Austin - How to Do Things with Words

J.L. Austin: How to Do Things with Words

The ideas presented are intended to be true and address a widespread phenomenon that has not received specific attention.
Traditional philosophical assumption: the purpose of a 'statement' is solely to 'describe' a state of affairs or 'state some fact', which must be either true or false.
Grammarians recognize that not all sentences are statements; there are questions, exclamations, commands, wishes, and concessions.
It's difficult to distinguish these categories using grammatical markers like word order or mood.

In recent years, things accepted as 'statements' have been scrutinized with care.
The idea that a statement of fact ought to be 'verifiable' led to the view that many statements are pseudo-statements.
Some statements are strictly nonsense despite grammatical correctness, as argued by Kant.
Many utterances that look like statements are not intended to record or impart straightforward information.
'Ethical propositions' may be intended to evoke emotion, prescribe conduct, or influence it.
Words in descriptive statements may indicate the circumstances of the statement, reservations, or how it should be taken.
Overlooking these possibilities is the 'descriptive' fallacy.
Not all true or false statements are descriptions; term 'Constative' is preferred.
Philosophical perplexities arise from taking utterances as straightforward statements of fact when they are nonsensical or intended as something different.
These views are producing a revolution in philosophy.

The type of utterance is not nonsense but masquerades as something else.
It commonly masquerades as a statement of fact, descriptive or constative, even in its most explicit form.
Study it in this misleading form to contrast it with statements of fact.
The utterances considered fall into the grammatical category of 'statement', are not nonsense, and do not contain verbal danger signals.
These utterances do not 'describe' or 'report' anything and are not 'true or false'.
Uttering the sentence is part of doing an action, not merely saying something.

(E. a) 'I do (sc. take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife)' as uttered in the course of the marriage ceremony.
(E. b) 'I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth' -- as uttered when smashing the bottle against the stem.
(E. c) 'I give and bequeath my watch to my brother' -- as occurring in a will.
(E. d) 'I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.'
Uttering the sentence in appropriate circumstances is not describing the action but doing it.
The utterances cited are neither true nor false.
Naming the ship is saying the words 'I name, &c.' in the appropriate circumstances.
Saying 'I do' before the registrar or altar is indulging in marriage, not reporting on it.

A sentence or utterance of this type is called a performative sentence or performative utterance, or 'a performative'.
The term 'performative' is derived from 'perform', indicating the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action.
Issuing a performative utterance is, for example, making a bet.
Many performatives are contractual ('I bet') or declaratory ('I declare war') utterances.
The technical term 'operative', used by lawyers to refer to clauses effecting a transaction, comes closest to what we need.

Is it accurate to say 'To marry is to say a few words' or 'Betting is simply saying something'?
In many cases, the same act can be performed without uttering words.
Marriage can be effected by cohabiting, and betting can be done via a totalisator machine.
Therefore, 'to say a few certain words is to marry' or 'simply to say a certain something is to bet'.
Uttering words is a leading incident in performing the act, but it is not the sole thing necessary.
The circumstances in which the words are uttered must be appropriate.
The speaker or other persons must perform other actions.
Naming the ship requires being the appointed person; marrying requires not being already married; betting requires acceptance by a taker; gifting requires handing over the item.

The words must be spoken 'seriously' and taken 'seriously'.
The utterance should not be a joke or part of a poem.
Their being serious consists in their being uttered as a sign of an inward and spiritual act.
The outward utterance is not merely a description of the inward performance.
The idea that promising is not merely uttering words but an inward and spiritual act provides a let-out for those who break their promises.
Accuracy and morality support the idea that our word is our bond.

Are the things required to accompany an utterance described by it, making it true or false?
When normal concomitants are absent, we say the utterance or act was void, given in bad faith, or not implemented, not that it was false.
In promising, the person should intend to keep their word.
Speaking of a 'false' promise does not mean the utterance 'I promise that…' is false in the sense of misdescribing.
The person does promise, even if in bad faith.
The utterance may be misleading, deceitful, and wrong, but not a lie or misstatement.
At most, it implies or insinuates a falsehood.
We do not speak of a false bet or christening, and 'false promise' does not commit us to using 'false' only for statements.