Locke begins by distinguishing Political Power from other forms of power that arise in different social relations, to help distinguish a ruler of a Commonwealth from a Father of a Family, a Master of a Servant, a Husband over a Wife, and a Lord over a Slave. When these relations occur together in one person, the comparison helps to clarify the different kinds of authority.
He defines Political Power as:
a Right of making Laws with Penalties of Death, and consequently all lesser Penalties,
for the Regulating and Preserving of Property,
and of employing the force of the Community in the Execution of such Laws,
and in the defence of the Commonwealth from Foreign Injury,
and all this only for the Publick Good.
This section serves to establish the basis for a legitimate political order as a remedy to the disorder described when people live under force and violence without agreed rules.
Contextual note (footnotes discuss controversy):
Filmer criticized the notion of political power; Hobbes’s and Filmer’s debates influenced Locke’s framing.
Laslett’s edition and references are cited regarding Filmer and Hobbes’s critique of natural society and government.
Reference to earlier discussion: the need to establish a legitimate Original of Political Power beyond force and caprice, contrasting with the idea that force alone grounds political order.
Related biographical/historical notes: Locke’s engagement with contemporary debates (e.g., Hobbes, Filmer) is foregrounded in the commentary around §3.
§4 Of the State of Nature
To understand Political Power right, and derive it from its Original, we must consider what State all Men are naturally in:
A State of perfect Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the Will of any other Man.
A State also of Equality, wherein all the Power and Jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another:
There being nothing more evident, than that Creatures of the same species and rank promiscuously born to all the same advantages of Nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without Subordination or Subjection, unless the Lord and Master of them all, should by any manifest Declaration of his Will set one above another, and confer on him by an evident and clear appointment an undoubted Right to Dominion and Sovereignty.
The §4 note explains that this chapter as written in 1679-1680 underwent later additions and corrections (1689) and that the French and other versions begin this chapter at a slightly different point.
Additional editorial/interpretive notes in the margin discuss textual developments and how Locke’s text was shaped by later revisions and by Hooker’s material (Hooker’s influence is discussed in §5).
§5-6 The State of Nature and Liberty
§5: Equality by Nature as foundational to duties of mutual love and justice. Locke cites the Judicious Hooker, who treats equality as the basis for mutual love among men and for the duties of justice and charity. Quote (Hooker):
The natural inducement to love others as ourselves, since things equal must have one measure; if I desire good for myself as much as any man can desire for my soul, I should desire the same for others. If I harm others, I should expect harm in return; loving equals in nature imposes a natural duty of treating others with the same affection.
From this equality between ourselves and those like us, natural rules and canons for life follow by natural reason.
§6: Liberty in the State of Nature is not Licence.
Although there is unrestrained Liberty, it is not a State of Licence. A person does not have Liberty to destroy himself or any creature in his possession, but rather to use resources for a nobler purpose than mere preservation when required.
Locke’s emphasis here is that natural liberty includes the duty to preserve life and the social order, not the right to do whatever one pleases without regard to others.
Editorial notes tied to Hooker’s influence explain why Locke foregrounds Hooker’s authority here as a way to legitimate his own appeal to natural law and mutual duty.
Implication: The State of Nature contains liberty and equality, but without the establishment of common rules and a civil body, it would devolve into chaos; thus the need for political society.
§7 The Execution of the Law of Nature
To restrain invasion of others’ rights and to observe the Law of Nature, its execution lies in the hands of every man in the State of Nature:
Each person has a right to punish violators in order to prevent violation of the Law.
This distribution of punitive power is what makes the State of Nature inherently unstable unless there is a mechanism to deter and restrain offenders.
The core function of this right is to secure peace and preservation for all mankind by ensuring that transgressions are deterred and punished proportionately.
§8 The Nature and Limits of Punishment in the State of Nature
One man’s power over another exists in the State of Nature, but not as arbitrary power; it is limited to what is proportionate to the transgression and aimed at reparation and restraint.
Punishment is justified as ایک means to achieve two ends: proportional reparation to the offender for the injury done, and restraint to deter future offenses.
The offender’s transgression is a violation of the Law of Nature, which is a universal standard of reason and equity; thus, punishment is aimed at restoring balance and preventing further harm.
The offender’s violation threatens the peace of the entire species, which justifies the communal right to punish to maintain public safety.
The logic is that any man may act to punish, provided the punishment is proportionate and aimed at preventing further harm; this underwrites the justification for collective or shared enforcement of natural law.
§9 The Objection: Judges in Their Own Case; the Role of Civil Government
Locke anticipates objections from those who worry that self-judgment leads to partiality or revenge.
He acknowledges concerns about self-love and revenge corrupting judgment; he nevertheless argues that Civil Government is the proper remedy to the inconveniences of the State of Nature, especially the hazard of judging in one’s own case.
He challenges the notion that absolute monarchies, if they are the remedy, are inherently preferable to the State of Nature; he questions what kind of Government would be better than the State of Nature if one person can exercise arbitrary power over many without accountability.
He questions the premise that a ruler’s arbitrary power would necessarily be more just or orderly than the disorder of the State of Nature.
§10-11 Rights in the State of Nature and the Role of Reparation and Punishment
§10: In addition to punishing offenses, there is a separate Right to seek Reparation for damages caused by transgressions. The injured party has a right to demand compensation, and others may join in recovering damages.
§11: From these two distinct Rights—(a) punishing the offense for restraint and prevention, and (b) seeking reparation for damages—arises the jurisdiction of the Magistrate who holds the common right of mankind. In other words, the authority to punish and to secure reparations would be exercised by those who align with the common good of the community or society. (Note: This passage also intersects with Locke’s later Second Letter on Toleration, where he discusses the proper limits and purposes of civil authority and punishment; editorial footnotes point to connections with toleration and civil governance.)
Implication: The Magistrate’s power originates from a universal right, but is exercised for the public good, not for private advantage.
§12 The Private Right to Reparation and the Public Right to Punish
The offended party retains the right to seek reparation for damages from the offender, and this right is distinct from the public/punitive power exercised by the magistrate.
The private party may appropriate the offender’s goods or services as a form of satisfaction or reparation, by Right of Self-preservation, as every man has a power to punish the crime to prevent its recurrence, by preserving all mankind and doing all reasonable things to that end.
Locke emphasizes that in the State of Nature, every man has a power to kill a murderer to deter others and to secure the community from further violent acts, especially when the murder cannot be remedied through private satisfaction; this right is grounded in the natural law’s aim to preserve life and security for all.
Hence, the State of Nature includes both a right to punish and a right to seek reparations, with the possibility for self-help in extreme cases when the public authority is not yet established.
The biblical reference that underpins this argument is Genesis 9:6: the duty to punish murder as part of the divine command to preserve human life.
§13 The Objection Revisited: Self-judging, Partiality, and Civil Remedy
Locke anticipates further objections about self-judging, but reiterates that civil government and established laws are the remedy for the dangers of self-judging and partiality.
He notes that the Law of Nature is intelligible and plain to a rational creature, and that the municipal laws of many countries are right insofar as they are founded on this Law of Nature and interpreted accordingly.
Locke also remarks on the potential danger of multiplying laws and judges, reflecting his broader critique of legalism and lawyers in civil governance.
§14-15 The Reality of the State of Nature and the Foundation of Government
§14: The question of whether there were ever any men in a State of Nature is addressed by Locke through two lines of argument:
First, Princes and rulers of independent governments are themselves in a State of Nature with respect to each other, because they are not bound by any higher civil authority in their mutual dealings.
Second, a group or community enters into a contract to form one Body Politick; friendships, alliances, and covenants between individuals can keep them in a State of Nature unless they mutually agree to form a political society.
Garcilaso de la Vega (Histoire des Incas) and the Desert Island example are used to illustrate how agreements between individuals can be binding even in a State of Nature; Truth and keeping faith belong to men as men, not merely as members of a society.
§15: Locke defends Hooker’s view that the Laws of Nature bind men absolutely, even in a State of Nature, though they are not bound by any fixed fellowship or solemn agreement. This is a crucial defense against those who deny natural law without social contract.
The text notes modifications between the first and second states of the edition, including the substitution of a Soldania/Saldanha reference with Garcilaso-based illustration to reflect different geographic contexts (America vs. Soldania). A diary entry (8 February 1687) records Locke’s note about Garcilaso’s text and his later corrections.
Hooker’s influence is reiterated as part of Locke’s strategy to ground natural law and government in respected authorities, while still reinterpreting and adapting them for his own political theory.
§16-§18 CHAP. III. Of the State of War
§16: The State of War is a State of Enmity and Destruction. A sedate design upon another man’s life—declared by word or action—puts him in a State of War against the aggressor; the aggressor thereby exposes the life of the other to the possibility of being taken away by him or by those who defend him.
It is reasonable and just that I should have a Right to destroy that which threatens me with Destruction.
The Fundamental Law of Nature: Man being preserved, as much as possible, when not preserved, the safety of the innocent is to be preferred; thus one may destroy a man who makes War upon him or has declared enmity.
The idea is that such men are not under the ties of the Common Law of Reason and have no other rule but Force and Violence; they may be treated as Beasts of Prey.
§17: Hence, anyone who attempts to bring another man into his Absolute Power declares a design upon that man’s life; the one who would subdue another by force would use him as he pleased and destroy him when convenient; freedom from such force is the security of preservation. Reason dictates that someone who would enslave another should be treated as an enemy to preservation. If someone would take away the freedom that belongs to all in the State of Nature, he would likewise intend to take away everything else; accordingly, he is in a State of War with the other.
The analogue: in the State of Society, those who would take away the freedom of those within the Society or Commonwealth must be thought to intend to take away all else as well.
§18: It is lawful to kill a thief who has used force to seize another, thus getting him into one’s power; such a necessity arises because a thief has not harmed but has used force to gain possession; the thief is in effect an enemy to the life of the victim and may be destroyed in defense, since the thief is not bound by the common law of reason.
Editorial notes/interpretive remarks in the margins discuss whether §18 is an interpolation or an extension, possibly connected with the 1689 edition, and whether it relates to James II or broader political cautions about authority and power. Some editors suggest this paragraph may have been inserted to address contemporary political concerns.
Genesis reference in §16-§18: Locke frequently aligns natural-law reasoning with scriptural (biblical) justifications for the preservation of life and the right to punish or destroy those who threaten it, such as the Genesis reference to the sanctity of life and the divine command to preserve life and punish murder when necessary.
Summary of Core Concepts and Connections
State of Nature as baseline for political power: liberty, equality, and lack of civil subordination are fundamental, but with a natural law (Law of Nature) that governs behavior and preserves mankind.
Law of Nature and its enforcement: every person has a right to punish violations in order to prevent the breach of the law, secure peace, and deter potential offenders; punishment must be proportionate and aimed at reparation and restraint.
Two distinct rights in the State of Nature: (a) the right to punish offenders to prevent violations, and (b) the right to seek reparations for damages caused by those violations.
The role of civil government: civil government is the remedy to the inconveniences and perils of judging in one’s own case, ensuring impartial enforcement of laws and protection of life and property.
The State of War is a specific subset of the State of Nature defined by an active and declared hostility against another’s life, which justifies preemptive or retaliatory force to secure preservation.
Foundational references and authorities: Locke cites Hooker and others to ground natural-law claims, while also engaging with contemporaries like Hobbes and Filmer. The text demonstrates Locke’s strategy of building a robust natural-law framework for legitimate political authority.
Real-world relevance and implications: Locke’s framework underpins later theories of consent, government legitimacy, the rights of individuals, and the limits of political power; it also informs debates about the authority of rulers, the rights of rebellion, and the justification for civil liberty and toleration.
Key biblical and classical references included in the argument: Genesis 9:6; references to the Law of Nature; Hooker’s Ecclesiastical Polity as a source of natural-law grounding.
Notable textual notes: the manuscript presents variations between the first and second states of the edition; the editor’s footnotes discuss textual interventions (e.g., Garcilaso, Soldania), dating of passages, and the relationship to Hooker’s text; these reflect Locke’s evolving stance and editorial decisions during the late 17th century.
Noteworthy Quotations (selected)
Political Power definition: "a Right of making Laws with Penalties of Death, and consequently all less Penalties, for the Regulating and Preserving of Property, and of employing the force of the Community, in the Execution of such Laws, and in the defence of the Commonwealth from Foreign Injury, and all this only for the Publick Good."
Hooker on equality and mutual love: "The like natural inducement, hath brought Men to know that it is no less their Duty, to Love others than themselves…"
State of Nature as liberty but not licence: "Tis the State of Liberty, yet it is not a State of Licence."
Right to punish in the State of Nature: "the Execution of the Law of Nature is in that State, put into every Mans hands, whereby every one has a right to punish the transgressors of that Law to such a Degree, as may hinder its Violation."
Proportional punishment and deterrence: "what is proportionate to his Transgression, which is so much as may serve for Reparation and Restraint."
Private reparations: "the damnified Person has this Power of appropriating to himself, the Goods or Service of the Offender, by Right of Self-preservation…"
Genesis reference for punishment: "Genesis ix. 6: Whoso sheddeth Mans Blood, by Man shall his Blood be shed."
State of War description: "The State of War is a State of Enmity and Destruction; And therefore declaring by Word or Action, not a passionate and hasty, but a sedate setled Design, upon another Mans Life, puts him in a State of War with him…"
Connections to Broader Themes
This portion of Locke’s Second Treatise lays groundwork for social contract theory: the move from natural liberty and equality to organized government justified by consent and common good.
It contrasts with Hobbes’s Leviathan by emphasizing the legitimacy of the right to punish and the role of the Law of Nature as a universal standard, while also arguing for the establishment of civil authority to avoid the hazards of self-judgment and endless conflict.
The discussion foreshadows the later political arguments for limited government, checks and balances, and the rights of individuals against arbitrary sovereign power.
The treatise integrates natural-law reasoning with scriptural motifs and classical authorities to ground political obligations in universal human nature and reason, rather than merely in conventional authority or force.
Quick Reference Points (for study)
Political Power = Right to make laws with penalties, to regulate property, to use communal force for enforcement and defense, for the public good.
State of Nature = Perfect freedom + equality; no subordination unless divinely ordained; governed by the Law of Nature.
Law of Nature = Reason; restraints on harming others; prescribes mutual duties.
Two natural rights in the State of Nature = (a) punishment to restrain and deter, (b) reparation for injuries to the injured party.
Punishment is not arbitrary; it must be proportionate and aimed at deterring future offenses.
Civil government is the remedy for the risks of judging in one’s own case; consent and the common good legitimize authority.
State of War = Enmity and Destruction; declaration of hostile intent against another’s life justifies preemptive or retaliatory action to preserve life.
Textual context: Locke engages with Hooker, Hobbes, Filmer; revisions between 1679 and 1689; references to Garcilaso and Soldania show situating examples for the State of Nature.