Feminist Reformulation of Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism

Hans Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism are examined through a feminist lens to explain why international politics has been perceived as a male domain and how the discipline itself may be biased by masculine assumptions. Tickner notes that diplomacy, military service, and IR scholarship have been dominated by men, and that even successful women in high politics face discrimination or doubt about their ability to press the nuclear button. The piece argues that realism’s vocabulary—power, threat, deterrence—has a masculine ring, and that women have often engaged more with peace and social welfare issues, yet are still pigeonholed as naive or unpatriotic when dissenting from security policy. The aim is not to discount Morgenthau’s contributions but to show how his six principles reflect a partial, masculine view of international politics and to offer a feminist reformulation.

Morgenthau's Six Principles: A Masculine Perspective?

1. Politics is governed by objective laws rooted in an unchanging human nature, allowing for a rational theory of international politics.
2. Interest defined as power infuses rational order into political life, promoting a rational, objective, and unemotional view of politics.
3. Power is an objective category universally valid but not fixed; power equates to the control of man over man.
4. Realism acknowledges the moral significance of political action and the tension between moral commands and political requirements.
5. It rejects identifying the moral aspirations of a nation with universal moral laws, using interest defined as power to guard against moral excess and folly.
6. Realism maintains the autonomy of the political sphere, asking how policies affect national power; it rests on a pluralistic view of human nature and abstracts a dimension called political man from other human traits.

Tickner cautions that Morgenthau’s vision is a partial description of international politics, rooted in masculine assumptions about human nature and morality. She defines masculinity and femininity as socially constructed categories that vary by time and place, not fixed biological traits. The language of objectivity in Morgenthau’s framework is tied to masculine norms, while feminists argue knowledge is socially constructed and language-relayed, thus always contestable. The search for an objective science of IR, modeled after the natural sciences, is challenged as culturally biased and hierarchical rather than universal.

Morgenthau’s construction of an amoral realm of power politics is framed as a solution to the tension between universal moral laws and pragmatic political action. Tickner notes that this tension parallels Kohlberg’s stages of moral development and Gilligan’s critique that moral reasoning differs by gendered socialization, with women commonly perceived as contextual and relational in their moral reasoning. The realist insistence on a distinct public realm also aligns with a gendered separation of spheres, a divide feminists argue excludes women’s experiences and contributions. The result is a discipline that emphasizes conflict and order while de-emphasizing cooperation, reform, and moral pluralism.

A Feminist Perspective on Power, Security, and Knowledge

Tickner reframes power from a masculine, domination-centric concept to a multidimensional, relational understanding. Female-centered accounts emphasize power as energy, capacity, and potential, and often highlight coalition-building and persuasion rather than coercion. Hannah Arendt’s concept of power as the ability to act in concert aligns with feminist views of shared authority and collective action. This broader view allows for both competition and cooperation in international relations and opens space for regional cooperation and security communities where power is exercised through mutual reliance rather than zero-sum domination.

Security, too, should be redefined beyond military strength. In interdependent modern environments, security involves basic needs, development, and environmental health. Johan Galtung’s structural violence and Sara Ruddick’s maternal thinking suggest that security is tied to satisfying fundamental needs and preserving life, not merely deterring external threats. Ruddick’s emphasis on peaceful conflict resolution and a move toward non-violent means of resolving disputes resonates with Gilligan’s moral reasoning, which stresses care, context, and turning-taking rather than abstract universal rules. These perspectives encourage conflict resolution approaches that seek mutually beneficial rather than zero-sum outcomes.

Toward a Feminist Epistemology in IR

Tickner argues for a feminist epistemology characterized by dynamic objectivity, connectivity, and attention to difference. This approach seeks to acknowledge the world’s independent integrity while recognizing our embeddedness within it. The aim is to build an ungendered or human science of international politics that accepts plural realities and integrates both masculine and feminine modes of thought. The discussion draws on Barbara McClintock’s complex, data-driven science (as framed by Evelyn Fox Keller), Karen Harding’s African world view, and Carolyn Merchant’s ecological thinking to stress holism, context, and cultural diversity. The result is a call for epistemologies that value ambiguity and difference rather than dichotomous, power-centered explanations.

Feminist Reformulation of Morgenthau's Six Principles

Tickner offers a reformulation that preserves the value of Morgenthau’s insights while recasting them in a more inclusive, multidimensional framework. The reformulation reframes objectivity, national interest, power, morality, universal moral principles, and political autonomy as follows:

1. A feminist perspective holds that objectivity, as culturally defined, is linked to masculinity; human nature includes both masculine and feminine elements. Dynamic objectivity provides a connected, non-dominating view of knowledge.
2. The national interest is multidimensional and context-dependent, demanding cooperative solutions to interdependent global problems (nuclear risk, economic wellbeing, environmental degradation).
3. Power cannot be universally defined; domination reflects masculine norms and excludes possibilities for collective empowerment often associated with femininity.
4. Moral considerations are inseparable from political action; politics entails moral significance, and the realist focus on order over justice is incompatible with basic needs and social reproduction.
5. While nations have distinct moral aspirations, universal moral principles are not the sole basis for action; shared moral elements can help de-escalate conflict and foster international community.
6. The autonomy of the political is denied in feminist thought; constructing a broader, ungendered science requires including women and challenging narrow political boundaries that exclude their concerns.

In closing, Tickner does not deny Morgenthau’s contributions but argues for an inclusive, human science of IR that recognizes cooperation, justice, and interdependence alongside conflict and power. Adequate representation of women and equality of contribution from both genders are essential for such an ungendered, comprehensive discipline.

REFERENCES and notes are omitted here for brevity, but the core argument and reformulation are drawn from J. Ann Tickner’s Feminist Reformulation of Morgenthau’s Principles of Political Realism, Millennium, 1988.