Leibniz's Defence of Optimism: The Theodicy
The Occasion for the Theodicy
Theodicy: This is the only book-length work published by Leibniz during his lifetime.
The book was written in response to Pierre Bayle’s defence of Manichaeism, which Leibniz deemed a threat.
Bayle’s Argument: Leibniz describes Bayle’s stance as attributing moral failings to divine negligence, echoing pagans who blamed gods for their wrongdoings.
Leibniz’s Concern: He feared that readers might adopt harmful beliefs due to Bayle’s arguments that suggested the existence of two divine principles: one good and one evil.
Leibniz proclaimed Bayle’s opinions as indefensible, urging the need for a robust defence of divine goodness in light of evil.
The Main Aims of the Theodicy
Objective: Leibniz's work responds to the consequences of the Manichean hypothesis that renders moral responsibility void.
Key Points:
Moral Evil: According to the Manichean view, moral actions are dictated by an internal evil principle, negating personal accountability.
Leibniz’s Goals:
Provide an alternative explanation for the existence of moral evil.
Demonstrate the consistency of human freedom with divine responsibility for our actions.
Categories of Difficulties: Leibniz categorizes issues regarding the existence of evil into two classes:
Difficulties arising from human freedom and its incompatibility with divine nature, while being necessary for guilt and punishment.
God’s conduct regarding evil, which appears to compromise His goodness, holiness, and justice.
Argument Structure:
Part One: Explaining the existence of moral evil: God, being wholly good, permitted the existence of moral evil.
Part Three: Justifying physical evil: Humans can justifiably be held accountable (punished) for their actions.
Leibniz on the Existence of Evil (1)
Vindication of Divine Attributes: Leibniz’s goal is to exonerate God’s perfections—His holiness, justice, goodness, greatness, power, and independence—while explaining the existence of evil.
Privilege of Evil:
Evil is understood as a privation, not an actual entity.
Moral evil comes from the will of human beings and not God’s design.
God allows moral evil but does not will it, maintaining that this allowance does not affect His supreme goodness.
Leibniz on the Existence of Evil (2)
Freedom of Actions: Leibniz asserts that absolute necessity (logical, metaphysical, or geometrical) doesn’t govern free actions.
Divine Choice:
God, who always chooses the best outcome, does not act out of absolute necessity.
Nature's laws, established by God, balance between strict necessity and arbitrary will.
Contingency of Freedom: Freedom is characterized by a lack of absolute necessity with God’s choice being legitimately contingent but not arbitrary.
The Conduct of God in Relation to Moral Evil
Bayle's a priori Argument: Leibniz reconsiders Bayle's approach regarding God's perfection and the ensuing necessity of moral evil.
God as an Infinite Principle: He stresses that God is a singular, infinite principle embodying all perfections, including absolute goodness.
Definition of the ‘World’:
Leibniz explicitly defines “world” as the totality of all existing entities and their occurrences.
Actual vs. Possible Worlds
Definition of Possible Worlds: A possible world consists of a coherent array of substances and events. Multiple possible worlds can exist simultaneously, unlike the one actual world.
Uniqueness of Worlds: Each world is differentiated by distinct entities or happenings, even if differences are trivial.
God’s Creation of the World
Selection of the Best Possible World: God chooses the best from an infinite array of possible worlds to actualize.
Function of God’s Intellect: This ability arises from God’s supreme intellect which comprehends all essences and their compatibility.
Process of Creation: God selects a world after evaluating all possibilities, leading to the actualization of one particular world.
The Responsibility of Evil in the Best Possible World
Evil's Role: Since the selected actual world contains moral evil, this suggests that such a world, while containing evil, could still be the best possible world.
Moral Goodness: Evil must be part of the best of all possible worlds and must be consistent with God's supreme goodness, rather than a willful allowance of wrongdoing.
Principle of Sufficient Reason: Leibniz asserts that if multiple equally good worlds existed, then God would have no rationale for selecting one over the others, necessitating a singular best option.
Leibniz’s Response to Counterarguments
Questions about Alternative Worlds: Queries arise about the potential for a better world devoid of evil. Leibniz refutes the premise, emphasizing:
The metaphysical nature of evil as imperfection complicates the conceiving of a world free from moral evil.
The interconnectedness of events means that changing any aspect in the actual world produces a different world altogether.
Good vs. Evil Assessment: Leibniz contends there are not more evils than goods, emphasizing our misfocus on the negative aspects rather than the positives.
Counter-Response to Bayle: Recognizing the limits of human understanding, Leibniz concludes we do not need to decisively understand the rationale behind each instance of evil within the larger scheme of the best world.
Justification of Physical Evil
Vindication from Accountability: While moral evil necessitates punishment, Leibniz raises concerns about whether divine accountability for physical evil is justified.
Responsibility and Freedom: Emphasizing free will requires addressing the deterministic implications of his system, thus potentially leading to ineffective justifications for physical evil.
Necessity of Events and Divine Action
Types of Necessity: Leibniz differentiates between absolute necessity and hypothetical necessity:
Absolute Necessity: An event that is impossible to negate.
Hypothetical Necessity: Implies that given certain conditions, an event must occur, though it may not be strictly necessary.
Divine Determinism vs. Freedom: God's choice being morally necessitated does not equate to the idea that events are strictly determined; his choice represents moral imperfection rather than absolute compulsion.
Human Freedom in a Deterministic System
Leibniz’s View of Freedom: Freedom is defined by intelligence, spontaneity, and contingency, with the process implying that human beings are accountable for their moral choices.
Connection with Contingency: Actions are contingent, suggesting that alternatives exist in the possible world without negating the freedom associated with making those actions.
Justification of Moral and Physical Evil
Moral Evil Role: Represents voluntary human actions that lead to moral evil, establishing a basis for accountability, alongside physical evil due as punishment for moral failings.
Summary Conclusion:
Moral Evil: Exists as a necessary component of the best possible world, chosen by God based on goodness.
Physical Evil: Justified through free will and moral agency, making punishment for moral evil a legitimate consequence of the actualized world.
Metaphysical, Logical Necessity
Leibniz’s seemingly contradictory statements stem from a nuanced distinction he makes between different types of necessity: absolute (metaphysical) necessity and moral (hypothetical) necessity. Understanding this distinction is key to resolving the tension in his argument.
Why it is not "Absolutely Necessary": For Leibniz, something is absolutely or metaphysically necessary if its negation implies a contradiction (like 2+2=4). He argues that other possible worlds, even those that are not the "best," are still logically possible and internally consistent. Since a world without certain evils is not a logical impossibility, God's choice to create this specific world is not a result of metaphysical compulsion. If it were, the other possible worlds would be impossible, which Leibniz denies.
Why it is "Morally Necessary": When Leibniz says God will "necessarily" choose the best, he is referring to moral necessity. This is rooted in God's perfect nature—Specifically His infinite wisdom (which knows the best) and His infinite goodness (which wills the best). Given that God is perfect, it is "necessary" in a moral sense that He acts in accordance with that perfection. He cannot not choose the best because that would imply a defect in His nature, but this is a "certainty" of action rather than a logical constraint on the possibilities themselves.
Avoiding Arbitrariness: By situating the choice between these two poles, Leibniz avoids the "arbitrary" tag (where God chooses for no reason, which would violate the Principle of Sufficient Reason) and the "absolute necessity" tag (which would lead to Spinozistic determinism and eliminate divine and human freedom).
In summary, the "necessity" Leibniz refers to in the second instance is a description of God's infallible character rather than a logical restriction on the range of possible outcomes.
For Leibniz, freedom of the will does not mean a state of "perfect indifference," which is the idea that the soul is in a state of complete balance or neutrality with no reason to prefer one choice over another (often called the liberty of equilibrium). He rejects this for several reasons:\n\n1. Principle of Sufficient Reason: Leibniz’s philosophy is grounded in the rule that nothing happens without a reason. If the will were truly indifferent, there would be no reason for it to choose one option over another, making the act of choosing impossible. An arbitrary choice without a motive would be irrational and violate the laws of the universe.\n\n2. Intelligence and Motive: True freedom requires intelligence and spontaneity. This means the will is guided by what the intellect perceives as the "best" or most desirable outcome. Being "inclined" by a reason is what makes an agent rational and free, rather than acting like a random coin toss.\n\n3. Moral vs. Absolute Necessity: While the will is "necessitated" by the perception of the good, this is a moral necessity (or hypothetical necessity) rather than an absolute necessity (like the truth that ). Because it is not logically impossible to choose the alternative, the choice remains contingent and free, even though a rational agent will always choose what they perceive as the best.\n\nIn summary, Leibniz argues that being in a state of balance would leave the agent paralyzed. Free will is therefore the ability to act according to reasons and a sense of the good, not the ability to act without any reason at all.
Priori Consideration of God:
The “a priori” consideration of God in Leibniz’s Theodicy refers to reasoning that begins with the definition and essential nature of God, rather than starting from our empirical experiences of the world (which would be an a posteriori approach).
Starting with Perfection: This approach starts with the premise that God is a singular, infinite principle embodying all perfections—specifically infinite wisdom (to know the best), infinite goodness (to will the best), and infinite power (to create the best).
Deductive Logic: From these divine attributes, Leibniz deduces that it is logically necessary for God to select the best of all possible worlds. If He is perfect, He cannot have a sufficient reason to choose a lesser world.
Addressing Evil: While an a posteriori view (looking at the world's suffering) might lead one to doubt God's goodness, the a priori consideration maintains that because God’s nature is perfect, the existence of evil must be a necessary component or a privation within the "best" possible system, even if human beings cannot comprehend the specific rationale for every instance.
In essence, it is a "top-down" argument: because the Cause (God) is perfect, the Effect (the actual world) must be the most perfect one possible.
Leibniz would likely find this claim partially correct but would refine it using his specific metaphysical framework. His response would likely center on these key points:
The Best of All Possible Worlds: Leibniz would argue that the reason God permits sin is not just to avoid "destroying" free will, but because the world containing free agents (even those who sin) is part of the "best of all possible worlds." In His infinite wisdom, God calculated that the total perfection and goodness of this actual world—including the existence of moral freedom—outweighs the perfection of any world where sin is simply blocked.
Moral Necessity vs. Absolute Power: Leibniz would clarify that it is not that God "could not" hinder sin in a physical or absolute sense, but that He is "morally necessitated" to choose the best possible outcome. To interfere with a specific human choice would be to alter the entire interconnected chain of events that makes this world the "best." If God changed one thing to remove a sin, He would essentially be actualizing a completely different world, which would have its own set of defects and a lower total degree of perfection.
The Interconnectedness of Events: Since Leibniz defines the "world" as the totality of all entities and occurrences, he argues that events are intrinsically linked. Removing a sin might seem like a small correction, but in Leibniz's system, it would disrupt the harmony of the entire system.
Freedom and Accountability: Leibniz agrees that preserving free will is essential for moral accountability. He defines freedom through intelligence and spontaneity rather than "perfect indifference." For him, physical evil (punishment) is justified only because human beings possess the freedom to commit moral evil. Therefore, while God allows sin, He does not "will" it; He permits it as a necessary component or privation within a system designed for the highest possible level of overall goodness.