Does Consequentialism Face a Problem?

Fundamental claim: $a$ is morally right iff (if and only if) the consequences of $a$ maximize what is good.
- This simultaneously answers two questions:
- What it is for an action to be right.
- What makes an action right.
Often summarised as “choose the act whose outcome produces the greatest net good.”

Criterion 1 (Condition-Specification)
- A theory must clearly state the conditions under which an act counts as right.
- Example application to consequentialism: “Right = maximises good consequences.”
Criterion 2 (Correspondence with Defensible Judgements)
- The theory’s verdicts must align “sufficiently well” with our most defensible moral intuitions & considered judgements.
- Rationale:
- Even in purely descriptive domains (e.g.
  biology) we discard accounts that badly mis-classify clear cases.
- Analogy: A “pine-tree theory” claiming anything with green leaves, a trunk, and seed-origin is a pine would wrongly label a coconut tree a pine—thus inadequate.
Failure on either criterion ⇒ theory is inadequate.

Judith Jarvis Thomson (building on Philippa Foot) introduces a specific challenge—the Trolley Problem—aimed at consequentialism’s fit with Criterion 2.
Caution: Internet “trolley problems” vary; Thomson’s original pair of cases is the philosophically precise version discussed here.

Setup
- You are driving a runaway trolley headed toward a fork.
- Main track: $5$ unsuspecting workers; collision certain, brakes fail.
- Side track: $1$ worker, equally unaware.
Options & Consequences
1. Do nothing ⇒ $5$ die, $1$ survives.
2. Pull switch ⇒ trolley diverts ⇒ $1$ dies, $5$ survive.
Common moral judgement (class poll ≈ $90\%$ ): Morally permissible to pull the switch.

Setup
- You, a surgeon, have $5$ patients each needing a different vital organ:
- Patient 1: heart
- Patient 2: right lung
- Patient 3: left lung
- Patient 4: left kidney
- Patient 5: right kidney
- A single healthy patient is an exact tissue match for all five.
- The healthy patient does not consent to donation.
Options & Consequences
1. Perform non-consensual harvest & transplants ⇒ healthy patient dies, $5$ recipients live.
2. Respect refusal ⇒ healthy patient lives, $5$ recipients die.
Common moral judgement (class poll ≈ $99\%$ ): Morally impermissible to harvest.

Both cases present a choice between:
- Outcome A: $1$ death, $5$ lives.
- Outcome B: $5$ deaths, $1$ life.
Consequentialism ranks Outcome A higher in both scenarios.

Scenario	Consequentialist “right” act	Widely held moral intuition
Trolley Driver	Pull the switch (Outcome A)	Permissible (agreement)
Transplant	Harvest organs (Outcome A)	Wrong (sharp disagreement)

Hence, consequentialism coincides with intuition in Case 1 but clashes in Case 2, violating Criterion 2.

$\text{If Consequentialism is adequate} \;\Rightarrow\; \text{it corresponds sufficiently with defensible judgements}.$
$\text{Consequentialism does <em>not</em> correspond sufficiently with defensible judgements}.$
Therefore, $\text{Consequentialism is <em>not</em> adequate}.$ (Premises 1 & 2, modus tollens)
- Note: Premise 2 is defended by the transplant case.

Highlights tension between impartial outcome maximisation and individual rights/consent.
Suggests any comprehensive moral theory must explain why “switching tracks” feels permissible while “harvesting organs” feels abhorrent, despite identical utilitarian tallies.
Invites exploration of additional moral principles (e.g.
deontological constraints, the Doctrine of Double Effect, personal rights) to supplement or modify pure consequentialism.

Can consequentialism be refined (e.g.
rule-consequentialism, negative responsibility limits) to align with defensible judgements, or must we abandon it?
Thomson challenges students to craft a well-reasoned resolution to this dilemma.