Moral Facts and Objective Morality

Harman emphasizes the distinction between natural/non-natural phenomena and objective scientific facts/moral facts.

Harman argues that observations are "theory-laden," influenced by pre-existing assumptions.
Example: Ancient astronomers and Venus
- Observed Venus in the morning, calling it the "Morning Star."
- Observed Venus in the evening, calling it the "Evening Star."
- They didn't realize they were observing the same object due to their astronomical theories.
- Theories colored their observations, leading to incorrect conclusions.
Later astronomers with different theories recognized the Morning Star and Evening Star as the same object (Venus).
Moral theories similarly influence our perception of right and wrong.
Different moral theories lead to different judgments about actions.

Harman poses the question: What differentiates ethics from science?
Scientific theories can be tested against the world.
Observations confirm a scientific theory (e.g., Venus being a single object) only if the theory is correct and the observations accurately reflect reality.
If observations can be explained solely by psychological facts about the observer, they don't provide evidence for the external reality.
Harman suggests a difference in how we make moral observations.

Example: Observing someone giving money to a person in need.
- We can describe the observable facts: Person A gives money to Person B. Person B is grateful. Person A appears willing.
- However, the observation doesn't inherently reveal whether the act is good, bad, or neutral.
Observations can be used to verify the occurrence of events (e.g., confirming that the money exchange is real and not a performance).
Observations cannot be used to test the moral value of the action.
If moral claims are merely reflections of our feelings (as Hume, Mackie, and Harman suggest), then there's no objective truth about right or wrong.

Subjective moral theories struggle to explain moral disagreement.
If morality is solely based on feelings, persuading someone with different feelings becomes impossible unless their feelings can be manipulated.
This raises the question: What is the point of moral discussions if they are just expressions of subjective feelings?

David Enoch argues that we can make sense of objective morality because we treat morality as objective in our discussions and disagreements.

Enoch compares disagreements about taste (e.g., chocolate) to disagreements about facts (e.g., climate change).
- Chocolate preference is subjective; climate change involves factual evidence and attempts to persuade based on evidence.
If moral discussions were entirely subjective, they would resemble disagreements about chocolate preference.
Example: Murder
- If morality is subjective, disagreeing about the morality of murder would be like disagreeing about pizza toppings.
- However, when we consider murder as wrong, we attempt to provide reasons, persuade, and convince others of our view.
Enoch emphasizes that disagreements on objective moral principles are not easily dismissed.
We are compelled to change others' minds using reasons, evidence and arguments.

Mackie uses moral disagreement as evidence for the subjectivity of moral claims.
Enoch uses the same fact to support the idea that we treat ethical views as objective.
If objective moral facts exist, why is there persistent disagreement compared to scientific matters?
Enoch attributes this to the lack of a well-established methodology for morality, unlike the scientific method.
Enoch proposes developing a similar methodology for testing moral principles.
This methodology involves proposing ethical principles/theories, conducting thought experiments, and evaluating arguments.

A concern with objective morality is the potential for intolerance.
- Believing in one correct moral answer might lead to intolerance towards differing views.
Enoch is less concerned, suggesting that tolerance itself might be objectively valuable.