Are Prime Ministers still as powerful as they once were?
Paragraph 1 – Collective responsibility and cabinet control
Weaker Counterargument: The rise in cabinet opposition and resignations shows a weakening of PM power.
Explanation: Collective Ministerial Responsibility (CMR) has been more visibly exercised in recent years, limiting the PM’s ability to maintain party unity.
Evidence: Boris Johnson’s downfall in 2022 after mass resignations (Sunak, Javid); David Davis resigning over May’s Brexit policy; Anneliese Dodds leaving Starmer’s cabinet in 2025 over foreign aid.
Stronger Argument: Despite these instances, PMs still dominate through cabinet appointments, reshuffles, and control of committees.
Explanation: The PM can shape cabinet loyalty by appointing allies, removing critics, and marginalising full cabinet discussions.
Evidence: Sunak’s Nov 2023 reshuffle (sacked Braverman, brought in Cleverly and Lord Cameron); Thatcher appointed ‘dry’ Tories to push her economic agenda; Blair ran a “sofa cabinet” and chaired key committees, keeping tight control over policy direction.
Paragraph 2 – Individual ministerial resignations vs PM resilience
Weaker Counterargument: The principle of Individual Ministerial Responsibility (IMR) weakens PMs by forcing out ministers and destabilising governments.
Explanation: Frequent resignations can cause reputational damage and imply poor executive control.
Evidence: Amber Rudd (2018), Gavin Williamson, Suella Braverman, Chris Pincher, and Tulip Siddiq—all resigned for personal or departmental failings under different PMs.
Stronger Argument: These resignations often protect, rather than threaten, the PM by removing liabilities and deflecting wider blame.
Explanation: PMs can use ministerial resignations strategically to signal accountability while maintaining their own position.
Evidence: Johnson attempted to protect his position by backing Chris Pincher, but only resigned after extreme pressure; Rishi Sunak survived multiple scandals and reshuffled as needed; Blair used Liam Fox’s and other resignations as political damage control without ever undermining his premiership.
Paragraph 3 – Institutional challenges vs PM dominance over policy
Weaker Counterargument: PMs now face more institutional and external constraints, such as the Lords, judiciary, and markets.
Explanation: Decisions can be blocked or reversed due to pressure beyond Parliament.
Evidence: Lord Dannatt (crossbencher) influenced defence policy 2015–16; Liz Truss’s mini-budget collapsed after financial backlash; UK Supreme Court ruled Johnson’s 2019 prorogation unlawful.
Stronger Argument: These constraints are exceptions—most PMs still dominate domestic and economic policy through convention and party majority.
Explanation: PMs can push through major decisions without consultation or consequence if backed by Parliament.
Evidence: Blair and Brown transferred interest rate powers to the Bank of England without cabinet consultation; Harold Wilson refused to discuss devaluation for years; Macmillan delayed cabinet debate on his resignation entirely.