If Abortion, then Infanticide
Abortion and Infanticide: Key Ideas
Main Argument
The authors argue that the same major arguments that defend abortion also justify infanticide.
They contend that fetuses and infants cannot be distinguished by any morally significant intrinsic property, nor are they discernible based on their relationships to others.
If arguments for abortion are valid, they inadvertently allow for infanticide as well.
If infanticide is deemed unjustifiable, then arguments for abortion must also be reevaluated.
Philosophical Context
Common philosophical positions on abortion vary, with some asserting divine souls or humanity as grounds for moral protection of life, while others deny these positions.
A notable point of agreement: both abortion proponents and opponents oppose infanticide.
Common Arguments for Abortion
Several defenses for abortion that also permit infanticide:
Self-consciousness argument: If fetuses are not considered self-conscious persons, infanticide follows as justified.
Bodily autonomy: Judith Thomson’s argument for a woman's control of her body can also be applied to infanticide.
Moral significance of consciousness: Both fetuses and infants can lack consciousness, allowing infanticide under this reasoning.
Lack of a rearing relationship: The absence of a nurturing bond between the fetus and parents can lead to similar justification for infanticide.
Parthood: If a fetus is a part of a woman's body, it differs from an infant, but this distinction fails from a moral standpoint.
Viability: Infants needing bodily support may not have a different moral status than non-viable fetuses.
Philosophical Responses to Counterarguments
Counterarguments fail to secure substantial moral status differences between fetuses and newborns based on cognitive abilities or consciousness.
Comparisons are drawn to household pets, suggesting all share similar cognitive limitations, rendering arguments meaningless.
The authors argue that the perceived moral significance of consciousness does not hold since consciousness alone does not warrant protection.
Potentiality and Moral Status
Potentiality: The authors explore how potential for healthy development is crucial for understanding moral status.
They argue that mindless entities have interests exclusively in their healthy development and do not concern themselves with other potential futures.
This view contributes to a framework where both abortion and infanticide are understood as morally significant harms.
The Inequality Argument for Abortion
The inequality between men and women regarding pregnancy leads some to argue for abortion rights.
The authors find this argument insufficient for justifying infanticide.
They provide thought experiments (e.g., a mother in extreme circumstances) to illustrate that socially constructed inequalities should not lead to killing innocents.
The Right to Control One's Body
Many defenses of abortion hinge on a woman's autonomy to reject physical burdens.
This argument is crucial but if valid for abortion, it must equally hold true for infanticide, as the reasoning does not change based on the developmental stage of the organism.
Key Takeaways on Consciousness and Moral Value
The authors challenge the relevance of consciousness as a moral boundary, arguing that interests exist regardless of awareness.
They illustrate that consciousness alone does not inherently grant moral value or rights, drawing parallels with various forms of sentience.
Conclusion
The authors conclude that if one accepts arguments leading to the justification of infanticide, then one must reconsider the moral grounds for abortion.
They argue that both fetuses and infants have interests in healthy development that, when acknowledged, position both as deserving of moral consideration.