Methodology Lesson on Intuitions in Philosophy
In this methodology lesson, we explore the use of intuitions in philosophical arguments, particularly in the context of analytic philosophy. The method of intuitions often involves presenting hypothetical scenarios to evoke responses regarding their plausibility and implications for different philosophical theories. This practice is evident in the works of philosophers such as Saul Kripke, especially in his discussions within 'Naming and Necessity'.
Responding to Opposing Intuitions
When one holds a philosophical theory (referred to as theory t) that entails a claim (p) is false, yet faces conflicting intuitions from an opponent suggesting p is true, several strategies can be employed to defend against such counter-intuitive challenges. The lesson outlines five primary responses that can be adopted, though these are not exhaustive.
Denying the Intuition: A philosopher may simply refute the validity of the intuition presented by the opponent. By stating, "I don’t share that intuition," one acknowledges their personal stance against the commonly accepted belief. While it's crucial to present such a denial honestly – not feigning disinterest or lack of intuition – it also requires a commitment to truth-telling, making this approach delicate as it runs the risk of appearing disingenuous.
Evasion of the Intuition: This approach involves conceding that the intuition aligns with p but asserting that the theory t does not, upon a closer examination, entail the falsity of p. The defender must construct a narrative that illustrates why t can hold despite the intuition pointing otherwise, thus creating a compelling argument that successfully sidesteps the problematic implication.
Shape-Shifting the Theory: Here, the philosopher acknowledges that t indeed entails that p is false but offers a modified version of the theory, referred to as t*, which eliminates the conflict with the intuition. This maneuver does not surrender the original argument but instead tweaks it minimally to preserve its core insights while avoiding entailing the falsehood of p. However, any revision must still hold substantive value to the original proposal.
Disarming the Intuition: In this response, the philosopher might concede that intuitions regarding p exist but argue that they do not serve as strong evidence. The reasoning could include claims that extreme or bizarre scenarios, like those often posed by opponents, do not warrant trust in intuitions about normal claims. This technique can invoke philosophical traditions contrasting standard intuitions with extraordinary narratives, such as those from ordinary language philosophy.
Transmuting the Intuition: An advanced technique where the philosopher accepts that p invokes an intuition but nuances it by describing it differently, suggesting it concerns epistemic possibilities instead of metaphysical ones. This is a key move in Kripke’s methodology; by reinterpreting the scenario in a manner that limits metaphysical conclusions, the argument is reframed, and the initial concern about p is sidestepped. Kripke employs such tactics to differentiate intuitions about descriptive experiences which are less deterministic than they might initially seem.
The Nature of Intuitions and Philosophy
The effectiveness of these strategies largely hinges on a deeper exploration of the nature of intuition itself. Philosophers must critically engage with whether our intuitions convey true insights about the nature of reality or if they are too heavily influenced by linguistic and cultural contexts. Moreover, a subtle but crucial debate emerges around the credibility of subjective experiences and the extent to which they can dictate the boundaries of possibility in philosophical discourse.
Philosophers like Kripke argue for a distinction between epistemic and metaphysical possibilities, which becomes especially poignant in discussions surrounding subjective experiences such as pain and identity. These discussions challenge the fundamental notion of what constitutes a shared understanding of experiences and how they relate to broader philosophical claims about natural kinds. Ultimately, the engagement with intuitions serves as a fundamental technique in developing arguments and counterarguments in complex philosophical landscapes, highlighting the complicated intersection of thought, experience, and language.