Tort Law: Personal Torts (Lecture #8)
Intentional Interferences with the Person
tresspass to the person = assault, battery and false imprisonment
Authoratative Definitions
'An assault is an act which causes another person to apprehend the infliction of immediate, unlawful, force on his person; a battery is the actual infliction of unlawful
force on another person. Both assault and battery are forms of trespass to the person. Another form of trespass to the person is false imprisonment, which is the unlawful imposition of constraint upon another's freedom of movement from a particular place.' — Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172, 1177 (Goff LJ)
Assault
assault = (1) apprehension + (2) intentional, immediate, unlawful force
assault = The threat must be of immediate force (Tuberville v Savage [1669] 1 Mod. Rep. 3; 86 ER 684)
R v Ireland [1998] A.C. 147
assault = possibility of immediate force will probably do
just as it is not true to say that every blow which is struck is an assault, so also it is not true to say that mere words or gestures can never constitute an assault. It all depends on the circumstances… The words and gestures must be seen in their whole context — Lord Hope
Battery
(1) intentional application of force + (2) direct and immediate + (3) no lawful justification = battery
the least touching of another in anger is a battery' — Cole v Turner (1704) 6 Mod. Rep. 149 (Holt CJ)
Wilson v Pringle [1987] QB 237 (CA)
Facts
2 schoolboys were involved in an incident at school
the defendant, Pringle, allegedly grabbed the claimant’s schoolbag, causing the claimant to fall and suffer a hip injury
the claimant sued for battery, a form of trespass to the person
the defendant argued that the act was horseplay, not intended to cause harm
Legal Issue
does the tort of battery require:
an intent to touch, or
an intent to cause harm?
is hostility a necessary element of battery?
can implied consent (e.g. to ordinary schoolyard contact) negate liability?
Outcome
Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and clarified the law on battery
it held that battery requires intentional touching, but not necessarily an intent to injure
however, the touching must be hostile—meaning outside the bounds of everyday social interaction
Ratio Decidendi
battery consists of:
intentional physical contact, and
hostility, defined as contact not generally acceptable in ordinary conduct.
the court rejected the idea that intent to harm is required
implied consent to everyday physical contact (e.g. jostling in school) can negate hostility
False Imprisonment
(1) positive act + (2) that directly & intentionally resulted in... + (3) restriction of C's movement, either completely or to a defined area = false imprisonment
Iqbal v Prison Officers Association [2010] QB 732
Facts
Mr. Iqbal was a Category C prisoner at HMP Wealstun
on the day in question, prison officers went on unlawful strike action, organised by the Prison Officers Association (POA)
as a result, Mr. Iqbal was confined to his cell all day, unable to access work, exercise, or healthcare
he sued the POA for false imprisonment, arguing that the officers’ failure to unlock his cell constituted unlawful detention
Legal Issue
does false imprisonment require a positive act by the defendant, or can it be committed by omission?
can a union be held liable for the actions of its members during an unlawful strike?
Outcome
Court of Appeal dismissed the claim.
it held that false imprisonment requires a positive act of restraint
the prison officers’ failure to act (i.e. not unlocking the cell) was an omission, not a positive act
therefore, there was no false imprisonment, and the POA was not liable
Ratio Decidendi
false imprisonment is a tort of strict liability, but it still requires a positive act that directly causes confinement
mere omissions, even if unlawful or negligent, do not satisfy the act requirement
the court clarified that inaction, such as failing to unlock a cell, does not constitute direct interference with liberty
liability cannot be imposed on a union unless its members’ actions amount to a tortious act for which the union is vicariously liable
Fault
strict Liability
but note the need for intention
Defences
s.3(1) Criminal Law Act 1967
Austin v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2007] EWCA Civ 989 (CoA); [2009] UKHL 5 (HoL)
Facts
on 1 May 2001, a large anti-globalisation protest took place in Oxford Circus, London
police, fearing serious public disorder, implemented a containment strategy (known as “kettling”) by forming a cordon around approximately 3,000 people, including both protestors and bystanders
the claimants, including Ms. Austin, were peaceful individuals caught within the cordon and held for up to seven hours without access to food, water, or toilets
they brought a claim under Article 5(1) ECHR, alleging unlawful deprivation of liberty
Legal Issue
did the police’s use of containment (kettling) amount to a deprivation of liberty under Article 5(1) ECHR?
if so, was the deprivation lawful, necessary, and proportionate under the exceptions permitted by Article 5?
Outcome
Court of Appeal held that there was no deprivation of liberty, and the House of Lords upheld this decision.
The Lords ruled that context and purpose are relevant in determining whether a restriction amounts to a deprivation of liberty.
Since the police acted in good faith, with the aim of preventing violence, and the measures were proportionate and time-limited, Article 5 was not breached.
Ratio Decidendi
the definition of “deprivation of liberty” under Article 5 must be interpreted in context, considering:
the type, duration, effects, and manner of implementation of the measure
the purpose behind the restriction
a temporary restriction on movement, even if complete, does not necessarily amount to a deprivation of liberty if it is:
Proportionate,
Implemented in good faith, and
Aimed at preventing serious harm
Dictum(s)
“The purpose of the measure and the circumstances in which it is imposed are relevant to the question whether there has been a deprivation of liberty.” — Lord Hope
R v Billinghurst [1978] 1 WLUK 395 (Criminal law
case)
Facts
the defendant was a rugby player who, during a match, punched an opposing player in the face
the punch was not part of the play and was described as an off-the-ball incident
the victim suffered actual bodily harm
the defendant argued that violence is inherent in rugby, and therefore the victim had consented to the risk of injury
Legal Issue
can a player in a contact sport be criminally liable for assault occasioning actual bodily harm if the injury occurs during a match?
does consent to participation in sport extend to intentional acts of violence outside the rules of the game?
Outcome
the court held that the victim’s consent did not cover the punch, as it was outside the scope of the game’s rules
the defendant was found guilty of assault occasioning actual bodily harm under Section 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861
Ratio Decidendi
consent in sport is limited to conduct within the rules and spirit of the game
intentional violence that is not part of the game is not covered by implied consent, even in contact sports
the court distinguished between accidental or rule-bound contact and deliberate off-the-ball aggression