Gene Sharp's Theory of Power: A Feminist Critique of Consent
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Source: Kate McGuinness, Journal of Peace Research, 1993. Review Essay of Gene Sharp, Social Power and Political Freedom (1980). The article analyzes Sharp’s theory of consensual power through a feminist lens focused on gender relations and patriarchy.
Central aim: evaluate whether Sharp’s theory of power, grounded in consent and withdrawal of consent, can effectively analyze and alter gender oppression.
McGuinness defines a usable theory of power as one that can change relations of domination to benefit the traditionally powerless. It should be relational and grounded in actual experiences, not merely abstract possession by the powerful.
Sharp’s theory underpins his approach to non-violent change and non-violent action: power is not a monolithic possession but a plural, relational set of social powers.
McGuinness outlines a three-part analysis to test Sharp’s theory in gender relations:
1) Pateman’s argument that women are not fully constituted individuals in civil society, limiting the application of consent.
2) Lipsitz & Kritzer’s critique of Sharp about power in relation to a ruler’s aims, linked to feminist perspectives (Guillaumin on appropriation of women’s bodies; Kelly on sexual violence).
3) The possibility of shared political culture and whether consent-based power can be imagined in women’s and men’s different worlds (Gilligan; Margolis).Conclusion (anticipated): Sharp’s theory is of limited value for characterizing power in gender relations or for altering patriarchy; it is male-biased and fails to account for women’s experiences.
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The introduction clarifies that domination/subordination relations give rise to critical global problems (dictatorship, genocide, war, social oppression such as sexism, racism, classism).
A usable theory of power should empower those who are traditionally powerless and redefine power relationally (not as a fixed possession of dominants).
Sharp’s contribution is twofold: (i) classification of nearly two hundred types of non-violent direct action, making invisible history visible; (ii) a pluralist, relational view of power that contrasts with a monolithic view.
Sharp’s pluralist view defines social power as the capacity to control the behavior of others through group action that affects other groups; political power is the form of social power used for political objectives, involving government or opposition to government (pp. 7–8, in Sharp’s works).
He locates external sources of power in society, the so‑called loci of power (six loci), which are the mechanisms through which those without power can influence those in authority.
A key claim: obedience and submission are the heart of political power; obedience is voluntary and consent to governance is the norm, even under totalitarian regimes (though fear can complicate this).
Consent is withdrawable; withdrawal of consent is a method for disadvantaged groups to challenge power, particularly in the non-violent action framework.
Implications of power-as-consent:
Human agency is foregrounded (an actor-model of social interaction; subjects choose to obey or disobey).
Assumes some shared political culture/values; requires common experiences of power for broad withdrawal of consent.
Suggests power can be redefined to achieve instrumental ends without radical social restructuring (McGuinness cites Summy [1983] on this point).
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2. Gene Sharp's Theory of Power (continued)
Sharp is a key theorist on non-violence, systematizing non-violent action and elaborating a theory of power that supports non-violent change.
Sharp distinguishes two views of political power: a monolithic view (power resides in the state and those who enforce sanctions/violence) and a pluralist view (power as relational, residing in social channels and the behaviors of many groups).
Sharp’s definition of social power: the capacity to control the behavior of others, directly or indirectly, through action by groups of people, which impinges on other groups of people. Political power is the form of social power wielded for political objectives, especially by governmental institutions or by people in opposition to or in support of such institutions. This definition emphasizes external sources of power (“loci of power”) and the need for cooperation/obedience to realize power.
Because power is not inherent in leaders, Sharp locates power in external social sources; the control of power depends on obedience and cooperation of others. The famous assertion: “The most important single quality of any government, without which it would not exist, must be obedience and submission of its subjects. Obedience is the heart of political power” (Sharp, 1973, p. 16).
Consent, when given, can be withdrawn (Sharp, 1973, pp. 30–31). The withdrawal of consent creates a tangible mechanism to resist abuses (dictatorship, genocide, war, oppression).
Implications of Sharp’s view:
Strong human agency in politics; an actor-centered model rather than a strictly structural perspective.
Assumes some level of shared political culture/values to enable broad consent and broad withdrawal of consent.
Suggests power can be redirected or redefined for instrumental purposes without necessarily transforming the entire system.
McGuinness foreshadows three critiques that she will develop in the feminist critique: lack of structural analysis, empirical concerns about consent-based power, and gender bias in assuming universal applicability of consent.
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3. A Feminist Critique of Consent
McGuinness foregrounds several lines of critique:
Sharp’s theory lacks a structural analysis that would reveal how power operates within patriarchal systems.
The empirical base of consent-based power can be questioned (Lipsitz & Kritzer; Summy cite limitations and alternative power dynamics).
A central critique: Sharp’s theory does not account for women’s experiences of power in patriarchy, even though women have engaged in non-violent resistance that does not rely on withdrawing consent (e.g., feminist processes of consciousness-raising).
The overall claim: consent-based power is not a universal descriptor for power relations, especially in gender relations where patriarchy structures power in ways not reducible to consent/withdrawal.
The analysis proceeds in three moves: (1) place Sharp in the social contract tradition; (2) apply Lipsitz & Kritzer to gender relations, drawing on Guillaumin (appropriation of women’s bodies) and Kelly (feminist theory of sexual violence); (3) contrast shared political culture with feminist insights from Gilligan and Margolis about women’s experiences and moral/power schemas.
3.1 Consent and the Social Contract
Sharp’s work is linked to social contract theory (Rousseau, Hobbes, Machiavelli, Montesquieu). The core contractarian question: how can government by one man be legitimate if, in the natural condition, all men are born free and equal? The answer in social contract theory is that political rights arise through agreement.
Pateman’s The Sexual Contract (1988) challenges the idea that civil society is the full story of political rights; she argues that the social contract is incomplete without the sexual contract, which is rooted in gendered arrangements that maintain patriarchy.
Pateman argues that women are not fully constituted individuals in civil society; political rights depend on a prior sexual contract and marriage, which preserves private, conjugal rights and reproduces patriarchy. This means consent to governance is not a universal or neutral act for women; it is socially structured within a patriarchal private sphere.
Implication for Sharp: if women are not fully constituted as individuals, then the notion that political consent underwrites power is fundamentally limited for understanding gender relations. Women may resist through action that does not withdraw male consent in the public sphere; they may engage in feminist processes that do not rely on withdrawal of consent.
McGuinness notes that Sharp’s willingness to assume universal consent is biased by gendered assumptions and fails to recognize different social constructions of reality for women.
3.2 Consent and the Aims of the Ruler
Lipsitz and Kritzer (1975) critique Sharp by asking whether consent is always necessary, depending on a ruler’s aims. They propose two situations where power may not require consent:
A ruler may desire to control resources or territory rather than persuade or govern people directly (e.g., colonization where the ruler wants land or resources and can displace or kill inhabitants without relying on their cooperation).
In densely populated areas, an occupier can command enough manpower to control a population without the cooperation of the indigenous population.
The point for gender relations: even if a subjugated group withdraws the consent of a ruler’s supporters, this does not necessarily imply the withdrawal of consent by the group that is being governed. In gender relations, similar logic suggests that consent-based power may not capture the core dynamics of patriarchy where the primary form of oppression concerns control over women’s bodies, labor, and sexual life.
McGuinness argues that these critiques help illuminate similarities in gender relations: there are forms of power that do not rely on women’s consent or cooperation, particularly in contexts of appropriation and violence.
3.2.1 The Appropriation of Women
Colette Guillaumin’s analysis (1981) centers on the appropriation of women’s bodies in patriarchy, a concept she terms sexage. This process occurs on four concrete levels:
The appropriation of women’s time;
The appropriation of the products of their bodies (children, labor power);
Sexual obligation or physical use by men; and
The physical charge of disabled members and care for healthy male members.
Guillaumin identifies five means by which men appropriate women: in the labor market, through spatial confinement, display of force, sexual constraint, and law and customary rights.
Women are defined as natural objects within the system of sexage, which obscures the social construction of oppression. If patriarchy aims at appropriation rather than control, this parallels Lipsitz & Kritzer’s first critique and challenges Sharp’s emphasis on consent as the sole mechanism of power in gender relations.
This perspective suggests that men can exercise power over women without women’s consent and that this power is rooted in social structures, institutions, and gendered bodies.
3.2.2 Sufficient Manpower
In gender relations, there is a high ratio of men to women globally, giving the impression that men have enough manpower to control women without relying on women’s consent.
Liz Kelly’s feminist theory of sexual violence provides a key context: sexual violence serves as a mechanism of social control over women and supports male dominance. Kelly’s continuum of sexual violence includes an eleven-category spectrum from threats and harassment to rape and incest, illustrating how pervasive threats and acts of violence shape women’s behavior.
The continuum highlights the pervasive social control of women and shows that consent is not a reliable organizing principle for understanding the power dynamics in gender relations.
The discussion also notes that precise numbers are difficult to establish (due to underreporting, definitional shifts, and state complicity), but even conservative estimates show significant male advantage in power dynamics.
Roberts’ statistics (1984) are cited as provocative but contested: she proposed a one-to-one correspondence between attackers and victims, leading to estimates like 55–65% of males as assailants; McGuinness notes this as an illustration rather than a precise empirical claim.
Overall, the argument is that even if not all men support patriarchy, the structural benefits to men as a group persist, and concentrating on individual agency risks obscuring the structural advantages that patriarchy confers.
Some men resist patriarchy (anti-discrimination campaigns, anti-rape campaigns, caregiving roles). If such resistance is framed as a withdrawal of consent, it would attribute the change to men rather than to the women who experience oppression; this reinforces the need to center women’s experiences when evaluating power.
3.3 Consent and Shared Political Culture
Sharp’s theory relies on the idea of a shared political culture enabling both consent and withdrawal of consent across a population.
McGuinness notes potential problems with shared political culture in gender relations: patriarchy constructs masculine and feminine identities as near-opposites with different value assignments, limiting shared understandings of problems and solutions. Gilligan’s work on women’s moral voice (1982) and Margolis (1989) on social patterns support this claim.
3.3.1 A Different Moral Voice (Gilligan)
Gilligan argues that traditional psychological theories (Freud, Piaget, Kohlberg) depict women as lagging in moral development, portraying women as oriented toward care rather than universal justice.
Gilligan introduces the ethics of care versus the ethics of justice:
Ethics of care: morality grounded in responsibility and relationships; the self is defined in relation to others.
Ethics of justice: morality grounded in rights, impartial rules, and individual autonomy.
Sharp’s ethic is typically framed as an ethic of justice: power as control of resources, with rights-based claims to sources of power and an emphasis on consent as the mechanism to balance claims.
The ethical difference suggests that Sharp’s abstract framework may miss women’s experiential moral reasoning and relational contexts, challenging the presumption of a shared political culture capable of sustaining consent-based power in gender relations.
3.3.2 Different Social Patterns (Margolis, 1989)
Diane Rothbard Margolis describes three social systems that reflect different moral orientations and power patterns: exchange, placing, and pooling.
Exchange: resources as commodities; power is about scarcity and self-interest; individuals exchange control of power for favorable governance.
Placing: resources as social positions; power tied to positions and the claims that accompany them (care work, motherhood, etc.); includes obligations to dependents.
Pooling: resources valued for the common good; contributions are not tied to particular individuals; power is embedded in solidarity and collective action.
Margolis argues that power can be legitimate through consensus but is not uniform across the three systems. She stresses the role of naming and identity in constituting power dynamics (the power to define boundaries and identities).
Relationship to Sharp: Margolis shows that three distinct social patterns produce different forms of power and different mechanisms for achieving legitimacy, often not compatible with Sharp’s universal consent framework.
In particular, placing (care-focused) is poorly aligned with Sharp’s exchange-based, consent-driven model, because the power relations in placing rely on social obligations and care responsibilities that do not easily map onto voluntary consent or withdrawal of consent.
Margolis also emphasizes that knowledge and social roles (e.g., nurturing and care) can become barriers to power rather than sources of empowerment for those in dependent positions, challenging Sharp’s premise that power comes from control of sources (including knowledge).
Overall, Margolis demonstrates that Sharp’s universal consent model fails to account for diverse social forms and power configurations, especially those central to women’s lived experiences.
Page 4 (and beyond): Conclusion and Limitations
4. Conclusion
4.1 Limitations to Analysis
McGuinness acknowledges several limitations of her feminist critique:
The analysis focuses narrowly on consent in power, potentially neglecting how consent operates in gender relations in ways not captured by Sharp’s framework.
The use of Sharp’s framework may constrain the development of feminist theories by anchoring analysis to Sharp’s assumptions about power.
She uses broad categories (women, men) that gloss over diversity within groups; there is a tension between analytic coherence and acknowledging diverse experiences.
The aim is not to propose a complete replacement theory but to identify essential inadequacies in Sharp’s account for gender relations and to argue for incorporating women’s everyday experiences into power theories.
4.2 Summary
Sharp’s usable theory of power provides a valuable historical and practical contribution to non-violent action but fails to account adequately for gender relations under patriarchy.
McGuinness argues Sharp’s theory is male-biased, because it centers consent and collective withdrawal as the main lever of change, while ignoring structural oppression and women’s lived experiences.
Feminist theorists (Pateman, Guillaumin, Kelly, Gilligan, Margolis) offer frameworks that highlight the social construction of power, the appropriation of women’s bodies, sexual violence as a tool of social control, and divergent moral patterns that cannot be reduced to a single, universal notion of consent.
The concluding judgment is that Sharp’s theory, while historically important and useful for understanding non-violent action, does not provide a robust account of power in gender relations or an effective method for dismantling patriarchy.
McGuinness ultimately emphasizes the need to ground theories of power in the lived experiences of the oppressed, drawing on Nancy Hartsock’s argument that oppressed perspectives constitute world-views rather than mere margins of dominant discourse.
The article closes with a firm stance: Sharp’s theory is inadequate for gender relations, and a feminist approach offers essential insights for understanding and transforming power in patriarchy.
Key References (selected)
Pateman, Carole. The Sexual Contract (1988) – central to the social vs. sexual contract distinction; women’s lack of full civil status.
Guillaumin, Colette. The Practice of Power and Belief in Nature, Part I: The Appropriation of Women (1981) – sexage; four levels of appropriation; five means of appropriation.
Kelly, Liz. Surviving Sexual Violence (1988) – continuum of sexual violence (eleven categories).
Gilligan, Carol. In a Different Voice (1982) – ethics of care vs ethics of justice; gendered moral development.
Margolis, Diane Rothbard. Considering Women’s Experience: A Reformulation of Power Theory (1989) – exchange, placing, pooling; power to name; normative consensus and identity formation.
Lipsitz, Lewis & Kritzer, Herbert. Unconventional Approaches to Conflict Resolution (1975) – critiques of consent-based models; invasion/occupation examples (one-to-ten ratio in Norway).
Roberts, Barbara. The Death of Machothink (1984) – provocative estimates of violence against women; cautions about one-to-one counts.
McGuinness, Kate. Gene Sharp's Theory of Power: A Feminist Critique of Consent (Journal of Peace Research, 1993) – the present synthesis and critique.
Note: Page-by-page structure in this set of notes follows the major sections and subsections of the transcript. Numerical references are presented in LaTeX-compatible format where appropriate (e.g., $200$, $6$, $11$, $1:1$, $1:10$, etc.). The notes capture key arguments, counterarguments, and implications, along with the connections to foundational feminist theory and to Sharp’s non-violent action framework.
Gene Sharp's Theory of Power
Sharp defines power not as a monolithic possession but as a plural, relational set of social powers.
Social power is the capacity to control the behavior of others through group action affecting other groups.
Political power is a form of social power used for political objectives, involving government or opposition.
He identifies external sources of power in society, called loci of power, which allow those without formal authority to influence those in power.
A core assertion is that obedience and submission are the heart of political power, and obedience is largely voluntary, implying consent to governance.
This consent is withdrawable, providing a key mechanism for disadvantaged groups to challenge power, especially in non-violent action.
Implications of this view include foregrounding human agency, assuming a shared political culture, and suggesting that power can be redefined without needing radical social restructuring.
McGuinness's Feminist Critique of Sharp's Theory of Power
Central Aim: To evaluate if Sharp’s theory of power, grounded in consent, can effectively analyze and alter gender oppression.
Overall Conclusion: Sharp’s theory is of limited value for characterizing power in gender relations or for altering patriarchy; it is male-biased and fails to account for women’s experiences.
McGuinness organizes her critique into three main points:
Critique based on Pateman’s argument about women’s status in civil society:
Sharp's work is linked to social contract theory, which posits political rights arise through agreement (consent).
Carole Pateman’s The Sexual Contract ($1988$) argues that the social contract is incomplete without a prior sexual contract, rooted in gendered arrangements that maintain patriarchy.
Pateman contends that women are not fully constituted individuals in civil society; their political rights are structured by patriarchal gender arrangements like marriage.
Implication for Sharp: If women are not fully free individuals, then their consent to governance is not a universal or neutral act, fundamentally limiting Sharp's consent-based power model for understanding gender relations.
Critique based on Lipsitz & Kritzer concerning the aims of the ruler:
Lipsitz and Kritzer (1975) argue that power may not always require consent, especially if a ruler’s aim is to control resources/territory or if they possess sufficient manpower to control a population without their cooperation.
Application to Gender Relations:
The Appropriation of Women (Colette Guillaumin's sexage): Guillaumin (1981) describes sexage as the appropriation of women’s bodies on four levels: their time, products of their bodies (children, labor), sexual obligation, and physical charge of disabled/male members. This form of power, focused on appropriation, does not rely on women's consent, directly challenging Sharp’s emphasis.
Sufficient Manpower (Liz Kelly's theory of sexual violence): The pervasive male-to-female ratio gives the impression that men can control women without relying on their consent. Liz Kelly’s (1988) continuum of sexual violence (encompassing categories from harassment to rape) illustrates how widespread threats and acts of violence shape women’s behavior and serve as social control. This demonstrates that consent is not a reliable organizing principle for power dynamics in gender relations, as structural benefits to men persist regardless of individual women's consent.
Critique regarding shared political culture:
Sharp’s theory relies on the premise of a shared political culture necessary for collective consent and its withdrawal.
McGuinness, drawing on Gilligan and Margolis, argues that patriarchy constructs masculine and feminine identities as near-opposites, limiting shared understandings of social and political issues.
A Different Moral Voice (Carol Gilligan): Gilligan (1982) proposes an ethics of care (grounded in responsibility and relationships, often associated with women) versus an ethics of justice (based on rights and impartial rules, aligned with Sharp’s framework). This ethical difference suggests Sharp’s abstract framework misses women’s experiential moral reasoning and relational contexts, thus challenging the assumption of a shared political culture.
Different Social Patterns (Diane Rothbard Margolis): Margolis (1989) describes three distinct social systems: exchange (Sharp’s model fits here, power based on scarcity and self-interest), placing (power tied to social positions and obligations, like care work), and pooling (power in solidarity for common good). Margolis shows that power and legitimacy differ across these systems. The critique highlights the need to reconsider the dynamics of power and consent, emphasizing that traditional models may exclude or undervalue women's contributions and perspectives, which are often rooted in relational and context-specific experiences.
In particular, placing (care-focused) is poorly aligned with Sharp’s exchange-based, consent-driven model, because the power relations in placing rely on social obligations and care responsibilities that do not easily map onto voluntary consent or withdrawal of consent.
Margolis also emphasizes that knowledge and social roles (e.g., nurturing and care) can become barriers to power rather than sources of empowerment for those in dependent positions, challenging Sharp’s premise that power comes from control of sources (including knowledge).
Overall, Margolis demonstrates that Sharp’s universal consent model fails to account for diverse social forms and power configurations, especially those central to women’s lived experiences.
Page 4 (and beyond): Conclusion and Limitations
4. Conclusion
4.1 Limitations to Analysis
McGuinness acknowledges several limitations of her feminist critique:
The analysis focuses narrowly on consent in power, potentially neglecting how consent operates in gender relations in ways not captured by Sharp’s framework.
The use of Sharp’s framework may constrain the development of feminist theories by anchoring analysis to Sharp’s assumptions about power.
She uses broad categories (women, men) that gloss over diversity within groups; there is a tension between analytic coherence and acknowledging diverse experiences.
The aim is not to propose a complete replacement theory but to identify essential inadequacies in Sharp’s account for gender relations and to argue for incorporating women’s everyday experiences into power theories.
4.2 Summary
Sharp’s usable theory of power provides a valuable historical and practical contribution to non-violent action but fails to account adequately for gender relations under patriarchy.
McGuinness argues Sharp’s theory is male-biased, because it centers consent and collective withdrawal as the main lever of change, while ignoring structural oppression and women’s lived experiences.
Feminist theorists (Pateman, Guillaumin, Kelly, Gilligan, Margolis) offer frameworks that highlight the social construction of power, the appropriation of women’s bodies, sexual violence as a tool of social control, and divergent moral patterns that cannot be reduced to a single, universal notion of consent.
The concluding judgment is that Sharp’s theory, while historically important and useful for understanding non-violent action, does not provide a robust account of power in gender relations or an effective method for dismantling patriarchy.
McGuinness ultimately emphasizes the need to ground theories of power in the lived experiences of the oppressed, drawing on Nancy Hartsock’s argument that oppressed perspectives constitute world-views rather than mere margins of dominant discourse.
The article closes with a firm stance: Sharp’s theory is inadequate for gender relations, and a feminist approach offers essential insights for understanding and transforming power in patriarchy.