Road to Democracy (South Africa) 1990–1994

Change of Leadership ( $1989$ – $1990$ )

• PW Botha suffered a debilitating stroke in $1989$, weakening his political grip.
• National Party (NP) caucus replaced him with F. W. de Klerk as party leader, while Botha initially remained State President.
• In August $1989$ Botha resigned the presidency; de Klerk immediately assumed the post, giving South Africa its first new head of state in more than a decade.
• De Klerk recognised that continuing minority rule was unsustainable and that the black majority had to be incorporated into constitutional politics.

De Klerk’s Opening-of-Parliament Speech ( $2$ February $1990$ )

• Widely described as “the speech that changed South Africa’s future”.
• Key promises:
– Unbanning of liberation movements: African National Congress (ANC), Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), and South African Communist Party (SACP).
– Unconditional release of political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela.
– Lifting of press censorship and the emergency restrictions imposed on educational bodies and trade-union federation COSATU.
• Signalled the formal start of dismantling apartheid; displayed political courage and willingness to negotiate a democratic settlement.

Unconditional Release of Nelson Mandela ( $11$ February $1990$ )

• Mandela walked out of Victor Verster Prison after $27$ years of incarceration, to global media coverage.
• His freedom cleared the way for direct ANC–NP negotiations.
• Mandela immediately briefed senior ANC leadership on negotiation strategy, underscoring his personal commitment to a peaceful settlement.

Sebokeng Massacre ( $11$ April $1990$ ) – First Major Obstacle

• About $50\,000$ residents marched against rent increases; police opened fire, killing $8$ protestors.
• Violence forced postponement of nascent talks, but secret meetings between Mandela and de Klerk rescued the process.

Groote Schuur Minute ( $2$ May $1990$ ) – First Formal Meeting

• Participants: ANC & NP, led respectively by Nelson Mandela and F. W. de Klerk.
• Joint undertakings:
– End political violence and create a climate for negotiation.
– Draft follow-up document (the later Pretoria Minute).
– NP committed to lifting the State of Emergency everywhere except KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) and to scrapping the Separate Amenities Act.
– Political prisoners to be released.
• ANC maintained its right to armed struggle and asked the international community to retain sanctions until real change occurred.

Pretoria Minute ( $6$ August $1990$ ) – Consolidating Momentum

• Follow-up gathering between NP and ANC.
• NP agreed to repeal remaining apartheid legislation and to end the State of Emergency in KZN.
• In return, ANC agreed to suspend the armed struggle — a huge confidence-building step.
• Paved the way for “real talks” about South Africa’s constitutional future.

Continuing Violence ( $1990$ – $1991$ )

• Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) hostel-dwellers attacked ANC supporters in the Vaal Triangle; about $30$ people killed.
• Numerous township clashes threatened negotiations, yet Mandela and de Klerk’s personal resolve held the process together.

CODESA I – Convention for a Democratic South Africa ( $20$ December $1991$ )

• Venue: World Trade Centre, Kempton Park.
• $19$ political organisations attended; the United Nations and Commonwealth observed.
• PAC and Conservative Party (CP) boycotted; IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi also stayed away, sending only a delegate.
• Key output: “Declaration of Intent”, sketching a blueprint for a democratic order (independent judiciary, new constitution, human-rights guarantees).
• IFP and Bophuthatswana refused to sign, forming early stumbling blocks.

White-Only Referendum ( $17$ March $1992$ )

• Context: NP lost a Potchefstroom by-election to the hard-right CP, prompting calls to halt reforms.
• De Klerk called a national referendum of white voters: “Do you support the continuation of the reform process which aims to achieve a new constitution through negotiation?”
• Result: $68.7\%$ “Yes”, giving de Klerk a decisive mandate to press on.

CODESA II ( May – June $1992$ ) – Stalemate Emerges

• Central agenda: design of an interim government.
• NP insisted on power-sharing to protect minority interests; ANC demanded majority rule, confident of electoral victory.
• Township violence unresolved; negotiations collapsed when ANC staged a walk-out and launched “rolling mass action”.

Boipatong Massacre ( $17$ June $1992$ )

• IFP residents of Kwa-Madala hostel, allegedly with police collusion, killed $49$ residents of Boipatong (Vaal Triangle).
• Heightened ANC suspicion of a state-sponsored “third force”; deepened rift in talks.

Bisho Massacre ( $7$ September $1992$ )

• $80\,000$ ANC supporters marched on Ciskei capital, demanding military ruler Brigadier Oupa Gqozo join democratisation talks.
• Ciskei troops opened fire: $28$ dead, $200$ injured.
• Violence in KZN concurrently flared; ANC charged the government with orchestrating unrest.
• Goldstone Commission appointed; confirmed covert security-force involvement (“third force”) in township killings, further discrediting apartheid security apparatus.

Record of Understanding ( $26$ September $1992$ ) – Talks Revived

• Chief negotiators: Cyril Ramaphosa (ANC) & Roelf Meyer (NP).
• Secret bilateral produced concessions that reopened multiparty talks, though the structure of an interim government was still unresolved.

Sunset Clause Proposal ( Early $1993$ )

• Joe Slovo (SACP) offered a breakthrough formula:
– Government of National Unity (GNU) for a fixed “sunset” period, guaranteeing power-sharing.
– Civil-service and security-force jobs protected for $10$ years post-election to reassure whites.
• Removed biggest hurdle, enabling the Multiparty Negotiating Forum (MPNF).

MPNF & The Chris Hani Assassination ( $10$ April $1993$ )

• MPNF convened to resolve CODESA II failures.
• Chris Hani (popular SACP & ANC leader) murdered by Clive Derby-Lewis and Janusz Waluś — white extremists hoping to provoke race war.
• Country erupted in protest; Mandela’s televised plea for calm underscored his presidential stature and galvanised urgency for settlement.
• AWB (Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging) later stormed the venue in an armoured car, smashing glass doors; demanded a white homeland. Negotiators refused to yield.
• Despite disruptions, parties fixed an election date: $27$ April $1994$.

Late-Stage Violent Flashpoints ( $1993$ – Early $1994$ )

• St James Church Massacre ( $25$ July $1993$ ): APLA guerrillas killed $11$ worshippers, wounded $58$.
• Heidelberg Tavern Attack ( $30$ December $1993$ ): APLA assault on Cape Town restaurant left $4$ dead, $6$ injured; reinforced PAC decision to stay outside negotiations.
• Shell House March & Shoot-out ( $28$ March $1994$ ):
– Roughly $30\,000$ IFP supporters marched on ANC HQ (Shell House) demanding recognition of Zulu sovereignty.
– Shooting by ANC security killed $8$ (official) to $53$ (wider Johannesburg toll); violence spread across Gauteng.
– Mandela, de Klerk, and Buthelezi held urgent talks; Buthelezi pressed for election postponement, which Mandela rejected as “sacred”.

Final Preparations & Inclusion of Hold-Outs

• Election threatened as IFP and CP initially refused to register; $19$ other parties ready to contest.
• Freedom Front (Gen. Constand Viljoen) entered race two months before polling, channelling Afrikaner nationalism into ballots rather than bullets.
• One week before $27$ April $1994$, IFP finally signed up after marathon talks; party name hastily added to ballot papers.

$27$ April $1994$ – First Democratic Elections

• Voter turnout estimated at $+$$20$ million; queues kilometres long became the defining image of transition.
• Results:
– ANC ≈ $62.6\%$ (parliamentary majority but < $66.6\%$ needed to unilaterally draft a constitution).
– NP ≈ $20.4\%$; IFP ≈ $10.5\%$; Freedom Front ≈ $2.2\%$.
• Nelson Mandela elected President; Thabo Mbeki (ANC) and F. W. de Klerk (NP) installed as Deputy Presidents in the GNU – embodiment of the Sunset Clause compromise.

Significance & Broader Connections

• Demonstrated negotiated revolution: neither outright military victory nor total capitulation, but a carefully staged transfer of power.
• The process blended liberal-constitutional ideals (independent judiciary, Bill of Rights) with pragmatic power-sharing to manage fears of both black majority and white minority.
• Repeal of apartheid laws, release of political prisoners, and security-sector reform illustrated that legal change, elite pacting, and grassroots mobilisation worked in tandem.
• Persistent violence (Sebokeng, Boipatong, Bisho, KwaZulu-Natal wars) highlighted dangers of spoilers and underscored need for truth-seeking bodies (later Truth & Reconciliation Commission).
• International dimensions: sanctions, observer missions, and diaspora lobbying exerted pressure and lent legitimacy to talks.
• Ethical lesson: leadership (Mandela’s reconciliatory stance; de Klerk’s willingness to risk white backlash; Slovo’s principled compromise) can steer polarised societies toward peaceful settlement.
• Practical outcome: Interim Constitution of $1993$ became the basis for the final $1996$ Constitution, still acclaimed for its rights culture and separation-of-powers architecture.