsiders may use force to stop mass killing)

Many states—especially in the Global South—resent the “right to intervene” because it recalls colonialism and great‑power domination.

2. Kofi Annan’s Challenge

Annan asked: If intervention violates sovereignty, how do we respond to Rwanda or Srebrenica?
This question pushed the international community to find a middle ground.

3. Birth of R2P (2001 ICISS Report)

Evans co-chaired the commission that reframed the debate:

  • Shift from “right to intervene” → “responsibility to protect.”

  • Sovereignty = responsibility, not a license to kill.

  • Primary responsibility lies with the state itself.

  • The international community steps in only when a state is:

    • Unwilling or

    • Unable to protect its population.

R2P focuses on protection, not intervention.

4. What R2P Requires

R2P includes three layers:

  1. Responsibility to prevent (the most important)

  2. Responsibility to react (diplomacy, sanctions, ICC, and only as a last resort, military force)

  3. Responsibility to rebuild (after crises)

Military action must meet strict criteria and be approved by the UN Security Council.

5. Global Acceptance (2005 World Summit)

In a major breakthrough:

  • Over 150 heads of state unanimously endorsed R2P.

  • The Summit Outcome Document states that states must protect populations from:

    • Genocide

    • War crimes

    • Ethnic cleansing

    • Crimes against humanity

  • If a state is “manifestly failing”, the international community must act collectively.

6. Ongoing Resistance

Despite formal adoption, many states remain skeptical:

  • Fear of neo‑imperialism

  • Concern about misuse of intervention

  • Embarrassment over their own human rights records

  • Weak enthusiasm in Asia; declining enthusiasm in Africa, Arab states, and Latin America

Evans calls this “buyers’ remorse.”

7. The Goal

Evans argues the world must reach a point where, when atrocities occur, the question is not:

  • “Should we act?”
    but

  • “What action is required, by whom, and when?”

Kenya (2008) is cited as a positive example where R2P language guided diplomatic action.

8. Three Major Challenges Ahead

A. Conceptual Challenge

Clear up misunderstandings:

  • R2P is not a Trojan horse for imperialism.

  • It is not about automatic military intervention.

  • It is a framework for preventing and responding to mass atrocities.

B. Institutional Preparedness

Build real capacity:

  • Early warning systems

  • Diplomatic tools

  • Sanctions mechanisms

  • Peacekeeping and military readiness

  • Regional organization capabilities

C. Political Will

The hardest part:

  • States must be willing to act when atrocities occur.

  • Need strategies to generate political momentum quickly.

R2P: Conceptual Misunderstandings + Institutional Challenges pg. 4-6

1. Misunderstanding #1: “R2P = Humanitarian Intervention”

Evans stresses this is wrong.
He writes: “It is absolutely not the case… ‘humanitarian intervention’ is coercive military intervention… But ‘the responsibility to protect’ is about much more than that.”

Key Differences

Humanitarian Intervention

  • Means military force for humanitarian purposes.

  • Narrow, coercive, and historically controversial.

Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

  • Much broader.

  • Focuses primarily on prevention, not intervention.

  • Uses political, diplomatic, legal, economic, and security tools before force.

  • Military action is only a last resort and must meet strict criteria.

Preventive Dimension

  • R2P requires early action before atrocities occur.

  • Prevention includes:

    • Mediation

    • Economic support

    • Legal reforms

    • Security sector reform

    • “Preventive deployment” (e.g., Macedonia 1995)

Example: Burundi (post‑1994)
Evans notes that genocide was avoided through peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding.

2. Misunderstanding #2: “R2P = Military Force”

Evans calls this a travesty of the principle.

Reaction ≠ Military Action

Reaction can include:

  • Diplomatic pressure

  • Sanctions

  • ICC referrals

  • Political isolation

  • Incentives or mediation

Military force is used only when absolutely necessary to stop mass atrocities (e.g., Rwanda, Srebrenica).

3. Criteria for Military Action under R2P

Even when atrocities are occurring, military force must satisfy five legitimacy criteria:

  1. Seriousness of threat
    Must involve genocide, ethnic cleansing, or mass killing “actual or imminently apprehended.”

  2. Right intention
    Primary purpose must be stopping the atrocity, not pursuing other goals.

  3. Last resort
    All reasonable non‑military options must be tried first.

  4. Proportional means
    The scale and duration of force must be limited to what is necessary.

  5. Balance of consequences
    Intervention must do more good than harm.

Example: Iraq 2003
Evans argues it did not meet the threshold.

4. Case Study: Darfur

Evans says Darfur is clearly an R2P situation:

  • “More than 200,000 dying… over two million displaced…”

But military intervention would be:

  • Logistically impossible

  • Likely to worsen humanitarian operations

  • Likely to destabilize Sudan’s north–south peace process

Thus, R2P requires non‑military measures:

  • Diplomatic pressure

  • Economic pressure

  • Legal pressure (e.g., ICC indictment of Bashir)

This is not R2P failure—just a different form of R2P response.

5. Misunderstanding #3: “R2P Applies to Every Human Problem”

Some argue R2P should cover:

  • HIV/AIDS

  • Climate change

  • Nuclear proliferation

  • Small arms

  • Landmines

  • Environmental disasters

Evans rejects this.

He warns: “If R2P is to be about protecting everybody from everything, it will end up protecting nobody from anything.”

These issues fall under human security, not R2P.

6. Case Study: Cyclone Nargis (Myanmar, 2008)

French FM Bernard Kouchner argued that Myanmar’s refusal to allow aid triggered R2P.

Evans and others pushed back:

  • R2P applies to mass atrocity crimes, not natural disasters.

  • Only if the regime’s obstruction constituted a crime against humanity would R2P apply.

  • ASEAN pressure eventually forced Myanmar to cooperate, avoiding catastrophe.

This case shows the need for clear boundaries to maintain global consensus.

7. Institutional Challenge

Even if the world accepts R2P conceptually, institutions must be capable of acting.

Key Problems

  • Who does what? (UN, AU, EU, NATO, states, NGOs)

  • Lack of coordination

  • Weak early‑warning systems

  • Insufficient diplomatic and civilian capacity

  • Peacekeeping forces often unprepared for atrocity‑prevention roles

Evans notes that militaries are not traditionally trained for:

  • Protecting civilians from atrocity crimes

  • Rapid deployment into chaotic environments

  • Operating without clear front lines

He cites Srebrenica, UNAMID (Sudan), and MONUC (DRC) as examples of dangerous capability gaps.

R2P: “Peacekeeping Plus,” Coercive Protection, and the Political Challenge pg. 7-9

1. R2P Requires New Kinds of Military Operations

Evans explains that atrocity‑prevention missions are neither traditional warfighting nor traditional peacekeeping.

He writes: “What is involved here is neither traditional war fighting… nor… traditional peacekeeping.”

A. Not Traditional Warfighting

  • Warfighting aims to defeat an enemy.

  • R2P aims to stop specific violence, protect civilians, and stabilize.

B. Not Traditional Peacekeeping

  • Traditional peacekeeping assumes:

    • A peace agreement exists

    • Parties consent

    • The mission monitors and verifies

  • R2P missions often deploy when there is no peace to keep.

2. “Peacekeeping Plus” / “Complex Peacekeeping”

These missions:

  • Expect spoilers who may attack civilians or peacekeepers.

  • Require Chapter VII mandates (authorization to use force).

  • Often involve civilian protection, not just monitoring.

Evans notes that even though the UN now designs missions this way, militaries are still not fully comfortable with these roles.

3. “Fire Brigade” Operations

These are rapid, forceful deployments when atrocities erupt suddenly—like Rwanda.

  • They must quash violence quickly.

  • They are not warfighting, but also not peacekeeping.

  • They require high readiness, mobility, and robust rules of engagement.

Together, “peacekeeping plus” and “fire brigade” missions are called:

Coercive Protection Missions

Evans: “Together… have been described as ‘coercive protection missions’.”

These missions require the same core capabilities.

4. What Militaries Must Improve

Evans lists five operational requirements:

A. Force Configuration

  • What kinds of units, equipment, and numbers are needed?

  • Forces must be structured for civilian protection, not conquest.

B. Deployability

  • How fast can forces reach the crisis zone?

  • R2P requires rapid response, not months‑long mobilization.

C. Preparation

  • Doctrine and training must match R2P tasks.

  • Militaries need training in:

    • Crowd protection

    • De‑escalation

    • Operating amid civilians

    • Identifying atrocity risks

D. Mandates & Rules of Engagement

  • Must be clear, robust, and appropriate for civilian protection.

  • Weak mandates = Srebrenica‑type failures.

E. Civil‑Military Coordination

  • R2P missions require tight coordination with:

    • Humanitarian actors

    • Diplomats

    • Police

    • Local authorities

Evans warns: “Still not enough has been done… These problems are going to be around to haunt us.”

5. The Political Challenge: Mobilizing Will

Even perfect institutions fail without political will.

Evans writes: “Without the will to make something happen… capability… will not be used.”

Why Political Will Fails

  • Inertia

  • Fear of costs

  • Competing national interests

  • Risk aversion

  • Lack of leadership

How Political Will Is Built

Evans argues political will must be constructed, not waited for. It requires:

  1. Knowledge
    Awareness of the crisis.

  2. Concern
    Arguments that appeal to:

    • Morality

    • National interest

    • Financial cost

    • Domestic politics

  3. Confidence
    Belief that action will work.

  4. Institutional Processes
    Mechanisms that turn concern into action.

  5. Leadership
    Without leadership, “inertia will win every time.”

6. Emotional Commitment to R2P

Evans ends with a personal reflection on Cambodia:

“Not one of those kids… I am sadly certain… every last one of them died under Pol Pot’s murderous genocidal regime.”

This experience fuels his commitment to R2P.

He urges military leaders to ensure the world never again looks back after atrocities and says “never again” after it is too late.