Postwar Period and Neocolonialism in the Philippines

On 4 July 1946, the Americans bestowed upon the Filipino people their full independence. However, despite the recognition of the full sovereignty of the newly independent nation, the Philippines remained dependent on the United States. lis economic policies, political system, and state agenda were made and implemented to favor the Americans. The postwar years of the country can be summarized to the single theme of neocolonialism. While the government was composed of Filipinos. the United States had a close influence on the nationally elected governments thai ruled the country for most of the twentieth century. While the country ceased to be a U.S. territory, the relationship that was built between the two countries still contained elements of colonial subservience and dependency. In this lesson, we are going to look at different primary sources that demonstrate American neocolonialism in the Philippines from the immediate postwar years until the culmination of the EDSA republic.

This lesson tackles the postwar period in the Philippines by looking at three documents that demonstrate the kind of relationship between the Philippines as a newly independent nation-state and its former colonizer and world superpower, the United States of America. We are going to read and analyze three different kinds of primary sources that are useful in painting the picture of the Philippines during this period. The first document is a declassified U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) file that reports the conditions in the Philippines in the year 1950, the second is an article published in the magazine called the Philippine Free Press about the 1953 presidential election, and the last one is the speech delivered by former President Corazon Aquino before the U.S. Congress in September 1986

CIA Intelligence Memorandum No. 296 of June 1950

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States was established • after World War II. It became the primary agency of the United States in terms of intelligence work that has been crucial as they traverse a new world order-the Cold War period. This period culminated after World War Il and is characterized with the relentless competition between the democratic-capitalist United States of America and the socialist-communist Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) for world supremacy. In such a context, the Philippines, as a former U.S. colony, was automatically presumed to be under the U.S. umbrella. Thus, the policies of the postwar presidents in the Philippines ostensibly featured anti-communist and liberai economic leanings. These were explicitly demonstrated in many CIA documents that were produced about the Philippines in this period. These documents were originally confidential and classified. After the enactment of the Freedom of Information law in the United States, CIA declassified volumes of papers that were over 25 years old However, most of these documents were labeled as "sanitized copies."

One of the earliest documents was Intelligence Memorandum No. 296 with the subject "Current Situation in the Philippines" dated 6 June 1950. The memorandum is a five-page report on the political, economic, and military situation in the Philippines, and how these conditions dictate its relationship with the United States. The introduction of the report stated:

Even though deteriorating conditions in the Philippines should in the near future cause the downfall of President Quirino, the succeeding administration could be expected to be pro-US. If the present decline in stability throughout the Philippines continues for as much as ten years, however, pro-Communist forces might be able to seize power.

The report was divided into three parts: political situation, economic situation, and military situation. For the United States, these aspects were the most important ones in appraising the Philippines.

In the political aspect, the United States was pessimistic about the presidency of President Elpidio Quirino. His government was marred by corruption scandals across different levels of governance. The CIA detected an "active resentment against governmental inefficiency and abuses" among the people, which led to a general "[loss of confidence in the government." This bleak development, in the CIA's assessment, further strengthened the Communist-led Huk movement in Luzon, CIA also described "administrative corruption and inefficiency at virtually all levels.: Corruption was said to be perpetrated by the "small group of wealthy landowners and entrepreneurs who constitute the Filipino ruling clique" and "resulting from a lack of civil spirit, from knowledge of economic power, and from confidence in the past apathy of the disorganized and uneducated mass of the people."

In terms of the Philippine economy at that period, the CIA described the Philippines as "almost self-sufficient in food [which] favors long-range stability." However, they also mentioned how "long-standing inequalities in the nation's agrarian system... have been exploited by the Communist and have not only facilitated the development of the Huk movement in Luzon but are producing unrest elsewhere in the archipelago." The CIA also mentioned the critical problem of the "nation's rapidly deteriorating financial position." The Philippine government dealt with this problem by increasing taxes and tightening import control. These measures resulted in price increases in imported goods. The government also encountered difficulties in the conduct of foreign trade, which further led to "increased popular doubt as to the country's economic future, which led to aggravated political instability."

Aside from the corruption and inefficiency of the government, which the CIA saw as a result of "political immaturity and inadequate education," the law enforcement institutions of the Philippine Constabulary and the Philippine Armed Forces were also seen to not possess any "capability for maintaining law and order or even for preventing destructive raids by the Huks.", The Huks, which was the central concern of the United States, was an organization that fought the Japanese in the preceding war period and became an anti-government group during the postwar years. In this 1950 document, the CIA estimated that "although Huk activity is presently confined in the island of Luzon, it is expanding and growing more intensive."

The 1950 estimate of the CIA on Huk membership was pegged at 15,000 with the prospect of further increase. The CIA believed that the Huks were equipped with weapons that were sufficient and appropriate for their guerrilla operations. These weapons were acquired through theft, purchase, and seizure from government forces. The guerrillas were also sustained with the food and clothing "willingly contributed by sympathetic peasants and villagers." At times, the Huks also resort to force or intimidation in acquiring these essential supplies. The CIA assessed that the Huks were of high morals as evident on the "very few Huks [who] have taken advantage of past Government amnesty offers." On the other hand, the CIA's' appraisal of the Philippine Armed Forces and Constabulary was pessimistic. While the government forces were "well-equipped in comparison with their opponents" with U.S.-sourced materials, the combat efficiency of both the Army and the Constabulary lacked coordination and suffered from the failure in relieving small units in the field. While the deteriorating political stability of the period had little to no effect on the loyalty of the uniformed personnel, their morale was generally low. The CIA concluded that the "ulnit leadership is not of high quality, and an aggressive spirit is lacking in all ranks. The ineffectiveness of government forces is in part attributable to difficuit terrain and local sympathy for the Huks."

Analysis of the CIA Memorandum

It is essential to have contextual knowledge of the 1950 period to appreciate the report summarized on the previous pages. As mentioned, the period that immediately followed World War II was dictated by the Cold War. In this period, the two strongest and most powerful nation-states in the world were vying for world supremacy and were engaging in a diplomatic contest.

Both the United States and the USSR were suspecting each other of an agenda to dominate the world. Both countries engaged in a race of accumulation of arms, territories, and wealth to secure their place in the current world order. The fundamental difference between them would be their respective state ideologies. On the one hand, the United States was committed to liberal democracy and a liberal capitalist political economy. These ideas, arter all, launched the relatively young nation to world greatness in a matter of decades. On the other hand, the USSR was as committed to their socialist and communist ideology and the intent to export the glorious Russian Communist Revolution of 1917 across the world.

In this scenario, the United States, erstwhile colonial master and ally of the nascent Philippine Republic, was positioning in the Pacific. The Philippines, as its territory since 1899, was an essential stronghold as the Chinese Communist Party's revolution succeeded in 1949. The United States wanted to contain communism in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. That was why the presence of a growing communist army, the Huks, was a U.S. concern.

This concern was apparent in this August 1950 memo. The report, while presenting a general picture of the Philippines, was centrally concerned with the current situation of the Huk rebellion in the country. For example, in characterizing the political situation in the country, the report ultimately tied back on the effects of instability and the increasing discontent of the people against the government to the communist movement. They were apprehensive about how the decline in the government's popularity and Quirino's integrity would garner pro-communist sentiment. The same was true about their economic appraisals.

Their report on the economic condition in the country centered on their appraisals of the long-standing inequalities in the Philippine agricultural sector. Despite the projected self-sufficiency on food, the CIA pointed out that the "continued failure of the Philippine governing class - the beneficiaries of this agrarian system - to alleviate inequities has provided local Communists with excellent opportunities to organize the otherwise leaderless peasantry."

The CIA's preoccupation with the Huk rebellion is most highlighted in their report on the country's military situation. They pointed out the continuous strengthening of the rebel forces and the bleak improvements of the Armed Forces and Constabulary.

The CIA had detailed intelligence on the capacities and artillery of the Huks and expressed concerns on the ability of the rebels to acquire the sympathy of the rural population.

Like most of the declassified files of the CIA, this memo is also a sanitized copy. Hence, it can be inferred that more controversial appraisals of the CIA have been omitted in the version that the agency has approved for publication. Nevertheless, a contextual reading of the document reveals insights on the agenda and interests ot the United States in the Philippines during the years that immediately followed the War and the initial years of the Cold War period that would last until the disintegration of the USSR in the last decade of the twentieth century.

Leon O. Ty's "It's Up to You Now" and the Magsaysay Myth

Mainstream Philippine history textbooks always paint Ramon Magsaysay as the People's President. His humble beginnings and educational background were placed in stark contrast to his predecessors'. Indeed, the presidents before him were all lawyers who came from the old landed elite families and were prominent figures in Philippine politics for many generations of the American period. Magsaysay, however, did not enjoy the same advantages. He was not a lawyer, did not come from the national elite, was former employee of a bus company in his province, and a hardened guerrilla during the war. He was a governor of Zambales, elected as a legislator, and was appointed as secretary of National Defense under President Quirino. As defense secretary, Magsaysay gained popularity in his successful campaign against the Huks.

For all intents and purposes, Magsaysay was painted as a self-made president who rose from the ranks of the masses through sheer ability and patriotism. He was celebrated as an anti-communist hero who broke the growing momentum of the Huk rebellion as a defense secretary. He was beholden to no one because he had no significant business interest and was perceived and portrayed as a "man of action" who would put an end to the corruption and inefficiency of the government led by an oligarchy. U.S. newspapers and magazines supported this image, and so did the Philippine press.

Journalist Leon O. Ty penned an article "It's Up to You Now" for the Philippine Free Press three days before the November 1953 presidential election. This article is an illustration of Magsaysay's portrayal in the press. The article started with an anecdote where defense secretary Magsaysay called a newsman to express his worries in the way things were run in the Quirino cabinet. The article narrated how Magsaysay worried about having earned the ire of the president when he contradicted a particular shady deal about sugar importation that involved a certain compadre to the president. The article read:

I have my doubts, Magsaysay answered rather gloomily. 'The Apo [pertaining to the president] seems to dislike me now.!

'But why should he dislike you?' the newsman queried. 'Didn't you restore peace and order for him? You gave him prestige when you kept the 1951 elections clean. The President has repeatedly said he is proud of you!'

Magsaysay said Quirino began to be indifferent to him when articles about his success in combating the Huks were published in leading American magazines like Time, Life, Saturday Evening Post, Newsweek, and Colliers.

Leon Ty's write-up craftily narrated the history of Magsaysay's political career, from his days as a war veteran to his days as the defense secretary, until he resigned from the Quirino cabinet and immediately transferred from the Liberal Party to the Nacionalista Party where he was drafted as the standard-bearer. Ty's article also described Magsaysay's initial plan to resign from the Nacionalista Party and to run for senator under a third party:

'What do you plan to do now?' Magsaysay was asked toward the end of the conversation.

'Resign from the Cabinet and join a third party. I can't join the Opposition. I don't think the Nacionalistas will accept me, knowing I'm a Liberal.'

'But what will you do in a third party?' inquired the newsman.

'I'll run for senator,' he said.

'Useless for you to join a third party and run for a Senate post. You can't win. Not as a third party candidate!'...

The foregoing story is related to show that Ramon Magsaysay at the time never dreamed of becoming a candidate for president of the Liberal Party, much less of the Opposition.

The article also described the confidence of hardcore nationalists to Magsaysay. These include Jose P. Laurel, Claro M. Recto, and Lorenzo Tañada. This confidence demonstrated that Magsaysay had the trust of leaders known for their anti-Americanism. Supporting Magsaysay, according to Ty, was how the Nacionalista leaders such as Laurel showed patriotism:

Many people are still wondering why Dr. Laurel was willing to sacrifice his personal ambition in favor of the former LP defense secretary. They still believe that in a clean election, Laurel could win against any Liberal as shown in 1951. With victory practically in sight, why did Dr. Laurel decide to invite Magsaysay to be the NP standard-bearer?

Senator Laurel had his reasons for this action.

If I run and lose through frauds and violence as in 1949; he is said to have told close friends, "I will surely be driven to desperation. I may even have to resort to drastic measures. In which case, I might have to go to the mountains and lead a band of rebels, guerrillas. That I cannot do now on account of my age. I'm tired.

'And if I win, could I get as much aid from the United States as Magsaysay could? I don't think so. I know pretty well how I stand in the eyes of the American people. Because of my collaboration record during the Occupation, many Americans who still don't know what actually happened here during the war will stand in the way of material aid to our country. I have no choice. The welfare of our people is more important to me than my personal ambition. But if Magsaysay wins, I think America will go out of her way to help us because he is a friend, a great friend. To the American people, and for that matter, to the people of the world, Magsaysay is the physical embodiment of Democracy's courageous stand against Communism in the Far East.....

The rest of the article painted a picture of the Liberal regime in the Philippines for the past eight years. Ty casually stated, "In this article, we feel there is no need to enumerate what President Quirino has done for the country during the years he has been in office. The Filipino people know what he has accomplished. They also know what he failed to do." After a hefty narrative of Magsaysay's career that included depictions of his accomplishments, character, and frustrations, the article ended with a challenge for its readers: "The hectic political campaign is over. You, fellow voters, have heard the pros and cons of the issues involved in this election... It's up to you now!".

Analysis of Philippine Free Press' Pitch for Magsaysay

Magsaysay's campaign was a staggering success. For the first time in the history of elections in the Philippines, the president won a landslide victory. Magsaysay defeated Liberal Party's standard-bearer and incumbent Philippine President Elpidio Quirino with 68.9 percent ballots cast electing Magsaysay as president. Indeed, the unpopular and reputedly corrupt and aging Quirino was no match to the younger, energetic, and populist Ramon Magsaysay.

The buildup of Magsaysay's presidential campaign, however, was appraised by many historians like Stephen Shalom, William Pomeroy, and Renato Constantino as a U.S. project. Indeed, Magsaysay was avidly supported by the U.S. government. U.S. media such as Time and Reader's Digest created fantastic myths about his humble beginnings. They painted him as a fierce anti-communist, a relentless reformer of the corrupt Philippine state, and a loyal supporter of the United States. Indeed, CIA documents and former agents testified how CIA's Edward Lansdale orchestrated Magsaysay's journey to the presidency since the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) persuaded President Quirino to appoint Magsaysay as defense secretary. The image of Magsaysay as a humble politician was a packaging covertly manufactured by the CIA. They knew that Quirino and his party were highly unpopular, and they wanted to ensure that the next president would serve U.S. interests well.

The CIA was behind Magsaysay's campaign. They choreographed how the media would portray him. The very image that Lansdale wanted for Magsaysay was well captured by the Philippine Free Press article summarized previously. Ty wrote about Magsaysay's rise from the masses and painted him as a humble and patriotic politician who despaired with what he witnessed in the Quirino government. The article was, at times, contradictory. On the one hand, it painted Magsaysay as a relatively low-profile Liberal Party member who would never be considered as a presidential candidate. On the other hand, it also claimed that "Magsaysay easily stood out as the strongest pillar in the LP edifice." At the same time, while the article tried to distance Magsaysay from the image of being a U.S. puppet by having hardcore nationalists such as Laurel and Recto speak of his worthiness, it also highlighted the advantages of keeping the United States as allies, as depicted in the words of Recto quoted previously. Thus, while the article avoided giving Magsaysay the image of a U.S. bet, it was still able to place the United States as a valuable friend to the Philippine government and economy.

The unconcealed and historically documented support of the United States to Magsaysay's presidency is another indicator of the continued and unbridled U.S. influence on the Philippines' national affairs, years after the official end of U.S. colonization. Magsaysay is just a representation of how Philippine presidents of the postwar period continuously led the country according to the framework set by the United States.

Corazon Aquino’s Speech before the U.S. Congress

Corazon "Cory" Cojuangco Aquino functioned as the symbol of the restoration of democracy and the overthrow of the Marcos dictatorship in 1986. The EDSA People Power, which installed Cory Aquino in the presidency, put the Philippines in the international spotlight for overthrowing a dictator through peaceful means. Cory was quickly a figure of the said revolution; as the widow of the slain Marcos oppositionist and former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino Jr., Cory was hoisted as the antithesis of the dictator. Her image as a mourning, widowed housewife who has always been in the shadow of her husband and relatives and had no experience in politics was juxtaposed against Marcos' statesmanship, eloquence, charisma, and cunning political skills. Nevertheless, Cory was able to capture the imagination of the people whose rights and freedom had long been compromised throughout the Marcos regime. The people rallied behind Cory, even though she came from a wealthy haciendero family in Tarlac and has owned vast estates of sugar plantations and whose relatives occupied local and national government positions.

On 18 September 1986, seven months after Cory became president, she went to the United States and spoke before the joint session of the U.S. Congress. Cory was welcomed with long applause as she took the podium and addressed the United States about her presidency and the challenges faced by the new Republic. She began her speech with the story of her leaving the United States three years prior as a newly widowed wife of Ninoy Aquino.

She then told of Ninoy's character, conviction, and resolve in opposing the authoritarianism of Marcos. She talked of the three times that they lost Ninoy, including his demise on 21 August 1983. The first time was when the dictatorship detained Ninoy with other dissenters. Cory related:

The government sought to break him by indignities and terror. They locked him up in a tiny, nearly airless cell in a military camp in the north. They stripped him naked and held a threat of a sudden midnight execution over his head. Ninoy held up manfully under all of it. I barely did as well. For forty-three days, the authorities would not tell me what had happened to him. This was the first time my children and I felt we had lost him.

Cory continued that when Ninoy survived that first detention, he was then charged with subversion, murder, and other crimes. He was tried by a military court, whose legitimacy Ninoy adamantly questioned. To solidify his protest, Ninoy decided to do a hunger strike and fasted for 40 days. Cory treated this event as the second time that their family lost Ninoy. She said:

When that didn't work, they put him on trial for subversion, murder and a host of other crimes before a military commission. Ninoy challenged its authority and went on a fast. If he survived it, then he felt God intended him for another fate. We had lost him again. For nothing would hold him back from his determination to see his fast through to the end. He stopped only when it dawned on him that the government would keep his body alive after the fast had destroyed his brain. And so, with barely any life in his body, he called off the fast on the 40th day.

Ninoy's death was the third and the last time that Cory and their children lost Ninoy. She continued:

And then, we lost him irrevocably and more painfully than in the past. The news came to us in Boston. It had to be after the three happiest years of our lives together. But his death was my country's resurrection and the courage and faith by which alone they could be free again. The dictator had called him a nobody. Yet, two million people threw aside their passivity and fear and escorted him to his grave.

Cory attributes the peaceful EDSA revolution to the martyrdom of Ninoy. She stated that the death of Ninoy sparked the revolution, and the responsibility of "offering the democratic alternative" had "fallen on (her) shoulders." Cory's address introduced us to her democratic philosophy, which she claims she also acquired from Ninoy. She argued:

I held fast to Ninoy's conviction that it must be by the ways of democracy. I held out for participation in the 1984 election the dictatorship called, even if I knew it would be rigged. I was warned by the lawyers of the opposition, that I ran the grave risk of legitimizing the foregone results of elections that were clearly going to be fraudulent. But I was not fighting for lawyers but for the people in whose intelligence, I had implicit faith. By the exercise of democracy even in a dictatorship, they would be prepared for democracy when it came. And then also, it was the only way I knew by which we could measure our power even in the terms dictated by the dictatorship. The people vindicated me in an election shamefully marked by government thuggery and fraud. The opposition swept the elections, garnering a clear majority of the votes even if they ended up (thanks to a corrupt Commission on Elections) with barely a third of the seats in Parliament. Now, I knew our power.

Cory talked about her miraculous victory through the people's struggle and continued talking about her earliest initiatives as the president of a restored democracy. She stated that she intended to forge and draw reconciliation after a bloody and polarizing dictatorship. Cory emphasized the importance of the EDSA revolution in terms of being a "limited revolution that respected the life and freedom of every Filipino." She also boasted of the restoration of a fully constitutional government whose constitution gave utmost respect to the Bill of Rights. She reported to the U.S. Congress:

Again as we restore democracy by the ways of democracy, so are we completing the constitutional structures of our new democracy under a constitution that already gives full respect to the Bill of Rights. A jealously independent constitutional commission is completing its draft which will be submitted later this year to a popular referendum. When it is approved, there will be elections for both national and local positions. So, within about a year from a peaceful but national upheaval that overturned a dictatorship, we shall have returned to full constitutional government.

Cory then presented her peace agenda with the existing communist insurgency, aggravated by the dictatorial and authoritarian measures of Ferdinand Marcos. She asserted:

My predecessor set aside democracy to save it from a communist insurgency that numbered less than five hundred. Unhampered by respect for human rights he went at it with hammer and tongs. By the time he fled, that insurgency had grown to more than sixteen thousand. I think there is a lesson here to be learned about trying to stifle a thing with a means by which it grows.

Cory's peace agenda involved political initiatives and reintegration programs to persuade insurgents to leave the countryside and return to mainstream society and participate in the restoration of democracy. She invoked the path of peace because she believed that it was the path that a moral government must take. Nevertheless, Cory took a step back when she said that while peace is the priority of her presidency, she "will not waver" when freedom and democracy are threatened. She noted that similar to Abraham Lincoln, she understood that "force may be necessary before mercy." While she did not relish the idea, she "will do whatever it takes to defend the integrity and freedom of (her) country."

Cory then tured to the controversial topic of the Philippine foreign debt amounting to 26 billion dollars at the time of her speech. This debt has ballooned during the Marcos regime. Cory expressed her intention to honor those debts despite mentioning that the people did not benefit from such obligations. Thus, she expressed her protestations about the way the Philippines was deprived of choices to pay those debts within the capacity of the Filipino people. She lamented:

Finally may I turn to that other slavery, our twenty-six-billion-dollar foreign debt. I have said that we shall honor it. Yet, the means by which we shall be able to do so are kept from us. Many of the conditions imposed on the previous government that stole this debt, continue to be imposed on us who never benefited from it.

She continued that while the country has experienced the calamities brought about by the corrupt dictatorship of Marcos, no commensurate assistance was yet extended to the Philippines. She even remarked on the peaceful character of the EDSA People Power Revolution, "ours must have been the cheapest revolution ever." She demonstrated that the Filipino people fulfilled the "most difficult condition of the debt negotiation," which was the "restoration of democracy and responsible government."

Cory related to the U.S. legislators that wherever she went, she met poor and unemployed Filipinos willing to offer their lives to democracy. She stated:

Wherever I went in the campaign, slum area or impoverished village. They came to me with one cry, democracy. Not food although they clearly needed it but democracy. Not work, although they surely wanted it but democracy. Not money, for they gave what little they had to my campaign. They didn't expect me to work a miracle that would instantly put food into their mouths, clothes on their back, education in their children and give them work that will put dignity in their lives. But I feel the pressing obligation to respond quickly as the leader of the people so deserving of all these things.

Cory proceeded to enumerate the challenges of the Filipino people as they tried building the new democracy. These were the persisting communist insurgency and economic deterioration. Cory further lamented that these problems worsened by the crippling debt because half of the country's export earnings amounting to two billion dollars would "go to pay just the interest on a debt whose benefit the Filipino people never received." Cory then asked a rather compelling question to the United States:

Has there been a greater test of national commitment to the ideals you hold dear than that my people have gone through? You have spent many lives and much treasure to bring freedom to many lands that were reluctant to receive it. And here, you have a people who want it by themselves and need only the help to preserve it.

Cory ended her speech by thanking the United States for serving as home to her family for what she referred to as the "three happiest years of (their) lives together." She urged the United States to build the Philippines as a new home for democracy and in turning the country as a "shining testament of our two nations commitment to freedom."

Analysis of Cory Aquino's Speech

Cory Aquino's speech was an essential event in the political and diplomatic history of the country because it has arguably cemented the legitimacy of the EDSA government in the international arena. The speech talks of her family background, especially her relationship with her late husband, Ninoy Aquino. It is well known that it was Ninoy who served as the real leading figure of the opposition at that time. Indeed, Ninoy's eloquence and charisma could very well compete with that of Marcos. In her speech, Cory talked at length about Ninoy's toil and suffering at the hands of the dictatorship. Even when she proceeded to talk about her new government, she still went back to Ninoy's legacies and lessons. Moreover, her attribution of the revolution to Ninoy's death not only demonstrated Cory's perception of the revolution, but also, since she was the president, it represented the dominant discourse at that point in our history.

The ideology or the principles of the new democratic government can also be seen in the same speech. Aquino was able to draw the sharp contrast between her government and of her predecessor by expressing her commitment to a democratic constitution drafted by an independent commission. She claims that such a constitution upholds and adheres to the rights and liberty of the Filipino people. Cory also hoisted herself as the reconciliatory agent after more than two decades of a polarizing authoritarian politics. For example, Cory sees the blown-up communist insurgency as a product of a repressive and corrupt government. Her response to this insurgency rooted in her diametric opposition to the dictator (i.e., initiating reintegration of communist rebels to the mainstrèam Philippine society). Cory claimed that her primary approach to this problem was through peace and not through war. .

Despite Cory's efforts to hoist herself as the exact opposite of Marcos, her speech still revealed certain parallelisms between her and Marcos' government. These parallels are seen in terms of continuing the alliance between the Philippines and the United States, despite the known affinity between the said world superpower and Marcos The Aquino regime— as seen in Cory's acceptance of the invitation to address the U.S. Congress and in the content of the speech-decided to build and continue with the alliance between the Philippines and the United States and effectively implemented a substantially similar foreign policy to that of the dictatorship. For example, Cory recognized that the large sum of foreign debts incurred by the Marcos regime never benefited the Filipino people. However, she still expressed her intention to pay off those debts. Unknown to many Filipinos, there was a choice of waiving the said debts because those were incurred and stolen by a dictator and not the country. Cory's decision was an indicator of her government's intent to carry on a debt-driven economy.

Reading through Cory's speech, we can already take cues not only on Cory s ideas and aspirations, but also on the guiding principles and framework of the government that she represented.