Intelligence Studies Study Guide.docx

Study Guide

  1. What is intelligence?

    1. Refers to issues related to national security

    2. Lowenthal’s Definition:

      1. The process by which specific types of information important to national security are requested, collected, analyzed, and provided to policymakers.

      2. The products of that process, safeguarding these processes and this information by counterintelligence activities.

      3. And the carrying out of operations as requested by lawful authorities.

Purpose of intelligence (2 Reasons)

  • 1. Intelligence exists because governments seek to hide some information from other governments, which in turn seek to discover hidden information by means they wish to keep secret

  • 2. This same secrecy can be a source of consternation to citizens

Additional Reasons for Existence (Four)

  • 1. To avoid strategic surprise

  • 2. To provide long-term expertise

  • 3. To support the policy process

  • 4. Maintain the secrecy of information, needs, and methods

  1. Key events in the history of the intel community?

    1. Major Historical Developments:

      1. WWII (1939)

      2. Cold War (1947)

      3. The creation of COI and OSS (1941-1942)

      4. Pearl Harbor (1941)

      5. National Security Act (1947) *

        1. Created CIA

      6. Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)

      7. Vietnam War (1964-1975)

      8. Fall of the Soviet Union (1989-1991)

      9. Terrorist Attacks/War on Terrorists (2001-)

        1. 9/11

        2. Failure to provide warning

      10. Intelligence on Iraq (2003-2008)

        1. Iraq’s WMD

        2. Failure to provide accurate warning

      11. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (2004)

        1. Created ODNI

    2. Legal Frameworks:

      1. Constitution

      2. Espionage Act (1947)

      3. National Security Act (1947)

      4. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (1978)

  2. Missions of intelligence community agencies?

    1. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)

      1. Subordinate to the President

      2. Manage Intel, produce all-source intelligence

    2. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)*

      1. Independent of any agency

      2. DNI oversees CIA

      3. Produce all-source intelligence assessments, HUMINT collection, and covert action.

    3. Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA)*

      1. Subordinate to DoD

      2. Produce all-source intel., HUMINT collection

    4. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)

      1. Subordinate to DoD

      2. Collect, process, and exploit IMINT and produce GEOINT products

    5. National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)

      1. Subordinate to DoD

      2. Build and operate technical collection systems

    6. National Security Agency (NSA)

      1. Subordinate to DoD

      2. Collect, process, and exploit foreign signals intelligence (SIGINT)

    7. Department of Energy Office of Intelligence

      1. Subordinate to DoE

      2. Produce intelligence assessments on nuclear terrorism threats, nuclear counter-proliferation, foreign technology threats, and global energy

    8. Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence

      1. Subordinate to Department of Homeland Security

      2. Provide intelligence support across homeland security missions

    9. Coast Gaurd

      1. Subordinate to Homeland Security

      2. Provides intelligence and criminal investigations

    10. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)

      1. Subordinate to Dept. of Justice

      2. Focused on drug-related issues.

    11. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

      1. Subordinate to Dept. of Justice

      2. Pursues counterintelligence/counterterrorism, HUMINT collection, produce all-source intelligence, prevent bad things from happening, and investigate the bad thing

    12. State Departments Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)*

      1. Subordinate to Dept. of State

      2. Produce all-source intelligence

    13. Treasury Department’s Office of Intelligence

      1. Subordinate to Dept. of Treasury

      2. Provides intelligence on financial/support networks for terrorist groups

    14. Military Services

      1. Subordinate to DoD

      2. Collection and analysis

      3. Intel Centers-

        1. National Guard Intel. (NGIC)

        2. Office of Naval Intel. (ONI)

        3. National Air and Space Intel. (NASIC)

        4. Marine Corps Intel. (MCIA)

          1. Culture intelligence

    15. * = all source intel.

  3. The collection disciplines (the INTs)?

    1. GEOINT (Geospatial)

      1. It helps with visual representations of terrain but is limited by weather or obfuscation tactics.

      2. It is composed of information “layers” that answer questions like:

        1. Where am I?

        2. Where are the obstacles?

        3. Environment?

        4. Where are the enemies/friends?

    2. SIGINT (Signals)

      1. Can provide valuable information but is expensive and requires advanced technology and analysis.

      2. NSA, collected from satellites and airplanes

        1. COMMINT (speech and texts)

        2. ELINT (radar signals)

        3. TELLINT (weapons systems/telemetry)

    3. HUMINT (Human)

      1. Can provide critical information but is very risky because of its reliance on individuals.

      2. Clandestine vs. Overt

      3. Interrogations

    4. OSINT (Open Source)

      1. Widely accessible due to open publications but requires careful validation due to potential misinformation.

      2. Publicly available information.

    5. IMINT (Images)

      1. Similar to GEOINT

      2. Collected through satellites and airplanes.

  4. Steps in the intelligence cycle?

    1. Planning and Direction (Requirements)

      1. Identifying and defining policy issues or areas that need intelligence contribution.

    2. Collection

      1. Produces intelligence, not just finished intel.

    3. Processing and Exploitation

      1. The process that collected intelligence must go through before it can be given to analysis.

    4. Analysis and Production

      1. Turns the above intelligence information into reports (briefs or orals) for policymakers.

    5. Dissemination

      1. Decisions about how widely intelligence should be distributed and how urgently it should be passed

    6. Consumption (Lownethal’s Addition)

      1. How policymakers consume intelligence. Written reports or oral briefings? The degree to which intelligence is being used is important.

    7. Feedback (Lowenthal’s Addition)

      1. Dialogue between intelligence consumers and producers should take place after the intelligence has been received.

        1. Evaluation of requirements.

  5. Intelligence analysis challenges?

    1. Cognitive Bias

      1. Skew interpretations of data

    2. Uncertainty

      1. Forced to make judgments, risk of errors, inconclusive evidence

    3. Organizational Pressures

      1. Deliver policy-favorable outcomes

      2. Challenged over ignored

      3. Politicization (important)

    4. Limitations in Information

      1. Gaps in collection, inconclusive evidence

    5. Predicting Human Behavior

      1. Unpredictable

    6. Collaboration

      1. Mob rule, groupthink

    7. Overflow of Information

      1. Bias, misinformation, insufficient resources

  6. Oversight roles?

    1. Policymakers

      1. President

      2. NSC (National Security Counsel)

      3. Departments/Agencies

      4. IC?

      5. Congress

    2. Entities

      1. Executive Branch

        1. The President, Inspectors General, NSC-Covert Action

        2. Presidents Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAD)

      2. Legislative Branch

        1. Congress through intelligence committees, reviews budgets, reports, and hearings.

        2. Power to appoint

      3. Judicial Branch

        1. Courts (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court) FISA.

  7. Covert action/counterintelligence?

    1. Covert Action

      1. Activities of the U.S. government to influence political, military, and economic conditions abroad, where the U.S. role is not apparent/disclosed.

      2. Has to be deniable

        1. Plausible Deniability *

      3. CIA

        1. National Security Act 1947

      4. Ladder

        1. Lethal Operations

        2. Paramilitary

        3. Coups

        4. Sabotage

        5. Political/Economic Activity

        6. Propaganda

    2. Counterintelligence

      1. Involves activities aimed at protecting an intelligence agency’s operations from adversary intelligence services.

        1. FBI

        2. Includes identifying, deceiving, exploiting, or neutralizing threats.

      2. Key Functions

        1. Defensive- Protecting domestic intelligence

          1. Cyber security, vetting process, etc.

        2. Offensive- Identifying and manipulating adversaries.

          1. False information, double agents, etc.

      3. Motivation for Espionage

        1. MICE (Money, Ideology, Coercion, Ego)

  8. Private sector application?

    1. Functions

      1. Risk Analysis

      2. Cyber Intelligence

      3. Corporate Security

    2. Often work with businesses, NGOs, and government clients

    3. Corporations require intel.

      1. Competition, advantages, and market entry or risk migration.

    4. Engage in traditional intel

      1. HUMINT

      2. SIGINT

    5. Also, new forms

      1. Cyber intel.

      2. Data mining

      3. Social media analysis

    6. Provide insight into political risks, regulatory compliance, and political supply chain threats.

    7. Downsides

      1. Lacks standardization

      2. No universal code of ethics

    8. Cooperates with public intelligence for resource sharing.

      1. Contentious relationship

In-class discussion of test

Important key events in history

National Security Act of 1947

  • Largely military before

  • FBI

  • Creation of CIA

9/11 + commission

Pearl Harbor

Reasons to have oversight

9/11 Failure

  • failure to connect the dots

    • Phoenix memo

  • Did enough dots exist to put the pieces together?

    • Did policymakers properly prioritize terrorism?

  • Failure to provide a warning

Weapons mass destruction Ira q

  • Failure to connect too many dots

  • Too quick

  • Provided a warning, but the warning was wrong

  • Looking for a reason to invade

  • Bad intel (curveball)

  • Vulnerable to terrorism after 9/11

    • Confirmation bias?

Challenges:

  • So much new information that is coming in that it might be an overflow of information

Intelligence Studies Final Study Guide- Caden’s Version

Week #1: What is “Intelligence”?

  1. Information

    1. Anything that can be known regardless of how it’s discovered

    2. Becomes intelligence when it becomes of need to policy makers (especially executive officials)

  2. Intelligence

    1. Information that meets the needs to policy makers and has been collected to meet those needs

    2. It is a product and a process

    3. It’s a source of contention because:

      1. (1) a secret entity in a seemingly transparent gov’t

      2. (2) covert action → ethical dilemmas

  3. Policymaker-intelligence relationship

    1. Policymakers actively influence all aspects of intelligence

    2. Intelligence exists solely to support policymakers

  4. Four Reasons Why Intelligence Exists:

    1. (1) to avoid strategic surprise

      1. No idea that something was occurring behind your back

    2. (2) to provide long-term expertise

      1. Allows for stability and non-political

    3. (3) to support the policy process

    4. (4) to maintain secrecy of information, needs, and methods

  5. Politicized intelligence

    1. If intelligence officers have a strong preference for a specific policy outcome, their intelligence may display a similar bias

  6. Policy vs. intelligence

    1. (1) attempting to influence/ inform by providing intelligence is acceptable but manipulation is not

    2. (2) senior policy makers can ask senior intelligence officers for opinions

    3. (3) only one direction: intelligence advice → policy

What is Intelligence About?

  1. Weaknesses of intelligence

    1. (1) intelligence analysis can be unsophisticated

    2. (2) can be so data-driven that it misses intangibles

    3. (3) mirror imaging

    4. (4) policy makers can accept/ reject any intelligence

What is Intelligence?

  1. National Security Act 1947

    1. Major reorganization of foreign policy and military establishments

    2. Created the CIA

  2. Lowenthal’s definition of intelligence

    1. It is a process and a product but also it is involves the safeguarding of the intelligence and operations that the gov’t oversees to influence something that is unaware by others

  3. Why have an expensive intelligence organization?

    1. (1) expertise

    2. (2) prevent strategic surprise

    3. (3) support the policy process

    4. (4) maintain secrecy of information

Week #2: Development of the U.S. Intelligence Community

  1. Divide between intelligence and policy

    1. Semi-permeable membrane

      1. Intelligence can’t give policy recommendations because it needs to be an objective agency

    2. Face-to-face contact is rare

    3. Risk of politicization of intelligence

  2. Intelligence is not about finding truth

    1. Can never know the truth because we cannot read people’s minds

    2. Best we can get is reliable, objective, unbiased assessments

Intelligence Community

  1. Important themes

    1. (1) war

      1. Want knowledge on the enemy (capabilities, strategy, etc.)

    2. (2) rivalry

      1. Between the agencies

        1. Fight over authority, resources, voice

        2. coordination/ sharing issues

    3. (3) centralization vs decentralization

  2. Key events

    1. (1) Revolutionary War

      1. Wanted to avoid strategic surprise

    2. (2) Civil War

      1. Early use of SIGNIT/ interpretation

      2. Bureau of Military created

        1. First step to formal intelligence agency

        2. The military constituted the IC

    3. (3) FBI created in 1908

      1. Unique because it has the authority to do stuff domestically and a law enforcement agency

    4. (4) Army, Navy, FBI 1930s

      1. Did not share information → rivals

    5. (5) W. Donovan 1940s

      1. Helped found the CIA

      2. FDR called on him to overseas and return info to the president

        1. Origin of HUMINT

      3. Relented that he need a group of smart people to gather big picture intel

    6. (6) Coordinator of Info (COI) 1941

      1. Precursor to the CIA

      2. 1st national level agency outside of the military, strategic level intel

    7. (7) Pearl Harbor 1941

      1. Intel failure

      2. Guiding factor to the creation of the NIC

    8. (8) WWI

      1. SIGINT, ULTRA and MAGIC

        1. Electronic communications interception

    9. (9) COI → OSS → CIA

      1. Military had issue with the creation of independent CIA institution

        1. Put under control of the military as a compromise

    10. (10) National Security Act 1947

      1. Most important legislation in organization

      2. Created the CIA, DoD, and NSC

      3. Became legal basis for IC

      4. CIA

        1. Created to be independent, reports to president and DNI

    11. (11) Cold War dominates for 30 yrs post-WWII

      1. Threat-based foreign policy

        1. Drives U.S. investment in intel

      2. Espionage

        1. Recruit people abroad for info

      3. Use of imagery intel

        1. NGA agency

      4. Missile-gap debate

        1. Air Force and CIA disagreed about how many missiles USSR had

          1. Politicizing of intel

Secretary of Defense thought AF was exaggerating the number to get funding

  • Created the DIA

    1. (12) 9/11 Attacks

    2. (13) Iraq WMD 2003

    3. (14) Intel Reform and Terrorism Act 2004

      1. Created the DNI

        1. President’s senior advisor on intelligence

        2. Charged with overseeing agencies

          1. CIA was not happy

  1. Presidential Daily Briefing (PDB)

    1. Pre-2004 the CIA wrote it, but in 2004 the DNI took power and undercut the CIA’s influence

    2. Now it can be written by different agencies

Week #3: Structure and Overview of the U.S. Intelligence Community

  1. Structure has been relatively the same since 1947

IC Members, 18 Agencies

  1. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)

    1. Created by 2004 Terrorism Act oversees the IC (they're the CEO manager of the IC)

      1. Sets policy for IC, gives directives (e.g., badges)

    2. Produces all-source intelligence

      1. National Intelligence Council & National Counterterrorism Center

        1. Part of ODNI to do analysis, produces nat’l intel estimates (most important and pressing issues, represents the whole IC)

    3. DNI appointed by the president

      1. Does not have budget execution power, just allocation power (b/c of CIA and DNI tension)

      2. Represents the IC, gives intel briefings

      3. Difficult to compel agencies to do things

  2. CIA

    1. All-source intel

    2. Only agency that does covert action

    3. HUMINT collection

    4. Independent of any dep’t or agency

    5. Reports to DNI, but DCIA is appointed by president

    6. Significant presence overseas

      1. CIA doesn't always tell the ambassador everything b/c they are representing the IC → tension

  3. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

    1. All-source intel

    2. HUMINT, most overt and overseas

    3. Most similar to the CIA

      1. Competitive analysis

        1. Both have analysts looking at the same things but can come to different conclusions

      2. Serve different customers

        1. DIA - Secretary of Defense

        2. CIA - president

  4. National Geospatial Agency (NGA)

    1. Only agency that collects GEOINT

    2. Subordinate to DoD

    3. Collections and analysis agency, primarily collections

    4. Single-source analysis

  5. National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)

    1. Subordinate to DoD

    2. Builds satellites

    3. Acquisition agency

      1. Gets satellites into the sky and NGA analyzes/ collects

  6. National Security Agency (NSA)

    1. Subordinate to DoD

    2. Single- source

      1. Similar to NGA, but collects SIGINT

    3. Small analysis capability

  7. Department of Energy (DOE)

    1. Very niche role

    2. Nuclear proliferation, oversees nuclear labs

    3. Analysis agency, no collections

    4. Secretary of Energy is the primary customer

  8. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

    1. Identity crisis because became a hodgepodge of agencies under the banner of DHS

    2. Intelligence office I&A

    3. More domestic flavor

  9. Coast Guard

    1. Subordinate to DHS

    2. Primarily analysis to support the Coast Guard operations

  10. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)

    1. Subordinate to DoJ

    2. Law enforcement agency, small intelligence area

  11. FBI

    1. Terrorism-focused post-9/11

    2. HUMINT collection in the U.S.

      1. Counterrorism and counterintelligence

    3. Subordinate to DoJ, law enforcement agency

  12. State Department

    1. U.S.’ primary foreign diplomacy agency

      1. INR Intelligence and Research

        1. All-source intelligence

        2. Supports the Secretary of State

  13. Treasury

    1. Finance crimes, terrorists hiding money

    2. No collection

  14. Military Services

    1. DoD oversees 9 agencies

    2. Collection and some analysis to support the military

  15. 3 big all-source agencies

    1. (1) CIA, (2) DIA, (3) INR

Week #4: Intelligence Process and Cycle

6 Steps

  1. Requirements

    1. A direction of what to look into

    2. Can suddenly change (ad hoc requirements)

      1. National Intel Priorities Framework (NIPF)

        1. Top priorities that get the most attention/ resources

        2. Rack & stack of priorities

    3. In theory policy makers set the requirements

      1. In actuality, they don’t

        1. Too busy or don’t know much about intelligence

  2. Collection

    1. Agencies collecting intel on requirements (INTs)

    2. Varying levels of expediency

    3. Finite resources, creates tradeoffs

    4. What’s collected is raw intelligence

    5. Wheat vs. chaff problem

      1. More not necessarily better, more to sift through

  3. Processing and Exploitation

    1. Taking signals, data, images, etc. and translating and de-jargoning it to something meaningful and throwing out what’s not needed, refining but still raw

    2. Implication: a lot of what’s collected is not used, stays in the vacuum

  4. Analysis and Production

    1. Analysts take refined raw collection intel and turn it into finished intel

      1. Different forms of finished intel

        1. Briefing

        2. Paper

    2. Disagreements between analysts gets resolved in this step

      1. Competitive analysis

        1. Many different agencies on same issues guards against groupthink and confirmation bias

      2. Analytic coordination

        1. Incorporated opinions/ some to final conclusions

    3. Can contact collections to clarify things and find missing pieces

      1. Animosity b/c collections ops worry that analysts will reveal sensitive info

  5. Dissemination

    1. Tailored to needs of customer, brought to customer usually each morning

    2. Having someone in the room increases the ability for consumption

  6. Consumption

    1. Difficult to ensure

    2. Time is a commodity

  7. Feedback

    1. Rare, policymakers don’t have time

    2. Consumers may not see the importance of it

What’s Wrong with the Cycle

  1. Policymakers don’t give requirements, expect IC to figure it out → IC tries to anticipate requirements

  2. Collection managers can’t wait for requirements to come in, they work more with analysts, analysts driving collection

  3. Policymakers have access to raw intel which is potentially problematic b/c they’re not trained to read it

    1. Raw can be biased, contradictory, wrong

  4. A competent analyst doesn’t need collection data, can draw on previous expertise on subject

    1. Expert bias

  5. Finished intel does not drive policy decisions

    1. Want intel to support what they already want to do

  6. Intel has a limited utility in providing impact on policy

Week #5: Intelligence Collection and the INTs

  1. Capability + intent = threat

The Collection Disciplines (INTs)

  1. GEOINT (NGA)

    1. Something visual that’s map or image based

      1. Examples:

        1. Aircraft, satellites (classified and commercial)

        2. “Air Breathers”

          1. Airplanes, UAVs

          2. Can be shot down, which limits where it can be flown

      2. Imagery intelligence (IMINT)

        1. Subdiscipline of GEOINT

        2. Image taken from the sky/ space

    2. Cons:

      1. (1) does not identify intent

      2. (2) weather limits collection

      3. (3) prone to denial and deception

      4. (4) takes some expertise to understand

    3. Pros:

      1. (1) Satellites can be used remotely and intrusively

  2. SIGINT (NSA)

    1. Collects on anything that emits signals

      1. Intercepts foreign signals (via satellites, airplanes, sensors)

    2. 2 categories

      1. (1) COMINT

        1. Communications intelligence

        2. Interception of a communication between two people (speech/ text)

          1. Texts, emails, calls, etc.

      2. (2) ELINT

        1. Electronic communication

        2. Something emitting a signal (no speech/ text) to communicate

          1. Airplanes emitting a radar signal of its location

    3. Pros:

      1. (1) can provide insight into intent

      2. (2) remote and intrusive

      3. (3) opportunity to deceive

    4. Cons:

      1. (1) expensive

  3. HUMINT (CIA)

    1. (1) overt

      1. Assigned to an embassy representing a country

      2. Can employ elicitation techniques

    2. (2) clandestine

      1. Hidden

      2. Takes time to recruit, assign, vet to make sure they’re reliable, trustworthy, and not a double agent

      3. Involves a cover

        1. (1) official cover

          1. Posing as a gov’t employee that’s not CIA

        2. (2) nonofficial cover

          1. Posing as someone with no association to the U.S.

Risky, no immunity

E.g., journalist

  • Pros:

    1. (1) can help establish intent

    2. (2) cheaper

    • Cons:

      1. (1) access

      2. (2) security issues getting inside (difficult w/out embassies)

      3. (3) time intensive

      4. (4) analysts don’t know the identity of source which leads to tension

      5. (5) credibility issues

  1. OSINT

    1. “Open” = it can be obtained legally, but may still have to pay

    2. Cons:

      1. (1) too much data

      2. (2) prone to bias/ misinformation

    3. Pros:

      1. (1) cheap

      2. (2) safe

      3. (3) ubiquitous

      4. (4) 1st indication that something has happened

  2. MASINT (Science & Technology Dept of DIA)

    1. Measures and signatures intelligence

    2. Touch, taste, smell

    3. Collecting technical signature to come to conclusions

Week #6: Intelligence Analysis, Part 1

  1. Not about predicting the future

  2. Expertise is beneficial: can guide new analysts out of thinking traps, finds patterns

  3. Need cognitive diversity

    1. Can approach ideas from different perspectives

  4. Important considerations

    1. (1) objectivity

    2. (2) politicization

      1. Use intel to advance political agenda

      2. IC intentionally distorting intel to suit a political agenda

        1. Policymakers put pressure in IC to push an agenda

        2. Political leaning of IC members may cave to pressure and support of their ideologies

Week #7: Intelligence Analysis, Part 2

  1. Analysis is a cognitive not a mechanical process

  2. Cognitive Biases

    1. (1) cognitive bias

      1. Unmotivated biases, things the brain does that you don’t have control over

    2. (2) mirror imaging

      1. Apply Western way of thinking onto the adversary

      2. Assuming the adversary is just like us

    3. (3) anchoring bias

      1. Brain anchors onto something, usually the last thing you saw, heard, etc.

      2. Becoming accustomed to people/ what you’re studying that believe they can’t deviate

        1. Outside perspectives are important because incremental change is difficult to detect

    4. (4) selective attention

    5. (5) availability bias

      1. Think about the thing that is most easily accessible

    6. (6) confirmation bias

      1. Seek info to confirm what we already believe

        1. Cherry-picking info

          1. Leads to missing out on hypotheses that might be correct

Week #8: The Intelligence-Policymaker Relationship

  1. Clients of Intelligence

    1. (1) POTUS

    2. (2) NSC & staff

    3. (3) Dept’s and agencies and staff

    4. (4) Congress

    5. (5) IC*

Intel Producer and Consumer Relationship

  1. Policymakers don’t have time and groups are competing for that time and don’t have a monopoly on info.

  2. Intel officers and policymakers want different things

    1. Policymakers want:

      1. (1) insight on demand

      2. (2) no ambiguity

      3. (3) policy options and easy choices

      4. (4) analysis that reinforces policies or leads them in the right direction

      5. (5) a confident view

    2. IC officers want:

      1. (1) to know everything

      2. (2) to be believed

      3. (3) to influence policy for good

      4. (4) safeguard sources and methods

      5. (5) want to please and be relevant

    3. Luxuries that IC has

      1. (1) time

      2. (2) do not carry burden of decision

      3. (3) do not have to build political support

      4. (4) ability to turn the switch off

  3. Proximity Debate

    1. “Adjacent Hotel Rooms” vs. “High Wall”

    2. INR is the closest, physically, to its customers

Week #9: Intelligence Support for Military and Law Enforcement + Guest Speaker

  1. Levels of Intelligence

    1. Strategic

      1. Long term: broad/policy oriented

      2. Customers: D.C.

    2. Operational

      1. Intermediate: Operations focused & logistics

      2. Customers: military

    3. Tactical

      1. Immediate: Specific/Detail oriented

      2. Customers: military

  2. Order of battle

    1. Core part of military analysis

    2. How many of something does a foreign military have?

  3. Unique collection opportunities to military in wartime events

    1. Detainees, interrogations, POW, captured documents

  4. Targeting

    1. Mitigate civilian casualties

    2. No-strike lists

Week #10: Intelligence Failures

  1. 9/11 was not a strategic surprise b/c there was warning that something was going to happen, it was a tactical surprise

9/11

  1. Failure to connect the dots

  2. Major attack was imminent but no tactical info, too vague to be actionable

  3. Failure of collection

    1. Couldn't identify plan, method of attack

      1. Did detect an increase in chatter

  4. Failure of analysis

    1. Did not connect the dots

  5. Failure of policy

    1. Terrorism was not a high enough priority

  6. 1995, NIE high priority issue

    1. Highlighted aviation as an attractable method for terrorists b/c of vulnerabilities of airplanes

    2. But would cost a lot of money to protect and inconvenient

  7. 2001, PDB, 40 articles talked about BinLaden

  8. SIGNIT intercepted 9/10 “match is about to begin, tomorrow is day zero”

    1. But translated on 9/12

  9. Phoenix Memo

    1. Memo that FBI officer in Phoenix wrote saying an inordinate number of individuals were interested in flight schools

    2. Problem: FBI didn’t share with CIA

      1. DNI created post-9/11

  10. “The wall” to separate FBI criminal prosecutions and national security cases

    1. Inhibited investigation

  11. Failure of imagination

    1. Stuck on old hijackings model

Iraq WMD

  1. Failure by connecting too many dots

  2. 93 page assessment became a warrant to war in Iraq

  3. Analytically, one of the main errors was assumptions

    1. Deduced from what they knew of Iraq/ Hussein from past

    2. Over reliance on outdated mental models

  4. Leading collectors were tasked with “where” are the WMDs

  5. Technical analysis

    1. Through imagery, Iraq importing large aluminum tubes

      1. To restart the centrifuge system for bombs? DOE didn’t agree, everyone else did

  6. Biggest mistake was an over reliance on HUMINT

    1. CURVE BALL

      1. Iraqi scientist, Germany recruited him as a source, shared bits with the U.S. through liaison (U.S. didnt know who he was as a person)

      2. Fabricated everything to get the West involved in Iraq

  7. Failure was in how confident IC was that Iraq had WMDs

Reforms

  1. (1) transparency with what you know, how you know it, what you don't know

  2. (2) analytic tradecraft standards

    1. Meant to bring more nuance into intel

  3. (3) creation of DNI

  4. Purpose of reform is raising batting averages