2 Problems for Motivational Judgment Externalism

Definitions & Key Theories

Motivational-Judgment Internalism (MJI)
- Thesis: Whenever a person sincerely holds the moral judgment “I ought to do a,” that very judgment is — of itself — at least normally a source of motivation to do a.
Motivational-Judgment Externalism (MJE)
- Denies MJI.
- A moral judgment can exist without producing motivation; any motivation must arise from some distinct, external state (e.g.
  a desire, inclination, commitment).
Cognitivism
- Moral thoughts are ordinary belief states that represent the world as having moral properties (―“Murder is wrong” represents murder as having the property wrongness).
- Because beliefs are representational, not conative, they do not inherently motivate; thus cognitivists tend to be externalists.

Internalist picture
1. Non-cognitivist variant: moral judgments are desire-like states.
2. Cognitivist-internalist variant: moral judgments produce corresponding desires.
Externalist picture
- Moral judgment = belief;
- Motivation must stem from a separate desire (e.g. a desire “to do what I ought”).

Function of belief (cognitive state): represent facts; truth-apt.
Function of desire (conative state): motivate, guide action.
Externalists insist these functions stay separate; internalists blur or bridge them.

Reliable Change Fact (RCF):
“In a good & strong-willed person, a change in moral judgment is reliably and immediately followed by a corresponding change in motivation.”
Empirical-seeming regularity calling for explanation.

Abe (good + strong-willed) judges: “I ought to leave for the movie promptly.” → Motivation: go to movie.
Arrives; Beth is grieving. Abe revises judgment: “I ought to stay and comfort Beth.” → Motivation flips to stay.

Observed transition: \text{Judgment}1 \to \text{Judgment}2 \Rightarrow \text{Motivation}1 \to \text{Motivation}2

Non-cognitivist route
- Judgment = desire-like state.
- Change in judgment just is a change in desire; RCF follows necessarily.
Desire-Generating route
- Judgment produces a matching desire.
- When the judgment changes, the generated desire changes.
- Again, RCF is predicted.

Externalist must posit an antecedent general desire: D = “to do whatever I judge I ought to do.”
RCF explained as:
\text{Belief}(\text{ought}) + D \Rightarrow \text{Motivation}
Smith’s Critique:
- Having an omnipresent D makes the agent look like she possesses a moral fetish — an obsessive, indiscriminate urge to conform to perceived duty, rather than genuine concern for people (e.g. Abe’s care for Beth).
- Therefore explanation is psychologically implausible / unattractive.

P_1 (RCF): In good + strong-willed agents, judgment change reliably ⇒ motivation change.
P2: The best explanation of P1 is that Internalism is true (because it predicts RCF without positing a fetishistic desire).
\therefore Internalism is true ⇒ Externalism false.

Self-Knowledge Fact (SKF):
“A rational agent can come to knowledge (not mere belief) of her own motivations via the Transparency Method.”

Rational Requirement (RR) example:
If you will an end G and believe action S is necessary for G, rationality requires intending S.
Rational person: habitually disposed to satisfy such RRs (e.g. avoids contradictory beliefs, forms means/ends intentions).

Instead of introspecting directly, the agent looks through her mental states to the relevant subject matter, forms a judgment, then infers her own state.
1. For beliefs: Observe world → judge proposition p true → thereby know “I believe p.”
2. For motivations: Deliberate about options → judge “I ought to a” → thereby know “I am motivated to a.”

Non-cognitivist: Judgment “I ought to a” is a desire; knowledge follows because judgment assures motivation.
Desire-Generating: Judgment reliably creates the matching desire; high reliability → knowledge (error possibility minimal).

To explain knowledge, externalists must show that a rational agent likely has a matching desire whenever she judges she ought.
But MJE offers no account of rational psychology guaranteeing (or even making probable) such harmony.
Hence, as things stand, externalism lacks a satisfactory explanation of SKF.

Q_1 (SKF): Rational agents gain motivational self-knowledge via TM.
Q2: Best explanation of Q1 is Internalism (due to tight judgment-motivation link).
\therefore Internalism true ⇒ Externalism false.

Reliable Change
• Internalism: straightforward, no exotic desires.
• Externalism: requires “do-what-I-ought” desire → moral fetish worry.
Self-Knowledge
• Internalism: guarantees or highly secures alignment of judgment & motivation, legitimizing knowledge via TM.
• Externalism: lacks story; knowledge would appear accidental.

Externalists might salvage their view by positing a desire-like component built into rationality itself (e.g. a standing disposition to act on recognized reasons that is not fetishistic).
Philosophers have sketched such replies, but detailed development deferred to future discussion.

MJI / MJE – Internalism / Externalism about motivation.
Cognitivism – Moral judgments are beliefs.
Non-cognitivism – Moral judgments are desire-like.
Good agent – Morally concerned about others.
Strong-willed – Resolute in pursuing decided ends.
Rational Requirement – Norm linking ends, means, consistency, etc.
Transparency Method – Epistemic route: determine fact about world/ought → infer own state.
Moral Fetish – Alleged pathology of being motivated solely by “rightness” abstractly.

Reliable Change Argument
\begin{aligned}
&P1: \text{RCF} \ &P2: \text{Best explanation of }RCF\;=\;\text{MJI} \
&\therefore \; MJI\;\text{true}\;\land\;MJE\;\text{false}
\end{aligned}
Self-Knowledge Argument
\begin{aligned}
&Q1: \text{SKF} \ &Q2: \text{Best explanation of }SKF\;=\;\text{MJI} \
&\therefore \; MJI\;\text{true}\;\land\;MJE\;\text{false}
\end{aligned}