Questioning the Reality of Morality

Truth-Making & the Subject–Predicate Schema

  • Core question introduced: “Is there anything you really ought to do?”

  • Strategy: first analyze what makes any claim true.

    • Generic schema: x is Fx\text{ is }F
      xx = subject of the sentence.
      FF = predicate (the property being ascribed).
      • A sentence is true iff the subject really possesses the property denoted by the predicate.
  • Simple, familiar examples

    • “Grass is green.” → True because grass actually has the property being green.
    • “Brody is human.” (Brody = professor’s dog) → False because Brody lacks the property being human.
    • “Class is cancelled.” → Truth-value depends on whether the class has the property being cancelled at the relevant time.

Extending the Schema to Other Domains

  • Mathematics
    • “4=2+24 = 2+2” → True because 44 has the property being equal to 2+22+2.
    • “180180 is the sum of the interior angles of a triangle.” → True because 180180 possesses the property being the sum of a triangle’s interior angles.

  • Biology
    • “The oak tree is a plant.” → True because oak tree instantiates plant-hood.

Attempted Application to Morality

  • Candidate moral truths
    • “Murder is wrong.”
    • “Casual sex is permissible.”
    • “Vegetarianism is obligatory.”
  • If the simple schema works here, then each moral claim is true iff the corresponding action (murder, casual sex, vegetarianism) has the property wrongness, permissibility, obligatoriness, etc.

Doubts about Moral Properties

  • Compare:

    1. “Casual sex is permissible.”
    2. “Casual sex is widespread.”
      Being widespread seems clear, measurable: distribution over a large population or area.
      Being permissible feels less clear; its status as a real property is questionable.
  • Further comparison:

    1. “Stealing is wrong.”
    2. “Stealing is taking someone else’s property without permission.”
      Taking property without permission = straightforward descriptive property.
      Wrongness may not have the same kind of straightforward, mind-independent reality.

Objectivity vs Subjectivity

  • Philosophical definitions
    Objective truth = mind-independent; holds regardless of any human beliefs, desires, feelings.
    – Example: “The table is solid.” continues to be true even if no one believed it.
    Subjective truth = mind-dependent; holds in virtue of human mental states (beliefs, desires, fears, hopes, etc.).
    – Candidate: “Stealing is wrong” might be true only because of widespread human condemnation.

  • Implication for morality
    • If moral predicates (wrong, permissible, obligatory) are subjective, then there may be nothing anyone ‘really’ ought to do in an objective sense.

Competing Meta-Ethical Theories

  • Moral Realism
    • Answers the opening question “Is there anything you really ought to do?” with YES.
    • Claims that at least some moral propositions are objectively true; moral properties are real and mind-independent.

  • Moral Anti-Realism
    • Says NO: no objective moral requirements exist; moral discourse is ultimately dependent on human attitudes, conventions, or emotions.

Preview of Next Lecture

  • Will supply precise statements of what moral realists and anti-realists commit to:
    • Which propositions each side must accept or deny.
  • Introduction of John Mackie’s “Argument from Queerness.”
    • Core idea: if objective moral properties existed, they would be queer (i.e., fundamentally strange, unlike any other properties we know).
    • Their strangeness (ontological & epistemological) forms a challenge to moral realism.

Key Take-Aways & Study Pointers

  • The subject–predicate truth-maker model works unproblematically for descriptive claims (physical, biological, mathematical).
  • Whether it works for moral claims hinges on whether moral predicates denote real, objective properties or merely express subjective attitudes.
  • Master the distinctions:
    • Descriptive vs normative predicates.
    • Objective vs subjective truths.
    • Realist vs anti-realist meta-ethical positions.
  • Be prepared to explain Mackie’s “queerness” objection and why it specifically targets moral realism.