Intelligence Studies Study Guide.docx
Study Guide
What is intelligence?
Refers to issues related to national security
Lowenthal’s Definition:
The process by which specific types of information important to national security are requested, collected, analyzed, and provided to policymakers.
The products of that process, safeguarding these processes and this information by counterintelligence activities.
And the carrying out of operations as requested by lawful authorities.
Purpose of intelligence (2 Reasons)
1. Intelligence exists because governments seek to hide some information from other governments, which in turn seek to discover hidden information by means they wish to keep secret
2. This same secrecy can be a source of consternation to citizens
Additional Reasons for Existence (Four)
1. To avoid strategic surprise
2. To provide long-term expertise
3. To support the policy process
4. Maintain the secrecy of information, needs, and methods
Key events in the history of the intel community?
Major Historical Developments:
WWII (1939)
Cold War (1947)
The creation of COI and OSS (1941-1942)
Pearl Harbor (1941)
National Security Act (1947) *
Created CIA
Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)
Vietnam War (1964-1975)
Fall of the Soviet Union (1989-1991)
Terrorist Attacks/War on Terrorists (2001-)
9/11
Failure to provide warning
Intelligence on Iraq (2003-2008)
Iraq’s WMD
Failure to provide accurate warning
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (2004)
Created ODNI
Legal Frameworks:
Constitution
Espionage Act (1947)
National Security Act (1947)
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (1978)
Missions of intelligence community agencies?
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)
Subordinate to the President
Manage Intel, produce all-source intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)*
Independent of any agency
DNI oversees CIA
Produce all-source intelligence assessments, HUMINT collection, and covert action.
Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA)*
Subordinate to DoD
Produce all-source intel., HUMINT collection
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)
Subordinate to DoD
Collect, process, and exploit IMINT and produce GEOINT products
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
Subordinate to DoD
Build and operate technical collection systems
National Security Agency (NSA)
Subordinate to DoD
Collect, process, and exploit foreign signals intelligence (SIGINT)
Department of Energy Office of Intelligence
Subordinate to DoE
Produce intelligence assessments on nuclear terrorism threats, nuclear counter-proliferation, foreign technology threats, and global energy
Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence
Subordinate to Department of Homeland Security
Provide intelligence support across homeland security missions
Coast Gaurd
Subordinate to Homeland Security
Provides intelligence and criminal investigations
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
Subordinate to Dept. of Justice
Focused on drug-related issues.
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Subordinate to Dept. of Justice
Pursues counterintelligence/counterterrorism, HUMINT collection, produce all-source intelligence, prevent bad things from happening, and investigate the bad thing
State Departments Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)*
Subordinate to Dept. of State
Produce all-source intelligence
Treasury Department’s Office of Intelligence
Subordinate to Dept. of Treasury
Provides intelligence on financial/support networks for terrorist groups
Military Services
Subordinate to DoD
Collection and analysis
Intel Centers-
National Guard Intel. (NGIC)
Office of Naval Intel. (ONI)
National Air and Space Intel. (NASIC)
Marine Corps Intel. (MCIA)
Culture intelligence
* = all source intel.
The collection disciplines (the INTs)?
GEOINT (Geospatial)
It helps with visual representations of terrain but is limited by weather or obfuscation tactics.
It is composed of information “layers” that answer questions like:
Where am I?
Where are the obstacles?
Environment?
Where are the enemies/friends?
SIGINT (Signals)
Can provide valuable information but is expensive and requires advanced technology and analysis.
NSA, collected from satellites and airplanes
COMMINT (speech and texts)
ELINT (radar signals)
TELLINT (weapons systems/telemetry)
HUMINT (Human)
Can provide critical information but is very risky because of its reliance on individuals.
Clandestine vs. Overt
Interrogations
OSINT (Open Source)
Widely accessible due to open publications but requires careful validation due to potential misinformation.
Publicly available information.
IMINT (Images)
Similar to GEOINT
Collected through satellites and airplanes.
Steps in the intelligence cycle?
Planning and Direction (Requirements)
Identifying and defining policy issues or areas that need intelligence contribution.
Collection
Produces intelligence, not just finished intel.
Processing and Exploitation
The process that collected intelligence must go through before it can be given to analysis.
Analysis and Production
Turns the above intelligence information into reports (briefs or orals) for policymakers.
Dissemination
Decisions about how widely intelligence should be distributed and how urgently it should be passed
Consumption (Lownethal’s Addition)
How policymakers consume intelligence. Written reports or oral briefings? The degree to which intelligence is being used is important.
Feedback (Lowenthal’s Addition)
Dialogue between intelligence consumers and producers should take place after the intelligence has been received.
Evaluation of requirements.
Intelligence analysis challenges?
Cognitive Bias
Skew interpretations of data
Uncertainty
Forced to make judgments, risk of errors, inconclusive evidence
Organizational Pressures
Deliver policy-favorable outcomes
Challenged over ignored
Politicization (important)
Limitations in Information
Gaps in collection, inconclusive evidence
Predicting Human Behavior
Unpredictable
Collaboration
Mob rule, groupthink
Overflow of Information
Bias, misinformation, insufficient resources
Oversight roles?
Policymakers
President
NSC (National Security Counsel)
Departments/Agencies
IC?
Congress
Entities
Executive Branch
The President, Inspectors General, NSC-Covert Action
Presidents Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAD)
Legislative Branch
Congress through intelligence committees, reviews budgets, reports, and hearings.
Power to appoint
Judicial Branch
Courts (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court) FISA.
Covert action/counterintelligence?
Covert Action
Activities of the U.S. government to influence political, military, and economic conditions abroad, where the U.S. role is not apparent/disclosed.
Has to be deniable
Plausible Deniability *
CIA
National Security Act 1947
Ladder
Lethal Operations
Paramilitary
Coups
Sabotage
Political/Economic Activity
Propaganda
Counterintelligence
Involves activities aimed at protecting an intelligence agency’s operations from adversary intelligence services.
FBI
Includes identifying, deceiving, exploiting, or neutralizing threats.
Key Functions
Defensive- Protecting domestic intelligence
Cyber security, vetting process, etc.
Offensive- Identifying and manipulating adversaries.
False information, double agents, etc.
Motivation for Espionage
MICE (Money, Ideology, Coercion, Ego)
Private sector application?
Functions
Risk Analysis
Cyber Intelligence
Corporate Security
Often work with businesses, NGOs, and government clients
Corporations require intel.
Competition, advantages, and market entry or risk migration.
Engage in traditional intel
HUMINT
SIGINT
Also, new forms
Cyber intel.
Data mining
Social media analysis
Provide insight into political risks, regulatory compliance, and political supply chain threats.
Downsides
Lacks standardization
No universal code of ethics
Cooperates with public intelligence for resource sharing.
Contentious relationship
In-class discussion of test
Important key events in history
National Security Act of 1947
Largely military before
FBI
Creation of CIA
9/11 + commission
Pearl Harbor
Reasons to have oversight
9/11 Failure
failure to connect the dots
Phoenix memo
Did enough dots exist to put the pieces together?
Did policymakers properly prioritize terrorism?
Failure to provide a warning
Weapons mass destruction Ira q
Failure to connect too many dots
Too quick
Provided a warning, but the warning was wrong
Looking for a reason to invade
Bad intel (curveball)
Vulnerable to terrorism after 9/11
Confirmation bias?
Challenges:
So much new information that is coming in that it might be an overflow of information
Intelligence Studies Final Study Guide- Caden’s Version
Week #1: What is “Intelligence”?
Information
Anything that can be known regardless of how it’s discovered
Becomes intelligence when it becomes of need to policy makers (especially executive officials)
Intelligence
Information that meets the needs to policy makers and has been collected to meet those needs
It is a product and a process
It’s a source of contention because:
(1) a secret entity in a seemingly transparent gov’t
(2) covert action → ethical dilemmas
Policymaker-intelligence relationship
Policymakers actively influence all aspects of intelligence
Intelligence exists solely to support policymakers
Four Reasons Why Intelligence Exists:
(1) to avoid strategic surprise
No idea that something was occurring behind your back
(2) to provide long-term expertise
Allows for stability and non-political
(3) to support the policy process
(4) to maintain secrecy of information, needs, and methods
Politicized intelligence
If intelligence officers have a strong preference for a specific policy outcome, their intelligence may display a similar bias
Policy vs. intelligence
(1) attempting to influence/ inform by providing intelligence is acceptable but manipulation is not
(2) senior policy makers can ask senior intelligence officers for opinions
(3) only one direction: intelligence advice → policy
What is Intelligence About?
Weaknesses of intelligence
(1) intelligence analysis can be unsophisticated
(2) can be so data-driven that it misses intangibles
(3) mirror imaging
(4) policy makers can accept/ reject any intelligence
What is Intelligence?
National Security Act 1947
Major reorganization of foreign policy and military establishments
Created the CIA
Lowenthal’s definition of intelligence
It is a process and a product but also it is involves the safeguarding of the intelligence and operations that the gov’t oversees to influence something that is unaware by others
Why have an expensive intelligence organization?
(1) expertise
(2) prevent strategic surprise
(3) support the policy process
(4) maintain secrecy of information
Week #2: Development of the U.S. Intelligence Community
Divide between intelligence and policy
Semi-permeable membrane
Intelligence can’t give policy recommendations because it needs to be an objective agency
Face-to-face contact is rare
Risk of politicization of intelligence
Intelligence is not about finding truth
Can never know the truth because we cannot read people’s minds
Best we can get is reliable, objective, unbiased assessments
Intelligence Community
Important themes
(1) war
Want knowledge on the enemy (capabilities, strategy, etc.)
(2) rivalry
Between the agencies
Fight over authority, resources, voice
coordination/ sharing issues
(3) centralization vs decentralization
Key events
(1) Revolutionary War
Wanted to avoid strategic surprise
(2) Civil War
Early use of SIGNIT/ interpretation
Bureau of Military created
First step to formal intelligence agency
The military constituted the IC
(3) FBI created in 1908
Unique because it has the authority to do stuff domestically and a law enforcement agency
(4) Army, Navy, FBI 1930s
Did not share information → rivals
(5) W. Donovan 1940s
Helped found the CIA
FDR called on him to overseas and return info to the president
Origin of HUMINT
Relented that he need a group of smart people to gather big picture intel
(6) Coordinator of Info (COI) 1941
Precursor to the CIA
1st national level agency outside of the military, strategic level intel
(7) Pearl Harbor 1941
Intel failure
Guiding factor to the creation of the NIC
(8) WWI
SIGINT, ULTRA and MAGIC
Electronic communications interception
(9) COI → OSS → CIA
Military had issue with the creation of independent CIA institution
Put under control of the military as a compromise
(10) National Security Act 1947
Most important legislation in organization
Created the CIA, DoD, and NSC
Became legal basis for IC
CIA
Created to be independent, reports to president and DNI
(11) Cold War dominates for 30 yrs post-WWII
Threat-based foreign policy
Drives U.S. investment in intel
Espionage
Recruit people abroad for info
Use of imagery intel
NGA agency
Missile-gap debate
Air Force and CIA disagreed about how many missiles USSR had
Politicizing of intel
Secretary of Defense thought AF was exaggerating the number to get funding
Created the DIA
(12) 9/11 Attacks
(13) Iraq WMD 2003
(14) Intel Reform and Terrorism Act 2004
Created the DNI
President’s senior advisor on intelligence
Charged with overseeing agencies
CIA was not happy
Presidential Daily Briefing (PDB)
Pre-2004 the CIA wrote it, but in 2004 the DNI took power and undercut the CIA’s influence
Now it can be written by different agencies
Week #3: Structure and Overview of the U.S. Intelligence Community
Structure has been relatively the same since 1947
IC Members, 18 Agencies
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)
Created by 2004 Terrorism Act oversees the IC (they're the CEO manager of the IC)
Sets policy for IC, gives directives (e.g., badges)
Produces all-source intelligence
National Intelligence Council & National Counterterrorism Center
Part of ODNI to do analysis, produces nat’l intel estimates (most important and pressing issues, represents the whole IC)
DNI appointed by the president
Does not have budget execution power, just allocation power (b/c of CIA and DNI tension)
Represents the IC, gives intel briefings
Difficult to compel agencies to do things
CIA
All-source intel
Only agency that does covert action
HUMINT collection
Independent of any dep’t or agency
Reports to DNI, but DCIA is appointed by president
Significant presence overseas
CIA doesn't always tell the ambassador everything b/c they are representing the IC → tension
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
All-source intel
HUMINT, most overt and overseas
Most similar to the CIA
Competitive analysis
Both have analysts looking at the same things but can come to different conclusions
Serve different customers
DIA - Secretary of Defense
CIA - president
National Geospatial Agency (NGA)
Only agency that collects GEOINT
Subordinate to DoD
Collections and analysis agency, primarily collections
Single-source analysis
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
Subordinate to DoD
Builds satellites
Acquisition agency
Gets satellites into the sky and NGA analyzes/ collects
National Security Agency (NSA)
Subordinate to DoD
Single- source
Similar to NGA, but collects SIGINT
Small analysis capability
Department of Energy (DOE)
Very niche role
Nuclear proliferation, oversees nuclear labs
Analysis agency, no collections
Secretary of Energy is the primary customer
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Identity crisis because became a hodgepodge of agencies under the banner of DHS
Intelligence office I&A
More domestic flavor
Coast Guard
Subordinate to DHS
Primarily analysis to support the Coast Guard operations
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
Subordinate to DoJ
Law enforcement agency, small intelligence area
FBI
Terrorism-focused post-9/11
HUMINT collection in the U.S.
Counterrorism and counterintelligence
Subordinate to DoJ, law enforcement agency
State Department
U.S.’ primary foreign diplomacy agency
INR Intelligence and Research
All-source intelligence
Supports the Secretary of State
Treasury
Finance crimes, terrorists hiding money
No collection
Military Services
DoD oversees 9 agencies
Collection and some analysis to support the military
3 big all-source agencies
(1) CIA, (2) DIA, (3) INR
Week #4: Intelligence Process and Cycle
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6 Steps
Requirements
A direction of what to look into
Can suddenly change (ad hoc requirements)
National Intel Priorities Framework (NIPF)
Top priorities that get the most attention/ resources
Rack & stack of priorities
In theory policy makers set the requirements
In actuality, they don’t
Too busy or don’t know much about intelligence
Collection
Agencies collecting intel on requirements (INTs)
Varying levels of expediency
Finite resources, creates tradeoffs
What’s collected is raw intelligence
Wheat vs. chaff problem
More not necessarily better, more to sift through
Processing and Exploitation
Taking signals, data, images, etc. and translating and de-jargoning it to something meaningful and throwing out what’s not needed, refining but still raw
Implication: a lot of what’s collected is not used, stays in the vacuum
Analysis and Production
Analysts take refined raw collection intel and turn it into finished intel
Different forms of finished intel
Briefing
Paper
Disagreements between analysts gets resolved in this step
Competitive analysis
Many different agencies on same issues guards against groupthink and confirmation bias
Analytic coordination
Incorporated opinions/ some to final conclusions
Can contact collections to clarify things and find missing pieces
Animosity b/c collections ops worry that analysts will reveal sensitive info
Dissemination
Tailored to needs of customer, brought to customer usually each morning
Having someone in the room increases the ability for consumption
Consumption
Difficult to ensure
Time is a commodity
Feedback
Rare, policymakers don’t have time
Consumers may not see the importance of it
What’s Wrong with the Cycle
Policymakers don’t give requirements, expect IC to figure it out → IC tries to anticipate requirements
Collection managers can’t wait for requirements to come in, they work more with analysts, analysts driving collection
Policymakers have access to raw intel which is potentially problematic b/c they’re not trained to read it
Raw can be biased, contradictory, wrong
A competent analyst doesn’t need collection data, can draw on previous expertise on subject
Expert bias
Finished intel does not drive policy decisions
Want intel to support what they already want to do
Intel has a limited utility in providing impact on policy
Week #5: Intelligence Collection and the INTs
Capability + intent = threat
The Collection Disciplines (INTs)
GEOINT (NGA)
Something visual that’s map or image based
Examples:
Aircraft, satellites (classified and commercial)
“Air Breathers”
Airplanes, UAVs
Can be shot down, which limits where it can be flown
Imagery intelligence (IMINT)
Subdiscipline of GEOINT
Image taken from the sky/ space
Cons:
(1) does not identify intent
(2) weather limits collection
(3) prone to denial and deception
(4) takes some expertise to understand
Pros:
(1) Satellites can be used remotely and intrusively
SIGINT (NSA)
Collects on anything that emits signals
Intercepts foreign signals (via satellites, airplanes, sensors)
2 categories
(1) COMINT
Communications intelligence
Interception of a communication between two people (speech/ text)
Texts, emails, calls, etc.
(2) ELINT
Electronic communication
Something emitting a signal (no speech/ text) to communicate
Airplanes emitting a radar signal of its location
Pros:
(1) can provide insight into intent
(2) remote and intrusive
(3) opportunity to deceive
Cons:
(1) expensive
HUMINT (CIA)
(1) overt
Assigned to an embassy representing a country
Can employ elicitation techniques
(2) clandestine
Hidden
Takes time to recruit, assign, vet to make sure they’re reliable, trustworthy, and not a double agent
Involves a cover
(1) official cover
Posing as a gov’t employee that’s not CIA
(2) nonofficial cover
Posing as someone with no association to the U.S.
Risky, no immunity
E.g., journalist
Pros:
(1) can help establish intent
(2) cheaper
Cons:
(1) access
(2) security issues getting inside (difficult w/out embassies)
(3) time intensive
(4) analysts don’t know the identity of source which leads to tension
(5) credibility issues
OSINT
“Open” = it can be obtained legally, but may still have to pay
Cons:
(1) too much data
(2) prone to bias/ misinformation
Pros:
(1) cheap
(2) safe
(3) ubiquitous
(4) 1st indication that something has happened
MASINT (Science & Technology Dept of DIA)
Measures and signatures intelligence
Touch, taste, smell
Collecting technical signature to come to conclusions
Week #6: Intelligence Analysis, Part 1
Not about predicting the future
Expertise is beneficial: can guide new analysts out of thinking traps, finds patterns
Need cognitive diversity
Can approach ideas from different perspectives
Important considerations
(1) objectivity
(2) politicization
Use intel to advance political agenda
IC intentionally distorting intel to suit a political agenda
Policymakers put pressure in IC to push an agenda
Political leaning of IC members may cave to pressure and support of their ideologies
Week #7: Intelligence Analysis, Part 2
Analysis is a cognitive not a mechanical process
Cognitive Biases
(1) cognitive bias
Unmotivated biases, things the brain does that you don’t have control over
(2) mirror imaging
Apply Western way of thinking onto the adversary
Assuming the adversary is just like us
(3) anchoring bias
Brain anchors onto something, usually the last thing you saw, heard, etc.
Becoming accustomed to people/ what you’re studying that believe they can’t deviate
Outside perspectives are important because incremental change is difficult to detect
(4) selective attention
(5) availability bias
Think about the thing that is most easily accessible
(6) confirmation bias
Seek info to confirm what we already believe
Cherry-picking info
Leads to missing out on hypotheses that might be correct
Week #8: The Intelligence-Policymaker Relationship
Clients of Intelligence
(1) POTUS
(2) NSC & staff
(3) Dept’s and agencies and staff
(4) Congress
(5) IC*
Intel Producer and Consumer Relationship
Policymakers don’t have time and groups are competing for that time and don’t have a monopoly on info.
Intel officers and policymakers want different things
Policymakers want:
(1) insight on demand
(2) no ambiguity
(3) policy options and easy choices
(4) analysis that reinforces policies or leads them in the right direction
(5) a confident view
IC officers want:
(1) to know everything
(2) to be believed
(3) to influence policy for good
(4) safeguard sources and methods
(5) want to please and be relevant
Luxuries that IC has
(1) time
(2) do not carry burden of decision
(3) do not have to build political support
(4) ability to turn the switch off
Proximity Debate
“Adjacent Hotel Rooms” vs. “High Wall”

INR is the closest, physically, to its customers
Week #9: Intelligence Support for Military and Law Enforcement + Guest Speaker
Levels of Intelligence
Strategic
Long term: broad/policy oriented
Customers: D.C.
Operational
Intermediate: Operations focused & logistics
Customers: military
Tactical
Immediate: Specific/Detail oriented
Customers: military
Order of battle
Core part of military analysis
How many of something does a foreign military have?
Unique collection opportunities to military in wartime events
Detainees, interrogations, POW, captured documents
Targeting
Mitigate civilian casualties
No-strike lists
Week #10: Intelligence Failures
9/11 was not a strategic surprise b/c there was warning that something was going to happen, it was a tactical surprise
9/11
Failure to connect the dots
Major attack was imminent but no tactical info, too vague to be actionable
Failure of collection
Couldn't identify plan, method of attack
Did detect an increase in chatter
Failure of analysis
Did not connect the dots
Failure of policy
Terrorism was not a high enough priority
1995, NIE high priority issue
Highlighted aviation as an attractable method for terrorists b/c of vulnerabilities of airplanes
But would cost a lot of money to protect and inconvenient
2001, PDB, 40 articles talked about BinLaden
SIGNIT intercepted 9/10 “match is about to begin, tomorrow is day zero”
But translated on 9/12
Phoenix Memo
Memo that FBI officer in Phoenix wrote saying an inordinate number of individuals were interested in flight schools
Problem: FBI didn’t share with CIA
DNI created post-9/11
“The wall” to separate FBI criminal prosecutions and national security cases
Inhibited investigation
Failure of imagination
Stuck on old hijackings model
Iraq WMD
Failure by connecting too many dots
93 page assessment became a warrant to war in Iraq
Analytically, one of the main errors was assumptions
Deduced from what they knew of Iraq/ Hussein from past
Over reliance on outdated mental models
Leading collectors were tasked with “where” are the WMDs
Technical analysis
Through imagery, Iraq importing large aluminum tubes
To restart the centrifuge system for bombs? DOE didn’t agree, everyone else did
Biggest mistake was an over reliance on HUMINT
CURVE BALL
Iraqi scientist, Germany recruited him as a source, shared bits with the U.S. through liaison (U.S. didnt know who he was as a person)
Fabricated everything to get the West involved in Iraq
Failure was in how confident IC was that Iraq had WMDs
Reforms
(1) transparency with what you know, how you know it, what you don't know
(2) analytic tradecraft standards
Meant to bring more nuance into intel
(3) creation of DNI
Purpose of reform is raising batting averages