Securitization, Just War Tradition, and International Security Theories Notes

Securitization Theory and the Social Construction of Security

  • Definition and Construction of Security:     * Securitization theory posits that there is no fixed, set definition of security. Instead, security is a social construction.     * The Actors of Construction:         * Security issues are made, not born. This process is driven by actors with political power, primarily governments.         * Non-government actors also play a critical role. These include individuals or organizations with "strong voices" capable of convincing those in power that a specific phenomenon constitutes a security threat.         * Examples of such influential actors include military-industrial councils, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and various lobbying organizations. These groups argue that specific issues should be prioritized and granted increased funding.

  • The Process of Norm Diffusion and Securitization:     * Securitization follows the path of "norm diffusion" found in constructivist theory.     * Norm Entrepreneurs: These are actors who seek to raise an issue onto the agendas of policymakers. They attempt to push leadership into adopting and agreeing with a new norm or framing.     * Methodology of Securitization:         * A norm entrepreneur wanting more attention or funding for an issue will shift their rhetoric, framing the topic specifically as a "security issue."         * This messaging is pushed toward policymakers using money, influence, voice, sway, and political connections.         * If successful, the message is repeated until it reaches a "tipping point" in the "norm cascade," where the majority of stakeholders adopt the "security issue bandwagon."

  • Internalization of Security Norms:     * The final stage is internalization, where the issue is officially codified as a security threat.     * Evidence of internalization includes:         * Including the issue in official national security plans.         * Establishing or tasking an agency with "security" in its name to handle the issue.         * Using security-based funding streams and reports to talk about and pay for programs related to that issue.     * This bureaucratic shift moves power and money to deal with specific issues based entirely on their social construction as "security."

Just War Tradition: Jus ad Bellum (Justice Before War)

  • Latin Foundations:     * Jus ad bellum refers to the justice of going to war (the right to go to war).     * Jus in bello refers to justice in the conduct of war (how the war is fought).

  • Principles of Jus ad Bellum:     * Just Cause: There must be a valid reason for war. This typically includes:         * Direct self-defense against an attack.         * Defending a friend or ally who is being attacked.         * Responding to an imminent attack.     * Standard of Preemption vs. Prevention:         * Preemptive Attacks: Considered just because they respond to an attack that is literally about to happen (verifiably imminent).         * Preventive Attacks: Considered unjust because they attempt to stop a future threat that cannot be proven to be literally imminent.     * Right Authority: Traditionally, the power to declare war lies with a head of state (or historically, figures like the Pope).         * UN Charter Expansion: The UN Charter builds on this by suggesting a head of state should seek the agreement of the international community to ensure a war is not declared unjustly without consequences.         * Multilateralism: An emerging norm suggests that a head of state needs the approval of the international community to truly possess "right authority."     * Probability of Success: A state must have a reasonable belief that they have a chance to succeed. Entering a war without hope of winning is viewed as getting people killed for no reason.     * Official Declaration: The right authority must declare war in an official manner. (Note: This is rarely followed today due to domestic legal barriers, such as in the U.S. system, which restrict official declarations).     * Last Resort: War must only occur after exhausting all non-violent options.         * Practical Critique: The speaker uses the metaphor of keys being in the "last place you look"—once you start a war, you stop looking for other options. Critically, there are almost always other creative options available if states are willing to try them, leading to the argument that war technically can never reach a true "last resort" state.

Just War Tradition: Jus in Bello (Justice in War)

  • Principles of Ethical Conduct:     * Discrimination: Combatants must distinguish between combatants and non-combatants.         * Attackers must only target combatants.         * Combatants who have surrendered, are ill or injured, or are already imprisoned (Prisoners of War) must not be attacked.         * This principle has expanded into international human rights law regarding the prohibition of torture, fair treatment of POWs, and the protection of medical entities like the Red Cross.     * Military Necessity: Attacks must target locations that provide a specific military advantage for winning the war.         * Targets with no military purpose, such as purely civilian areas, should not be attacked.         * Historical Debate: The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are cited. Critics argue they were civilian targets. Defenders argue "military necessity" based on contemporary estimates that continuing the war could have resulted in approximately 5,000,0005,000,000 additional deaths over five more years of conflict.     * Proportionality: The scale of the response must be reasonable in relation to the initial attack.         * Example: A minor border skirmish does not justify the total destruction of an entire country.         * Since just cause is usually based on a known or imminent scale of attack, the defensive response should not be vastly out of proportion.

Just War Tradition: Jus post Bellum (Justice After War)

  • The Emerging Third Category:     * Jus post bellum focuses on justice after the conflict ends.     * Key questions include:         * How do we end the war justly?         * How do we rebuild after the war?         * How is justice and accountability achieved for crimes committed during the war?     * This is highly relevant to humanitarian interventions, civil wars, mediation efforts, and transitional justice programs. It moves beyond the idea that the international community ceases to care once the fighting stops.

Crimes Against Humanity and the International Criminal Court (ICC)

  • Core Categories Governed by the ICC:     * Genocide: A separate, distinct category.     * Crimes Against Humanity: Specifically grouped by the ICC into four main clusters:         1. Ethnic Cleansing.         2. Mass Murder (Mass, civilian atrocity).         3. Mass Deportation or Enslavement.         4. Sexual Violence.     * Other Noted Crimes: War crimes (which encompass many actions) and Torture (if widespread).

  • The Rome Statute Checklist of Crimes Against Humanity:     * A broader list includes: Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, force transfer, imprisonment or severe deprivation of physical liberty, torture, sexual violence, and others.

  • Genocide Definition:     * Protected Groups: Genocide applies only to acts committed against four specific categories:         1. National groups.         2. Ethnic groups.         3. Racial groups.         4. Religious groups.     * Excluded Groups: Political groups and gender are notably not covered under the legal definition of genocide.     * Methods of Genocide:         * Killing members of the group.         * Causing serious bodily or mental harm.         * Deliberately inflicting conditions calculated to bring about physical destruction (e.g., starvation).         * Imposing measures to prevent births.         * Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.     * The Intent Requirement: Critical to the definition is the "intent to destroy in whole or in part" that specific group. Proving intent is difficult because, while groups like the Nazis explicitly stated their intent, modern groups rarely record such intentions after the signing of international treaties.

Theoretical Paradigms: Liberalisms

  • International Relations (IR) Liberalism:     * Focuses on how sovereign countries can cooperate despite international anarchy.     * Relies on international institutions and law to govern behavior and reduce "transaction costs" of cooperation.     * Emphasizes treaties and the organizations created to enforce them.     * Promotes economic interdependence as a means to reduce conflict and increase human security by transferring higher human rights standards through global coordination.

  • Classical Liberalism:     * Primarily an economic theory regarding the "free market."     * Emphasizes the "invisible hand," competition, and finding equilibrium between supply and demand to lower prices and increase food quality.

  • Neoliberalism:     * An economic theory updated in the 1970s and 1980s to enforce classical philosophies through political and economic rules.     * Four to Five Main Tenants:         1. Lowering taxes (especially corporate taxes).         2. Reducing government regulations.         3. Reducing public spending.         4. Increasing free trade and reducing trade barriers.         5. Making international monetary transactions free and open.     * Enforced globally through the World Trade Organization (WTO) and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) like the IMF via "conditionalities" and structural investment programs. Critics argue this often helps multinational corporations at the expense of local populations.

  • Policy Models:     * Washington Consensus: Neoliberalism written into foreign aid policy. It requires free-market capitalism, low taxes, and low regulation as conditions for aid and loans.     * Beijing Consensus: Emphasizes state sovereignty and non-interference. It provides loans and aid without conditions on domestic policy, hoping to build long-term loyalty and reliance on the donor state (China).

Economic Insecurity and Poverty

  • Forms of Insecurity:     * Unemployment: High unemployment, specifically among young men, is a risk factor for organized crime, petty crime, and eventually armed conflict due to economic grievances.     * Generalized Poverty: Poverty rates and lines are measured and change over time.     * Intervention Critique: Declaring a "war on poverty" is often unhelpful because the victims of poverty are often targeted as if they are responsible for their situation, when 99%99\% of the time they are not.

Peacekeeping and Transitional Justice

  • Four Types of Peacekeeping:     1. Traditional Peacekeeping: Standing between two armies and telling them to stop shooting.     2. Interpositional Peacekeeping: Standing on a clear, established border to ensure neither side crosses or shoots (e.g., India and Pakistan border).     3. Multi-dimensional Peacekeeping: Modern approach used in civil wars. Includes standard peacekeeping plus election monitoring, securing aid corridors, rebuilding tasks, and capacity building for local military.     4. Peace Enforcement: Includes the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Historically used but currently failing or not in common use.

  • Transitional Justice Mechanisms:     * Truth Commissions: Fact-finding investigations that produce reports on crimes and perpetrators without necessarily leading to immediate trials.     * Criminal Tribunals: Can be domestic, international (ICC), or internationally-supported domestic trials.     * Community-based Reconciliation: Found in Rwanda (Gacaca courts). These involve local, non-official trials focused on talking through experiences, accountability, and forgiveness.     * Arts and Culture: Using dance, music, theater, or visual art to express communal trauma where words are insufficient.

Questions & Discussion: Security Council Simulation Review

  • Question (Student): What did we learn about the power of the veto in the simulation?     * Response: The veto power matters significantly. In the simulation, Russia might have vetoed a second resolution if they had realized what was being voted on. This mirrors reality where representatives in government often have not read the thousands of pages they are voting on, relying instead on staffers.
  • Question (Student): Why do people trust regional institutions over the UN?     * Response: The UN's universal nature means it includes countries one may not like or trust. Permanent members (the P5) hold veto power that can stall action. States like Sudan, when they are the target of a resolution but not on the council, have no voice in the solutions imposed on them. Regional organizations are seen as more legitimate by those involved.
  • Question (Student): Does being "called out" for hypocrisy actually happen at the UN?     * Response: Yes, particularly by smaller countries in formal speeches. While career diplomats (who must serve across different administrations) usually maintain professional reputations, political appointees are more likely to make "bombshell comments" or grandstand for a specific leader.
  • Question (Student/Observer): How do observer organizations like the WHO or EU feel in these meetings?     * Response: Observers often feel sidelined. Even though they may be the ones required to implement or fund a resolution (like the African Union or WHO), they lack a vote and their specific requirements (like the EU's request for ICC involvement) are often ignored by the voting nations who focus primarily on funding costs.