Detailed Study Notes on Michael Tooley's "Abortion and Infanticide"
INTRODUCTION
Collaborates with JSTOR to extend access to Philosophy & Public Affairs, a prominent journal for contemporary ethical and political thought.
Article by Michael Tooley titled "Abortion and Infanticide," published in the Autumn 1972 issue (Vol. 2, No. 1).
Dedicated to a rigorous philosophical examination of the morality of abortion and infanticide.
The central ethical claim challenged by Tooley is the widely held belief that human fetuses and infants possess a serious right to life.
ARGUMENT STRUCTURE
Tooley systematically discusses the essential properties an entity must possess to be granted a serious moral right to life.
He proposes a fundamental moral principle: for an organism to have a right to life, it must be capable of desiring to continue to exist as a subject of experiences and other mental states.
He concludes that since human fetuses and infants, especially newborns, do not meet this specific self-consciousness condition, abortion and infanticide may not be inherently immoral and could even be morally permissible under certain circumstances.
This position poses significant questions about the moral indefensibility in treating adult animals, such as cats and dogs, which may exhibit signs of self-awareness and a desire to live.
SECTION I: ABORTION AND INFANTICIDE
Examines the profound moral complexities surrounding both infanticide and its direct relation to abortion, highlighting the philosophical parallel between the two.
Highlights the inherent challenge of establishing a non-arbitrary and morally defensible cutoff point in human development for when an organism gains significant moral consideration.
Example: It is difficult to distinguish morally between a very early zygote and a newborn baby, given the continuous, gradual process of human development from conception to birth.
Conservative's objection: Those who oppose abortion (conservatives) argue that proponents of abortion (liberals) must clearly illustrate morally relevant differences between a fetus and a newborn to justify different moral treatment.
This challenge is labeled as significant for both liberal and conservative positions, illustrating the difficulty in drawing a bright line.
Discusses plausible extreme views surrounding abortion that often frame the debate:
If a fetus is unequivocally considered a person with a right to life, its destruction is morally justified only in extreme circumstances, such as to save the mother's life.
Conversely, if a fetus is not considered a person, then no special justification is morally required for its destruction, treating it more like a part of the mother's body or a non-sentient entity.
Commends the direct study of infanticide as a topic because it uniquely provokes deep moral reflections and pushes philosophical boundaries, forcing us to confront fundamental questions about life and personhood.
Addresses strong emotional responses, often reminiscent of societal taboos like incest or cannibalism, but insists on a rational, principle-based ethical analysis.
SECTION II: TERMINOLOGY
Establishes a critical distinction between "person" and "human being" as fundamental to the argument.
"Person" is viewed by Tooley as a moral concept, directly equating to possessing a serious moral right to life, rather than a biological classification.
This diverges from common interpretations that might equate personhood simply with being a member of the human species or having certain biological features.
Discusses rights in the context of desires, proposing that having a right generally implies that others have obligations regarding those desires.
Defines a right as an assertion about specific obligations others have concerning the desires of the entity in question.
Analyzes implications via torture vs. murder scenarios: while one might have a right not to be tortured (implying a desire to avoid suffering), a being unable to fully conceive of its future or articulate a desire to live might still possess certain primitive rights, though perhaps not a full right to life.
Emphasizes that basic rights can exist even in the absence of complex desires, but the right to life specifically hinges on the capacity for a desire for continued conscious existence.
SECTION III: THE BASIC ISSUE
Questions what precise properties fundamentally define personhood and at what specific point a human organism can be justly considered a person with a right to life.
Argues forcefully that a serious right to life pertains centrally to the capacity for consciousness and, more specifically, self-conception—the ability to be aware of oneself as a continuing subject of experiences.
Contrasts a prevailing pessimism about definitively resolving abortion ethics against the theoretical possibilities proposed by a clear ethical framework.
Details the moral inadequacy inherent in conservative positions, primarily due to their failure to clearly articulate and justify the specific properties that genuinely confer a right to life beyond mere biological existence.
SECTION IV: CUT-OFF POINTS AND CRITIQUE
Tooley critically examines and rejects various traditionally proposed cut-off points for when a human organism supposedly gains a right to life, arguing each lacks sufficient moral relevance:
Conception: Implies rights from the moment an ovum is fertilized, treating a zygote as having the same moral status as an adult. Tooley rejects this as arbitrary and lacking a basis in conscious experience.
Formation of human-like characteristics: Suggests rights begin when the fetus develops recognizable human features. Tooley argues this is superficial and not tied to mental capacities.
Ability to move (quickening): Historically significant, but Tooley dismisses it as a merely physiological milestone, not indicative of moral personhood.
Viability: The point at which a fetus can survive outside the womb, even with medical aid. Tooley argues this is contingent on external technology and not an inherent property of the fetus conferring rights.
Birth: The actual moment of being born. Tooley contends that mere physiological independence or location (inside vs. outside the womb) does not inherently confer a right to life if the underlying psychological capacities are not yet present.
Argues against each of these points, citing a lack of intrinsic moral relevance and emphasizing the biological continuity of development which makes arbitrary cut-offs problematic.
Rejects mere physiological independence as a sufficient grounding for a right to life, asserting that moral status must be tied to mental attributes.
Briefly references Judith Jarvis Thomson's position, particularly her focus on maternal rights and bodily autonomy, suggesting that even if a fetus had a right to life, it might not automatically entail a right to use another person's body.
SECTION V: CHALLENGES TO CONSERVATIVE POSITION
Conservatism often claims personhood begins early in development based on the concept of developmental continuity – the idea that from conception, there is an unbroken chain leading to a human person.
Tooley argues this concept is misleading if it implies that the potential for certain psychological capacities is equivalent to their actual presence and the rights they confer.
Defenders of the conservative view often show an over-reliance on the potentiality argument, assuming that merely possessing the potential to develop into a person is sufficient for a right to life.
Tooley counters that rights are grounded in current capacities, not future potential; a potential does not necessarily have the rights of an until it actually becomes one.
Another challenge relates to the conservative failure to establish a non-arbitrary criterion for personhood that is truly morally relevant and consistent across all stages of human development, from zygote to infant.
Tooley suggests that if the conservative position were to be taken to its logical conclusion, without a clear, morally relevant distinction for personhood, it would imply that a fertilized egg possesses the same rights as a fully developed adult, which he sees as intuitively problematic and lacking philosophical justification.
Let's discuss Michael Tooley's paper, "Abortion and Infanticide." Tooley squarely addresses the debate where the main issue is whether the fetus has a right to life. He is primarily interested in defining what constitutes a person and quickly states his criterion: "An organism possesses a serious right to life only if it possesses the concept of a self as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states and believes that it is itself such an organism." This fundamental idea implies that to be a person, one must perceive oneself as having a temporally unified set of experiences—essentially, one must think of oneself as a person to be one. To possess this capacity, one must be able to conceptualize oneself as a person.
The reason this feature marks personhood for Tooley is its intimate connection to the right to life. He argues that for something to have a right to X, it must desire X. For instance, if Jerry has a right not to have his property destroyed, that right is not violated if the property is destroyed with his consent, as he desired its destruction. This suggests that the obligation not to destroy Jerry's property stems from his desire that it not be destroyed. Applying this to the right to life, Tooley asserts that to have such a right, one must desire to continue the type of existence one currently has. Consequently, lacking this desire means one would not possess a right to life, and thus would not be a person in the moral sense Tooley examines. Fetuses and even infants, plausibly, cannot possess the desire to be a person because their desires are constrained by the concepts they hold. Just as one cannot desire aspects of topology without topological concepts, fetuses and infants lack the requisite concepts of existence or self to desire continued existence. Therefore, Tooley concludes that since fetuses and small infants are not persons, little justification is required for killing them. He uses the rhetorically charged example that they are on par with kittens, implying that killing kittens requires little justification.
Having explored Tooley's views on personhood and their implications for a liberal stance on abortion, we turn to the second part of his paper, where he considers alternative definitions of personhood. He examines five properties in Homo sapiens: conception, the attainment of human form, the ability to move spontaneously, viability, and birth. Tooley argues none of these features possess basic moral importance, presenting a dilemma. One could contend that only Homo sapiens with these properties have a right to life, which then necessitates an explanation for why Homo sapiens are special compared to other species that may exhibit similar properties. Alternatively, one could argue that all creatures with these features have a right to life, which would imply that animals such as cats, pigs, and dogs have a right to life equal to that of fetuses and young infants—a conclusion Tooley deems absurd. He expects opponents of abortion to embrace the first horn, requiring them to explain the special status of Homo sapiens.
Tooley specifically refutes viability and birth as cutoff points. He provides two cases: a fetus that has learned a language in the womb, arguing that physiological dependence does not negate a right to life; and Siamese twins who cannot survive separated, demonstrating that mutual dependence does not imply a lack of a right to life. He also rejects motility (the ability to move) as a criterion, stating it's neither a sufficient condition (as nearly all animals and even some machines could then have rights) nor a necessary one (paralyzed adults still possess a right to life). Therefore, any defender of motility would need to propose another necessary property, which is difficult to evaluate without further specification. The attainment of human form is similarly dismissed, as Tooley argues that other intelligent creatures could have a right to life without possessing a human form, and the form itself lacks intrinsic moral significance.
This leaves conception as a potential cutoff point. Tooley observes that conservatives often appeal to developmental continuity, arguing that from conception, a continuous process leads to a human person who clearly has a right to life. This places the burden on liberals to identify a morally relevant property that fetuses lack but fully-formed agents possess. However, Tooley notes a liberal rejoinder: conservatives have also failed to specify a morally relevant similarity between fetuses and fully-formed agents. To circumvent this, conservatives might propose the "Potentiality Principle": anything with the potential to develop into a being with a right to life through normal development already possesses that right. This principle avoids defining the specific property that confers a right to life, relying on the common agreement that fully-formed agents have rights and fetuses have the potential to become such agents through normal development.
Now, let's delve into Tooley’s critique of the Potentiality Principle itself. This principle asserts that merely having the potential for personhood is sufficient to warrant a right to life. If true, this significantly simplifies the abortion debate, as most fetuses are undeniably acknowledged to have the potential to become persons, thereby possessing a right to life. Tooley, however, presents a complex argument against this principle, leveraging what he calls the Moral Symmetry Principle. This principle states that in situations involving a causal process C leading to an outcome E, there is no morally relevant difference between refraining from initiating C (action A) and performing an action B that, with minimal effort, stops process C before outcome E obtains. For example, if pushing button 1 causes a slight pleasure in 60 seconds, and pushing button 2 within 59 seconds stops this process, the Moral Symmetry Principle suggests no moral difference between not pushing button 1 and pushing button 2 after button 1 has been pressed.
To apply this to the Potentiality Principle, Tooley asks us to imagine a future chemical that can transform cats into "super-cats"—agents with all the capacities of adult humans after a period of development. He posits that fully developed super-cats clearly have a right to life, while untreated cats do not. The question then arises: does a cat named Cuddles, injected with the chemical but not yet a super-cat, possess a right to life due to its potentiality? If the Potentiality Principle holds, then killing Cuddles at this stage would be wrong. However, the Moral Symmetry Principle implies otherwise. Killing Cuddles, the not-yet-super-cat, is an act of interfering with the causal process leading to super-cathood. This interference, according to the Moral Symmetry Principle, is morally equivalent to refraining from initiating the process altogether (i.e., not injecting the chemical into the cat in the first place). Tooley finds it intuitive that we are not morally obligated to transform all cats into super-cats. Thus, it is permissible to refrain from initiating the process. By the Moral Symmetry Principle, it then follows that it is permissible to interfere with the process, and since killing is a form of interference, killing the developing cats is permitted. This line of reasoning leads Tooley to conclude that the Potentiality Principle is false.
Applying analogous reasoning to fetuses, Tooley argues that it is permissible to refrain from initiating the causal process that would lead to personhood (e.g., refraining from fertilizing an egg). By the Moral Symmetry Principle, it must, therefore, also be permissible to interfere with the process that would lead to personhood through normal development (e.g., killing the fetus). Thus, Tooley concludes that killing a fetus is permitted. From Tooley's paper, two main conclusions emerge: first, his exacting definition of personhood, which demands self-conception, narrows the class of persons to exclude fetuses, supporting a liberal perspective on abortion. Second, his argument using the Moral Symmetry Principle effectively demonstrates that mere potentiality for personhood is insufficient to establish a right to life.