The United States and Spain: From Franco to Juan Carlos

Introduction: Spain and the ‘third wave’

Samuel P. Huntington's Third Wave of Democratization explains transitions from non-democratic to democratic systems (1974-1990).
Five global factors contributed to this wave:
- Legitimacy problems of authoritarian systems.
- Global economic growth.
- Changes in the Catholic Church.
- Policy shifts by external actors (e.g., European Community, US).
- ‘Snowballing’ or demonstration effects.

US initially against Franco but shifted due to the Cold War.
1953 bilateral agreement: US got access to bases in Spain in exchange for military and economic aid (around 600 million and 500 million respectively).
US wanted Spain in NATO, but faced opposition due to Franco's authoritarianism.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower's visit in 1959 symbolized Franco's acceptance by the US.
President John F. Kennedy continued ties, renewing agreements in 1963.
US balanced military interests with the desire for gradual change in Spain.

President Richard M. Nixon valued Franco's statesmanship.
1968 bases agreement renewal: Spain sought more aid; Nixon settled for 50 million in military aid and 25 million in credit.
Nixon met Juan Carlos in 1971, advising him to prioritize law and order after Franco's death.
Nixon sent General Vernon Walters to persuade Franco to hand over power to Juan Carlos.
Kissinger claimed US contribution to Spain's evolution was a major foreign policy achievement.
Kissinger noted Spain's history of extremes between anarchy and authority.
US policy was to work with the Franco regime while extending contacts for the post-Franco period.

Robert C. Hill (US Ambassador) avoided antagonizing Spanish authorities.
Horacio Rivero (successor) was a strong supporter of Franco.
1973–74 oil shock increased Spain's geo-strategic value.
Collapse of Portuguese dictatorship and Cypriot crisis further highlighted Spain's importance.
Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco's appointment as president was welcomed by US, assassination raised doubts.
Gerald Ford attended Carrero Blanco's funeral.
US signed a joint declaration of principles to renew the bases agreement.
Wells Stabler replaced Flanigan as Ambassador.

US objective: Spain's closer integration with the West.
Kissinger and Stabler: top priority was renewing the bases agreement.
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt urged Ford to engage with future Spanish leaders.
Ford visited Spain despite concerns about propping up Franco.
Kissinger predicted Juan Carlos would face pressures to balance liberalization with right-wing resistance.

1975: King Hassan II planned a ‘green march’ into Spanish Sahara; Kissinger interceded.
Kissinger favored ‘evolutionary political changes’ in Spain, led by conservatives.
State Department favored discreet contacts with opposition groups but excluded communists.
US was represented at both Franco’s funeral and Juan Carlos’ proclamation.
Kissinger advised Spain to go slowly with political evolution.
Carter Administration adopted a more flexible stance towards Communism.

Areilza raised the bases agreement to treaty status, requiring US Senate approval.
Juan Carlos visited Washington in 1976, committing to a parliamentary monarchy.
Kissinger supported Juan Carlos as the best hope for democratic evolution with stability.
Juan Carlos removed Arias Navarro and appointed Adolfo Suárez as Prime Minister.
Kissinger expressed admiration for Juan Carlos and Suárez.

Jimmy Carter adopted a more flexible stance towards Communism.
Suárez legalized the Communist Party in April 1977.
Carter Administration was cool towards Suárez, despite his expected victory in the June 1977 elections.

Washington did not significantly contribute to undermining authoritarianism in Spain.
US primarily supported Juan Carlos and favored a gradual transition.
Goal: ‘democratic evolution with stability’.
US bases in Spain were tainted by association with the Franco era.
Engaging authoritarian leaders via basing deals does little for democratization.